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DUMOURIEZ & THE DEFENCE OF ENGLAND AGAINST NAPOLEON

Dumouriez

From an original Miniature 1792

DUMOURIEZ
AND THE DEFENCE OF ENGLAND AGAINST NAPOLEON

BY J. HOLLAND ROSE LITT. D. CANTAB.
AUTHOR OF "THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON"
ETC. AND A. M. BROADLEY JOINT-AUTHOR
OF "NAPOLEON AND THE INVASION
OF ENGLAND." ILLUSTRATED WITH NUMEROUS PORTRAITS, MAPS AND FACSIMILES



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LONDON JOHN LANE THE BODLEY HEAD
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TO

HERBERT H. RAPHAEL, M.P.

WHOSE ACHIEVEMENTS AS
THE EXTRA ILLUSTRATOR OF
THE MEMOIRS OF BARRAS
HAVE BROUGHT TOGETHER
A COLLECTION OF
ILLUSTRATIONS AND AUTOGRAPHS
OF IMMENSE VALUE TO
FUTURE STUDENTS OF NAPOLEONIC HISTORY
THIS VOLUME IS
DEDICATED BY THE AUTHORS

LONDON,
June 18th, 1908.

PREFACE

IT was after the rupture of the delusive Treaty of Amiens, and the outbreak of war between France and England on May 18, 1803, that the Great Terror reached its most acute phase. During that year and the two which followed, the problem of National Defence became of such paramount importance, that party feeling was overshadowed and almost entirely blotted out by the necessity of devising measures of protection against the peril which threatened the very existence of the country.

It was no mere question of finance or internal economy which twelve months later brought back William Pitt to power, and placed the fate of England in the hands of the capable and far-seeing statesman whose policy was destined eventually to bring about the overthrow of Napoleon. On April 11, 1804, Pitt thus wrote from Walmer to some possible supporter:—[1]

Private.

MY DEAR SIR,

I have had no opportunity lately of knowing what may be your sentiments with respect to public affairs; but, seeing that they are likely very soon to lead to an important crisis, I am sure from our long habit of acting together, and from the many proofs I have received of your friendship and good opinion, you will

[1] Hitherto unpublished letter added to British Museum Additional MSS. Collection at Sotheby Sale of November 8, 1907.

readily excuse my troubling you with this confidential letter. You will have seen from what has passed in Parliament how much I have been dissatisfied for a considerable time with many parts of the conduct of Government, particularly in the essential article of what relates to the defence of the country. The experience of the last summer and the discussions of this session confirm me in the opinion that while the Government remains in its present shape and under its present leader, nothing efficient can be expected either to originate with them or to be fairly adopted and effectually executed. With this persuasion, and thinking that a system of more energy and decision is indispensable with a view to the immediate crisis, and the many difficulties we may have to encounter in the course of the present contest, I mean to take an early opportunity of avowing and acting on these sentiments more explicitly and decidedly than I have hitherto done; and I shall endeavour to give effect to my opinion by the support of all the friends whom I can collect. My object will be to press to the utmost those points which I think essential to the public defence, and at the same time in doing so to make it, if I can, impossible for the present Government to maintain itself. In this object I have every reason to believe that I shall have the fullest concurrence of all those with whom I have the most differed on former occasions and with whom possibly I may as little agree in future. With their number added to my own more immediate friends, and to the few who have acted with Ld. Grenville and Windham, I am persuaded that our division on any favorable question will probably be such as would be sufficient to shake a much stronger Government than the present, and if a considerable strength shows itself in Parliament, I have no reason to suppose that any insuperable difficulties will arise in another quarter. Calculations of strength beforehand are necessarily uncertain; but I think at lowest our numbers cannot be much less than 200, and I should not be surprised if they were considerably more. I have thus taken the liberty of explaining to you very frankly my views and expectations. I do not feel that I have any claim to ask your concurrence and support; or to do more than to lay the subject fairly before you. If your own view of the subject coincides with mine, it will certainly be

highly gratifying to myself personally, and your weight and influence with your friends will, I have no doubt, in that case secure us a valuable accession of strength.

I am, with great regard, my dear Sir,
Faithfully and sincerely yours,
W. PITT.

A newly-discovered letter from Dumouriez to Pitt, of great importance, is given in Appendix I.

In the Public Record Office (War Office Archives) are to be found various schemes of defence, elaborated both before and after 1802, but our concern in the present volume will be chiefly with those of 1803–5. That the all-important topic greatly occupied the mind of George III, the details given in *Napoleon and the Invasion of England*[1] make sufficiently clear, and the views therein enunciated concerning the personal participation of the sovereign in every detail connected with the subject have been fully confirmed by the recovery of further portions of the correspondence which passed almost daily between George III and his son, Frederick Duke of York. On the 25th August, 1803, the latter, then Commander-in-Chief, submitted to Lord Camden, the Minister at War, a scheme of defence which will be given *in extenso* in this volume.[2] The plan in question further developed and amplified a project for which Henry Dundas[3] had been responsible some seven years before.

On the very next day (August 26, 1803) Lord Nelson in a letter to Lady Hamilton[4] says: "I have wrote to

[1] *Napoleon and the Invasion of England: the Story of the Great Terror.* 1796–1805, by H. F. B. Wheeler and A. M. Broadley. London: John Lane, 1907.

[2] See *post*, p. 232.

[3] Afterwards Viscount Melville (1802).

[4] *Lord Nelson's Letters to Lady Hamilton*, with an Introduction by Douglas Sladen, p. 83. London: The Library Press. (No date, but recent.)

Dumourier: therefore I will only trouble you to say how much I respect him. I fancy he must have suffered great distress at Altona. However, I hope he will now be comfortable for life. He is a very clever man: and beats our generals out and out. Don't they feel his coming? Advise him not to make *enemies*, by shewing he knows more than some of us. Envy knows no bounds to its persecution. He has seen the world, and will be on his guard." It is evident, therefore, that General Dumouriez, of whose capacity as a strategist Nelson had formed a high opinion, from their intercourse in Hamburg during his sojourn there[1] in October, 1800, was now in England, and engaged in some mission of a military character. It is even said that the sending for Dumouriez had been suggested by Nelson himself, either to the King or his son, the Commander-in-Chief. In any case, it is certain that the name of the victor of Jemappes was on everybody's lips, and he soon became the man of the hour. On the 20th October a writer in *The Gentleman's Magazine*, under the signature of "Sense," emphatically recommends "a dose of Dumouriez" as an unfailing antidote to Bonapartist poison;[2] exactly a week later a grand review of both Regulars and Volunteers was held by George III in Hyde Park.[3] "Amongst those who rode past the King were 'Monsieur' [the Count d'Artois, afterwards Charles X], in green with red facings, the Prince de Condé, in white faced with blue, the Duke de Bourbon, in white faced with red, and the Duke de Berri, in green. A scarcely less conspicuous figure was that of General Dumouriez." By this time Louis XVI's former Minister of the Interior and

[1] See *post*, p. 206. [2] Vol. LXXIII, part ii, p. 931.
[3] *Napoleon and the Invasion of England*, Vol. II.

Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the North had become the advisory expert of the British War Office. Copies of many portions of the elaborate work which he did in this connection are to be found in the Official Archives now in the Record Office, but the Defence Scheme (1803–4), with a supplement written in 1805, and notes on Portugal and Ireland (1807), drawn up in Dumouriez' own handwriting and arranged chronologically, has only recently come to light, and that in a wholly unexpected manner. It apparently ought to have been in the possession of the Government, as Sir John Bowring,[1] the executor of Dumouriez' will, states explicitly that the whole of his papers were purchased by the Administration in power at the time of his decease.

Some four years ago, however, a French MS. of 397 pages, bound in thick white vellum covers strengthened by a metal clasp, came into the possession of Mr. Bertram Dobell, in whose sale catalogue it was described as an "Important Military Manuscript dealing with the subject of a French Invasion of England." The book was purchased by Mr. Broadley, but it was not until the researches for the publication last year of *Napoleon and the Invasion of England* were far advanced, that its present owner became aware of its authorship and important character. It has now been ascertained, beyond the possibility of doubt, and by external as well as internal evidence, that every word of this MS. is in the handwriting of General Dumouriez, about the earlier part of whose career so much has been written, but of whose twenty years' residence in England so little is known. The Dumouriez MS. contains a great deal more than the

[1] See *post*, p. 469.

Defence Project commenced in 1803, and according to his own note terminated in May, 1804. It comprises a memoir on other attacks on England, including a very interesting account of his former plan for the capture of the Isle of Wight, originally devised in 1777, when holding the important post of *Commandant* at Cherbourg; a note on the whole invasion subject dated August, 1805; projects of defence for Ireland and Scotland; and a military essay on the defence of Portugal.

Although the great majority of Dumouriez' biographers are hostile[1] and condemn in the bitterest terms his "desertion to the enemy," it cannot be denied that his personality is one of the most remarkable of those brought into strong relief by the stirring times in which he lived. It is important to remember that he had done something more than win his spurs both as a soldier and diplomatist before the birth of Napoleon.

When that important event took place on August 15, 1769, Dumouriez, then a man of thirty,[2] was, by one of those curious coincidences in which history abounds, taking part in a French expedition in Corsica. If he ever saw Napoleon at all, it must have been as a child in arms. When Dumouriez was French Minister of Foreign Affairs (1792) Napoleon was intriguing against Paoli in Corsica as an officer of Volunteers, his commission as an officer in the French Army having legally lapsed. In April, 1793, when Dumouriez' connection with France abruptly terminated, Napoleon was still in Corsica, although he had now definitely espoused the French cause. At this time

[1] A Bibliography of Works dealing with Dumouriez will be found in an Appendix II, p. 496.

[2] He was born at Cambrai, 25 January, 1739.

Conclusion.

Au reste il est tems de couper le cheveu qui tient le glaive de Buonaparte suspendu sur l'Angleterre. Il est tems de faire cesser cet état d'anxiété qui consume dans cet empire d'immenses moyens de guerre, qui comprime l'énergie nationale, qui la laisse exposée en spectacle à l'inquiete curiosité des puissances continentales; sans amener aucun résultat utile dans déterminer la fin de cette guerre.

Rien n'est plus dangereux qu'une perpetuelle défensive. Elle ouvre un champ plus vaste aux attaques de toute espece, rapprochées, ou eloignées, de la part de l'ennemi. On veut bien croire que chaque année ajouterait un dégré de perfection, s'il n'était pas dans la nature de l'homme de décroître en Energie, lorsqu'elle a été d'abord poussée au plus haut point, alors qu'elle s'émousse par une trop longue attente.

Mais au bout du compte, quand on aurait perfectionné les mesures prises pour la sûreté de la Patrie, à quoi aboutirait cette éternelle guerre défensive, dont la longueur pourrait endormir, ou attiedir l'énergie nationale, & qui continuerait à donner à l'Empire Britannique l'attitude humiliante d'une place assiegée par une armée moins forte que sa garnison? Quelle confiance pourraient reprendre les Puissances du Continent, si ce système, qui ressemble à la peur, se prolongeait, si cet armement exagéré & ruineux ne devenait dangereux

SPECIMEN PAGE OF THE DUMOURIEZ MANUSCRIPT

In the Collection of Mr. A. M. Broadley

Dumouriez was more than fifty-four; the future conqueror of Italy and would-be invader of England had still to reach his twenty-fourth birthday. To the last day of his life Dumouriez held Napoleon in frank detestation. His attitude of uncompromising opposition to "the tyrant" characterizes all his writings both before and after his arrival in London.[1] Although his *Jugement sur Buonaparte adressé à la Nation Française et à l'Europe* first appeared anonymously, he thus wrote to the English translator, Mr. Elder:—[2]

"I own myself the author of the work you have described, and you have my permission to publish this acknowledgement, if you think it will produce any good consequence, in every City, Town, and Province throughout Europe. The genuine character of the rebel, who hath usurped the throne of my Sovereign, is very imperfectly understood. . . . He knows not where to stop the career of victory, but is the slave of an impetuous and vindictive temper, that must at length plunge him into destruction. This adventurer should be better known, and that task be mine. I have made this happy land my home, where I hope to close the evening of my life. Thus circumstanced, I will support its Monarch, and its Government, by an unremitting exercise of every faculty I possess, because I am convinced that GREAT BRITAIN is the only country that can eventually SAVE MINE." It is only fair to say that Dumouriez' anti-Bonaparte pamphlet almost wholly lacks the coarseness and violence which distinguishes nearly the whole of our contemporary literature dealing with the same subject.

[1] See *post*, p. 489.
[2] *Analysis of the Character and Conduct of Bonaparte.* 1808.

Dumouriez' severest critics, as far as his public career up to April, 1793, is concerned, are compelled to admit his courage as a soldier, his sagacity as a strategist, his shrewdness as a diplomatist, his energy as a man of action, his foresight as a statesman, and his high-mindedness in private life. Few Frenchmen of his time were endowed with greater versatility of talent or practical knowledge of nations and languages; but no sooner is the word *traître* uttered than all the rest is at once ignored and blotted out. Most French historians and biographers decline once and for all to admit the existence of extenuating circumstances in the case of Dumouriez. His going over to the enemy, even if it were to save his life, was, in their eyes, unpardonable, and therefore nothing, either before or after, must be accounted to him for righteousness. It is forgotten that Dumouriez was by no means the only Frenchman who declined to bow the knee to Bonaparte. If he erred in this matter, he sinned in company with Louis Philippe, Duke de Chartres, destined to become in 1830 King of the French.

The labours of Dumouriez in England are very remarkable; and nearly the whole of his semi-official work for the British Government is contained in the 397 pages of the volume above referred to. The writer explains frankly the difficulties and distrust which beset his path and the disadvantages under which he laboured. Nevertheless, his scheme as a whole compares very favourably with that of the Duke of York (who, as Commander-in-Chief, had the whole resources of the War Office at his disposal), completed shortly before the time that Dumouriez began his labours. We have before us a scheme for the defence of England, drawn up by a man

who had not only filled the posts of French Minister of Foreign Affairs and Commander-in-Chief, but who had won the first great victory of the Republic. A quarter of a century earlier he had superintended the extensions of what is now the most formidable arsenal of Northern France. The subject was no new one for Dumouriez, for as far back as 1778–9[1] he had elaborated, while still at Cherbourg and while the political crisis of ten years later was no more than a cloud on the horizon, a project for the capture of the Isle of Wight, for the safety of which he was now (1804) called on to provide.

In order fully to understand the importance of the rôle played in England by Dumouriez, it will be necessary to trace his early history and give some account of his wanderings between 1793 and 1803. It will also be the endeavour of the writers to reconstruct the life-story of Dumouriez between 1803 and 1823, when the "ojos endiablados" — the preternaturally dark and sparkling eyes Charles IV of Spain used to speak of—were closed for ever, and the remains of one of Cambrai's not least distinguished sons was laid to rest beneath the pavement of Henley Church. A little book entitled the *Romance of Dumouriez* deals only with the story of his marriage to the shrewish cousin disfigured by smallpox, who only turned to him when weary of conventual life, and for a time made his existence insupportable. There is, however, much that is romantic in the alternations of hope and depression which characterized Dumouriez' career while living at Gunnersbury Lodge, Acton, and Rochester House, Ealing, and dreaming of a mission to Northern Europe which should bring about the discomfiture of Napoleon, and later still of

[1] See *post*, chap. II.

French honours and a Marshal's *bâton* from the hands of Louis XVIII. In the later period of his life he beguiled many a weary day by drawing up schemes for the development of South America as a counterpoise to Napoleonic aggression and Bourbon obscurantism. In this respect he figures as the precursor of George Canning.

The termination of the first portion of Dumouriez' defence-scheme coincides with the early days of Pitt's return to power, and there can be little doubt but that many of the measures of defence now adopted originated with the French "advisory-expert to the English Ministry," as Dumouriez often described himself. That the ex-French Minister of War moved in high circles and fraternized with both English and French Royalty is abundantly shown in the unpublished correspondence to which the writers have access.

The name of Dumouriez still excites varied emotions at Cambrai, where his birthplace, refaced and to some extent transformed, has survived a decree for its demolition. The writers have received courteous and willing assistance from the Mayor of Cambrai, and Mr. J. Renaut, the able Treasurer of the "Société d'Émulation," from the instructive proceedings of which, as well as from the pages of the *Variétés Cambrésiennes*, much valuable and hitherto unpublished information has been derived. A Cambrai collector, M. Paul Delannoy, has also supplied them with a complete list of the books, broadsides, brochures, portraits, and MSS. relating to Dumouriez which he has succeeded in accumulating. The general feeling on the subject of the "organizer of victory" at Valmy and the conqueror of Jemappes entertained at Cambrai and expressed by Cambrai critics can scarcely be

described as criticism. When Dumouriez revisited the haunts of his childhood in the first flush of his military successes against the foreign invaders, the citizens welcomed him with the ringing of bells, the sounds of music, and the illumination of their house. On October 19, 1792, a martial trophy adorned the Town Hall. It bore the following inscription :—

THE TOWN OF CAMBRAI
IS PROUD OF HAVING WITNESSED
THE BIRTH OF DUMOURIEZ,
JANUARY 26, 1739.

It was very different on April 26, 1793, when a handbill was distributed broadcast informing the public that

THE TOWN OF CAMBRAI
SHUDDERS AT HAVING WITNESSED
THE BIRTH IN HER MIDST OF
THE INFAMOUS AND WICKED
DUMOURIEZ.
LET PASSERS BY SHARE THEIR HORROR.
LET ALL TRAITORS TREMBLE.

Two days before that the Communal Council had resolved that "a petition be presented to the Convention requesting permission to demolish Dumouriez' birthplace, on indemnifying the present possessor." It was at the same time decided that inscriptions like that given above be exhibited on poles in various parts of the city. On the following day (April 25) the inhabitants were called to the Town Hall by the tolling of a bell. A procession headed by a military band then set out on the errand of setting up the denunciatory pillars. "This having been accomplished," writes M. A. Durieux,[1] and patriotic verses suitable to the

[1] *Mémoires de la Société d'Émulation à Cambrai*, Vol. XLIII, p. 135.

occasion having been circulated, its citizens returned to the Place d'Armes, singing suggestively :—

"The Tarpeian Rock is close to the Capitol."

M. Godefroy Mayer of Paris, has kindly supplied the drawing of the arms of the Dumouriez family of Provence, made by M. Emile Cellérier, President of the Heraldic Institute. He has also furnished the authors with a list of all Dumouriez' portraits known to him.

His Grace the Duke of Wellington has rendered a great service to the authors by permitting them to transcribe and publish the valuable and hitherto unpublished letters written by Dumouriez to the first Duke of Wellington, which throw most interesting light on episodes of the Peninsular War and the ever-memorable events of the year 1815.

Much useful information as to the places associated with Dumouriez' long stay in England has been given by Mrs. Jackson, the authoress of *The Annals of Ealing;* by Miss Spark, the present tenant of Gunnersbury Lodge; by Miss Lyndon, Mistress of the Marylebone Charity School, now located in Rochester House, West Ealing, for many years Dumouriez' home; and by Mrs. Climenson, of the Grange, Shiplake, the writer of a valuable historic guide to Henley-on-Thames.

The authors also desire to acknowledge the assistance they have received from Mr. Hubert Hall, of the Record Office; Mr. H. H. Raphael, M.P., who has placed at their disposal some of the rare portraits in his magnificent extra-illustrated *Memoirs of Barras;* Lieut.-Gen. Sir Henry Geary, K.C.B., who has communicated to them the MS. plan for the defence of the Isle of Wight discovered by him in 1890; and Mr. George L. de St. M. Watson, who has

bestowed much care on the collation and translation of the text of the Dumouriez MS. Their thanks are also due to Colonel E. M. Lloyd, R.E., Dr. G. K. Fortescue, and Mr. William Carr, for valued advice and help.

The general story of the "Great Terror" which filled the minds of Englishmen and Englishwomen between 1796 and 1805 has been told in its broader outlines in *Napoleon and the Invasion of England*, published last year, and of which a second edition has been called for. In the preface of that book it was stated that the Dumouriez MS. would be dealt with in a separate work dealing specially with a later phase of the English National Defence against the threatened invasion of the kingdom by Napoleon. The present volume fulfils the promise, and at the same time embodies the results of much further research in the same direction. It will be for the public to judge if the estimate formed by the writers of the real position of Dumouriez in history, differing as it does from that generally entertained by French writers on the subject, is or is not justified by the MS. memoirs and letters which now see the light for the first time.

CONTENTS

PAGE

PREFACE vii

CHAPTER I

DUMOURIEZ' PARENTAGE AND EARLY CAREER (1739–77) . . . 1

CHAPTER II

DUMOURIEZ, COMMANDANT OF CHERBOURG (1778–89) 40

CHAPTER III

DUMOURIEZ' PLAN FOR THE CAPTURE OF THE ISLE OF WIGHT (1779). DON'S SCHEME FOR ITS DEFENCE IN 1798 . . 47

CHAPTER IV

DUMOURIEZ AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (1789–92) . . 66

CHAPTER V

VALMY AND JEMAPPES 109

CHAPTER VI

DUMOURIEZ AND THE JACOBINS (DECEMBER, 1792—APRIL, 1793) 145

CHAPTER VII

TEN YEARS OF EXILE (1793–1803). NELSON AND DUMOURIEZ' CALL TO ENGLAND 187

CHAPTER VIII

PROJECTS OF BRITISH NATIONAL DEFENCE (1796–1803) . . 215

CHAPTER IX

PAGE

DUMOURIEZ' GENERAL REFLECTIONS ON THE DEFENCE OF ENGLAND 240

CHAPTER X

THE DEFENCE OF THE EAST COAST FROM THE SCOTTISH BORDER TO THE THAMES AND KENT 262

CHAPTER XI

THE DEFENCE OF THE SOUTH AND SOUTH-WEST COAST FROM SUSSEX TO THE SEVERN SEA 305

CHAPTER XII

THE DEFENCE OF WALES, THE WEST COAST OF ENGLAND AND SCOTLAND 350

CHAPTER XIII

DUMOURIEZ' NOTE ON THE INVASION CRISIS OF 1805 . . 366

CHAPTER XIV

PROJECTS AND WARNINGS 379

CHAPTER XV

WELLINGTON, VANSITTART, AND DUMOURIEZ 402

CHAPTER XVI

BEFORE AND AFTER WATERLOO 430

CHAPTER XVII

DUMOURIEZ IN ENGLAND—LIFE AT GUNNERSBURY LODGE, ACTON, ROCHESTER HOUSE, LITTLE EALING, AND TURVILLE PARK, HENLEY-ON-THAMES (1803-23) 451

CHAPTER XVIII

DUMOURIEZ AND HIS CRITICS—AN APPRECIATION . . . 471

APPENDIX I

PAGE
LETTER OF DUMOURIEZ TO PITT, JUNE 1, 1804 493

APPENDIX II

BIBLIOGRAPHY 496

APPENDIX III

ICONOGRAPHY 506

APPENDIX IV

CHRONOLOGY 512

INDEX 517

ILLUSTRATIONS

Dumouriez. From an unsigned mezzotint, 1792 . . *Frontispiece*

FACING PAGE

William Pitt. From the engraving by C. Brome after W. Owen, 1799 94

Bonaparte First Consul. From a curious colour print in the Barras Collection of H. H. Raphael, Esq., M.P. 98

The Enrolment of Volunteers. The country declared to be in danger, July 11, 1792. From a painting by Vinckon 112

Dumouriez. From a rare engraving in the Barras Collection of Mr. H. H. Raphael, M.P. 114

Dumouriez about 1792. From a contemporary bust engraved by F. Dien 122

Dumouriez. From an unsigned aquatint in the collection of H. H. Raphael, Esq., M.P. 148

William Pitt. From an aquatint in colours by Alix after Hickel . 156

Caricature. Dumouriez and his Aide-de-camp on full march to seal up the papers of the Prince of Orange by order of the Convention, but prevented by Messrs. Frog and Co. Published March 13 by S. W. Fores, No. 3, Piccadilly, where may be seen a complete model of the guillotine. Admittance one shilling 184

Dumouriez dining at St. James's. Caricature by James Gillray, published March 30, 1793, by H. Humphrey 188

Facsimile of Dumouriez' first letter to Lord Nelson, dated Oltensen, near Altona, No. 43, April 20, 1801. Acquired at the Bunbury sale for the British Museum . . . . . *Page* 209

MS. Memorandum of King George III on a proposed concentration of the English troops between Dorchester and Weymouth, given by him to the Duke of York in June, 1809 220

Viscount Melville. After a picture by Sir T. Lawrence engraved by H. Meyer 228

Frederick, Duke of York, as Commander-in-chief of the British Army. After engraving of A. W. Warren after R. Corbauld, 1803 . . 232

FACING PAGE

Specimen page of the Dumouriez Manuscript. In the collection of Mr. A. M. Broadley . . . . . *Pages* xiii and 259

Napoleon Bonaparte Premier Consul. From an aquatint in colours by Levachez, 1803 380

Gunnersbury Lodge, Acton, in 1908. (The present house contains the basement and several rooms of the Lodge of 1804–1808. The grounds remain unchanged) 382

Dumouriez *cir.* 1810. From a lithograph by Delpech 402

Dumouriez. From a drawing by Craff 404

Rochester House, for many years Dumouriez' residence in West Ealing. From an old print. Reproduced by permission from Mrs. Jackson's "Annals of Ealing" 454

Dumouriez' last home, Turville Park, Henley-on-Thames, where he died March, 1823 466

MAPS

A Map of the Isle of Wight 48

The Campaign of 1792 116

Battle of Jemappes, 6 November, 1792 136

Battle of Neerwinden, 18 March, 1793 170

French Plan, showing Invasions of England up to 1798 216

A new Pocket Plan of the Cities of London and Westminster, with the Borough of Southwark. Comprehending the new buildings and other alterations to the year 1797 296

Chart of the Channel and part of the German Ocean 306

A Military Sketch of the line to defend, from Plymouth to Dover, 1777–1797 310

Map showing the Dispositions adopted for the defence of Dorset, 1798–1801 338

DUMOURIEZ & THE DEFENCE OF ENGLAND AGAINST NAPOLEON

DUMOURIEZ
AND THE DEFENCE OF ENGLAND AGAINST NAPOLEON

CHAPTER I

DUMOURIEZ' PARENTAGE AND EARLY CAREER

"Cambrai is proud of having given birth to the illustrious Dumouriez."
Proclamation of 6 November, 1792.

1739—1777

IT was on Easter Sunday (April 18th), 1677, that the victorious troops of Louis XIV took possession of the Citadel of Cambrai, captured by assault on the previous evening, and thus brought to an end the Spanish domination of eighty years. On the following morning the "Sun King" made a triumphal entry with much pomp of circumstance into the picturesque city bordering the right bank of the Scheldt, at that time regarded by contemporary strategists as almost impregnable. The final annexation of Cambrai to France was promptly celebrated by a local poet, who provided the ballad-mongers with a set of verses, one of which runs as follows:—

Mais Cambrai, le pourra-t-on croire
Dont les fortifications,
Les Tours, les fameuse Bastions
Pourroit mesme effrayer les yeux de la victoire,
Batu, vaincu, soûmis par le plus grand des Rois,
A l'honneur, aujourd'huy, de se dire François.

In 1677 the author of Telemachus, destined to become eighteen years later Cambrai's most famous archbishop, was the hard-working parish priest of St. Sulpice, one of the most historic churches of Paris, where on November 16th, 1730, Antoine François Dumouriez, claiming descent from the Dumouriez of Provence, was married to Sophie Eléonore Ernestine Patissier de Châteauneuf, who could also boast of aristocratic lineage. Half a century previously, at the very time when the songs in honour of "La campagne glorieuse et triomphante de Louys le Grand" re-echoed through the streets of Cambrai, the grandfather of the bridegroom of 1730, who also bore the name of Charles François Dumouriez, is said to have played with marked ability the valets in Molière's plays as a member of the Comédie-Française.[1] The successful actor eventually became a successful inventor, and having taken out several patents for improvements in machines for the extinction of fires, was in February, 1716, appointed Director-General of Paris fire-engines. This scarcely agrees with the assertion of another writer[2] that the great-grandfather of the victor of Jemapes, François du Périer, the representative of the younger branch of a noble family of Provence, married Anne de Moriès or du Mouriez, and having been blessed with an abnormally numerous family, the name of de Mouriez (which eventually was changed to Dumouriez) "was, for the sake of distinction, assumed by some of their children, of whom the father of General Dumouriez

[1] Count de Proyart de Baillescourt in the *Mémoires de la Société d'Émulation de Cambrai;* article, "Quelques Notes sur Dumouriez," Vol. LVIII, 1903.

[2] Article, "Dumouriez," in the *Mémoires de la Société d'Émulation de Cambrai*, Vol. XLIX, 1894, by A. de Cardevaques.

was one." According to Count de Proyart de Baillescourt, the great-grandfather of General Dumouriez, like his own father, already bore the name of Dumouriez-Dupérier. M. Godefroy Mayer of Paris has kindly supplied the writers with the accompanying illustration of the Dumouriez arms,[1] authenticated by Monsieur Emile Cellérier of the Heraldic Institute, Paris :—

About the date and place of the birth of Charles François Dumouriez there can be no possible doubt. His birthplace in the Rue du Petit-Séminaire (then known as the Rue Scachebeuvons), although refaced and otherwise changed, still exists, and now bears the number twenty-

[1] The technical description of the Dumouriez arms is as follows :—

Arms of the family Perier-Dumouriez [Brittany, Provence, Anjou], Azure, bend or, lion's head in chief of the same, langued, crowned argent, bordure dentelée gules. [International College of Heraldry, Paris.]

four. Despite the decree which doomed it to destruction in 1793, it has survived the splendid church, close by, in which Fénélon preached. In folio 86 of register 135 of the parish of St. Nicholas, Cambrai, may still be seen the entry in which it is recorded that "on January 26th, 1739, towards two o'clock in the morning, there was born and baptized the same day Charles François Dumouriez, son of Monsieur Antoine François Dumouriez, esquire, commissary and quartermaster of the department of Cambrai, and the lady Caroline Patissier de Châteauneuf, his lawful wife. The godfather was Monsieur Gilbert François Parisse de Bellebatte,[1] Canon and Provost of the cathedral church of Cambrai, and the godmother, Madame Marie Jacqueline Françoise Goville d'Oshannussy, who have signed, the father being present." After the lapse of twenty-three years, on the completion of certain legal formalities both in Paris and at Cambrai, the official entry was amended on March 23rd, 1767, by the insertion of the name Dupérier after that of Dumouriez in the case of both father and son, and the correction of the Christian name of the mother by the substitution of that of Sophie Eléonore Ernestine for that of Caroline.

The connection of Cambrai with Dumouriez was purely accidental, for his father was born in the parish of St. Sévérin, Paris, on January 4th, 1708, while his more remote forbears came from Provence. The north of France was, however, destined to play an all-important part in the life of the sickly child who first saw the light

[1] Gilbert François de Bellebat (as the name should correctly be written), the godfather of Dumouriez, became a canon of the cathedral of Cambrai just nine months before the death of Fénélon, and was appointed Provost ten years later. He was a man of some note and lived till 1744.

in the Rue Scachebeuvons in January, 1738, for Valmy is within easy reach of Cambrai, while Jemmapes across the Belgian frontier is even nearer, the three places forming a sort of irregular triangle.

Madame Dumouriez was a cousin-german of Lieutenant-General Bussy, and Charles François was the only son she bore to the commissariat officer, whose official duties called him frequently to Paris and elsewhere. Her elder daughter became abbess of Fevracques at St. Quentin, while the younger married Baron de Schomberg a Saxon officer, who died a lieutenant-general in the French service. We hear little or nothing of Madame Dumouriez in connection with the infancy and upbringing of her son. Until he attained the age of six and a half he was a helpless cripple, dragged about in a chair on wheels, with his limbs encased in irons. It was when every remedy had failed and his life was despaired of that his father entrusted him to the care of the Abbé Fontaine, a vicar-choral of the cathedral, who gave music lessons to his sisters. The abbé took him to his house, removed and threw away the heavy metal supports, and gave nature fair play. At the age of nine he restored him to the astonished commissary completely cured, and "well versed in the rudiments." A year later he was following the third course in Paris at the College Louis-le-Grand, which he quitted covered with laurels in 1752.

By this time his mother was dead, and his father, having no longer any anxiety about his son's bodily health, turned his attention seriously to the completion of his education. He had no idea of so promising a youth entering the career he himself followed with but scanty remuneration, nor was he at all inclined to sanction the

boy's own idea of becoming a Jesuit missionary. It was agreed that a year should elapse before any definite choice of a profession was made, and meanwhile he set about giving his son instruction in those modern languages which he considered most suitable for increasing his knowledge and forming his taste. As far as Italian, Spanish, Greek, and English were concerned, he was himself able to be his son's teacher, while for German the services of a competent professor were promptly secured. Charles François Dumouriez soon showed abundant signs of that linguistic skill which stood him in good stead throughout his long and chequered career. All idea of embracing the calling recommended by the good fathers at the College Louis-le-Grand was abandoned, and at the instance of one of his uncles employed at the Foreign Office he resolved to win fame as a diplomatist. By this time he had become a voracious reader, and the whole of his leisure was now devoted to the study of the laws, manners, and customs of various peoples, the relations and interests which bound one nation of Europe to another, and the intricacies of treaty-law. He became simultaneously a capable draughtsman and an expert fencer. If he could not become a diplomat, he would be an advocate, but Fate willed it that he should neither be the one nor the other.

Charles François Dumouriez was only just eighteen when the Seven Years' War broke out, and his father was attached, in the capacity of commissary and quartermaster, to the army commanded by the Prince de Soubise. Young Dumouriez being unwilling to separate himself from his parent and teacher, obtained leave to accompany him as a sort of unofficial assistant. The elder Dumouriez had long since quitted Cambrai, and it was from St

Germain that father and son set out on February 8th, 1757, for Maubeuge. The rallying point of the army was in the Duchy of Cleves. On their arrival at Wesel, Dumouriez and his son were attached to the division of the Marquis d'Armentière, who, very speedily perceiving the intelligence and enthusiasm of the latter, made him his aide-de-camp. After the battle of Hasteimbeck, the elder Dumouriez was placed in charge of the administration of a portion of Friesland, his son being associated with him in his new duties. Shortly afterwards the Duc de Broglie being directed to attack Bremen, the commissary sent his son to arrange for the collection of taxes. Young Dumouriez arrived at the very moment when an advance was in progress against the villages surrounding the town. Carried away by his ardour, he immediately joined a company of grenadiers commanded by St. Victor. After performing several feats of valour he came back, covered with contusions and with his uniform pierced by musket-balls, to carry out his mission with the Duc de Broglie, who strongly counselled his leaving the administrative service and embracing a military career. On the evacuation of Friesland he returned to St. Germain, with his father so seriously ill as to be unable any longer to control or direct his actions.

It was only after mature reflection that the younger Dumouriez resolved to follow the advice given him by the Duc de Broglie. At the end of January, 1758, without his father's sanction or knowledge, he approached Lieutenant-General de Crémilles, the head of the War Department at Versailles, under Marshal de Belle Isle, and obtained the promise of a cornet's commission in the D'Escars Dragoons. In order to justify the favour accorded him and to make himself known to the colonel

in command, he enlisted in the regiment as a simpl volunteer. Although only just nineteen, Dumouriez ha done something more than undergo his "baptism of fire." At first the commissary disapproved of the step thus taken by his son, but he ended by giving his consent. "I enter the service somewhat late," said Charles to his father, "but I shall lose no time. I swear to you that in four years I shall either have been killed or be a knight of St. Louis." Before three years had elapsed he was decorated with the much-coveted order.

Dumouriez went through the campaigns of 1759–60 At the indecisive battle of Kloster Campen (15–16 October, 1760) he continued to fight desperately after being severely wounded in several parts of his body and while suffering from a fractured thigh (caused by his horse falling on him), the loss of two fingers, and serious injuries both to his eyes and forehead from the discharge of a gun at close quarters. It was in this condition he surrendered to the Baron de Behr, aide-de-camp to the hereditary Prince Ferdinand, who saved his life and caused him to be carried to the head-quarters of the Duke of Brunswick.[1] According to one of his biographers, Dumouriez must have perished at Kloster Campen if it had not been for a copy of the *Provinciales* arresting the course of a bullet which must have otherwise pierced his heart. After his wounds had been dressed the Duke of Brunswick sent him back to the French camp with a letter recommending him for the promotion which he

[1] Prince Ferdinand eventually succeeded his uncle, under whom he had served during the Seven Years' War. We shall hear of him again in connection with the life-story of Dumouriez. He was mortally wounded at the battle of Auerstädt (October 14th, 1806), and died some four weeks later.

allantry so richly deserved. He was offered the choice f the cross or his advancement to the rank of captain. He chose the latter, saying that he hoped soon to again leserve the former. Thanks to his youth and robust constitution (there was a wide difference between the stalvart soldier of 1760 and the "ricketty child" of 1745) Dumouriez recovered his health in the course of two nonths, although a portion of the bone of his left arm ad to be removed. He rejoined his regiment, and posbly learned many useful lessons in practical warfare om the numerous disasters brought about by the rivalry tween de Soubise and de Broglie.

At the conclusion of peace, in 1763, the captain of venty-four duly received the decoration he had pledged mself to win, and was placed on the retired list with a minal pension of 600 livres by way of recompense for s wounds and services. Almost at the commencement his career he found himself without employment, and the same time without any adequate income. On his y through Pont Audemar to rejoin his regiment, artered at Saint Lô, Dumouriez visited his aunt, the dowed Marquise de Belloy. It was at Pont Audemar t the youthful hero of battles innumerable, the bearer the marks of two-and-twenty wounds, and the wearer the cross of St. Louis, was destined to find what pears to be the solitary romance of his life. The rquise de Belloy had two daughters, both goodking, amiable, and well educated. Dumouriez fell in e with the younger, who reciprocated his passion. He ked her to share his adventures and the pension of o livres, but once more the stern commissary quarterster, who was on bad terms with his sister, intervened,

and peremptorily forbade the marriage. The young lad took refuge in a convent, and the disconsolate lover attempted suicide in a hotel at Dieppe. Once again his splendid constitution saved him. The dose of opium he had taken proved ineffective, and Dumouriez sought and obtained his father's pardon.

Almost in despair the luckless captain of dragoons looked out for a patron. If all the direct roads to fortune were for the moment closed to him, he must discover an indirect one. The many-sided talents and useful qualities of Dumouriez found favour in the eyes of the celebrated Favier,[1] who strongly recommended both Louis XV and the Duc de Choiseul to employ him either in a diplomatic or military capacity. It was at this juncture that the ex-cavalry captain set out for Italy, either as a soldier of fortune or in pursuance of some secret understanding with either monarch or minister.

Few men have had more biographers than Dumouriez, but nearly the whole of them sternly decline to admit even extenuating circumstances in the case of one who undeniably ended his career as a soldier of France by "going over to the enemy."[2] Up till quite recently no kind of attempt was made to approach the subject of Dumouriez with judicial impartiality or even ordinary fairness. The exiled general probably foresaw this when he published his autobiography in Hamburg short

[1] Jean Louis Favier (1720-84), once Secretary to the Sardinian embassy. He afterwards identified himself with the policy of Monsieur d'Argenson, and later was entrusted by the Duc de Choiseul with several secret missions to Spain and Russia. He spent some years in the Bastille, but was liberated and rewarded on the accession of Louis XVI.

[2] A detailed list of works dealing with the subject will be found in the Appendix under the heading "Bibliography."

er he took up his abode in the neighbourhood of at town. In 1822 MM. Berville and Barrière repub- shed this with considerable additions under the title of *a Vie et les Mémoires du Général Dumouriez, avec des otes et des éclaircissements historiques.* The first 325 ges of the first volume deals with the career of umouriez up to the early days of January, 1778, when autograph note of Louis XVI made him commandant Cherbourg. Probably the most reliable account of umouriez which has hitherto appeared is that by Montchanin, published at Paris in 1885; but the refully prepared note of forty-three pages, contributed M. A. de Cardevaques, is, to a great extent, free from e preconceived antipathy and bias which characterizes the itings of Dumouriez' most recent critics[1] at Cambrai. Encouraged, at any rate, by certain indefinite promises m those in authority, and provided with a passport,

Dumouriez certainly receives scant justice at the hands of M. Ernest oye in the first volume of a very interesting publication entitled *Variétés ésiennes* (Cambrai, Oscar Masson, 1897). The writer even denies any credit for the victories of 1792, which, on the authority of Napoleon, attributes "to secret intrigues between the Paris Government and the my." He also pretends that Dumouriez changed the orthography of his e to suit the various political phases through which he passed. When ing to the Duc de Choiseul, September 14th, 1764, he was du Périer de ières; at Cherbourg he was Dumouriez; at Niort, Du Mouriez, and so h. In support of this theory two exceedingly curious unpublished letters given *in extenso.* One of them has already been mentioned; the other, d Cherbourg, December 21st, 1778, relates to the refusal of the church- lens to accord him a seat worthy of his official position. The latter inly speaks volumes for Dumouriez' keen sense of humour. The article ludes by asserting that if M. de Freycinet is the little white mouse, the llation of the little black mouse should be given to Dumouriez, for "he an unbeliever and anticlerical of the most pronounced type." M. Delloye evertheless constrained to agree with Michaud's statement in his *Universal graphy* that Dumouriez had more influence than any of his contemporaries ing the earlier stages of the Revolution.

Dumouriez set out to seek his fortune in Italy. letter, delivered only after his departure, informed t commissary of the step he had taken, and the latt rushed off in hot haste to Versailles to demand from t Duc de Choiseul his son's arrest on a *lettre-de-cach* Dumouriez himself gives a very picturesque account[1] the hardships he underwent before his arrival at Gen where the French minister, M. Boyer, accorded a hea welcome to the good-looking, dark-eyed adventurer four-and-twenty, who spoke Italian, sang charmingly, a made verses, but brought little with him except the pa port and the cross of St. Louis. The frivolities of Geno society soon wearied him, and he begged for the co mand of a corps of five hundred men, which the Repu proposed to send to Corsica for the relief of St. Flore then besieged by Pascal Paoli. Although supported both M. Boyer and the future Doge Lomellini, the pre ence was given to Lantieri, an old soldier, who had b captain of the Royal Corsican Regiment in the servic France.

From Genoa Dumouriez passed on to Florence a Rome, arriving finally at Leghorn. The idea of the lit war in Corsica still haunted his imagination. If he co not fight against Paoli, why should he not enlist un his banner? The Genoese had declined his services, a he was free to take the field with their adversaries. a letter addressed to Paoli he offered to join him with f retired French officers he had taken into his pay. The p posal was politely declined. Meanwhile Dumouriez made the acquaintance of Costa de Castellana, a you lieutenant of the Royal Corsican Regiment, whose fath

[1] *La Vie et les Mémoires*, Berville et Barrière, Vol. I, pp. 43–4.

night of St. Louis and a captain of grenadiers, was at t moment imprisoned in a dungeon at Corte as an my of Paoli. The powerful family to which they longed was in active sympathy with the faction, headed the brothers Abbatucci, then at war with Paoli, who, ile ostensibly allied to England, according to Dumouriez, ried on certain secret negotiations with the Duc de oiseul, represented just then in Corsica by a certain lcroisant, a lieutenant-colonel of dragoons. On the er hand, the French minister entered into *pourparlers* h Genoa to furnish him with a contingent of six talions for the purpose of garrisoning Bastia and four er Corsican towns. Costa and his followers endeavoured persuade Dumouriez to induce the Duc de Choiseul supply them with arms, ammunition, and gunboats, condition that after the defeat of Paoli was accom-hed the country should be ceded to France. The posal was declined on the ground that the French ernment could not, at the end of a disastrous war, ark on a project which must evidently disturb the dly relations then existing with both England and oa.

umouriez told the chiefs of the Costa de Castellana, ani, and Abbatucci party that if they once succeeded vercoming the followers of Paoli, he might be able to the Duc de Choiseul for such assistance as he could er without formally acknowledging their independence. idea was received with enthusiasm, and the emis-es obtained the written adhesion of no less than twenty-r heads of parishes.[1] Costa set out for Moriani, and mouriez, with five retired officers, chartered a French

[1] The nearest equivalent to the word *pieves* used in the original.

coasting-boat and sailed for Porto Vecchio. In the pl
of the new republic of Corsica which he had elaborat
Dumouriez stipulated for a substantial reward, as well
for the supreme command of the army. Having land
without experiencing resistance he had an interview wi
one of the brothers Abbatucci, who was defending t
Pass of Bocognano against the troops of Paoli. Th
came to terms as to the future of the projected republ
and Dumouriez drew a hasty sketch of certain entrenc
ments which ought to be made immediately. The negl
to follow the advice proffered cost Abbatucci his life, a
gave Paoli possession of the defile. Dumouriez return
to Sartenne, where some three thousand men assembl
with the view of laying siege to Bonifacio, but a few cann
shots from the ships put the Corsicans to flight. Bef
re-embarking Dumouriez had made many valuable
servations, and impressed on the inhabitants the necess
for cutting a good road through the forest from Sarte
to Porto Vecchio.

On anchoring off Ajaccio Dumouriez ascertained
a plot was in progress for obtaining possession of
citadel. He advised the conspirators to stay their h
until they heard from him, and immediately set out
France. Thirty-three days later the ship arrived at M
seilles without masts and only kept afloat with the grea
difficulty. If they had not fortunately met with a N
politan boat, Dumouriez and everybody on board m
inevitably have died of starvation. He now learned t
the treaty between France and Genoa had been signed, a
that Major-General Count de Marbœuf was to comma
the six battalions destined for the six places which Fra
undertook to protect.

Undaunted by the news, Dumouriez approached the brated Roux de Corse, the rich owner of privateers, o less than ten years before had waged war against gland with his own ships, and placed before him the morandum he had drawn up concerning the future of rsica. Roux de Corse threw himself heart and soul o the project, hoping to recoup his outlay from the ber he could bring from Porto Vecchio. Not a moment s to be lost, and, having pawned his watch and clothes provide money for the five officers still in his pay, mouriez set out in hot haste for Paris, where he found questions of Corsica and the Corsican army were ex- ng universal interest amongst the courtiers from the mtesse du Barry and the Duchesse de Grammont down he chambermaids at Versailles. The next day he was seted with the Duc de Choiseul, who began to regret ing so precipitately signed the treaty with Genoa.

The minister was evidently much captivated by the eme of a Corsican Republic with strong leanings rds France, but feared it was too late. Dumouriez mptly placed two alternative plans of action before the ister, who promised to consider them, enjoining the ctest secrecy. The partisans of the Genoese compact the Corsican army, however, proved too strong for mouriez, whose only friend, Favier, was, in this matter, a ler in the enemy's camp. The Duc de Choiseul at a lic audience called him an adventurer, and twitted him having entered into negotiations with the Corsicans hout either order or permission. In despair he set out for eims. At his request Favier sent on his portmanteau Mons. It contained only his uniform, a great coat, a shirts and handkerchiefs, sundry pairs of silk stockings,

and a copy of Horace. In one of the pockets his protec
put ten louis, wrapped up in a ribbon of the Orde
St. Louis. From Mons in November, 1763, he wrote
submissive letter to the Duc de Choiseul, in which h
accepted all the blame for the scene in the galleries
Versailles. He asked only for a passport in a letter
recommendation to the French ambassador in Spa
With this missive, however, he forwarded another elabora
memorandum on Corsican affairs, beginning with t
assertion that "The treaty with Genoa must necessar
entail within a few years a war against Paoli." Fr
Mons he also wrote to his father explaining all that h
taken place, and asking him to discharge a debt he h
incurred at Leghorn. For his information he sent him
copy of the letter and memorandum he had addressed
the minister he had unwittingly offended. The une
pected happened. The Duc de Choiseul addressed so
friendly and complimentary words to the much-perplex
ex-commissary quartermaster, and at the end of the we
a bulky packet reached Dumouriez containing a le
from the duke, a certificate of noble birth, a permiss
from the King to take service in Spain, commendat
letters to the Marquis Grimaldi and the French amb
sador, a touching and affectionate epistle from his fath
and a bill of exchange for fifty louis. In excellent spi
Dumouriez wrote to his cousin in her convent and turn
his face towards the Pyrenees, where more roma
adventures and useful experience awaited him.

It is impossible within the limits of this brief ske
to give any detailed account of the year spent
Dumouriez in Spain and Portugal. In the early da
of 1764 he was cordially welcomed to Madrid by t

, who, in due course presented him at
of Charles III, at which the good-looking
ptain with his wounds, ready wit, natural gaiety,
shing dark eyes, soon became a *persona gratissima.*
French ambassador prophesied he would return to
ris a full-blown colonel. Dumouriez found time to
nder over a great part of Spain with his eyes open,
d his earliest published literary effort, entitled *Essai*
l'Espagne, afforded abundant evidence of that extra-
inary power of observation which forty years later
od him in good stead. At Madrid he fought one of
few duels he was ever engaged in, his discomfited
ersary being a Prussian officer who had ridiculed
pretensions of Spain to be regarded seriously as a
itime power. During the absence of Dumouriez in
Peninsula his cousin took the veil in the Convent
he Nursing Sisters at Bayeux. Partly by way of
raction, and partly in consequence of suggestions
e to him in high quarters, Dumouriez now set out
a voyage of discovery in Portugal, furnished with
nt letters of introduction from the representatives
oth England and France. From Lisbon he pushed
o the banks of the Coa, once more entering Spain
Almeida by way of Coimbra, then following the right
of the Tagus, so as to explore thoroughly the whole
e frontier districts. Arriving once more at Lisbon
e route which passes through Estremos and Armada,
esented himself to M. de St. Priest, the French
ssador at the Portuguese Court, and forwarded
al large packets of notes and statistics to M. d'Ossun,
felt a little nervous as to the outcome of the adven-
In an incredibly short space of time Dumouriez

prepared an elaborate scheme both for
defence of Portugal, of which a summary is
in the MS. volume which has accidentally co
in London.[1]

Being regarded with some suspicion both in Portu
and French circles, Dumouriez chiefly frequented
houses of the English residents at Lisbon, while work
night and day on the work eventually published
Lausanne under the title of *The Actual Condition of*
Kingdom of Portugal in the Year 1766, which, des
certain errors attributable to haste, affords strik
proof of the author's extraordinary powers of resea
and his singular skill in dealing with complicated statist
The book has now become comparatively rare. Fift
days after his return to Madrid Dumouriez presente
the Marquis d'Ossun duplicate copies of the mem
entitled *System of Attack and Defence of Portugal*, acc
panied by a map on a large scale of the course of
Tagus, on which both the marches of troops and
encampments were indicated. The Duc de Choiseul
orders that the note prepared by Dumouriez shoul
submitted to the King of Spain, who at once appoi
a commission for its examination. While waiting
events in Madrid Dumouriez is said to have paid
attention to Mdlle. Marquet, the daughter of the
architect, for whose edification he compiled two little
volumes, entitled *Lessons in Geography* and *Lesso*
History and Philosophy. Almost the whole of the
1767 was spent agreeably enough in Spain, but Dumo

[1] See Introduction, *et post*, Appendix II.

[2] Wellington used this work during the Peninsular War, but critic
as inaccurate in certain details. See Earl Stanhope, *Notes of Convers*
p. 70.

mained without the definite career he was always rch of. His father bitterly resented his desire to in Spain, and during his absence his elder sister e Abbess of Fevracques, while the younger espoused aron de Schomberg. Meanwhile all he had pre- in his interview with the Duc de Choiseul as to the of Corsica had taken place. The minister found lf the dupe alternately of Paoli and the Genoese, n May, 1768, Europe learned with surprise that a y had been concluded between France and Genoa, in e of which the island was finally ceded to the former. accomplish this secrecy, caution and patience were ssary, and while the idea was still in embryo ouriez' dust-stained memoir of November, 1763,[1] once more extracted from its pigeon hole, and the e minister, now preoccupied with a scheme for the xation of Corsica, once more thought of the clever egist then wasting his time at Madrid.

mouriez was recalled. He swore fidelity to Mdlle. uet, who told him "to follow his fate and only regard s his best friend," and set out with his habitual ptitude for Paris, where his father had now finally

e long letter of Dumouriez to the Duc de Choiseul, published in the *Cambresiennes* [see *ante*, p. 11], is dated Versailles, 14th Sep- 1764, after the return of Dumouriez from his first visit to Corsica. h exceedingly witty it has no great historical importance, but it me doubt on the piquant details of his supposed encounter with the after the success of the palace intrigue against his Corsican scheme. e writer expresses a wish to enter the navy or serve as a lieutenant- in Poland, Cayenne, or the island of Bourbon. He implores the n of the minister in the humblest terms, and says that he awaits a the Hôtel d'Angleterre, Rue de Colombier, Paris. The letter is 'Du Périer de Mouriès." If Dumouriez had become a naval officer, n might possibly have had the one heaven-born admiral he wanted, r found.

taken up his abode. Before the last days of 1767 th
de Choiseul informed him that the King had sanctio
appointment as assistant-brigadier of the Corsican
ditionary force under the command of the Marq
Chauvelin, and that he was to immediately prepare
departure. The duke not only gave him 18,000 li
compensation for his four years' pension and the s
he had rendered in Portugal, but very graciously ma
amende honorable for the affront he had received four
previously.

It was late May, 1768, that Dumouriez set out
Corsica. There is in the MS. collection of the Ea
Crawford and Balcarres an unpublished letter of Du
riez to the Duc de Choiseul dated "Versailles, Ma
1768." In substance it runs as follows:—

"It is not from want of respect to the Duc de Cho
that the writer did not ask to be sent to Corsica.
awaits the orders of Monseigneur. Having some deb
Versailles, he begs him to glance at the enclosed [pro
a memoir of his services and sums due to him]."

His nomination must have soon followed, for before th
of the month he was at Lyons awaiting the arrival
general, and when at last Toulon was reached nothin
ready. Although new to the work he superintende
embarkation of almost an entire legion. At th
moment he received a packet containing private ir
tions from the minister, who confided to him the t
conveying to the Papal States the whole of a colo
Spanish Jesuits established in Corsica only two
before. This was managed so expeditiously tha
September 1st he reached Bastia, where he was co

comed by the Marquis de Chauvelin, whose last military vice dated as far back as 1741. A quarter of a century t in foreign embassies or amongst the luxury and dis- tion of Versailles was a bad preparation for the Cor- n campaign. The shortcomings of de Chauvelin were n realized by Lieutenant-General the Count de Marbœuf, o had vainly hoped for the supreme command, and now le up his mind to thwart as much as possible the opera- s of his chief, who counted very much on the aid and ce of Dumouriez. In his autobiography Dumouriez at considerable length the story of the manœuvres in h he played so important a part. The greater part of Chauvelin's officers, recruited as a rule from the den youth" of Versailles, made the fatal mistake of sing their enemies, the ragged, untrained, badly d peasants, with whom they longed to come to close ers.

mouriez advocated prudence and diplomacy. He that a powerful faction was in reality opposed to and that it might without great difficulty be hed from him, and even induced to take the field on ther side. His counsel was unanimously rejected. was even a whisper of cowardice. This was at once d by the conspicuous gallantry displayed by uriez in the first success achieved, which was both t and decisive. M. de Chauvelin changed his n, and M. Delille, of the commissariat (who shared uriez' ideas), was sent to Paris to place the new plan paign before the minister. It was approved, and returned to Corsica before the end of November. while some reverses had overtaken the French arms, undisguised joy of Monsieur de Marbœuf, who, on

de Chauvelin falling ill, obtained the command *ad inter*
He at once proposed that, in view of the critical state
affairs, Paoli should be asked to agree to an armistic
measure which was at once stoutly combated
Dumouriez, who had been requested by de Chauveli
continue his negotiations for the subventioning of
Corsicans opposed to the pretensions of the leader
alliance with England. He was loyally supported
de Narbonne, but the views of de Marbœuf prevailed,
four days later there was a cessation of hostilities.

On arriving at Calvi Dumouriez reported all that
occurred both to the minister at Paris and to M. de C
velin. He also informed Paoli that, although the armi
was binding on him as a French officer, he should cont
to oppose him at the head of the Corsicans, with who
had entered into personal engagements, and who wer
included in the terms of the understanding arrived a

In January, 1769, he led a desperate attempt to sur
the port of Isola Rossa, but his design had been bet
to Paoli. He managed nevertheless to effect his retr
Calvi, and a few days later captured an important po
on the western coast of the island. Meanwhile M
Marbœuf was describing him in his official corres
ence with Paris as "a dangerous madman." A few
later three officers of the same rank as himself wer
moted to the grade of colonel, and Dumouriez re
disdainfully the lieutenant-colonel's commission
had been sent to him. He proffered his resignatic
it was refused, and M. de Marbœuf's brief triump
embittered by a general conspiracy on the part
Corsicans, who took advantage of the armistice to
plans for the massacre of the whole French army.

The situation in Corsica seriously compromised the
y of France in the eyes of Europe, and twenty fresh
talions were, early in 1769 (the year of Napoleon's
rth), added to the twenty-two already in the field. The
uc de Choiseul was determined to press matters to a
nclusion, and the supreme command was entrusted to
ieutenant-General Count de Vaux, of whom Dumouriez,
er the lapse of nearly forty years, speaks appreciatively
the MS. he compiled in England. The appointment
the time excited widespread dissatisfaction, and even
mouriez regretted that his friend M. de Chauvelin had
n denied the opportunity of retrieving his disasters.
e Corsicans, who had experienced the ability and
terity of M. de Vaux, were terror-struck, for he had
e through the Corsican campaign which signalized the
r of Dumouriez's birth. He still bore the marks of
ound which he had received from the hand of a
sican peasant. Thirty years after he succeeded in
ntifying his assailant. The man thought himself lost,
prepared for death, but de Vaux gave him a hand-
e present and took charge of his family. The generous
se he pursued had a great effect on the minds of
Corsicans.

was in the spring of this most eventful year that
nt de Vaux disembarked at St. Florent. In his
ess to the Staff he expressed the King's entire
oval of the action of Dumouriez. Six weeks after he
promoted to the rank of colonel. The whole of Paoli's
s were concentrated on the plateau surrounding
ined mosque, now known as St. Peter's Chapel, after
rously defending the bridge at Golo and the village of
, successfully carried by the French troops. For an

act of daring, accomplished either without the orders
Count de Vaux or through a misunderstanding of
instructions, Dumouriez was placed under arrest, althou
he had succeeded in occupying St. Peter's Chapel, th
centre of a position of quite exceptional importance. H
afterwards fully justified his conduct, and at the sack
the castle of Corte he received one hundred volume
from Paoli's[1] library. With the capture of Corte t
flickering flame of resistance died out. Two mon
previously he had received the news of his father's dea
but it was only after the intelligence of Paoli's depart
for England reached the camp at Bogognano that he
justified in taking advantage of the permission accor
him by the general to proceed to France for the purp
of settling with his sister the affairs of the decea
commissary. The war was at an end, and Corsica ef
tively annexed to France, when Dumouriez took ship
Marseilles at Bastia. A fortnight previously Napol
Bonaparte had been born at Ajaccio. In his a
biography of 1794 Dumouriez denounces the conques
Corsica as a crying injustice, and speaks with enthusi
of the valour of Paoli's peasant soldiers at Ponte Nu
He could never forgive the Duc de Choiseul for ha
thrown over in 1763 and 1764 his own schemes for a
of moral suzerainty which France could have obta
by assisting the Corsicans to free themselves from
yoke of Genoa and Paoli, but at the close of the camp
of 1768–9 Dumouriez' connection with Corsica and
destinies came once and for all to an end.

[1] The story of Pascal Paoli, almost as romantic as that of Dumouri
beyond the scope of this volume. Frederick the Great called him "th
Captain of Europe." Both Paoli and Dumouriez lie in English graves.

On arriving at Compiègne he found the old King completely under the domination of the Comtesse du Barry, of whose evil influence he speaks in unmeasured terms of reprobation in his autobiography. "Cette coquine là me donne bien de l'embarras," whispered the Duc de Choiseul to the newly-made colonel, in whom the all-powerful royal mistress at once recognized an enemy to be crushed at all costs. In the society of men like Favier, the younger Crébillon, Guibert, and Collé, Dumouriez spent the winter of 1769–70 very pleasantly at Paris. It was this juncture that his intimacy with the Comte de Broglie, which was to exercise so powerful an influence on his fortunes, first began. In the age of tortuous intrigue which produced the Chevalier d'Éon, de Broglie maintained a high reputation for probity and straightforwardness. Louis XV, the weakest and most perfidious of sovereigns, fully recognized his ability, but fearing the strength of his character, confined his favours to maintaining a secret correspondence with him, every trace of which he endeavoured to destroy.

At the commencement of 1770 the idea of sending Dumouriez to Poland first occurred to the Duc de Choiseul. He was anxious to obtain correct information as to all that was going on in that distressful country, now rapidly becoming the shuttlecock of European diplomacy, before adopting a policy which would entail no inconvenient foreign complications. During three months Dumouriez ransacked the archives of the French Foreign Office for papers relating to the affairs of Poland, ever since the election of Poniatowski to the throne six years previously. At the same time he perused with avidity every book he could

find in the royal library or elsewhere dealing v
Polish history. He induced the Duc de Choiseul to encourage the publication of the Polish atlas of Rizzi-Zannoni, and sought advice of every one who had had practical experience of Polish affairs, or had made the condition of Poland a subject of study, including the Comte de Broglie and the Abbé de Mably. Once more he vainly approached his fair cousin, now immured within the walls of a convent.

The Duc de Choiseul had brought about a clos
alliance between the courts of Paris and Vienna, wh
he hoped to strengthen by the union of the yo
Dauphin to Marie-Antoinette, one of the many daught
of the illustrious Maria Theresa. As events prov
the match arranged with so much adroit wire-pull
ultimately contributed to the minister's downfall.
order to avoid the inevitable distractions of the marri
fêtes, Dumouriez rented a house at Meudon, wh
aided by a friend, the Chevalier de Taules, he
sued his Polish researches without interruption.
length he reduced the results of his three months' w
into a memoir of twenty pages. According to
conclusions he had arrived at, French influence m
be directed to the transformation into a single b
of the various independent Polish confederations,
views and interests of which were frequently diver
If this was satisfactorily accomplished, he counselled
encouragement of the national cause by a money sub
and the sending to Poland of a contingent of offi
engineers, and artillerymen, on the condition that reg
manœuvres should be carried out in conjunction with
Turkish army in Moldavia. He proposed that a tr

thy agent should be dispatched to Poland forthwith, but without the power of carrying out the scheme proposed. The condition of things should be further studied on the spot.

As might be expected, the choice of the minister fell on Dumouriez, who was granted 12,000 livres for his travelling expenses and a monthly salary of 3000. The plan of Dumouriez was fully approved by Count Wielhorski, who arrived in Paris to represent unofficially the Polish Confederation[1] at the French Court. It was proposed that the general assembly of the various associations, so far as its legislative and administrative functions were concerned, should take place at Eperies, in Upper Hungary, in order to obviate the possibility of any interruption on the part of the Russian troops. In July, 1770, Dumouriez set out for his new sphere of activity.

Before leaving Paris Dumouriez had a long and confidential interview with the minister, who revealed to him several particulars relating to the secret policy of France. Amongst other things he informed him that La Rozière, able staff officer, was elaborating with the assistance the Comte de Broglie a scheme for the invasion of England at that moment embroiled with Spain. The command of the projected expedition was tentatively promised either to de Broglie or his brother. Dumouriez perceived that it had become necessary for the minister to involve France in a war for the purpose of countering the influence of the Duc d'Aiguillon and Chancellor Maupeou, who had lately gained the favour of the King.

[1] Confédération de Bar. This was formed in 1768 by a large number of nobles in South Poland, to uphold the national independence then threatened by Russia.

Dumouriez promised to be back in a month, and in tak leave earnestly asked the minister to employ him in the projected expedition against England. Dumouriez and the Duc de Choiseul never met again.

Breaking his journey at Munich and Vienna, it was only at the end of August that he arrived at Eperies, where the prevailing corruption and conflict of interests presented almost insurmountable difficulties. The outlook from a military point of view was equally discouraging, and the only commanding officer of real merit, General Zaremba, was supposed to have a secret understandin with the King of Prussia. The whole available for amounted to less than 17,000 badly mounted troope under ten independent leaders, without any preconcert plan of action, and notoriously jealous and suspicious each other. Fortifications, artillery, and infantry w altogether wanting. The situation seemed despera when Dumouriez found a powerful ally in the Counte de Mniezeck, whom he compares to Armida, but Armi without the heroes of Tasso. The able daughter of t celebrated Count de Bruhl not only aroused Dumouri enthusiasm, but succeeded in reconciling many of conflicting interests which were proving an insurmou able obstacle to the practical realization of his plans.

Under her auspices the project he had elaborated accepted by the Confederation, and steps were at o taken to put it in execution. It is impossible to g the details of all the negotiations which ensued, but September he was able to ask the Duc de Choiseul to ma arrangements for the payment of a monthly subsidy 60,000 livres dating from August 1st. Dumouriez imm diately began to select suitable military positions, a

steps for the formation of corps of artillery and infantry. He urgently requested that a number of competent officers should be sent to him, but his demands were only partially complied with. A success obtained by his troops over a Russian detachment commanded by Suwarrow, who attacked one of the strongholds he had fortified, materially stimulated the courage of the Poles, and Dumouriez continued to increase his infantry, and make large purchases of guns both in Silesia and Hungary. He hoped in the course of 1771 to be able to take the field in considerable force, and asked the minister to send him more money and arms. All proceeded well, and the changed aspect of Polish affairs would probably have produced the general war contemplated by the minister if it had not been for the peace intrigue adroitly carried out by the implacable Du Barry and Chancellor Maupeou, which on Christmas Eve caused the dismissal and banishment from Court of Duc de Choiseul and de Praslin. Dumouriez had successfully overcome the greater part of the difficulties which beset him, and his projects were actually on the point of realization when everything was arrested by the events of December 24th, 1770, at Versailles.

The untoward intelligence reached Dumouriez on January 8th, 1771. He immediately felt that all his schemes for the unification of Poland must be abandoned, and the best opportunity of his life was lost. The Duc d'Aiguillon, while pretending to acquiesce in what had been done, determined to sacrifice the agent and thus throw discredit upon on the choice and the policy of his disgraced predecessor. He wrote a specious letter to Dumouriez, full of the most fulsome praises, in which he declared that the

change of ministry would in no sense affect the s
taken for the confederation of Poland, and entreated hi
in no way to relax his efforts.

Dumouriez was not destined to remain long in a fool's paradise. Summoned to Vienna by his friend, the French Ambassador Durand, he saw with his own eyes the dispatch in which d'Aiguillon denounced his projects as wild dreams. In the hope of enlightening the minister he drew up a short statement entitled "Précis of Polish Affairs," which he unfortunately sent to M. Linguet, whom he erroneously thought to be in the confidence of th Duke. The memorandum was duly delivered, but t foreign minister curtly refused either to accept his resig tion or to send a commissary to regulate all financ questions between Dumouriez and the Government.

In the meantime Dumouriez' refusal to pay certain p sions and subsidies had made him unpopular with seve members of the Confederation. He preferred to dev all the funds available to the purchase of arms and increase of the efficiency of the army. Nevertheless determined to fulfil the promise he had made of join the Polish army in April, leaving his cousin, M. Châte neuf, who had acted with much tact and ability as secretary, in charge at Eperies. The strategic abilit Dumouriez which Napoleon, when at St. Helena, affe to belittle, was certainly displayed in a very mar degree in the events which rapidly ensued. Nothing remained in possession of the Russians to the right of Vistula, but the successes achieved before Cracow c pletely turned the heads of the Poles, who began to t the inhabitants in a manner which convinced Dumou that the triumph of April 29th and the following d

d not be lasting. The news from Eperies was of a ost disquieting nature. Suspicion had taken the place of confidence, and many of the Confederates saw clearly that an entire change of front was meditated. Towards the end of June the obstinacy of Pulawski and other errors on the part of the leaders acting under the orders of Dumouriez enabled Suwarrow not only to regain all the ground he had lost, but to inflict a signal defeat on the troops of the Confederacy. Dumouriez at once realized e hopelessness of the position, and informed the delegates Eperies of his determination to take no further action il his successor arrived. In vain they sent deputations ntreat him to reconsider his decision. He told them sk the Duc d'Aiguillon and M. Durand "not to help n, for that was hopeless, but to make peace for them if ere possible." Pulawski was ready to ask pardon in humblest terms. He returned, it is true, to Eperies, but as only not to give the Court of Warsaw the triumph he rupture. In spite of their manifold shortcomings weaknesses, Dumouriez could not help sympathizing the unfortunate Poles. After the rout at Landscron, ouriez had advised the Countess Mniszeck, the Count ac, and others associated with them, to make their with the Court of Warsaw, or to obtain the pro- n of St. Petersburg, Berlin, or Vienna.

neral the Baron de Viomesnil,[1] a man of considerable y and unimpeachable personal character, was ap- ed as Dumouriez' successor in Poland. A great on of his instructions consisted of a formidable attack on the policy and the proceedings of his predecessor. ned of what he might anticipate by a Foreign Office

[1] One of the victims of August 10th, 1792.

employé, whose enthusiasm for the cause of Polish li enlisted his active sympathy on the side of Dumouriez, t latter was able to arrange for the transmission of the documents necessary for his justification to a place of safety in France.[1] Within a few weeks of his arrival Viomesnil realized the actual state of affairs, and the gross injustice of which Dumouriez had been the victim. They promptly came to a complete understanding, which paved the way to a friendship based on mutual esteem. Viomesnil lost n time in informing the Duc d'Aiguillon of the excellence Dumouriez' plans, the carrying out of which would, in opinion, have paved the way to success.

It was in January, 1772, that Dumouriez arrived in P accompanied by his aide-de-camp, Captain Count de Sé They had visited in the course of their homeward jou the battlefields of Frederick the Great in Bohemia, halted for a short time at Dresden, Leipsic, and Frank Dumouriez had also spent a few days with his sister, Abbess of Fevracques. His interview at Versailles the Duc d'Aiguillon was a stormy one. The Ministe braided him for devising plans too grandiose for execu and "insulting a representative assembly of noble P "You are a creature of de Choiseul," said d'Aigu "I am a creature of God and my sword," replied Du riez, whose imperturbability provoked threats of the Ba and condign punishment. The War Minister was sca less frigid than the head of the Foreign Office, but fortun for Dumouriez the one cordially detested the other, an

[1] The bearer of Dumouriez' papers was his cousin and secretar Châteauneuf. They are supposed to have disappeared during the Revo along with his *Memoirs on Poland* and *Notes on Hungary*. The edit the biography of 1822 express a hope that they may one day come to amongst the royal archives.

raced emissary to Poland not only obtained his arrears of salary but was attached to the Lorraine Legion, commanded by the brother of Viomesnil. Louis XV listened with glee to the story of the passage of arms at Versailles. He also secretly disliked his Minister of Foreign Affairs, but he preferred his evident incapacity to the awe-inspiring superiority of de Choiseul.

The year 1772 was passed between Paris and Versailles, Dumouriez as a supernumerary officer being exempt from active service. He devoted his leisure to drawing up a ractical handbook on light troops for the guidance of icers, which proved of much practical utility. He next ned his attention to military hygiene and the Army dical Department, seeking in vain to overcome a moun- of prejudice and obsolete ideas. He also made lyses for the War Office of his more copious notes on military condition of Portugal, Spain, Prussia, Russia, Austria. Louis the Well Beloved accepted a copy of ttle work drawn up for the War Minister Monteynard tled *Tableau Spéculatif de l'Europe*, and before the r was out he was engaged with two collaborators, one of n being Delille, formerly a commissariat officer in Cor- in drawing up a work on States-General.

wedish affairs now began to excite interest in France, Louis XV was supposed to have exercised some terious influence over Gustavus III, when the latter, August, 1772, carried out the bloodless revolution h changed the form of government. French troops urgently asked for at Stockholm, but their convey- thither, without endangering a rupture with Eng- , was a problem of considerable difficulty. Dumouriez orated a plan acceptable alike to the King and the

War Office, and he was told to set out for Ham
"I don't want d'Aiguillon to know anything of t
mission," said the most double-dealing of sovereigns.

Dumouriez knew his danger and hesitated. That very evening he was in the presence of the King, who said, "Go to Hamburg and carry out the orders of Monteynard." Without waiting for a reply, he disappeared. It was in June, 1773, provided with a letter of instructions, a passport, a code of cipher, and a well-filled purse that Dumouriez set out for Hamburg. Before he arrived the two Swedish factions of the "hats" and the "caps had settled their differences, and his mission was virtua over. From the very moment he set foot in Hamburg was surrounded by the spies of the Duc d'Aiguillon, and correspondence was submitted to the closest scrutiny. made arrangements with his friend Guibert for a tri Berlin, where he hoped to see Frederick the Great face to f In October, two days before the date fixed for his depart he was arrested in his bed by French police agents, and fore the month was ended he was a prisoner in the Bas

Within eight-and-forty hours of his arrival Dumou was on the best possible terms with his jailers. He left behind him many piquant reminiscences of his tention which must be passed over with regret. As r be expected he made good use of the first period o leisure which had come to him during the thirty-four of his eventful life.

He made a careful study of the inscriptions he traced on the walls of his quarters. He discovered v traces of such notable predecessors in misfortune as (who had recorded his sufferings in English), La donnaye, the Duc de Courlande, Charles de Biren,

halotais. Beneath a psalm paraphrased by the latter he wrote:—

> N'adresse point au ciel une plainte importune,
> Et'quel que soit le cours de ton sort incertain,
> Apprends de moi que l'infortune
> Est le creuset du genre humain.[1]

Travel, history, military tactics, and philosophy in turn afforded abundant occupation to the prisoner in the Bastille. At last the Duc de Soubise intervened, and nobody could assign any definite reason for the fate which d befallen him. The King declared he was a good er, and the complaisant d'Aiguillon, if he had dared, ld probably have thrown the blame on Madame du ry. At the end of three months he was to return to e employment. Meanwhile Louis XV willed that he ld take up his abode in the castle of Caen, the man town which more than half a century later me the scene of the banishment, last illness, and h of Beau Brummell.

so happened that the Lorraine Legion was just then ered close by at Falaise. He became the guest of the rs, and gave them the full benefit of his "instruction ght troops." By a fortunate chance his cousin, the heart of his earliest affections, was an inmate of a nt at Caen. An attack of small-pox hopelessly d her beauty, and she probably owed her life to the and assiduous attention of her former lover. Their d fortunes afforded but a scanty income, but the old g of affection revived, and without much difficulty

[1] xteen years later, when commandant at Cherbourg, he gave the Comte is (afterwards Charles X) a copy of this very verse, to a certain extent hetic one.

Mdlle. de Broissy could be absolved from her v
Before she was entirely convalescent Louis the Well
Beloved died, and the royal *lettre-de-cachet*, which justified
Dumouriez' nominal imprisonment, immediately became
invalid. His enemy, the once omnipotent Du Barry,
was powerless to do him any further harm. On Sep-
tember 13th, 1774, having obtained all the necessary dis-
pensations, Dumouriez married his cousin at St. Audemer,
and the young couple began life at St. Quentin under
the auspices of the Abbess of Fauvrac. To pay the
expenses of the nuptial ceremony Dumouriez sacrificed
five thousand volumes of his beloved library. One h
little more of Madame Dumouriez, who, on all hand
agreed to have been not only jealous and intolerant, b
hypochondriac, who never recovered the loss of her
children almost at the moment of their birth. She
quarrelled with his abbess sister-in-law, and settled d
in a country house near Rouen, where, despite her p
and charity, she succeeded in making everybody a
her profoundly miserable. In 1788 the ill-assorted
finally separated, and three years later Madame Dumo
became the inmate of a Paris convent. She sur
however, for some years, dying in the early days
Empire, while Dumouriez was in England.

In 1775 Baron de Pirch introduced into Fra
system of military manœuvres based on a Pr
model. At a time when the Great Frederick wa
object of universal admiration they were adopted wi
hesitation, and Dumouriez was chosen as one of the

[1] The marriage of the colonel of the Lorraine Legion and his
afforded the subject of a work, entitled *Le Roman de Dumouriez*, b
Welschinger.

y colonels appointed under the new system. While Paris a deputation from Artois approached the war minister (du Muy) to oppose a scheme for the straightening of the Lys. The subject greatly interested M. du Muy, who had been commander-in-chief in Flanders. As the result of a conference with Dumouriez, the latter was directed to proceed to Lille, not only to study the Pirch manœuvres, but to inquire on the spot into the validity of the objections raised by the States of Artois to the rectification of the course of the Lys proposed by M. Bouillard. Dumouriez carried out the mission confided im with the greatest care, and the minister (who died tly afterwards) ordered the suspension of the proed works.

he next mission entrusted to Dumouriez was the mination of M. de Maillebois' plan for the creation of ilitary post at Ambleteuse, of which we shall hear n nearly thirty years later in connection with Napo's threatened invasion of England. In 1776 he was moned to Paris and appointed Royal Commissioner, njunction with the Chevalier d'Oisy and M. de la ère, for the purpose of inquiring into the most connt locality and best means of forming a military e on the shores of the Channel. The Chevalier y died before the task was commenced. In the n of Brigadier de la Rozière, Dumouriez found a -worker worthy of his own natural ability and intable energy. They finally fixed on Boulogne in rence to Ambleteuse, and there proposed to estabn arsenal for twelve ships of the line, which could y be defended by fortifications. La Rozière was acquainted at Cherbourg, where he advised that

another port for thirty vessels should be constru opposite Portsmouth, while Brest formed the counterp of Plymouth. Dumouriez even then foresaw that the American War would eventually embroil France with England. He added to his report a note as to *the best means of providing within a month enough ships to convey* 50,000 *men to England.* In September, 1776, Dumouriez and his coadjutor arrived at Versailles, where a Council of Ministers, presided over by M. de Maurepas, assembled to consider their report.

The Boulogne project was approved, but nothing was done. Meanwhile Dumouriez had been appointed M. de Saint Germain Assistant Quartermaster-Genera the Boulogne district, so that he might direct the work person. His views as to the American War, however, not meet with acceptance, and he therefore retired to country, where he remained during the whole of occupied in drawing up a memorandum on the defen Normandy, and translating the autobiography of venuto Cellini as well as a German work containing lives of the eminent generals of Charles XII. In Ju forwarded to M. de Montbarray a memorandum o American War, foretelling the defeat of General goyne.

At the end of December, 1777, he was again call Versailles, where he met La Rozière, who had been sent for. War was declared as Dumouriez pred The defence of the coast was already the question o hour. La Rozière was dispatched to Brittany to after Brest, but the safety of Normandy could no ignored, and M. de Maurepas asked for a memoran on that subject. Dumouriez drew it up there and

s XVI asked who was its author, and on being in-med, wrote with his own hands opposite his observa-ons on the projected arsenal: "Dumouriez, Commandant e Cherbourg." In the early days of the first month of ıe following year Dumouriez arrived on the coast of Normandy, and commenced the career which had been ıapped out for him by the ill-fated sovereign with whose estiny that of Dumouriez was to be so closely bound p. He was now in his thirty-ninth year, and his annual ıcome from all sources amounted to just 25,000 livres. nto the discharge of his new duties he at once threw ıat constitutional energy and enthusiasm which twelve ırs later were to make him pre-eminently the man the hour as far as the future of France was con-ned.

CHAPTER II

DUMOURIEZ, COMMANDANT OF CHERBOURG 1778—1789

"The undertaking is a prodigious one, and does no trifling credit to the spirit of enterprise of the present age in France."

Arthur Young at Cherbourg, August, 1788.

DUMOURIEZ in his autobiography speaks of an early visit paid by him to Cherbourg as far back as 1758, when he was only a subaltern of nineteen. The natural advantages of its position from a strategic point of view made a deep impression on his mind, and throughout his adventures in Corsica, Spain, Portugal, Poland, and elsewhere he remembered the modest town on the Normandy littoral, only eighteen leagues distant from the southern shores of the Isle of Wight, in his opinion the natural objective of a French invasion. It was in February, 1778, that Dumouriez, now on the eve of forty, arrived at Cherbourg in the capacity of commandant. The garrison was ridiculously small, and the dilapidated defences quite unequal to offering serious resistance to an attack from the sea. Dumouriez was not a man to play the part of a commandant *pour rire*. He lost no time in asking with characteristic pertinacity for men, money, guns, and ammunition. In so doing he trod on the corns of the various officials theoretically responsible for the marine, the cannons, and the fortifications. His demands were refused or ignored, but with each rebuff his insistence increased. He discovered abuses at every turn.

be expected he soon quarrelled with almost every-
with whom he was officially associated. He super-
eded the venerable head of the artillery who had seen no
ervice since 1741, and in conjunction with his more ener-
etic successor commenced to mount guns, and complete a
attery on Pelée Island, the most essential point of the
oadstead he hoped to make impregnable. He impressed
n the minds of both King and minister that Cherbourg
as really "the Hotel of the Channel," the anchorage of
very convoy between Brest and Havre, and that its effi-
ient defence was a question of vital and national import-
So infectious was his enthusiasm that he induced
ldiers to work on the placing of guns as volunteers.
spite of his many worries Dumouriez laboured
ily during two years in conjunction with an associa-
f friends on the elaboration of a project for the
uction at Cherbourg of such a port as would trans-
t into a naval and military centre of the highest
tance. He entitled his work *Memoirs on Cotentin*,
was transmitted to the ministers as the result of
vestigations of a literary society. It elicited from
Vergennes, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, a letter
warmest appreciation.

he end of Dumouriez' first year at Cherbourg he
ed to a friend at Paris a letter which not only
that his wife had accompanied him to his new
of duties, but throws a curious light on the diffi-
of his position :—

"CHERBOURG, *December 21st*, 1778.[1]

R,

"I have been anxious to send you the result of the
n of the local legal authorities in order to enable

[1] *Variétés Cambresiennes*, Vol. I, pp. 114-15.

you to comprehend in its true light the discussion anxious to see terminated. It is a fact that the conte has not been provoked by me.

"On my arrival I requested the churchwardens to assign a pew to my wife. Even supposing that no rule exists providing an eligible pew for the commandant of a fortress because he has himself an honourable position in the choir, there is not a town in the kingdom where a pew would not be accorded to his family. Although the honours of a commandant are personal, as a commandant is often a married man he ought to be regarded as the first citizen of the town where he commands, and one ought not to refuse the first place in church or in public assemblies to hi any more than one would to the wife of the lord manor, for the commandant represents the lord o manor. In consequence of the refusal, as the wi the commandant cannot be in the choir, she wou placed in church after all the tradespeople who pews, which is an evident absurdity and is pra nowhere. . . .

"Lately an indecent altercation arose betwee d'Orange, first judge of the bailiwick, and M. Dulo one of the churchwardens, about a pew which refused to M. Ourry, ex-director of the ice-stores. compelled to exercise my authority to prevent the the churchwarden being cut off by the judge wh had grossly insulted. I might have said to him, as 'Menæchmi,'[1]

"'What would you do, Sir, with the nose of a warden?'

"I assure you the eight churchwardens, who spe the name of the whole community without cons anybody, are blunderers. The other churchwarden not acceded to their demands, and the nobility, the j and all respectable people bewail their absurdities.

[1] A play of Plautus.

sily verify all that I tell you, as well as the statements in my former letters. After doing this you will be in a position to give your decision with all the equity and prudence your fairness may suggest, and I am delighted that it should be pronounced by one I love and respect as much as yourself.

"I am, with all affection and regard,

"Your humble and obedient servant,

"DUMOURIEZ."

Nearly a year later he addressed the following hitherto unpublished letter to the authorities at Paris, which shows the extraordinary attention he bestowed on the minutest ils :—

"CHERBOURG, *November 15th*, 1779.

ENTLEMEN,

"An abuse is at present rife on our coasts which I you to remedy, on the ground that it impedes navi- n at a time when we most need to see it assisted by possible means. Seaweed is being burnt all along oast very late into the night. Our vessels, which can pass the strait [*Raz*] and the side route [*déroute*] in y, as well as the men-of-war escorting them, are or may led by these fires. Besides, it becomes impossible to o along the coast the requisite night signals for all the coastguard stations have been provided with s, because there would ensue confusion between signals and the seaweed fires. You will see in VI Art. V of the Marine Regulations of 1681 that s must be made by means of smoke by day, y night by means of fire. Art. XLV Title IX of me regulations lays down the severest penalties for ch as light false fires. Though the intention of the oard population is not to mislead vessels, the fact ns that it is precisely this evil that they will bring . At any time it would be well to obviate this in-

convenience, but it becomes more imperative that now that all vessels plying along the coasts are pressed into the King's service to bear assistance to his fleets. Consequently I request you to be good enough to order, under the severest penalties, that no sea-board inhabitant shall keep seaweed fires alight at sunset and before sunrise. You will do well to make this prohibition in concert with the Admiralty tribunals that are next to you on the right and the left of your jurisdiction, so that the King's service may be exactly carried out all along the coast. I am informing my superior officers of this letter, in order that all private commanders may be enjoined to assist in the execution of your regulations.

"I have the honour to be, Gentlemen,

"Your very humble and very obedient servan

"DUMOURIEZ,

"Commandant of Cherbour

Montchanin, Dumouriez' latest French biographer one of the few who refrains from wholesale denunci of the "traitor, unbeliever, and free-thinker of the pronounced type," only devotes seven pages of his bo the career of the energetic and fore-seeing *Comma de Place* at Cherbourg. Dumouriez himself deals w in a couple of short chapters,[1] but its side-lights stantly recur in the projects for the defence of En which, by the irony of fate, were destined to engro attention a quarter of a century later. M. A. de vaques[2] disposes of the whole subject in a single graph, which, however, fully admits the good accomplished on the French littoral by Cambrai's illus but much-abused son.

[1] *La Vie et les Mémoires du Général Dumouriez*, Paris, 1822. chapters IV. and V., pp. 526–92.

[2] *Mémoires de la Société d'Émulation de Cambrai*, Vol. XLIX, p.

w began," he writes, "the happiest epoch of Dumouriez' life. He created one of the greatest of French naval arsenals, and although the works were hastily carried out, the enemy had no longer any desire to make this portion of the kingdom the object of an attack. *His schemes for the invasion of England* were not much relished by the Government, and it was in America that the engagements took place which eventually induced the Government of George III to acknowledge the independence of the United States. In 1786 Dumouriez welcomed Louis XVI to Cherbourg on the occasion of the sinking of the cones upon which the moles of the new harbour were to rest.[1] Two years later (1788) he was oted to the rank of Brigadier-General (*maréchal de*)."

relations of Dumouriez with Marshal d'Harcourt, overnor of Normandy, and his son and subordinate Duc d'Harcourt, were not of the most cordial kind. ouriez had been appointed without their concurrence, they were both inclined to regard his constitutional ty as that *excès de zèle* which Talleyrand has qualified as rdonable." As has already been sufficiently shown, ourg was at this period the victim of that house-divided-t-itself policy which so largely characterized French istration during the eighteenth century. Dumouriez mmandant it is true, but he had to deal with half n conflicting departments. It is by no means im-

[1] after years these sunken cones often proved fatal to English men-of-n 1802 H.M.S. *Minerve* struck on one of these cones, and captain and ent many years of durance vile in France. A very interesting MS. t of the occurrence, as well as of the sufferings of the prisoners, is in ion of Mr. Broadley. Arthur Young, who visited Cherbourg in , 1788, gives a most interesting account of the cones and other en-g achievements carried out during Dumouriez' tenure of office.—See *in France*, pp. 119–122.

probable that this state of affairs contributed to th
of appreciation in high quarters of the "invasion projects
which he pressed on the consideration of the Duc
d'Harcourt, who had served with credit in the Seven
Years' War, and might now (as Dumouriez pointed out)
easily gain a marshal's *bâton* by the capture of the Isle of
Wight and a subsequent march to London. Years later
Dumouriez wrote that by neglecting his proposals France
lost "the great and only chance of terminating the war
gloriously on English soil."[1] December, 1778, or January,
1779, were the alternative dates proposed by Dumouriez
for the execution of the plans detailed in the next cha
To describe in detail the engineering works he carrie
in Cherbourg and its vicinity between 1778 and 1788
his constant *démêlés* with the supreme naval and m
authorities during the same period, is manifestly b
the scope of this volume. Most of the biographer
critics of Dumouriez declare that it was in the ever
1789–90 that the brigadier of fifty found the opport
of a lifetime. For the moment the attention of the r
is invited to the elaborate plan for the *attack* on the
Wight, which its author, for some reason or another,
porated in the MS. of his general *defence* schemes,
up in 1804–5, and discovered in a complete form
four years ago under the circumstances detailed
introduction.

[1] *Mémoires*, Vol. I, p. 346.

CHAPTER III

DUMOURIEZ' PLAN FOR THE CAPTURE OF THE ISLE OF WIGHT

"The island would have been a most excellent stronghold, beyond all danger of starvation, if communications with France were cut off."

Dumouriez.

1779

THE Isle of Wight, almost from time immemorial, entered largely into all French projects for the invasion of England. In July, 1377, a landing was actually effected coast, and in the same month of 1545 three more ts were made by the French to obtain a footing but the invaders were repulsed by the troops of VIII without much difficulty.[1] During the onwealth apprehensions were again rife as to the of that part of the kingdom, now to some extent ed by forts. On August 27th, 1652, the President Council of State thus wrote to the Governor of the :—

and Raigne of King Henry VIII, by Lord Herbert of Cherbury, London, 1649.

letter is inserted in an exceptionally interesting copy of Sir Richard *History of the Isle of Wight*, published in 1781, and dedicated to I. Amongst the various items added to this volume, which was at Sir Henry Hope Edwardes's sale by Mr. Broadley, are several showing the camps of defence formed there in 1741. As regards of Wight during the Great Terror (1796–1805), many details are *Napoleon and the Invasion of England* (London: John Lane, 1907). I, 3 n., 111, 115, 243 n.; Vol. II, 129. George III was as anxious e safety of the island in 1797–8, and again in 1803–4–5, as the of Council was in 1652.

"By intelligence w^h^ hath beene given to the
they are informed that the Dutch have some desi
the Isle of Wight, for the surprize thereof or some plac
of strength thereupon, for the prevention of w^h^ wee have
thought fitt to give you notice hereof, and desire you to
acquaint the Command^rs^ of the severall fforts and Guarri-
sons upon that Island and that you will give them in
charge to take especiall Care of the places under their
Comands and to be wanting in nothing w^h^ may bee for
the security of those places, and that you will also in all
other things bee carefull which may bee for the safety of
the whole Island.

"Signed in my name and by order of the Councell o
State appointed by Authority of Parl^t^

"WILLIAM PUREFOY, *Presid*
"E. THURLOE."

As Dumouriez regarded the engineering wo
Cherbourg as a standing menace to Portsmout
Isle of Wight very naturally attracted his attentio
a strategic point of view, and hence the plan of in
which remained amongst his papers until, by the
of fate, it formed part of the MS. of his *Project*
Defence of England. The introduction is manif
quarter of a century older than the text itself.

Dumouriez heads his observations:—

HISTORICAL NOTE

ON THE VARIOUS PROJECTS OF DESCENT ON ENGL

"The usurpation of the supreme power by Buo
his personal hatred of England, as well as tha
Minister Talleyrand, the bold front presented

[1] The historical note stands by itself, and furnishes incidentally a
tion of Dumouriez' conduct in drawing up plans for the British
ment.

A MAP OF THE
ISLE OF WIGHT
SOUTHAMPTON
WATER
PORTSMOUTH
SPIT-HEAD
EXPLANATION

nation which alone remained erect when all Europe was kneeling to that lucky adventurer, have made the invasion of England the avowed object of the labours, cares, and expenditure of the French Government. Hence I deemed it advisable to emphasize the warnings I had been uttering for long. I was loath to see the plans I had elaborated at the behest of two kings [Louis XV and XVI] for the prosecution of regular warfare between two states, which esteemed each other even amidst their rivalries, turn to potential instruments of spoliation and crime, if carried out by the barbarians into whose hands they had fallen.

"A descent upon England was long looked upon as an impracticable chimera in face of the countless and invincible naval forces that encircle this island-empire with a line of floating citadels, collected or dispersed at will at any threatened points around the coasts. True, it had been proved on repeated occasions that small convoys of troops directed against England, Scotland, or Ireland had outwitted the vigilance of the ablest seamen in the world; but it was considered impossible that an army could be collected in one or several ports of France, sally forth across the narrow straits, and land in England without being encountered, engaged, dispersed, and annihilated by the squadrons of the enemy. The most recent successful descent was William III's, and its happy issue was attributed to the premeditated collusion and inaction of the English Navy. The very elaborate show of invasion that France had made in 1779 testified still further to the impracticability of these expeditions and enhanced the feeling of security.

"Neither England nor France had given thought to the possibility of crossing the Channel by means of small decked vessels laden with a whole army and avoiding thus: (1) the dilatoriness of embarkation and landing; (2) the difficulty of making the coast exactly at the predetermined spot;

(3) the slowness and roughness of the passage; and (4) the need of an equally large fleet to guard and defend this ponderous convoy. It was never imagined that so inferior a naval power as France could ever replace strength by daring, or that the ferrying of an army to England could ever be simplified so as to become a raid of Northmen or of filibusters of to-day.

"After reflecting upon our weakness at sea at the outset of the American War, and coming to the conclusion that our war with England could only end badly for us and consummate the total destruction of our naval resources so long as it was waged by water alone, I cherished the belief that we could only tilt the scales in our favour by bringing our land armies into play and attacking the English at home. I appreciated the inconvenience and the danger of launching out upon so great an adventure with inadequate means; but seeing the shortness of the crossing, the frequency of fog in the Channel, the length of the October and November nights, and the species of calm that characterizes this narrow sea for more than six weeks between the equinoctial storms and the periodic tempests of December and January, I deemed the obstacles by no means insuparable, especially for partial 'diversions,' and in the winter of 1777–8 I laid before the Ministry the plans of an expedition against the Isle of Wight, which were but the preliminary of a great project of descent, that was to follow as the natural complement.

"Here is the scheme of invasion of the Isle of Wight detached from the general plan:—

"In 1778 England had 50,000 men in America and not 10,000 regulars at home that could be collected at any one given spot. The militia were not embodied. Admiral Keppel's fleet numbered only twenty sail against the same total of his opponent, M. d'Orvilliers. There were in Portsmouth only one battalion of foot, six hundred pensioners, a few marines doing duty in the port, or ready

for drafting on to the ships or frigates then fitting out. A second-rate guardship was moored at Spithead. The Isle of Wight contained a large number of sick men in Newport Hospital, the corn and foodstuffs for the Portsmouth squadrons at Brading and St. Helen's, and stacked timber and ship-yards in full work for the frigates, corvettes, and cutters of the Portsmouth division at Cowes. All the defence of the island consisted of a little artillery in Shanklin Fort, with 150 pensioners.

"The Cherbourg harbour works were underway and afforded an excellent pretext for cantoning in the peninsula of Cotentin twenty-four battalions and one regiment of dragoons, with eight companies of artillery. This force was enough to occupy completely the Isle of Wight and erect batteries and forts at the points around the coast where a landing could be effected. The island would have been a most excellent stronghold, beyond all danger of starvation, if communications with France were cut off. The soil is very fruitful; there are corn, cattle, and horseflesh in abundance; and by sending away to Hampshire all the inhabitants not required in the fields one could have held out there several months. Besides, the second part of this project will show that there were good reasons for not fearing either blockade or starvation. The embarkation was to take place in the harbour and roads of Cherbourg in two hundred oyster ketches known as *chasse-marées*. These craft are decked, sometimes sternless and double-prowed, of shallow draught, and excellent sailers. Thirty were to be converted into gun-sloops, by shoring up the bows to accommodate a twenty-four pounder, like a bowchaser. They were to be fitted with a couple of false keels, so as to be beached without tilting over. I had picked up this idea of the false keels in Catalonia, where they are adapted to fishing-smacks similar to French *chasse-marées*. These thirty gunboats were to sail in three divisions, at the head and on the flanks of the flotilla,

which in addition would have enjoyed the escort of the eight gun-sloops of the Royal Navy stationed between Havre and St. Malo, and of a few privateers from there and Cherbourg habitually cruising in the neighbourhood. All these warlike preparations could be made quickly and unostentatiously. La Hogue, Granville and Cancale, even without the co-operation of Havre, Dieppe, and St. Valéry, could have more than provided the number of armed *chasse-marées* required for the expedition. There were then some 1500 of these craft between Brest and Dunkirk, and the total has since gone up. We were to wait for the oyster-fishing season in the Bay of Cancale without giving the boats notice, and stop them as they sailed past Barfleur Head and through the Race of Jobourg, and bring them all together at Cherbourg. Each boat was to ship in the hold by way of ballast a piece of ordnance (field, battery, or park), with its carriage taken to pieces, and one hundred rounds of shot. Every man was to carry one hundred cartridges and twenty pounds of biscuits. The necessary tools would be added, and the dragoons would take with them saddle, bridle, and pistols. Horses would not have been lacking in the Isle of Wight.

"Two hours would have sufficed to embark the men in Cherbourg Harbour, after a previous rehearsal. Every *chasse-marée* would have easily held sixty men, and the landing would have taken about the same space of time. The thirty gun-sloops, grounded broadside on, might have served as a landing-stage for part of the force.

"The distance from cape to cape is eighteen leagues, or at most twenty to twenty-two with the bends of the island coast-line. A time was to be fixed for the expedition in the month of November, and by leaving in the evening on the ebb tide we could expect to reach the shores of Wight with the full morning flood. English and French smugglers would have provided us with enough of pilots, and we had, indeed, already engaged a few.

"The landing was to be executed from east to west, and embrace the whole southern coast of the island, from Sandown Bay, where the main body would land, to Chale, Brixton, and Freshwater bays. The eight royal gunboats and the thirty adapted *chasse-marées* with the grenadiers and the chasseurs on board would have entered Brading Harbour. Half this vanguard could have taken up its position there whilst the other half made for Ride-Key [Ryde Quay]. Once on *terra firma*, the troops would have marched off: the *Sandown* division in *two* columns, the *right* taking the highway by the Brading and Arreton Heights, and the *left* through Chiverston, Brenston, Arreton, and St. George's Down, to join forces again at Newport. The *Chale Bay* division would have likewise marched to Newport by Kingston and Chilleton Down: the *Brixton* division on to Newton by Brixton Down, turning off west of Carisbrook, and the *Freshwater* division on to Yarmouth, via Aston Farm and Thorley. The longest march for any of the four columns was about ten miles, which the French foot soldiers could have done in four hours, even while dragging by hand its battalion gun, pending the capture of horses, an easy matter that would not have delayed the advance.

"At Newport the troops would have taken an hour's rest, and then have made in several extended columns for the northern shore of the island, to occupy it in its entirety. All the heavy artillery and the munitions of war would have been landed in Brading Haven; and the *chasse-marées* would have taken ballast on board with the utmost dispatch and sailed off the following night for France, each on its own account. Only the thirty adapted *chasse-marées* would have been retained in the island for the service of the army and the maintenance of communication with Cherbourg, which the English Navy could hardly have interrupted. The attack and defence of the island would then have become a series of opera-

tions of *grande guerre*, wherein at that time the French would have shown to much advantage.

"There were to accompany the army corps a number of shipwrights, caulkers, sailmakers, and six hundred seamen, who would have settled at Cowes and Yarmouth for the winter, and built with the timber in the local yards a large quantity of gun-sloops, manned by some picked troops, in addition to the crews. Each would have had a furnace on board for making hot shot; some would have been formed into bomb-ketches, and armed with mortars and howitzers.

"This flotilla might have made Spithead untenable and certainly uncomfortable for the home guardships, always having its retreat open to it on to the shoals, almost the very sands, under the protection of the island batteries, within the fire of which the English Navy, great and small, could not have ventured to come. This occupation would have compelled the English Government to collect a large force around this central point, either in order to attack or to hold in check the French garrison of the island.

"Lastly, all the vessels found in the island or fetched from Cherbourg were to be brought into Brading Harbour laden with stones, and sunk in the 800-fathom fairway that lies between the Dean Sand and the Horse Sand, from the outer road of St. Helen's and the inner one of Spithead. This latter part of the scheme was to be put into execution only on condition that the whole of the plan was not adopted.

"Here is the second part of this plan, of which the occupation of the Isle of Wight was only the preliminary, while this second part was supplementary.

"I was aware that in the course of the year 1779 the French and Spanish fleets were to join forces, and together total sixty-six sail, and this combined fleet, in point of numbers far greater than the English, was to enter the Channel.

Preparations were afoot in Brest to embark 18,000 men, nearly one-half horse. A second division of 17,000 men was mustering at St. Malo under the orders of the Marshal de Vaux, who was placed in command of the whole expedition, 70,000 strong. A third was collecting at Havre, 12,000 men in all, under the Duc d'Harcourt. The fourth and strongest was gathering at the Camp of St. Omer, and was to start from Boulogne. M. d'Orvilliers, sailing up the Channel at the head of the combined force, could thus lead and convoy 50,000 men.[1]

"Arrived off Portsmouth, Marshal de Vaux would have found 12,000 troops already in occupation of the Isle of Wight, and he would have decided either to operate a landing in Southampton Water under the protection of his numerous fleet, or else to proceed on his way, unite with the St. Omer division of 20,000 men coming from Dunkirk, Boulogne, and Calais, and effect his descent on Rye, Pevensey, or even in the Thames itself. If he had resolved to land near Portsmouth, he could easily have accomplished his object in an arm of the water, between Hill-head and Hook. Let it be remembered that the English fleet was withdrawn to the Irish Channel, and that there was no army and no militia. Once on land the Marshal would have chosen one of two alternatives. First, to leave a body of 15,000 to 18,000 men behind to besiege Portsmouth, and continue his march on London. In this case the division established on the Isle of Wight, which would have acted as *tête de pont* for a landing, would have co-operated by land and water with a strong squadron in the siege of Portsmouth whilst the Marshal made a quick march through Bishop's Waltham, New Alresford, Alton, and Farnham to reach Guildford on the further side of the Downs, which run parallel with the coast from east to west. Thence he would have met with no hindrance on his march

[1] Or, to be exact, 47,000 men; and, allowing 20,000 men to the Boulogne force, the total would be 67,000.

to London; and his rearguard, strengthened by the Isle of Wight division after the fall of Portsmouth (which could not have held out very long),[1] and consisting of at least 20,000 men, could have posted itself at Basingstoke, with an advanced column pushed forward to Reading, and a double *tête de pont* on the Thames, either in order to cover his rear and cut all communication between the east and west of England, or else to effect a junction with his main body if he had thought it necessary for dealing a great blow. Secondly, if the Marshal had thought it inadvisable to leave to chance the capture of Portsmouth, he could have massed his army between Southampton and Chichester, with his centre at the excellent Portsdown Camp, and have left that position only after the fall of Portsmouth. The Isle of Wight division would have co-operated by sea with a portion of the combined fleet anchored in Spithead Roads. In this case the St. Omer force would have embarked at Boulogne and Calais, landed at Rye, and combined its marches with his after the capture of Portsmouth.

"If, on the other hand, Marshal de Vaux had found it more suitable to the circumstances of the case to leave Portsmouth behind him and proceed with all his army, 70,000 strong, by the accretion of the St. Omer contingent, to carry out the great plan of a landing at Rye, which I will elaborate at a later stage of the present work[2] as the most important one of all I ever knew, the Isle of Wight division would have created a very troublesome diversion for the English, who could neither have amused themselves by besieging it in earnest, whilst London was in the greatest danger, nor decreased the troops that held it blockaded along the half-circle from Poole to Chichester.

"Why, it may be asked, not have awaited the junction

[1] The fortifications of Portsmouth were then very weak.

[2] This chapter occurs in the volume which deals with the defence of England, and was written at the close of 1803 or early in 1804, with the experience which Dumouriez had since gained.

of the two allied fleets in the spring or summer of 1779 and their possible entrance into the Channel, to carry out under their protection the invasion of the Isle of Wight? For two reasons. (1) Because the repugnance of the French Navy to entering the Channel, where it no longer ventured since the battle of La Hogue, was well-nigh insuperable, and it would have required absolutely imperative orders, consequent on a first sacrifice of 12,000 men, to get the combined fleets to advance so far. If one had delayed till their arrival, there would have arisen the customary breach between the naval and the military commanders, and the whole thing must have risked turning into a mere empty and ruinous show. (2) Because this spot [the Isle of Wight] could be more usefully occupied beforehand, either as a *tête de pont*[1] to further the landing of the army near Portsea Island, seize the excellent Portsdown Camp, and proceed with safety to the beleaguring of Portsmouth (in which case the Isle of Wight would have served as a 'place of arms' or a *dépôt* to aid by sea the siege operations), or else as a source of diversion to divide the English forces, and denude the vicinity of Rye in favour of the *real* invasion threatening the Capital from the nearest practicable spot.

"That is why, to initiate some step, whilst giving him an inkling of the great project which I entrusted to the Marshal de Vaux, my respected protector, I had presented the Minister with my separate plan for an isolated operation, complete and independent, suited to the entry or the non-entry of the combined fleets into the Channel.

"The above project came to naught, after the expenditure of 80,000,000 francs on the land force alone. Firstly, my plans were changed. It was decided to start the Isle of Wight expedition from Havre instead of Cherbourg, and in order to kill two birds with one stone, to

[1] *Tête de pont*, a fortified bridge-head, protecting the landing of an army on the farther side of a river, or (as here) of an arm of the sea.

attack Portsmouth simultaneously, even with this mediocre force of 12,000 men. Secondly, the use of *chasse-marées* was rejected as too simple a means of transit, and it was decided to have recourse only to transports, chartered at great cost, that were more in accordance with the luxurious tastes of the armies of those days. This would have made the expedition more complicated, difficult, and slow, but much more lucrative to the rogues it was designed to enrich! Thirdly, they no longer took into account the St. Omer force, which was devoted merely to manœuvres. Fourthly, the division collected at St. Malo was destined to attack Plymouth, which was unstudied and unknown. Fifthly, a few vessels were freighted at Brest, the employment of which was to be decided only after the arrival of the allied fleets, when it would have been too late. Lastly, M. d'Orvilliers in person proceeded to Cadiz to fetch the Spanish fleet, but the criminal conduct of the commander of the Ferrol squadron compelled the French admiral to cruise for two months off the coast of Spain, whence he certainly returned with sixty-six sail, but too late for a land expedition, and with 14,000 men on the sick list and a complete lack of water. This might have been sent out from Brest. It was, however, judged wiser to put into that port, after thus missing the opportunity of attacking Plymouth, and doing so with success because of its unpreparedness. Thus vanished all—project, hope, and honour!![1]

"I have given the project with all details. Had it been put into execution, even only so far as the seizing and holding of the Isle of Wight was concerned, it might have led to the destruction, for a long time at least, of the best roadstead in England, by the natural effect of the obstacles to the passage of the waters entering by the Needles and flowing out by St. Helen's roads, and the

[1] This is one of the fullest accounts written by a Frenchman of the aims, possibilities, and causes of failure of the famous 1779 plan.

alluvium thereby occasioned.[1] This would have forced England into an unfavourable peace, or at least to the immediate recognition of the independence of America. If it had succeeded *in toto* the disadvantages would have been even greater, and the political and commercial credit much shaken. But, nevertheless, as war was then waged humanely between completely civilized nations, neither carnage nor devastation would have had to be feared.

"Things are now altered. The French armies consist of looters led by brigands. The fell sentence *Delenda est Carthago* has passed BUONAPARTE'S lips; his tiger's heart beats but for blood and rapine; his wounded pride calls for revenge, and the immolation of his slaves would be as nothing to him provided he could wipe out the pamphlets of the London hacks in fire and blood. With him, then, can be no negotiation, no compromise. It is a life and death struggle, and nothing else.

"It must not be forgotten that Buonaparte has given his name to Cherbourg Harbour. This favour and predilection point to the use he wishes to make of it. There he has collected a large number of craft of the kind specified in the old project. He is bent upon penetrating into England, and once landed, establishing a *tête de pont*. His vanity constrains him to it, his political existence perhaps depends on it. He is threatening at one and the same time with an all-encompassing attack the east and south of England and the south-west and west of Ireland.

"It is without doubt the Dutch coast, especially the mouths of the Meuse and the Scheldt, that provides him with the greatest and easiest means for the invasion. Presumably it is his chief starting-point, Boulogne and Dunkirk forming a central diversion, Cherbourg, St. Malo, and Brest affording other diversions, against the respective ports of the English coast, and the Irish expedition

[1] The editors are scarcely able to follow Dumouriez' reason in this particular.

being an outer diversion setting forth from Spanish and possibly Portuguese harbours and from the western shores of France.

"But in this project of invasion there is, properly speaking, no sham attack. Every expedition is to be pushed forward by the French with equal vigour; in every case they will attempt to strengthen the *tête de pont* and to settle in force; for even if the first point they succeed in occupying is not the one best adapted to the furtherance of their ulterior aims, it will serve at least to divide the English forces, to perturb the nation and the capitalists, and to confuse the general plan of defence. To avoid these disastrous consequences the plan of defence in question should be independent and complete in all its distinct parts, both when considered as a whole and when the aggregate of its material features is to be carried out.

"This is what I shall attempt to develop in a series of detailed memoirs on the defence of the coasts of the United Kingdom, to which this historical note is the necessary introduction. I shall be happy if my experience can be of use to a nation full of energy and resource. I shall rejoice if I can help to save a single cottage of Happy England, and to carry out the views of the Government which has done me the honour to call for my services."[1]

Nineteen years later, when Dumouriez was an exile at Hamburg, a French invasion of the Isle of Wight was regarded as imminent. The writers are able to place before their readers[2] the General Orders for defence in

[1] It will thus be seen that the foregoing account by Dumouriez of the project of 1779 for the invasion of the Isle of Wight really forms the introduction to the defence project as detailed in chapters IX.-XIII.

[2] These orders were discovered in MS. amongst the archives of the Jolliffe family at Padmore by Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Le Guay Geary, R.A., late Governor of the Bermudas, while commanding the Artillery of the Southern District in 1890. The Squire of Padmore of 1798 commanded a company of the Isle of Wight Volunteers, who prepared to offer a stubborn resistance to the invaders.

case of attack issued in May, 1798, by Major-General Don:—

HEAD-QUARTERS NEWPORT ISLE OF WIGHT,
May 4th, 1798.

PREPARATORY GENERAL ORDERS

On an Alarm, three Guns, in addition to the Maritime Signals, will be fired from the following Heights—viz.

Needles,
St. Catharine's Tower,
Ashey Down,
And in the Forest of Parkhurst.

Upon these Signals being made, the whole of the Forces raised in the Island will assemble at their respective Rendezvous, to be appointed by their Commanding Officers, and march as soon afterwards as may be possible, according to the following Directions:—

Capt. LOCK'S Sea Fencibles to occupy and man the Batteries, Works, and Passes, at Whiteclift Bay, Sandown Fort, and Shanklin Chine.

Capt. GRIFFITH'S Sea Fencibles to occupy and man the Batteries, Works, and Passes, at Luccombe Chine, Bonchurch, Ventnor, Steephill, Mirables, Knowles, Chale Bay, Brixton Bay, and Cowleaze Chine.

Capt. HILL'S Sea Fencibles to occupy and man the Batteries, Works, and Passes, at Brixton Bay, Brook Green Chine, Grange Chine, Compton Chine, Compton Cowleaze, Freshwater Gate, Allum Bay, Totland Bay, Colwell Bay, Round Tower Point, and Yarmouth.

Capt. BASKERVILLE'S company of Sea Fencibles to reinforce the Batteries, Works, and Passes, at Compton Cowleaze, Compton Green Chine, and Brook Green Chine.

These Officers will have the Goodness to make themselves acquainted with the Batteries, Works, and Passes in their respective Line, and so proportionate their men accordingly.

The Provisional Cavalry (if called out) and the Yeomanry Cavalry, to march from their places of Rendezvous, to Newport, where they will receive their further Orders. Upon their Approach to the Town, they will send forward an Officer to Head-quarters.

The Artillery company at West Cowes, to march to Newport, where they will receive their further Orders.—On their approach to the Town, they will send forward an Officer to Head-quarters.

The Newport Artillery company to assemble in the Main street, and Form on the Right of the Volunteer companies of Newport.

Capt. COOPER'S company at Wootton-bridge, to reinforce the Posts of Shanklin Chine and Luccombe Chine.

Capt. COOPER'S Volunteer company, Ryde, and Capt. Jolliffe's company at Arreton, to march to Sandown Bay where they will receive their Orders from the Commanding Officer at that Post.

Capt. KEMP'S company at Godshill, to march to Shanklin Chine and Luccombe Chine, for an additional reinforcement of these Posts; and will also occupy the road from Luccombe Chine to Steephill.

Capt. COLE'S company at Whitwell, to occupy the Passes at St. Lawrence, Sir Richard Worsley's Cottage and Steephill.

The company at Gatcombe, to occupy the Pass from the Undercliff leading to Niton.

The company at Chale, to reinforce the Posts in that bay, and particularly the Pass leading from Rocken End Point.

The company at Shorwell, to occupy the Ground between Atherfield Rocks and Cowleaze Chine.

The company at Brixton, to occupy Jackman's Chine and Chilton Chine.

Capt. BLAKE'S company from Calbourne, to occupy Brook Green Chine.

Capt. HOW'S company to occupy the Ascents up the Cliffs from Brook Green Chine to Compton Cowleaze.

Capt. KEECH'S company to occupy Compton Cowleaze.

Capt. RUSHWORTH'S company to occupy Freshwater Gate, Allum, Totland, and Colwells Bays.

The seven companies at Newport to parade in the Main street, as likewise Capt. JAMES KIRKPATRICK'S company, which last is destined for the protection of the town.

The companies of the Capt. DAY'S at West Cowes, to march to Newport, where they will receive their further Orders.—On their Approach to the Town, they will send forward an Officer to Head-quarters.

Capt. WARD'S company of East Cowes, to march to Newport, where they will receive their further Orders.—On their Approach to the Town, they will send forward an Officer to Head-quarters.

All the unarmed Inhabitants, and who are capable of acting as Pioneers, to provide themselves with Axes, Bill-hooks, Pickaxes, Shovels, or Pitchforks; and are desired to collect themselves at their Parish Churches, there to be arranged, and their Leaders to be appointed. They will from thence march and assemble as follows:

Those between right bank of the Medina River and Brading Harbour, on Brading Down.

Those of the Peninsula of Yaverland and Bembridge, on Bembridge Down, above Whiteclift Bay.

Those of the Villages near Sandown Bay, in the rear of Sandown Fort.

Those of the Parishes of Arreton and Newchurch, on the high Ground above Mr. Wilkes's Cottage.

Those of the Parishes of Godshill and Niton, at the Passes of Niton, St. Lawrence, Sir Richard Worsley's Cottage, and Steephill.

Those of the Parish of St. Lawrence, at the Passes of St. Lawrence, Sir Richard Worsley's Cottage, and Steephill.

Those between the Left Bank of the Medina River, Freshwater, and St. Catharine's Tower on Brixton, Shalcombe, Tapnel, and Afton Downs, assembling on said Downs according to the contiguous Situations of their respective Parishes.

Those of the Parish of Freshwater, on the Heights between Colwell and Totland Bays.

Those of the Town of Newport and the Vicinity of it, on the road between Newport and Carisbrooke.

The whole forming in Line, two deep.

The Parishes between the Right Bank of the Medina and Brading Harbour to furnish 100 Draft Horses, with Drivers and Harness, to facilitate the conveyance of Artillery, and to form on Brading Down.

The Parishes of Arreton, Newchurch, and Godshill, to furnish 100 Horses for said service, and to form on Blake Down.

The Parishes between the Left Bank of the Medina River, Freshwater, and St. Catharine's Tower, to furnish 100 Horses for said service, and to form on Shalcombe and Tapnel Downs.

If the Enemy determines his Attacks on the West and Southward of the Island, the cattle and stock to be driven and conveyed to the Right Bank of the Medina River; if on the East Side of the Island, to the left Bank of the Medina.

The great roads leading from Newport to the Westward, Southward, and Eastward of the Island, to be kept clear for the passage of Troops.

Each man to provide himself with a Haversack, and to carry with him three days' provisions.

As it is necessary the Troops should be practised in occupying the different Posts of the Island, Major-General Don has fixed upon Sunday the 13th instant as a Day of Exercise, and requests the Island Forces to comply on that Day with the above Orders; the driving

of the cattle and conveyance of stock excepted. One Day's Provisions will be sufficient on this occasion.

The Alarm Guns will be fired precisely at Five o'clock in the morning on said day.

As the defence of the West and South sides of the Island is most complicated, the General will in particular practise the defence of these Quarters on Sunday the 13th inst.; and on the Sunday following the defence of the East-end of the Island, and the Island Forces are again requested to comply with the above Orders at that time.

The Commanding Officers of Volunteers companies, to send to Head-quarters Requisitions for 40 Rounds of blank cartridges per man on Monday next. The Powder, Paper, and Twine will be issued at Newport.

(Signed)

G. DON, Major-General.

. . . . . .

Up to the present (1788–9) the career of Dumouriez has been sketched only in outline. The French Revolution brought to the commandant at Cherbourg the opportunity which enabled him materially to influence the destinies of France and Europe. From this point his life-story must be told in greater detail.

CHAPTER IV

DUMOURIEZ AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

C'est le caractère qui dirige les Révolutions, influence les assemblées, et gouverne la foule.

Mme. ROLAND, *Mémoires.*

Nous vous attestons qu'il est contre les principes de notre constitution de conquérir.

Reflexions du Dumouriez, 30th March, 1792.

A TIME of danger brings out in strong relief the salient features of a man's character: it either strengthens his resourcefulness and hardihood or reveals the weakness which may have been hidden under the mask of conventionality. So too it is with periods of political upheaval. They make or mar reputations with astonishing rapidity. Nothing is more remarkable in the early part of the French Revolution than the forcefulness of the movement and the insignificance of the men who sought to stem or guide it. Though we may not agree with the verdict of Mirabeau's collaborator, Dumont, that the incapacity of Louis XVI was the chief cause of the Revolution, yet it was undeniably a contributory cause. The infatuated opposition to reform of Marie Antoinette and the Comte d'Artois (the King's youngest brother), the nullity of the ministers, the incredible ignorance, levity, and ineptitude of the great mass of the nobles, all played their part in the drama which began with the follies of Midsummer, 1789, and ended in

the tragedy of the Reign of Terror of 1793–4. That able woman, Mme. Roland, as she looked on at events in 1789–91, confessed that she felt dismay at the very mediocre talent to be found among the reformers. She was right. Apart from Mirabeau, who was weighed down by vices, debts, and disease, no leader appeared who could

Ride on the whirlwind and direct the storm.

After the death of Mirabeau, in April, 1791, France looked in vain for a successor to him; the cause of order and moderation found no champion except mediocrities such as Lafayette, Narbonne, and their like, who were utterly unable to close the breach then widening between King and people. The men of talent sought to push on the Revolution to still further lengths, and the Girondin group of deputies which wielded most authority in the second, or Legislative, National Assembly, heralded the advent of the second Revolution by measures which led to war with Austria and the overthrow of the monarchy. Yet among the ardent young orators of the Gironde there was no man of action. Whether barristers or publicists, idealists like Buzot or wirepullers like Brissot, they had no hold on the army and on the political clubs, which by the close of the year 1791 had gained a preponderating influence on events. With the exception of Pétion (a member of their party who became Mayor of Paris towards the close of 1791, and enjoyed for a time much popularity), the Girondists had no link with the terrible actualities of the present. The trinity that swayed the clubs—the narrowly fanatical Robespierre, the "amorphous Titan" Danton, and that apostle of fraternal levelling and homicide, Marat—was utterly repellent to

them. Yet the need of dominating the clubs, the rabble, and the army was imperative, and the orators found for a time their man of action in Dumouriez. Just as the Jacobins opened up for Bonaparte the first vistas of a career that was to become world-wide, so too the Girondists brought the commandant of Cherbourg to a sphere commensurate with his energies. Only three years separate the entrance of Dumouriez and Bonaparte on to the stage of world politics, but in the Revolution a year counted as a decade.

At the time of the outbreak of the Revolution Dumouriez was fifty years of age. A sketch by a contemporary describes him as of "a small frame, but thick set and sinewy; his appearance common-place, almost ugly, though his features are agreeable; his eyes small, but lively and daring; his mouth large, but with an expression of sweetness and gaiety, or at times of shrewdness and disdain; his voice clear and firm; his manners brusque and lively, but without rudeness — reserved, and with nothing of passion in them." A son of the south, he gesticulated much; but his diplomatic tasks, though of a second-rate order, had given him a tone far above that of a soldier of fortune, while the wide range and originality of his ideas lifted him high above the class of "secret agents." His keen insight into affairs had shown him the vicious spots of the *ancien régime*, and aroused in him a keen desire to clear away its wens from the face of France and Europe.

Yet he had the love of monarchy which marked a man of patrician descent and close acquaintance with public business. He knew France well, and his instincts and convictions alike impelled him to renovate the monarchy

and strengthen the nation by uniting them on a basis at once reasonable and firm. In his *Mémoires* he affirms his political aims ever to have been the binding together of King and people by a constitution. That explains his partial success and his failure. It was the policy of Mirabeau. It sought to establish a reasonable compromise; but the time for reason and compromise was not yet come.

In the early part of the Revolution we find Dumouriez displaying his firmness and activity by repressing the symptoms of mutiny among his garrison at Cherbourg, and thereafter quelling a formidable riot in the town (July, 1789). His known sympathy with the cause of reform, and his popularity with the soldiers and citizens, counted for much in these affairs. Further, he had the gift of ready speech which attracts men, and the power of prompt and daring action which overawes them. At the crisis of the riot he rushed at a sailor, who had taken the keys of the corn-store, seized him by the throat, and tore them from him. At the end of it all he had the good sense to consult the crowd what punishments should be meted out to the guilty. By the popular vote two ring-leaders were hanged, and ten others were sent to the galleys in the roadstead.[1] If at that time of the first and worst of the Jacqueries, commanders had generally acted with equal energy and tact, anarchy might never have prevailed over the forces of order.

The prejudices of the King and Queen against all officers who held reforming views hindered Dumouriez's advancement; and in the year 1790 we find him at Paris without a commission. On October 16th he wrote to the

[1] *La Vie et les Mémoires du Général Dumouriez*, Vol. II, pp. 42–52.

President of the National Assembly, protesting against unjust charges respecting his conduct at Cherbourg, and refuting them by letters from the mayor of that town.[1] We know little of his doings at Paris; but his energy and his knowledge of other countries procured him a semi-official mission to the Belgic Provinces of Austria, where the popular ferment was a source of hope to reformers and of fear to the French Court.

After this he drew up a plan for "The military organization of a free State," which aroused much attention. In his guiding principles he may be called a follower of Mirabeau, with whom he had some dealings during the winter of 1790–1. The soldier, like the statesman, saw clearly that Louis XVI must frankly and honestly accept the reforms on which a vast majority of Frenchmen were bent; that the union between reformed monarchy and the regenerated nation would reconcile the claims of liberty and order; and that this happy consummation, which would dower France with the strength of youth, could be attained only during a time of peace.

Peace (wrote Mirabeau) France must have, "for nothing is accomplished during war." The King (so he insisted) equally needed peace; for in case of a disastrous war "the ruler will be the object of all the suspicions, the victim of all the parties."[2]

In the same spirit Dumouriez wrote to the king on March 19th, 1791, begging him not to believe the calumnies against him, but to test his loyalty by send-

[1] This letter (printed) is in the valuable collection of French Revolution pamphlets (R. 277) in the British Museum.

[2] *Correspondance entre Mirabeau et le Comte De la Marck* (Paris, 1851), Vol. II, p. 278.

ing him on a mission to Mayence in order to soothe the feelings of the German princes lately dispossessed of their feudal rights in Alsace, and to lay the war-ghost which the French *émigrés* were seeking to conjure up. The letter contains the phrase, remarkable as coming from an ambitious soldier: "A foreign war would bring our misfortunes to a climax; it would seriously aggravate your troubles, already too great."[1]

Probably to this time we may refer to a memorandum (dated merely 1791) sent by Dumouriez to the Society of Friends of the Constitution, in which he proposed a radical change in the method and *personnel* of French diplomacy.[2] Starting from the assumption that France was about to become a self-governing nation, he declared that her policy ought to be essentially peaceful, because she need have no more enemies. He pointed out that wars had generally arisen from the ambitions of sovereigns or of irresponsible ministers, and he asserted that, if free people came into conflict, their struggles would be violent but short, seeing that they would not be waged for the purposes of conquest. That claim arouses a smile, uncertain whether of irony or pity, as we look back at the series of wars of aggrandisement on which the nations were then about to enter. But the hope that freedom and enlightenment would chase away Mars and enthrone Mercury and Ceres, held sway in the period before the attempted flight of Louis XVI to the eastern

[1] See the *Mémoires*, II, p. 417, for the whole letter.

[2] *Mem. sur le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères.* Par Dumouriez. (Paris, 1791). In the British Museum Collection (R. 277). He seems to have written it partly in conjunction with Mirabeau, and perhaps with the approval of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Montmorin. See the Dumouriez *Mems.* II, 105, 419–22; also *ib.*

frontier and the threatening Declaration of Pilnitz issued thereafter by the German Powers.

There is a ring of sincerity throughout this remarkable but little known pamphlet. Not only did Dumouriez foretell a peaceful future (which democracy may perhaps finally realize), but he pointed out some practical means for hastening its advent. He demanded especially that the methods of diplomacy should be radically changed. In place of secrecy and tortuousness there must be openness and simplicity. Further, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the diplomatic service ought truly to represent the masses of the people. Their officials and agents must not be drawn from the privileged few, but from the citizen class, which thenceforth was to govern the state. France, he declared, would not really control her destinies until her policy was shaped by citizens, not by aristocrats and their followers. With a view to the simplification of the diplomatic service, he suggested that the yearly expenses of that department of the State should be cut down to 2,529,000 francs (about £101,200), even including secret service money and "presents." The sum is, of course, impossibly small; but economies were possible, as Dumouriez showed when he became Minister of Foreign Affairs about a year later; in fact, the pamphlet marked out the lines on which democratic states (notably the United States) have sought to advance. The "new diplomacy" may be traced back to the system sketched by Dumouriez in the earlier part of the year 1791. The closing sentence deserves to be quoted, "When people [throughout Europe] are fully persuaded of our justice and moderation, we shall become the arbiters and peacemakers of Europe, whereas formerly we were its disturbers and its scourge."

These hopes were soon to be dashed. Louis XVI never accepted the Revolution, still less did his queen. The anti-religious legislation of 1790, especially "the Civil Constitution of the Clergy," and the attempts made to force its provisions on the "orthodox" priests, cut the King to the quick. "I had rather be King of Metz," he exclaimed, "than reign over France on such terms." In the spring of that year he began to prepare for flight, not to loyal Normandy and Brittany as Mirabeau had recommended, but to the Austrian and French *émigrés* on the eastern frontier. The attempt was an ignominious failure, and hopelessly compromised his future and that of France.

In that disastrous month, June, 1791, Dumouriez left Paris in order to take up the military command of the five Departments near the mouth of the Loire. With it he acquired the rank of maréchal-de-camp (brigadier-general). Scarcely had he arrived at Nantes when the flight of the King became known. Proceeding to the central *place* at midnight, he found it filled with an excited crowd of men in their shirts. The President of the Department informed him in mournful tones of the terrible news; whereupon Dumouriez calmly replied, "Very well. If the King has gone, the nation remains. Let us take counsel what is to be done."

This manly and resolute demeanour ensured his success in the difficult tasks which confronted him during the ensuing eight months. Little is known of his actions except that they gave satisfaction to the authorities and to the inhabitants. His readiness in divining the needs of a situation, his *bonhomie* with the troops, and his powers of organization sufficed to keep those five Departments in

fairly good order even in that time of turbulence and strife. The following letter, hitherto unpublished, is almost the only relic of his correspondence at this period :—

"FONDENAY, *October 9th*, 1791.

"GENTLEMEN,

"I am very glad that you approve of the distribution of the Cantonments of the battalion of Mayenne and Loire. It was impossible, particularly in the present circumstances, to bring it together wholly in one [head-] quarter: this could only have been effected in the city of Nantes itself, and you can judge, without my entering into details, of the inconvenience resulting therefrom. In fact, I deem it highly essential, for the discipline, instruction, and health of these estimable young men, that not one moment should be lost in dispatching the Companies to their respective destinations. As for that of your battalion for [*illegible*], it is only until the Vendée battalion is raised and assembled. Then it must occupy the Cantonment at the mouth of the Loire, and your battalion those of the Department of Vendée. Such are the principles that have guided M. de Verteuil in his repartition of these battalions, which, as a rule, should not see service too near their homes. Besides, it seems to me that the spirit of emulation is not so great as I should have expected in your Department, which I have hitherto held up as a model of patriotism. I send you a letter which the administrators have pressed me to write and have scattered broadcast in the Vendée. You may use the same means, *mutato nomine*, and if you think my signature likely to awake emulation, I invite you to append it at the foot of the circular. I leave it to you to either keep the dragoons at Puissandre [?], Savenay, and Blain with the Infantry, or to send them to Aneenis [?] to go in their squadrons. Nevertheless, I send you an

order in blank referring thereto, in which you can fill in the routes if you decide upon the second course of action. For a long time I have thought, like yourselves, that troops of the line were needed at Nantes, and requested a battalion from the Minister. I have lately heard from him that he finds it quite impossible to send us that supplement. As for the squadron of dragoons, my opinion is that it should not be moved from Aneenis to Nantes; and my chief reason is that of discipline, seeing that this squadron is without officers. Besides, neither M. de Verteuil nor I can undertake such a removal without orders from the Minister, save in very grave circumstances, which do not at present exist. So that if you care for this opinion you must apply to the Minister himself, and I advise you, through your deputies, to address once more the Legislature, to obtain, not a squadron, but a battalion of infantry, which will be more useful and better placed. I bow with respect.

"DUMOURIEZ,

"Maréchal-de-Camp."[1]

The letter is interesting, as showing that discontent was arising in those districts, which were soon to witness the terrible Vendéan Rising. For the present Dumouriez held it in check; and his conspicuous abilities brought him under the favourable notice of Count Narbonne, who became Minister of War on December 5th, 1791. The need of men who were faithful to the constitution and could keep order was so imperative that Narbonne first promoted him to the rank of lieutenant-general, and then summoned him to Paris (February, 1792).

Dumouriez was now in his element. In the dearth of experienced officers (most of whom had joined the ranks

[1] In Mr. Broadley's collection.

of the *émigrés*) his counsels were highly valued. As war seemed imminent, he drew up for Narbonne a plan for the defence of the south of France, and after March 9th, when Narbonne was replaced at the War Office by the far more incapable Degrave, the latter also sought the advice of the general. At the same time he was courted by Gensonné, one of the ablest of the Girondists, who had seen proofs of his ability in the military district of Nantes. Through Gensonné he became acquainted with the other Girondist chiefs and with the remarkable woman, Madame Roland, who was at once their inspiration and their evil genius.

Her estimate of him, written under the shadow of the guillotine, is tinctured with all the bitterness of failure; but, as it is the judgment of the ablest French woman of that time, it may be well to give it here:—

"Dumouriez had more intellect and less morality than they [the ministers]. Diligent and brave, a good general, a clever courtier, a good writer and ready speaker, capable of great enterprises, he only lacked something of strength of character for his intellect, and a fund of coolness for carrying out his plans. Pleasing with his friends, and ready to deceive them all, he was made for the intrigues of a corrupt court. His brilliant qualities, and his interest to win glory, caused the belief that he would be useful in the republican armies; and perhaps he would have kept straight if the Convention had been wise; for he is too prudent not to act well when his reputation and his interest lead him that way. . . . A skilful officer, he was, even in the judgment of his jealous colleagues, the only one among them who could successfully lead a great army."[1]

[1] *Mémoires de Mme. Roland*, ed. by M. H. Barrière (Paris, 1885), pp. 267, 268, 278.

This is the verdict of a disappointed woman who saw in Dumouriez one of the causes of the overthrow of the Gironde, owing to events soon to be considered. For the present we note that Dumouriez, at the beginning of March, 1792, was on familiar terms, not only with Degrave, but also with Delessart, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and strongly urged him to give a firm reply to the overbearing note which the Austrian Court had just sent to Paris. Sir Robert Keith, the British ambassador at Vienna, stated that the most offensive passages in that note were added by the Emperor Leopold II, then near his end, "with the mistaken hope of intimidating France." Leopold therein declared that the muster of armed bands of French *émigrés* at Coblentz and Trèves, of which France had complained, was a nullity; that her troubles were due to an internal disease attributable to the violence of the republican party, which had plotted against Louis XVI, fostered anarchy, threatened Austria, and encouraged revolt in the Austrian, or Belgic, Netherlands. All this was the work (he declared) of a factious minority which the sane part of the French nation would eventually overcome. Meanwhile Austria and Prussia would act as guardians of the peace of Europe.[1]

This effusion did not tend to foster the sanity of the French National Assembly or promote the cause of peace. Dumouriez rightly gauged the temper of the Assembly when he urged Delessart firmly to deny the right of the Emperor to dictate to France, and to press for satisfaction on the questions in dispute between France and Austria. These were, firstly, the presence in the Empire of the

[1] See an excellent account of these negotiations in *The Causes of the War of* 1792, by J. H. Clapham (Cambridge, 1899).

armed forces of French nobles and others, amounting to some thousands, who boasted that with the aid of the German Powers they would invade France and crush "the factions" at Paris; secondly, the compact between Austria and Prussia, which was known to be hostile to France; and thirdly, the means adopted by the Emperor to prevent the German nobles, who possessed feudal rights in Alsace recently abolished by the French Assembly, from accepting the pecuniary indemnities now offered.

It is impossible here to enter into these details. Some of them were unimportant, and all could have been settled had a sincere desire for peace reigned at Paris and Vienna. But this was not the case. The old hatred of those two courts, dulled for a time by their "unnatural" alliance effected by Kaunitz, the Austrian chancellor, in 1756, had been whetted by the intrigues of Marie Antoinette at Versailles on behalf of the Hapsburg power. Prince Kaunitz, in his old age, saw his life-work crumbling away, and resolved that if the rupture came it should come with no loss of dignity for the proud House of Hapsburg. In reality, a collision between those ill-mated allies lay in the nature of things. Austria, the champion of the old order saw with alarm the spread of French revolutionary principles through her Belgic provinces, and still more through the Rhineland and Swabia. The young democracy of France, eager and self-confident, longed to measure its strength against that embodiment of tradition and privilege, the House of Hapsburg, whose motley peoples and scattered states promised to be no match for a nation in arms. There come times in the history of mankind when the principles of the future and of the past meet in the

shock of conflict, even when the ostensible causes of that conflict are slight. Such a time was now at hand.

Despite the advice of Dumouriez, the French foreign minister, Delessart, persisted in sending tame replies to the haughty missives of Kaunitz; and when the terms of the correspondence became known to the French Assembly, it ordered his arrest, and sent him before the High Tribunal of the State at Orleans.

To the ministry thus abruptly vacated Dumouriez was raised with equal suddenness on March 15th, 1792. He accepted it with reluctance, a military command being his desire.[1] The present post was certainly not enviable. The Cabinet consisted of three ministers, one of whom, Degrave, had had an experience of ten days. But it now received an accession which gave it a decidedly Girondist complexion. Roland took the Home Office; Clavière, that of Finance; Lacoste, the Navy; and Duranton, the Ministry of Justice. The ministry was nicknamed by the King's friends *le Sansculotte*, owing to the frankness with which the new-comers addressed the King. But it is clear that Louis by no means resented the manly tones of Dumouriez, for whom he soon professed much esteem. According to the general's *Memoirs*, he succeeded in partly overcoming the dislike which Marie Antoinette had conceived for him; but in view of the facts soon to be set forth we may doubt his statement that the interview which he had with her led to a good understanding. It proves, however, that he remained in ignorance of her secret efforts to thwart his diplomacy and bring discredit on the French arms in the ensuing war. The facts, as now known, incline us to credit Mme. de Campan's statement, that the Queen,

[1] *Mémoires*, Vol. II, pp. 136–8.

after the interview, expressed her resolve never to believe in *a traitor*. In that word the unhappy Queen revealed her narrowness of judgment and invincible prejudice against every officer who embraced reforming principles.

Far more important, however, than the behaviour of the King and Queen to Dumouriez was his conduct of the affairs of his office. Was he, or was he not, guilty of provoking war with Austria? If he was guilty, he committed a crime against humanity, in letting loose floods which were to devastate Europe. Some writers have attributed the whole cycle of the revolutionary wars to his heedless ambition.[1] But, in all fairness, it should be remembered that the trend of affairs was strongly for war before he took office. The last note of the Court of Vienna was taken at Paris as an open threat of intervention in the affairs of France. The suggestions of such action, which had been most guardedly uttered in the declaration of the Austrian and Prussian monarchs at Pilnitz in July, 1791, were now declared in unmistakable terms; and if, as the German historian von Sybel has laboured to prove, Leopold's last note was a well-meant attempt to strengthen the peace party at Paris, it must be pronounced a stupendous blunder. But we now know, from the researches of Herr Vivenot, that Leopold's aims were far from disinterested, and that Austria and Prussia had recently concerted a plan for a future partition of France. Austria was to have Alsace and Lorraine, while Prussia gained the duchies of Jülich and Berg, and a share in the contemplated partition of Poland.[2]

[1] e.g. M. Chuquet, *Valmy*, p. 13: "Dumouriez fit déclarer la guerre à l'Autriche"; also Boguslawski, *Leben des Generals Dumouriez*, Vol. I, p. 123, calls him "Die Triebfeder der Kriegs-Erklärung."

[2] Vivenot, *Quellen zur Geschichte der Kaiserpolitik Oesterreichs*, I, 406.

This plan acquired new vitality when Francis II succeeded to the heritage of his father, Leopold (March 1st, 1792). The young Emperor was ambitious, strongly royalist, and eager to do something for the honour of his aunt, Marie Antoinette, and the profit of his house. Accordingly, the compact between the courts of Vienna and Berlin was strengthened, a union which portended aggression against France and Poland. The French *émigrés* hoped to bring Sweden into line with the two German Powers for a crusade to crush the Revolution in France; but on the day after Dumouriez's entry upon office that fervid crusader, Gustavus III, was struck down by an assassin; and the Regent who succeeded him dared not embark on a war. Spain also could not move in the royal cause, and Catharine II of Russia was known to be encouraging the German Powers to the French enterprise in order that she might be free to interfere in Polish affairs.

These disquieting symptoms had little effect at Vienna and Berlin. Their armies, it was believed, would soon overpower the half-mutinous forces of France. Accordingly, the dispatches sent from Vienna to Paris were as exacting as ever. In his dispatch of March 18th Kaunitz denied that France had any cause of complaint against Austria, and used phrases which implied the right of the allies to intervene in French affairs.[1] On March 30th Earl Gower, British ambassador at Paris, reported that the two Austrian notes communicated on the previous day by Dumouriez to the National Assembly showed "that the politics of the Court of Vienna with regard to

[1] Vivenot, *op. cit.*, I, 425. See, too, Sorel's narrative in his great work, *L'Europe et la Révolution française*, Pt. II, pp. 357–60, 395–401.

the affairs of France are not in the least altered by the Emperor's death, but that on the contrary the same measures will be adopted, perhaps with more energy, considering the youth and enterprising spirit of the King of Hungary, and considering at the same time the change that has taken place in the French administration." He then says that the ministers had the support of the most active and ardent of the people, and that Dumouriez had urged the Assembly to restrain the indignation aroused by the reading of the dispatches until he had received a reply from Vienna to his request for a definite and categorical answer.[1] In his dispatch of that day he maintained the right of France to gain satisfaction for the points in dispute by April 15th, and intimated that if Austria continued her armaments they would be considered as tantamount to a declaration of war. His dispatches were couched in stronger terms than those of Delessart; but seeing that the National Assembly had put that minister on his trial for the crime of moderation, that body, and not Dumouriez, must be held responsible for the change of tone.

It is, however, highly improbable that war could have been averted. The German Powers looked upon France as an easy conquest. The French people were determined to allow no intervention whatever in their domestic concerns, and a large part of the Jacobin and Girondin groups longed for war. It is true that Robespierre, Danton, and Marat inveighed against war from a shrewd

[1] *Dispatches of Earl Gower*, edited by Mr. Oscar Browning (Camb., 1885), pp. 164–5. See, too, the news given by Thugut, the Austrian minister, to Breteuil and passed on to Fersen on April 17th, that Francis II meant to attack the French, but that they must be *amused* two months till he was ready (Fersen, *Diary*, p. 255).

suspicion that it must commit the destinies of France to some great general; but the rank and file were less observant of the teachings of history, which had prompted Burke to his famous prophecy of the advent of a military dictator.[1] They believed that the cry—"war against governments, peace to the peoples"—would paralyse the old monarchies, and that the unfettered might of France would revolutionize the whole of the Continent. The nobler half of the Girondist party, led by the orator Vergniaud, by Mme. Roland and her devoted admirer, Buzot, pleaded eloquently for a crusade on behalf of Liberty. In a thrilling oration Vergniaud besought the Assembly to be the Providence of the future to myriads of serfs, and he pictured the shades of those who had departed as thronging their hall with voiceless pleadings for their descendants.

In those days of freshness and hope exalted enthusiasm counted for much; but the Assembly was also swayed by meaner considerations. The wire-puller Brissot, who headed an influential group of the Girondins, believed that a war with Austria would hopelessly compromise the King and Queen, and hasten the advent of a republic in which he and his friends would be supreme. He is even reported by Dumont to have suggested the disguising of some French horsemen as uhlans, who were to raid French villages on the frontier, and so provoke a declaration of war.[2] Certainly at a later date he boasted that it was the abolition of royalty that he had in view in causing the declaration of war.[3] Again, in his "Address

[1] Burke, *Reflections on the French Revolution*, Part II, section iv.

[2] Dumont's *Recollections of Mirabeau*, quoted by Clapham, *op. cit.*, p. 191.

[3] *A tous les Républicains de France*, by Brissot.

to his Constituents," he wrote: "We [the Girondins] sought in the war an opportunity to lay traps for the King, to reveal his bad faith and his connections with the emigrant princes." Seeing that Brissot possessed great influence in the Jacobins' Club (far greater than Robespierre had at that time), and a large and eager following in the Assembly, one must pronounce him more than any other Frenchman guilty of the war. Dumouriez, as we have already seen, was an ally, not a follower, of the Girondin groups, and certainly he never held Brissot's views respecting the monarchy.

As if to fill to the brim the cup of folly which France was to drain to the dregs, many of the Constitutional party believed that a war would strengthen the executive and firmly establish the monarchy on its new basis. The Queen, too, possibly even Louis XVI himself, though he wavered on this topic, now clung to the desperate hope that safety might be found in the irruption of an Austrian army, which would scatter the levies of France, cut its way through to the Tuileries and deal vengeance on "the factions." This was their sole hope, so their staunch friend, Count Fersen, found in a secret interview with them about February 20th.[1] Thus it came about that no party in the Assembly opposed war, and, from the most conflicting reasons, groups that were opposed in all else concurred in this fateful desire. In such a case, to pass judgment on a minister newly come to office as the cause of war is a mark either of puerility or of prejudice.[2]

Seeing that Francis II was not more, but less, pacific

[1] *Diary and Correspondence of Count Fersen*, pp. 246, 306. See, too, Clapham, *op. cit.*, pp. 189, 190.

[2] Taine, *La Révolution française*, II, 128–36, lays the responsibility on the Assembly, but at that time the policy of Austria was not fully known.

than his father, Dumouriez had come to see that war was inevitable. On April 11th he informed Earl Gower that if no answer were received from Vienna within four more days, the French Government would regard itself as at war with Austria.[1] Meanwhile the Court of Vienna, on April 7th, stiffly referred the French ambassador, de Noailles, back to its dispatch of March 18th as its last word on the subject. On April 15th Dumouriez received Noailles' dispatch describing this rebuff. On the following day he proposed to the Council of Ministers to recall Noailles, and to request Louis XVI to propose to the Assembly a declaration of war against Austria.[2] According to Dumont, three of the ministers disapproved of war, viz. Roland, Clavière, and Degrave, but they gave way before the inevitable.

Accordingly, there was seen on April 20th the strange sight of an almost captive monarch proposing to his captors a declaration of war with a view to their overthrow and his release, while the Assembly, with very few dissentients, enthusiastically entered into the scheme, and threw down the gauntlet to the first military power in the world. Assuredly no one of those ardent crusaders realized that they were kindling a flame which was destined to last, with a short interval, for two decades, to shrivel up the old order of things in Europe, and to blast the cause of liberty which they believed they were furthering. M.

[1] *Gower's Dispatches*, pp. 170, 171. Dumouriez, in his *Mémoires*, Bk. IV, chap. II., admits that, as a *Frenchman*, he longed for war after the insults from Austria, but, as a minister, he sought to avert it. We cannot find much distinction between his conduct as a minister and a Frenchman. We think it is clear that he did little to avert war, and that he accepted it as inevitable, but he did not provoke it.

[2] Sorel, *op. cit.*, II, 429, 430.

Sorel prefixes to his account of the rupture with Austria the terrible indictment: "The Gironde wished for war, and through war, power." Previously he had included in his censure the National Assembly and the populace of Paris, because, while Narbonne had worked for a "limited" conflict with the Emperor and the Elector of Trèves, "they let loose a real and a passionate war, a national war, in which the perpetual hatred of Austria was inflamed by all the ardour of revolutionary propaganda."[1]

The eminent historian who thus emphatically described the condition of affairs previous to Dumouriez' accession to office might be expected to admit that the change of a foreign minister was not the chief cause of war. But the reader who carefully peruses M. Sorel's masterly narrative at this point, and still more so the articles which he published in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* for 1884, must soon become aware of a strong bias operating against the reputation of Dumouriez. It may therefore be well to notice some of his characteristic criticisms, not from the review, but from his maturer work. Ignoring the fact that Dumouriez had been military commander at Cherbourg since the year 1777, M. Sorel, after laying stress on his secret missions and imprisonment in the Bastille, says:—

"The year 1789 found (*trouva*) him military commander at Cherbourg. . . . After thirty restless years, in which he had negotiated more than fought, and intrigued more than negotiated, he had with great difficulty obtained this subordinate post. He was an ambitious man; he had not succeeded; he was discontented, a restless *frondeur*. . . .

[1] Sorel, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 342, 395. Cf. Mirabeau's prophetic assertion in his speech of May 20th, 1790: "C'est toujours sous le charme de la passion que les Assemblées politiques ont déclaré la guerre."

The French Revolution was not, in his eyes, a movement for the regeneration of humanity; it was a career. He threw himself into it with a perfect scepticism, a complete indifference as to means, claiming to play with this Revolution as Retz had played with the Fronde. . . . A deist in philosophy, a constitutionalist in politics, a soldier above all, that is to say, a born enemy of disorder, despising the *canaille*, enamoured of a powerful authority which would guarantee civil reforms, dreaming at last that he saw coming under his control this Revolution which was beginning to turn to his profit, he held, as he said later to Louis XVI, that one must play the part of fire, 'giving oneself to their views, adopting their spirit and their jargon in order the better to deceive them,' marching with them, in short, up to the very day when one could march against them."[1]

This preamble to M. Sorel's description of Dumouriez' career does not inspire confidence. The *parti pris* is too obvious; and, to those who know Dumouriez' past, the prejudice is too glaring to need much correction. We may, however, point out that his adhesion to the cause of reform had, up to the summer of 1791, hindered his advancement; that his conduct had been quite consistent since the outbreak of the Revolution; and that, if he looked upon that event as opening up a career, he erred in company with Mirabeau and with the young Corsican who saw in the Revolution *la carrière ouverte aux talents*. In truth, M. Sorel, in his eager assault upon Dumouriez, exposed his own flank; he laid himself open to the rejoinder, that if we drum out from the cohort of Revolutionary worthies all those who refused even to consider

[1] Sorel, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 402–6.

their own advancement, we shall reduce it to a select band of headless idealists.

It will, however, be time enough to pronounce on Dumouriez' character when we have examined his career. We have seen that in the month of August, 1791, he desired peace. But the hostile attitude of the young Hapsburg sovereign, Francis II, the threats of the French *émigrés*, the bellicose ardour of the National Assembly, possibly, too, the secret wish of the King and Queen for war, had their influence; and even before Austria had refused his last request for a definite and categorical explanation of her attitude, he had determined to prepare for war.

The plans of Dumouriez rested on three fundamental conceptions, hostility to Austria as the natural enemy of a free France, friendship with England as the natural ally of a newly enfranchized people, and the desire to extend the influence, though not the boundaries, of France to her "natural limits"—the Rhine, the Maritime Alps, and the Pyrenees.

Let us examine these plans somewhat fully. Dumouriez' first Memorandum, setting forth the means to be adopted in case of a war with Austria, is entitled, *Reflections on the Negotiation with England in Case of War* (March 30th, 1792). He there lays down the axioms of his policy—that the safety of France in her present state will compel her in case of a rupture with Austria forthwith to carry the war into the Austrian or Belgic Netherlands; and that, as this will alarm England, he will send Talleyrand (already favourably known by his mission to London early in the year) to appease her fears. Talleyrand will say, in effect, to the British ministers: "You have gener-

ously forborne to take advantage of our embarrassments; we now call you to witness that our proposed invasion of the Belgic Provinces is the only means of averting utter ruin from France, and that we will in no case annex them. You can have no interest in joining our enemies. Our colonies, desolated by the risings of the negroes, will be a burden and no profit to you if you conquer them. Your wasting of our shores will avail little. We, on the contrary, will conquer Holland, and open the estuary of the Scheldt to commerce. The passion for liberty will paralyse the hands of our enemies on land, and then, in two or three years, we will dispute with you the empire of the seas. You alone will have ruined our constitution. You alone will have compelled us to extend our power by propagating the spirit of liberty. But if you remain neutral we shall certainly conquer the hostile league. The two nations, if allied, will be the arbiters of peace or war for the whole world."[1]

Here Dumouriez struck the keynote of the new French diplomacy. It was manly, bold, but, towards England at least, essentially peaceful. Evidently he did not dread a war with Austria; for he trusted that the ardour of the present, added to the national instinct for the offensive, would speedily disconcert the imposing but ill-knit confederacy then being formed in Central Europe. But there was one condition essential to success—the friendship of England. This he was resolved to obtain by the mission of Talleyrand to London. As a clause of the constitution prevented Talleyrand from accepting office under Louis XVI, he was to proceed to London as unofficial adviser to the *ci-devant* Marquis de Chauvelin, the newly appointed am-

[1] Pallain, *La Mission de Talleyrand à Londres*, pp. 172–7.

bassador. The latter, a young man, inexperienced in affairs, but a brilliant figure in Society, was to be the figure-head of the French embassy; and it appears that Talleyrand suggested, and Dumouriez chose him so that he might be under the tutelage of the far more experienced Archbishop of Autun. This able ecclesiastic, as we have said, had already undertaken a mission to the British Court early in the year for the purpose of assuring England's neutrality in the conflict that already was foreseen. But neutrality was not enough for Dumouriez. He wanted an alliance, or something very like it; and the means of gaining it he set forth very fully in the "Instructions for MM. Chauvelin, Talleyrand, and Duroverai," dated April 19th, 1792.

Monsieur Pallain has hazarded the conjecture that they may have been drawn up by Talleyrand, because in style they resemble some of his later notes. To this we may reply that they clearly resemble the earlier *Reflections*, and that their *verve* and forcefulness are characteristic of Dumouriez. Talleyrand may have touched them up; but it is not usual for a Minister of Foreign Affairs to ask an agent to dictate the sense of the instructions on which he is to act; and as we also know from the *Souvenirs* of Dumont that the two men were not on the best of terms,[1] we may accept them as substantially the work of Dumouriez.

Starting from the supposition that the necessities of the case would compel France to attack the Austrian Netherlands, Dumouriez urged Talleyrand to reassure the British Government that this apparently offensive

[1] Pallain, *op. cit.*, p. 233 note. Also Lady Blennerhassett, *Life of Talleyrand*, Vol. I, p. 189; McCabe, *Talleyrand*, p. 118.

movement was in reality defensive; above all, that it did not betoken conquest.

In this connection we may note that the Diplomatic Committee, at whose session Dumouriez was present on April 19th, proposed to the Assembly on the following day, that, along with the declaration of war against Austria, it should formally disavow all intention of conquest, and assert that it would never employ its forces against the liberty of any people. This decree, which was carried almost unanimously, ought to have been superfluous, seeing that Article VI of the Constitution of 1791 was couched in exactly the same terms. In other respects, too, it may provoke the ridicule of cynics; but it certainly expressed the exalted feelings of that time, and was in consonance with the diplomacy of Dumouriez. He discerned the important truth, hidden from Frenchmen in the next two decades, that England could never allow France to hold the Netherlands. Therefore, while about to invade the Belgic Provinces, he sought to retain her friendship by hinting that those provinces would become a federal republic, independent of French control.

Having thus cleared away the first obstacle to a friendly understanding, Talleyrand was to seek to convince the British ministers that their true interests lay in opposing the coalition, which was really a conspiracy against all free states and harboured designs of dismembering France, and probably also Poland and parts of the Germanic system. Further, he was to point out that the triumph of the coalition would imply the re-establishment of absolute monarchy in France, the renewal of the Family Compact with Spain and of the alliance with Austria. Still more incredible was it that England would

draw the sword against France. For what could she gain by attacking a brave and determined people, whose strength always increased with war? Her conquest of the French colonies would bring her no gain but much difficulty. France, it was hinted, could give England much trouble in Ireland as well as India. In any case, the indomitable energy of the French forbade the thought of conquest by a coalition which was strong only in appearance. France, victorious, would revolutionize Holland, and establish herself in Belgium and in the Rhineland. But was it not time, he urged, that the old rivalries should cease, and that the two nations should assist each other in the path of progress?

Along with these lofty thoughts Dumouriez took care to formulate material arguments which were more likely to have weight at London. England was known to long for the recovery of Tobago, a colony almost solely British by settlement and in commercial interests, which she was constrained to cede to France in the humiliating peace of 1783. On its side, the French Government urgently needed money. Why not effect an exchange on these terms? France would place a loan of three or four millions sterling on the London market, and would ask the British Government to guarantee the payment of the interest. Tobago would be the price of this privilege. Foreseeing, perhaps, that Pitt, with his zeal for economy and neutrality, would object to so compromising an action, Dumouriez sought to weaken his scruples by promising that France would renew the Anglo-French Commercial Treaty of 1786 on favourable terms. But he further sketched an alluring plan which bears the stamp of his daring genius. If Spain showed herself hostile to the

two nations, could they not form a compact for the freeing of South and Central America from the Spanish yoke, thus assuring to themselves the command of those markets? Thus strengthened, the two friendly peoples would become the arbiters of Europe and lead it forward on the path of progress.[1]

In order to associate Louis XVI with this overture to England, Dumouriez induced him to write on April 18th a confidential letter to George III couched in the friendliest terms. It declared his wish that the ties uniting the two peoples should become lasting, assigned the greatest importance to their "alliance," as being "necessary for the stability of the constitution of the two States and the maintenance of their internal tranquillity; and, I will add, that united, we ought to command peace in Europe."[2]

George III did not rise to the height of the situation, partly, perhaps, because this letter appeared in the Paris papers shortly before it was presented to him. It is probable that Dumouriez approved of the publication as tending to identify Louis XVI with the national policy; but certainly the incident created a bad impression at

[1] Pallain, *op. cit.*, pp. 219–42. The plan of rousing the Spanish colonies against Spain had certainly been considered by Pitt in the summer and autumn of 1790, when a war with Spain appeared very probable over the Nootka Sound dispute. At that time General Miranda, a native of Caraccas, had interviews with Pitt, who encouraged him to hope, in case of war, for British support in freeing that district from Spain. Nothing came of it, as peace was preserved. Miranda then went to Paris, and is said to have been in close touch with the Girondins. We have found no proof that Dumouriez then knew him personally until January, 1793; but in April, 1792, he must have known of his plans and kept them in reserve, as the British ministry afterwards did in 1797–1800 and 1804–6, as a trump card against Spain. A good Life of Miranda is much needed.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 215–19.

London. That indiscretion alone would have prejudiced the success of a mission where the greatest tact was necessary, and Chauvelin soon showed his tactlessness by haunting the *salons* of the Opposition. Possibly, too, George III had already heard the news which Marie Antoinette on April 19th sent to her confidant, Count Fersen, at Brussels: "The King desires that the King of England be secretly informed that the letter M. Chauvelin bears, though written by his own hand, is at least not his own style."[1] She then adds a pious ejaculation that "vengeance may come at last for all the outrages endured in this country." There seems to be no reference in George III's letters to this explanatory missive; but if we remember that, early in May, the Pitt Ministry sought to suppress the seditious pamphlets then rife in Great Britain, the reason for the failure of Dumouriez' attempt to gain her alliance will be sufficiently clear. The horror of French democracy felt by George III, by Lord Camden, by the Chancellor Lord Thurlow, and other ministers was notorious; and though Pitt and Grenville were not unfriendly, they, too, were resolved not to suffer the slightest departure from neutrality. It was something to be sure of that; and the fervent royalists who hoped to see a league of the kings against France mourned when the Court of St. James issued a declaration of its strict neutrality (May 25th). For Dumouriez, however, this was a heavy blow. The British alliance was the key-stone of his diplomatic fabric. Whether it would have paralysed the coalition, as Fox afterwards maintained, is doubtful. Pitt, in his zeal for economy, had so cut down the army, that it was at present almost a negligible

[1] Fersen, *op. cit.*, p. 319.



WILLIAM PITT
From the engraving by C. Brome after W. Owen.
(1799)

quantity. But the failure of France to raise a loan in London hampered her efforts, and probably assured the failure of her stroke against the Austrian Netherlands.

The efforts of Dumouriez in other directions claim only a brief notice. Before war broke forth, he made an effort, fruitless as it proved, to secure the neutrality of Prussia. He further sought to detach the South German States from their connection with Austria (a step successfully followed by the Directory and Napoleon in more favourable times). In order to reduce Russia to inaction, he sent an envoy to Constantinople to seek to persuade the Porte once more to move against her.[1] Above all, he sought to multiply the difficulties of Austria by stirring up discontent in the Austrian Netherlands. These provinces and likewise the bishopric of Liége had long been in a state of ferment, which the Court of Vienna and the bishop had in vain sought to quell. Here, then, were the means of humbling the pride of the Hapsburgs. The dismantling of the barrier fortresses (Mons, Namur, etc.) left that land almost at the mercy of France, and the inhabitants, though too Catholic and conservative to sympathize with the French democrats, would at least welcome them as deliverers. Thither, then, Dumouriez dispatched Maret (afterwards Duc de Bassano under Napoleon) with the aim of paralysing the Hapsburg forces in that quarter. He instructed him to assure the Belgians that their liberty would be respected, and that they should form a "federal republic, obeying the same authority in all that pertains to common defence and foreign policy; that State can gain unity only when the peoples of the provinces are

[1] Sorel, II, p. 455.

united in principles and in moral and political conceptions."[1]

The reader who knows the history of France under the Directory and Napoleon cannot fail to see how different the history of Europe would have been if those rulers had refrained from thrusting the centralized institutions of France upon the Belgians and other peoples. An observance of the principles laid down by Dumouriez would have girdled France with free and allied communities—a means of defence surer by far than the subject satrapies and kingdoms which were a menace to other states, and therefore a perpetual cause of war.

Maret's mission had little effect. Austria, too, proved to be better prepared in her Netherlands than was expected, possibly because Marie Antoinette had warned the Court of Vienna, through Count Fersen, that the French intended to strike at their Netherlands. "It is essential to take precautions around Liége,"[2] she wrote on March 30th to Fersen. The count, we may remark, was partly responsible for the efforts of the Queen to bring on a war; for, as he wrote on April 18th, he had "advised their majesties to incite the rebels to attack"[3] Austria. The queenly serenity of Marie Antoinette in her last days must win our admiration; but we cannot shut our eyes to the infatuation and duplicity of her conduct in the spring of 1792. After inciting "the rebels" to a war, she took all possible steps to hinder the conclusion of a Franco-British alliance, and to assure the conquest of France by the German Powers. Her conduct can be condoned only by

[1] Dumouriez to Maret, April 30th, 1792.
[2] Fersen, *Diary*, p. 316.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 318.

the Jesuitical maxim, *Nulla fides cum infidelibus servanda.*[1]

Unconscious of these hidden snares Dumouriez struggled manfully with the mass of difficulties which every eye could see. In truth, France was girded by foes. He had hoped, by dangling the prize of the Austrian province of Milan before the eyes of the King of Sardinia, to range him against the Hapsburg Power, of which he was always jealous. But now the presence at Turin of that monarch's son-in-law, the Comte d'Artois, added to his own hatred of democracy, inclined him strongly to the Austrian side. A French envoy passing through his kingdom was placed under arrest. Dumouriez at once sent a demand for his release and an apology within twenty-four hours. This behaviour won the applause of the Assembly; but Dumouriez carefully explained it away at Turin, and once more sought, but in vain, for the alliance of Sardinia. Several of the lesser German states also joined Austria, and a declaration of war from Berlin seemed imminent.

In such a crisis audacity was the highest prudence. The chief advantage possessed by France lay in her central position between the forces of the coalition. As in the wars between Francis II and the Emperor Charles V, so too now, her compact territory might defy the attacks of the half of Europe. Her armies, moving on interior lines against foes spread out on a far wider arc, could make headway against great odds; and certainly the odds were great. Prussian troops amounting to 12,000 men in Brabant, 15,000 in Luxemburg, and 25,000 in the Palatin-

[1] It seems an exaggeration to say "It was with feelings of despair that the King and Queen found themselves drifting into war" (*Cambridge Mod. Hist.*, Vol. VIII, p. 220). The Queen's feelings were certainly far different.

ate, might at any time move against France; and in those same districts there were Austrian armies of 58,000, 25,000, and 30,000 men respectively, besides 35,000 in the Breisgau on the Upper Rhine, and a further force in the Swiss district of Porentruy, the neutrality of which the Court of Vienna had violated in order to have Franche Comté at its mercy.

To oppose these forces, which altogether exceeded 200,000 men, France could dispose of 53,000 men in the army of the north, 62,000 in Alsace, and 49,000 in and near Metz. These forces, in all 164,000 men, were ill-equipped, ill-paid, and therefore ill-disciplined. In order to procure the necessary funds, Dumouriez, whose experience and activity pulsated through the ministries of war and finance, devised the plan of patriotic gifts for the army, and the Assembly further ordered the issue of 300,000,000 francs in assignats or paper money. Only by great daring, it seemed, could France snatch a victory; and if anywhere it would be in the Austrian Netherlands. Apart from the advantage of supporting her troops in a rich and friendly land she might hope to rouse the Belgians, gain numerous recruits, and drive the Austrians back on Cologne or Luxemburg. Dumouriez hoped that three legions composed of Brabanter's Liégeois and Dutch "Patriots" would soon be seen campaigning with the "soldiers of Liberty."[1]

The plan of striking first at the Netherlands was thoroughly sound in principle. It was adopted by Dumouriez himself in the autumn of that year, by Carnot a year later, and notably by Napoleon in the Waterloo campaign.

[1] *La Défense nationale du Nord* (1792–1802), by MM. P. Foucart, J. Finot, etc., 2 vols. (Lille, 1890). *Earl Gower's Dispatches*, pp. 175–8.



BONAPARTE FIRST CONSUL

From a coloured line engraving, drawn and engraved by Chataiguier, in the Barras Collection of H. H. Raphael, Esq., M.P.

The dictates of strategy and of common sense alike enjoined an attack on the richest and weakest part of the Austrian dominions; and such a move was in accord with those political conceptions on which Dumouriez, and we may add Napoleon, laid so much stress. Already the former had thus trenchantly summed up his plans: "To keep to a strict defensive on all sides where there are mountains like the Alps and Pyrenees, or the sea, or a river like the Rhine, presented a natural barrier, and to wage an offensive war everywhere else."[1] This implied a defensive everywhere except against Nice and Savoy (that is, if Sardinia declared against France); and an offensive against the Belgic and Rhenish lands. Thus Dumouriez sketched a plan which was destined to shape the future of France; for it implied the extension of the influence, though not the boundaries, of France up to those natural barriers. In a military sense, then, Dumouriez set forth and popularized the idea of the "natural boundaries," which struck deep into the imagination of his people.

As to the details of the Belgic campaign, Dumouriez devised two real attacks, together with two feints for the purpose of distracting the enemy. Theobald Dillon, with a small force from Lille, was to make a demonstration towards Tournay; while Lafayette, with 10,000 men of the Metz army, advanced to Givet on the Meuse, marched down that river, and seized Namur, in order to protect the right of the principal operations. These were to begin from Valenciennes as a base. The plan was that Biron, formerly Duc de Lauzun, should march rapidly on Mons with a vanguard of 10,000 men; while Rochambeau, the commander-in-chief, with a much larger force, followed

[1] Dumouriez, *Mems.*, Vol. II, p. 221 (Bk. II, chap. III).

him up and supported him. After occupying Brussels, Biron was to make a dash at the citadel of Antwerp, and after seizing or blockading it was to deal similarly with the fort at Ostend. Speed was essential. "Let us strike like lightning," he wrote on April 26th to Biron. "We must carry the nation along with us."[1]

The plan was undeniably brilliant, though perhaps too ambitious, and involving too great diffusion of forces. In any case it failed hopelessly, owing to the faultiness of the means. Rochambeau advocated a different scheme, and in other ways disagreed with Dumouriez; Lafayette, who commanded one column, was also ill-affected to the minister;[2] and his colleagues, Biron and Theobald Dillon, were inexperienced in the handling of armies. Worse still was the state of the soldiery. Unsteadiness or excitability, or perhaps the treason of some foreign troopers, caused a panic in the forces of Biron and Theobald Dillon. They fled back in wild disorder, and the runaways of the Lille force disgraced themselves by murdering Dillon in that city.[3]

These disasters gave Rochambeau the excuse for launching a protest against the whole plan of campaign and tendering his resignation, which Dumouriez promptly accepted, replacing him by Lückner. Amidst the outcry and the confusion at Paris, the ministry nearly collapsed. Owing to charges of incapacity, Degrave resigned the ministry of war on May 8th, and was succeeded by Servan; but it was the energy and staunchness of Dumouriez which aroused new spirit at Paris and put some

[1] *Défense nationale*, I, 23–5.
[2] Dumouriez, *Mems.*, Bk. IV, chap. III.
[3] *Défense nationale*, I, pp. 27–43, for the official documents on these affairs.

life into the armies on the frontier. Even Earl Gower was fain to admit that "at least he possesses the virtue of courage."[1]

Nevertheless, as the Austrians were better prepared than was expected, and the Belgians showed no desire to welcome the French, his plan of campaign fell through. The great need was for faithful officers and trained troops. Royalist officers deserted daily to the enemy, and this made the troops suspicious and restive. If the Austrians had been sure of their base in the Netherlands, they could have ended the war at a blow. But they did little or nothing for some six weeks—a fact which is the best justification of Dumouriez' original scheme.

Meanwhile the centre of interest shifted to Paris. The torpor of the Austrians and the boldness of the Girondins brought about a crisis far different from that which either Marie Antoinette or Dumouriez had expected. She had helped to mar his plan of campaign; but now, as was so often to happen in the ensuing months, disaster on the frontier brought to power at Paris the sternest antagonists of the monarchy.

The accession of Servan to the ministry on May 9th doubled the strength of its Girondin elements, for he had a manly energy and power of controlling affairs altogether lacking in the precisians Roland, Gaudet, and Clavière. Self-confident, but with enough of tact to hide his inexperience in military and executive matters, he impressed the Assembly with a sense of his capacity; his enthusiasm for Mme. Roland was widely known, and he it was who now introduced into the Cabinet the plans favoured by that militant high priestess of democracy, setting them forth with the

[1] *Gower's Dispatches*, p. 182.

energy of a man of action and with more than the usual frankness of his native Switzerland. The forward wing of the Gironde had long sought to weaken the constitutional monarchy; and now their adherents in the Cabinet prepared to sap it at its base. They requested the King to dismiss his "orthodox" confessor and replace him by a "constitutional" priest, that is, by one who had sworn to obey the "Civil Constitution of the Clergy," passed in 1790. Dumouriez protested against this attempt to interfere with the King in a matter of conscience, and the proposal was dropped.

But in more important matters the Girondins had their way. On May 27th the Assembly passed a motion for the expulsion from France of all orthodox or nonjuring priests. Two days later it ordered the disbanding of the King's Guard; and early in June Servan, without previously consulting his colleagues in the Cabinet, sent to the President of the National Assembly a proposal for the formation of a camp of 20,000 volunteers drawn from the departments. The time of the muster was to be shortly before the national festival, the 14th of July; the place was to be Paris. In vain did Dumouriez combat this motion both in the Royal Council and in the Committee of the Assembly. The Girondins and Jacobins gained the support of many of the moderates and carried the proposal on June 8th.

The dangers of the plan were patent, and Louis XVI resolved to veto it, together with that relating to the priests. Thereupon Dumouriez warned him of the danger and futility of such an action. In a private interview he pointed out that in the present temper of the populace the royal veto would be swept aside, and would merely have

the effect of bringing up double the number of volunteers and heating their hostility. Moreover, there were ways of drawing from the decree its sting. For instance, a minister of war not unfriendly to the King might change the locality of the camp on the reasonable ground that the troops were not wanted at Paris, and that some place nearer the frontier would be more fitting. Thereupon the King asked his ministers for a few days wherein to consider the matter.

In vain did Dumouriez seek to weaken the King's resolve to veto the decree for the banishment of the orthodox priests. In vain did he remind him of his powerlessness to hinder the populace from expelling or massacring these "unpatriotic" priests. The eldest son of the Church could not bring himself to sign any such measure. His opposition caused Mme. Roland to write to him a very outspoken, if not impertinent, letter, which brought matters to a climax, as she doubtless intended.

We here come to a strange episode on which Dumouriez' *Memoirs* alone throw light. The deaths of the King and Queen prevent us knowing their side of the question, and we must therefore beware of accepting in its entirety the version of the minister. He states that in an interview with the King and Queen the latter asked him whether the King was any longer to put up with the insolence of Roland and his followers. Dumouriez advised them not to suffer it longer, but to dismiss all his ministers. To this the King demurred, and said he must keep him, Lacoste, Duranton, and Laporte. Dumouriez consented, but only on condition that the King sanctioned the decrees on the camp and the banishment of orthodox priests. The King and Queen both exclaimed against these conditions, but

the minister insisted on them as indispensable, and pointed out that Soissons could be fixed as the place of muster for the *fédérés*. "Well," said the King, "you must be minister of war." "Yes," replied Dumouriez, "if your Majesty will sanction the two decrees." He declares, in his *Memoirs*, that Louis assented to this. Certain it is that he cashiered the three Girondin ministers—Roland, Clavière, and Servan; whereupon Dumouriez, with the others, took their places.

Little need be said respecting Dumouriez' tenure of the portfolio for war, for it lasted five days (June 13th to 17th). Despite the howls of rage which greeted him in the Assembly for siding with the King at this crisis, he determined to make it quite clear to that body that the national defences were in a precarious state. Amidst many interruptions he read a Memorandum on the urgent need of reform, and insisted that more heed must be paid to the counsels of the responsible ministers. At the close there were threatening shouts that he should sign it and leave it with the Assembly. He did so with a defiant air, which imposed even on his bitterest enemies. There was something in those gleaming eyes and manly face that commanded respect.

But now he met a worse obstacle even than the howls of a mercurial Assembly. Louis XVI, having gained the support of Dumouriez, was bent on forcing his hand. On entering the Tuileries the minister found the King's behaviour brusque and masterful. Louis bade him and his colleagues carry to the President of the Assembly a note vetoing the two decrees. The ministers remonstrated, but to no effect. On the following day their arguments were of no more avail. Dumouriez thereupon resigned. The King succeeded in persuading Lacoste

and Duranton to remain. Perhaps he hoped to bend the will of Dumouriez, for on that evening a member of the *Feuillant*, or moderate party, made a great effort to win over the general, pointing out that by recently siding with the King he had made enemies of the Girondins and Jacobins, and that his present change of front could not be understood.

The inducement was great, and it is possible that the cause of constitutional monarchy might even now have triumphed had Dumouriez frankly supported the effort of Lafayette and the middle-class portion of the National Guard to crush the forces of disorder on June 29th. As is well known, the vanity of Lafayette and the cowardice of the friends of order wrecked this very partial and ill-devised effort, and the mutual dislike of the two generals (which appears in the very inaccurate version of Lafayette's attempt given in Dumouriez' *Memoirs*[1]) doubtless would have prevented anything more than a merely temporary alliance. It was the bane of France that the friends of order were ever at feud among themselves. Mirabeau despised Necker; Lafayette scorned the idea of acting with Mirabeau; the Girondin idealists unwittingly let loose the waters of strife; and now there was no man and no party that could stem the torrent. Only a well-organized party led by a strong man could have saved the situation; and probably the distrust inspired by Dumouriez' earlier career would have prevented his

[1] In *Memoirs*, Bk. IV, chap. IX, he states that Lafayette came to Paris on June 17th and 18th (that is, *before* the mobbing of the King in the Tuileries, which Lafayette came to *avenge*), and that he, Dumouriez, might have revenged himself on him had he so desired. As this part of the *Memoirs* was written before the spring of 1794, this inaccurate and misleading account of a well-known event is inexcusable, and implies malice against Lafayette.

union with the Moderates, to whom this task would naturally have fallen. With them he had much in common. Like them, he supported the Constitution of 1791, but his connection with the Girondins, partial and temporary though it was, made him hateful to the Feuillants. Hence at the critical moment he fell unsupported by either party. This probably explains why the King paid no heed to his advice. Louis looked on him, no less than on Mirabeau at an earlier period, as merely a demagogic tool, to be used while serviceable and then cast aside.

Dumouriez saw the hapless monarch but once more, namely, when he went to render up the accounts of his Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The interview brought out the better side of both natures. After the King had complimented him on the accuracy of his accounts, the ex-minister ventured to implore him with tears to sanction the decrees; but Louis, though deeply touched, remained obdurate. "I call God to witness," he said, "that I desire only the happiness of France." "I doubt it not, Sire," replied Dumouriez, "but you owe to God an account not only for the purity but also for the enlightened exercise of your motives. While believing that you are saving religion, you are destroying it. The priests will be massacred; you will lose your crown. Perhaps you, your consort, your children. . . ." "I expect death," exclaimed the King; "and I pardon the factions for it. I am grateful to you for your kindness. You have served me well; I hold you in esteem, and if ever a happier time comes, I will give you proof of it." He then rose abruptly, put the papers in order, and calmed himself. On hearing the door open he turned and said, "Adieu. May you prosper."

Such was the end of the brief ministerial career of Dumouriez. It inspired in him a deep affection for the King, a passionate love of regenerated France, and a profound contempt for the factions that were working her ruin. Every one who closely watched the Revolution must have experienced a strange medley of feelings. The movement itself was so sublime; the populace that sought to carry it on was so fickle, fierce, and mean. Those who pandered to its whims and passions rode for a time on the crest of its muddy wave. Every one else was sucked under. The one condition of success was to keep well to the front, push all rivals back, and splash melodramatically.

Does the conduct of Dumouriez in the months of March–May, 1792, warrant the charge that he was a mere adventurer and intriguer? In order to answer this question we must ask first whether he identified himself with the Court party or with the rising group of the Girondins; whether he pinned his faith to the still considerable group of Feuillants, or courted the powerful Jacobin and Cordelier clubs, where Robespierre and Danton held sway. Those were the four pathways to power then open. There were no others.

The foregoing account will have shown that he refused to attach himself to any of these parties. He offended the King and Queen in that he, an officer, favoured the Revolution and upheld the democratic constitution of 1791. By so doing he grouped himself with the Feuillants; but, as his connection with Gensonné brought him into touch with the Girondins, it was as an ally of the latter party that he took office in March, 1792. Soon, however, he sounded their intentions, and found them to

be hostile to the monarchy and destructive of all firm government. His instincts as a soldier alienated him more and more from that brilliant but misguided group. As we have seen, he broke away from them when they began to sap the base of the throne. For a few hours the Feuillants thought that they had gained him, but they counted wrongly. His nature was too ardent and eager to consort with that negative and helpless group.

In fact, when he left Paris for the army, he had broken with all parties. In a tactical sense he made a mistake in repelling the offer of the Feuillants. That discredited party needed a man of action, and he could have been that man. Possessing a magnetic influence over men scarcely inferior to that of Mirabeau and military gifts that he lacked, Dumouriez might have taken up the rôle which the hand of death snatched from the tribune of the people in the spring of 1791. Why he spurned the advances of the Feuillants will perhaps never be fully known. But, in any case, it is clear that in so doing he deliberately closed the door that might have led to wealth and power, and that he turned to the military career as that alone in which a Frenchman might serve with honour. Despair of the future and contempt for the Parisian populace may have impelled him to this step, for these feelings throb passionately through the words which he then penned: "One finds out only too surely that men scarcely deserve the trouble that is taken in the government of them."

CHAPTER V

VALMY AND JEMAPPES

From this day a new epoch in the history of the world begins, and you can say that you were present at its birth.
GOETHE (after the battle of Valmy).

IN undertaking a preliminary survey of the life of Dumouriez, the authors of this volume desire merely to illustrate his character and attainments, so that the reader may understand what manner of man he was who sought to preserve England from invasion during the struggle with Napoleon. They have shown that his participation in civil affairs at Paris in March–June, 1792, bears no signs that stamp him as an unprincipled adventurer; that, on the contrary, he firmly believed in a democratic monarchy; that he refused to attach himself to the parties from which wealth and power might be expected; and that, after rendering up his accounts, he departed sick at heart for the campaign then about to reopen in the north.

To describe in detail the course of the war in 1792 would far exceed the limits of this work. It is necessary, however, to point out the services which Dumouriez rendered at that crisis, and to clear away some misrepresentations which have been fastened upon him. Received at first with suspicion by the commander-in-chief, Lückner, he was relegated to an unimportant command—that

of the camp at Maulde, near the Belgian frontier. Seeing that all the leading officers and many of the troops were decidedly Feuillants his position, as a former ally of the Girondins, was far from easy, but by eschewing politics, by inuring his men to hardships, and by constant sallies against the foe, he gradually gained the confidence of all about him.[1]

It is worth noting that the painter of the charming picture "Les Enrôlements des Volontaires" has placed him in a position which he never occupied. He was at the frontier at the time (July 11th) when the National Assembly declared the country to be in danger, and ordered special means to be taken for enlisting men. The picture shows the recruits filing off opposite a tent where they had entered their names amidst the rolling of drums and shouts of the populace. At their head is Gouvion St. Cyr, later to be one of Napoleon's marshals. Marat's threatening figure and outstretched hand seem to portend the September massacres. Robespierre is coming down the steps with sombre mien. Pétion, the popular mayor of Paris, is calming the excited women and a Jacobin *exalté* in a *bonnet rouge*. To his left, also on horseback, is Dumouriez, casting a piercing and anxious look on the youths filing by. To his left, again, is the massive head of Danton, below whom are grouped Brissot, haranguing the populace, and grasping with the left hand that of the handsome Marseillais, Barbaroux. The grouping of figures is in point of fact impossible; but it illustrates vividly the feelings aroused in the artist by the subsequent exploits of Dumouriez and by the enthusiasm of those days, when the Terror was but dimly foreshadowed and

[1] *La Défense Nationale dans le Nord*, Vol. I, pp. 109-18.

the self-denying zeal of the French youth fringed her frontiers with forces which were one day to become invincible. For the present, one regrets to add, the Parisian volunteers were by far the most disorderly and unsteady, and some battalions had to be disbanded. It has also been computed by von Sybel that the special measures for the raising of volunteers throughout the whole of France produced only 60,000 troops between July 11th and September 20th.[1]

In a personal sense the way was cleared for Dumouriez by the events of August 10th, 1792, and by their sequel. On that day the Girondins and their allies among the populace brought about the overthrow of the monarchy. Prussia had declared war on July 24th, and the threatening manifesto of the Duke of Brunswick threw Paris into a frenzy. All this told against the royal cause; and on August 10th, when surrounded by hostile bands, Louis XVI in the tamest conceivable way betook himself to the National Assembly. The only blows struck for royalism were dealt by the Swiss Guards and a few loyal gentlemen at the Tuileries. As is well known, the Assembly provisionally dethroned the King, immured him and his family in the Temple, and annulled the Constitution of 1791. This action was endorsed by its successor, the famous Convention, which declared the establishment of a French republic at the time of the autumnal equinox.

Meanwhile, Lafayette made the effort which he should have put forth some weeks earlier. Having the support of the municipality of Sedan, he attempted to gain over his army. He succeeded in administering to it the oath of fidelity to the Constitution of 1791; and the mayor

[1] Sybel, *op. cit.*, Bk. IV, chap. IV.

of Sedan ordered the arrest of the Commissioners from the Assembly who came to assert its authority. But now Lafayette showed a lack of the spirit so necessary at such a crisis. Had he acted promptly and led his troops to Paris, he might have deposed the revolutionary leaders. But his actions were slow and half-hearted. His men had time to weigh the consequences that such conduct might entail. That imperious instinct of national self-preservation which prevents an army of good patriots from marching against the central authorities, if thereby it leaves the frontier open to attack, quickly asserted itself. Possibly Lafayette himself felt the force of this conviction. In any case, he was now helpless; and, while fleeing across the frontier on August 20th, he fell into the hands of the Austrians, and was by them consigned to prison. In all probability he had made no overtures whatever to them; and his conduct in this respect therefore compares favourably with that of Dumouriez at the somewhat similar crisis of March-April, 1793.

Six days before this disaster befell his former rival, Dumouriez had written to give his adhesion to the new order of things, which, as he said, "was to be expected from a nation deceived, betrayed, and driven to extremities."[1] The letter has been cited as a proof of his faithless and scheming nature. Certainly it is not creditable to him. But it should be remembered that he had warned the King against the fatal course of action adopted on June 12th; and since his departure from Paris near the end of June the danger to France had been redoubled by the advance of the Prussian army, reputed to be the best in Europe. He had to choose between the

[1] Letter printed in the *Moniteur* of August 19th, 1792.

THE ENROLMENT OF VOLUNTEERS. THE COUNTRY DECLARED TO BE IN DANGER, JULY 11TH, 1792

From a painting by Vinchon. Reproduced by permission of Messrs. Manzi, Joyant & Co.

nation and a King who had avowed his reactionary tendencies. Further, it should be noticed that he made his choice on August 14th, six days before Lafayette fled over the border. A comparison of dates, therefore, suffices to refute the insinuation that Dumouriez changed front in order to gain Lafayette's command. In truth, it was in the evening of August 18th that a courier arrived from Paris, bringing the news of his appointment to the supreme command of the Army of the North.[1] The news caused an outburst of joy among his men. The soldierly bearing of Dumouriez, the bold aggressiveness of his plans, and, not least, his good comradeship, had won their hearts. In a time of crisis these qualities are of priceless worth. Even his severest critics[2] admit that he had the power of inflaming his hearers and breathing spirit into sluggards. In that he was a born leader of men.

Certainly France needed such a man. It is difficult to exaggerate the perils of the military situation at that time, enhanced as they now were by the advance of 42,000 Prussians under their King, Frederick William II, and the Duke of Brunswick. This force, formidable by its discipline and prestige, crossed the frontier on August 19th. It was to be joined by an Austrian force from the Netherlands under General Clerfait, besides 5500 Hessians and about 4500 French *émigrés*. For various reasons their advance at first was slow;[3] and possibly it was this which inspired Dumouriez with the daring notion of disregarding that army and pressing the Austrians hard

[1] See his letter of August 18th to the President of the National Association in the *Moniteur* of August 22nd.

[2] e.g. Chuquet, *Valmy*, pp. 18–20.

[3] See Sybel, *op. cit.*, Bk. IV, chap. IV, for the plans and delays of the allies.

in their Netherlands. Something could be said for this, his first and favourite plan. The Belgians were restive under the Hapsburg yoke, which had been riveted upon them once more after the risings of 1789–90. The people of the bishopric of Liége were always ready for revolt against their bishop. The capture of Brussels would paralyse the efforts of the Austrians against Lorraine, and possibly break up their unnatural union with Prussia. Further, the eastern fortresses of France might be expected to stay the invaders, until reinforcements came up to strengthen Lückner's force of 19,000 men in the neighbourhood of Metz. As for that of Sedan, of about equal strength, Dumouriez proposed to entrust it to General Arthur Dillon.

News however reached him at Valenciennes on the night of August 24–5 which compelled him to turn eastward. The troops at Sedan were half mutinous; Lückner was retreating on Verdun; the advance of the allies threatened the little fortresses of Montmédy and Thionville; while the citadel of Longwy was already besieged by Clerfait and seemed likely to surrender. Hastily providing for the commands at Valenciennes and the Maulde Camp, Dumouriez set out in hot haste for Sedan, which he reached on the 28th. His reception by the troops could scarcely have been worse. Ill-paid, mutinous, seeing a possible traitor in every officer, and regretting their old chief Lafayette, they resented the authoritative energy stamped on the features of their new chief. Not a cheer greeted him as he rode along their lines, and one man ventured to shout out, "There is the —— who brought on the war"; to which Dumouriez promptly replied, "Is there any one among you cowardly enough to be sorry for the war? Do you

DUMOURIEZ

From a rare engraving in the Barras Collection of Mr. H. H. Raphael, M.P.

think you will gain liberty without fighting for it?" This happy retort silenced the murmurers and raised the spirits of the whole array.

A glance at the accompanying map will enable the reader to appreciate the difficulties of Dumouriez' position. He held about 19,000 men in front of Sedan, and might be exposed to the attack of the Austrians marching from their Belgic territory, or from Clerfait's force, which had captured Longwy and was now marching on Montmédy. Worse still was the news from the south. The then second-rate fortress of Verdun, garrisoned only by two battalions, was threatened by the Prussians and their allies, nearly 55,000 strong. To check their advance Lückner had scarcely more than 15,000 men at and near Metz, after deducting troops for garrison duty.

The first thing was to call up all possible reinforcements from Rethel and Châlons-sur-Marne; the second, to send two battalions for the support of the garrison of Verdun—an enterprise which they failed to effect. The third was to devise some plan of action for the Sedan force. For this purpose he summoned a council of war on August 30th, and it must be admitted that his account of its proceedings given in the *Memoirs* is utterly misleading. He states that he laid before his officers a map of Champagne, dilated on the means of defending it, and set forth the difficulties the Prussians would have in blockading the strongholds of the east, and in dragging heavy convoys through a hilly country and a hostile population; that, nevertheless, General Dillon, and all the others except Thouvenot, voted for a retreat by way of Ste. Menehould on Châlons-sur-Marne, or even Rheims; that, as Thouvenot's appearance betokened courage and capacity, he beckoned to him to stay

behind, and, pointing to the forest of Argonne, said to him, "There are the Thermopylæ of France. If I have the luck to get there before the Prussians, all is saved."[1]

Now, all this is a picturesque fiction. The official account of the council in the war archives at Paris shows that Dumouriez, Dillon, Thouvenot, in fact, the whole council, voted for an entirely different plan, namely, to leave a few troops in garrison at Sedan and Mézières, and with the rest make a raid into the Austrian Netherlands. This scheme had some recommendations. It was offensive and therefore suited to the genius of Frenchmen; it carried the war into the enemy's country, which was rich in supplies; and it would probably compel Clerfait to retreat to Luxemburg and Liége, thereby leaving the Prussians too weak to do more than attempt the siege of the eastern fortresses in that campaign.

Further, the evidence brought together by Sybel and Sorel shows clearly that the Duke of Brunswick had always disliked the campaign, and longed to be rid of "those French devils." His indecision and his dislike of a war with France were so well known, even at Paris, that Dumouriez probably counted on his retreating at the first opportunity. Certain it is that the Duke had declared his determination never to advance on Paris in that campaign, but to limit his efforts to the capture of the fortresses on or east of the River Meuse.[2] It is therefore difficult to see why Dumouriez should have chosen to hide away his plan, and to slander Dillon by ascribing to him the pusillanimous design of a retreat on Châlons or Rheims. Vanity and

[1] *Mems.*, Bk. V, chap. VI.

[2] Sybel, *op. cit.*, Bk. IV, chap. I. *The Duke of Brunswick*, by Lord Fitzmaurice, pp. 58–62 (London, 1901).



DISTRICT OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1792.

longing for the picturesque are qualities only too prominent in French memoirs, the interest of which is generally proportionate to their mendacity, and in those respects Dumouriez was a Gaul of the Gauls.

It is, however, incorrect to say that Dumouriez' march to "the Thermopylæ of France" was prescribed by his enemy, Servan. On August 25th that minister (reinstated in office on August 10th) had ordered Dillon with the Sedan force to concert measures with Lückner for the succour of Verdun, and in any case for the defence of the road leading from Verdun through the Argonne to Paris. On September 2nd, after hearing that Verdun was closely invested, Servan detailed his scheme more clearly and urgently. In the name of *la patrie* he bade Dumouriez, at Sedan, carry out these orders: "Place your army [he wrote] between the Meuse and the Marne, approach to Ste. Menehould or its environs, or even to Châlons-sur-Marne, crossing the Aisne, so that you may have it as a defence, and so arrive more certainly on the banks of the Marne. Once behind the Marne, if you persist in your idea, you may assign your army to a lieutenant-general under the direction of Marshal Lückner, and yourself proceed to make your attempt against Belgium." These orders, be it observed, prescribed a retreat as far as Châlons, in order that the army might be behind the sheltering arc of the River Marne.

Long before Dumouriez received these tame injunctions he had formed a far bolder scheme. Hearing a heavy cannonade in the direction of Verdun on the morning of August 31st, and finding that Clerfait was moving rapidly against him from Montmédy, he determined to march southwards and occupy the passes of the

Argonne. It is said that one of his generals, Money by name, advised this plan at the end of the council-of-war on the 30th. In any case, it is certain that Dumouriez formed the resolve to seize the passes of the Argonne in consequence of the changed aspect of affairs, and not owing to the orders of Servan; in fact, the assertion of Sybel, that the merit of pointing out the Argonne position belonged to Servan, is quite untenable. The directions which he gave on August 25th to Dillon at Sedan were for the defence of the road leading from Verdun to Paris, and did not prescribe the defence of the Argonne ridge. On September 1st he wrote to Dumouriez recommending the Argonne as a good defensive position; but on the following day he sent the far more precise instructions quoted above, namely, to skirt the rear of that ridge, make for Ste. Menehould, merely in order to reach Châlons and the great bend of the Marne. It was to that river, not to the Argonne, that Servan looked as the chief defence against Brunswick's army.[1]

Moreover, on August 31st, that is, long before the receipt of Servan's orders of September 1st and 2nd, Dumouriez began to break up his camp to the south-east of Sedan, and marched off to seize the chief passes of the Argonne, using that barrier, not as a screen during a retreat to the Marne, but as a barrier for the defence of *la patrie*. On September 2nd, while on the march, he wrote to Servan pointing out that he had anticipated his instructions, probably those of September 1st. He might have added that he was improving on them. Thus, though his description of the council-of-war is wholly

[1] See *La Défense nationale*, p. 152, and Chuquet's *Valmy*, pp. 35–6, 40, for the documents, of which Sybel gives only an inexact summary.

wrong, we may admit that he merely transferred to it the resolution which he formed quietly and alone on the following day.

He entered into this new plan with his customary ardour. His high spirits, and the Gallic gaiety with which he faced and overcame difficulties, electrified his troops. They knew that Clerfait's vanguard was at Stenay, and might seize Grand Pré, the central pass of the Argonne, before they could come up. All this did but lend wings to their dangerous flank march in front of an advancing foe. Fortune favoured them. Brunswick having advised Clerfait to be cautious until Verdun surrendered, that general only reconnoitred in advance of Stenay. Consequently, on September 3rd, Dumouriez was able to occupy the valley of Grand Pré, where, as he said in his letter to Lückner, he took up an impregnable position above the little River Aire.[1] On the previous day Verdun had surrendered to the Prussians; but its resistance, though short, had enabled Dumouriez to take the step which saved France.

Carlyle's description of the Argonne as a "mountain-wall of forty miles" is a fine effort of the imagination, as is most of his account of the Valmy campaign. But, as plain fact will have it, the Argonne is not a mountain-wall with "crags" and "heights." It is a broad range of clay hills nowhere rising to more than about 250 feet above the surrounding plains. Its value as a military defence, then, lay in its densely-wooded slopes and in its hollow, winding, muddy roadways. The latter had everywhere been neglected since the abolition of the *corvées* (forced

[1] The letter proves the date to be September 3rd, not September 4th, as given in his *Memoirs*.

labour on roads), and in this poor country they had gone to utter ruin. The Argonne was ages behind the rich lands near Paris. Arthur Young, in July, 1789, found the village of les Islettes, in the southernmost pass, "a collection of dirt and dung," and the people scarcely recognizable as French[1]; in fact, this very village was on the old border of France and the Germanic Empire. East of it lay the fertile land of the three bishoprics (Metz, Toul, and Verdun); west of it lay "la Champagne pouilleuse."

It was against this primitive district (since shorn of its difficulties by deforestation and improvements in roads) that Brunswick was urged onwards by the impatient Prussian monarch. Frederick William scoffed at the prudent counsels of the duke. The speedy surrender of Longwy and Verdun aroused his hopes of a general collapse of the French defence. In vain did Brunswick plead for the avoidance of the Argonne by a southward march through Bar-le-Duc, round its outermost spurs, to Châlons. The King brooked no delay. So far as he knew, the Argonne was not held by the enemy. If it were held, there were five roads by which it might be crossed; and it was impossible that the French should occupy all five of them in such force as to resist a determined attack. Finally, it was essential to keep in touch with Clerfait at Stenay, whose line of advance would be through the pass of Grand Pré. The balance of advantages, therefore, lay in an attempt to pierce the Argonne.

The dispositions of Dumouriez for its defence were as follows. He himself, along with General Miranda, the would-be liberator of South America, whose character will concern us later in this work, commanded the main

[1] A. Young, *Travels in France*, p. 197 (Bohn Edit.)

array, defending the easiest of the three passes, that at Grand Pré. Dillon, with a smaller force, held the far longer and more difficult passage at les Islettes and la Chalade; and there he was joined by part of the garrison of Verdun and by the two battalions sent to its relief (September 5th). Dumouriez charged Dillon to guard a by-road (not marked on the accompanying map) about half way between la Chalade and Grand Pré. Dillon's cavalry was also told off to the southern spurs of the Argonne in order to sweep the country clear of supplies as far as Bar-le-Duc, in case the Prussians should march by that road. These arrangements of Dumouriez were masterly, as M. Chuquet admits.[1]

The three positions held by the French were strong; but to distribute a force of not more than twenty-four thousand men to guard all of them (without counting those on the north at La Croix aux Bois and Le Chêne Populeux) was decidedly risky. It is true that General Kellermann was about to bring the French army of Metz (he had replaced Lückner in that command) by way of Toul and Bar-le-Duc to the south and to strengthen the French defence on its extreme right, and he managed to slip past the Prussians; but for various reasons his march was very slow. It seems that he, as well as Dumouriez, believed for some days that Brunswick would turn eastwards in order to besiege Metz.[2] But that was not to be. Frederick William ordered an advance on Paris; and the first attempts to force the Argonne were made on September 12th, long before the reinforcements ordered

[1] Chuquet, *Valmy*, p. 73, note.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 100–4, corrects the misstatements of Dumouriez in his *Memoirs*.

DUMOURIEZ ABOUT 1792
From a contemporary bust engraved by F. Dien

up from Valenciennes and the Maulde Camp could come up.

On both sides the movements were clogged by persistent rains, and as the villagers in front of the Argonne, at Dumouriez' orders, had everywhere removed food and firing, the position of the invaders was miserable in the extreme. Goethe, who accompanied the Prussian army, states that every march was attended with much suffering. Nevertheless, on the 12th Brunswick won the first move in the game. Skilfully he masked his real intentions by feints against les Islettes and Grand Pré, which held the French to those points, while Clerfait's Austrians pounced upon the almost unguarded defile farther north—La Croix aux Bois. In defence of Dumouriez, it may be said, firstly, that with 24,000 men he could not guard five defiles spread over a front of more than thirty miles; secondly, that Colomb, who commanded at La Croix aux Bois, reported on the 11th that it was almost inaccessible; thirdly, that Dumouriez, while denuding it of its former small garrison, had ordered up from the rear a battalion of volunteers, who failed to arrive in time.[1]

On hearing of this disaster on the north, Dumouriez at once sent off Chazot with about 6000 men and twelve guns, and ordered him to charge with grape-shot, bayonet, and sabre. Chazot surprised the Austrians at dawn of the 14th, and put them to flight, but once more the Imperialists came on and, in overwhelming numbers, captured the pass, and drove Chazot out westwards towards Vouziers (September 15th). Possibly Dumouriez

[1] Dumouriez, *Memoirs*, Bk. V, chap. VIII, admits that he too readily believed the reports about that position.

should have given him more support; but while the Prussians threatened the all-important position at Grand Pré, it was inadvisable to weaken the central force, on which everything turned.

The whole affair proved the impossibility of defending the five passes at once against superior forces, and the experience there gained was, as we shall see, to be used by Dumouriez in his later plan for the defence of London. For the defence of the capital he relied, not on the camps of the first line near the coast, but rather on those of the second and third lines, after the movements and forces of the invaders were well ascertained. A first line of defence can do little more than delay the invaders, and, if it rests on a ridge having no good communications between the several passes, it is certain to be forced by an enterprising foe. Herr Boguslawski, in his excellent *Life of Dumouriez*, happily compares the situation with that of the attempted defence of the Balkan Passes by the Turks against the Russians in 1877. The defenders relied on the Shipka and one or two other well-known passes, whereas Gourko worked round their rear by the very difficult Khainkoi Pass, and rendered all their positions untenable.[1] The same will always happen against an active and intelligent enemy, and it is probable that Dumouriez in 1792, like the Turks in 1877, would have done better to hold strongly some central post in the rear of the main pass, keeping light troops only in each of the defiles in order to delay the attack, and thereby enable the defending army to fall on the invaders before they debouched into the plain.

[1] See, too, Epauchin, *General Gourko's Advance Guard in* 1877, translated by H. Havelock (The Wolseley Series), chap. II.

The position of the French would now have been very serious if Clerfait had pushed the pursuit hard and Brunswick had attacked Grand Pré. But both leaders were too slow and methodical in their movements. Chazot had time to get clear away, and Dumouriez, imposing on the duke by his firm demeanour, drew off steadily by night and gained the heights of Autry.[1] Dillon also continued his retreat towards Ste. Menehould, that being the point on which, according to Dumouriez' new plans, the French were to rally. Having their backs to the Argonne, they were to hang there on the flank and rear of the enemy, and by holding this excellent position clog the march of Brunswick, in case he should venture on a rush to Paris. This conception of Dumouriez has been universally admired. It was no less bold than skilful, and in accord with the rules of the military art.

His conduct of the retreat further revealed his power over men. That difficult move would probably have been successful had Chazot joined the main body at the appointed time and place; but through weariness his troops were behindhand. On September 15th, while entering the plain of Montcheutin, they were pounced upon by Hohenlohe's light troops and field-guns, and fled in wild disorder with cries of "Treason!" "All is lost!" The flood of fugitives seemed about to carry with it Dumouriez' main force south of Autry, when the commander-in-chief, aided by Miranda, placed his army in three columns, and by his personal intrepidity stopped the stampede. Many, however, of Chazot's men had rushed off to Rethel and never rejoined the colours.

[1] Jomini, *Guerres de la Révolution*, Vol. I, p. 120, blames the allies for their slowness, and says that Dumouriez' firmness and presence of mind saved the situation.

Once again on that day the excitement and nervousness of the troops brought matters to a sorry pass. Scarcely had the force encamped, near to Dommartin-sous-Hans, when it was seized by an unaccountable panic. As evening fell, veterans and volunteers, horse and foot rushed away wildly southwards. Dumouriez had been twenty hours in the saddle; but he now again mounted his horse, and with his staff sought to allay their fears. He shouted to them that the Prussians were far away, and that their own rearguard stood firm. When arguments and the rich expletives of camp parlance proved of no avail, he smote the runaways with the flat of his sword. Little by little shame drove out their fears; and then the commander ordered fires to be lighted to serve as rallying-points for the clusters of repentant runaways. The men came together, not by regiments, but as chance would have it, and the night at last settled down quietly upon the defenders of France huddled pell-mell, hungry, dispirited, and soaked to the skin. Had Dumouriez shown less firmness, or had Brunswick's horsemen fallen on them in the darkness, the last hope of France would have vanished. As it was, the men were still far too unsteady to face the Prussians in the open; and the two panics of September 15th explain the cautious defensive of Dumouriez on the following days.

His behaviour to the troops was tactfully clement. Seeing that nearly all had sinned, he could not make examples; he sought rather to cheer them, to point out the advantages of their position, and the difficulties of the invaders. Above all, he appealed to their patriotism, and by this fatherly conduct gained their affection and confidence. It is a mark of his tenacity of character that even now he

would not listen to the advices from Paris to retire behind the Marne. He clung to the belief that the salvation of France was to be worked out at or near Ste. Menehould.

Towards that town there were converging the troops of Kellermann from the east and part of the Army of the North under Beurnonville, and he believed that a concentration at so commanding a position on the south-western spurs of the Argonne would give pause to the cautious Brunswick.

These calculations were terribly risky; for, as Jomini pointed out, Brunswick ought to have sprung upon Kellermann or Beurnonville before either of them reached Ste. Menehould.[1] But the allies, hard pressed for food, stricken by dysentery, and drenched by the ceaseless rains, were in no condition for active movements. During the critical days of September 15th–17th Brunswick remained opposite Grand Pré. On the two next days he followed on the track of Dumouriez, and was about to make moves which would head him away from the Argonne slopes, when the King suddenly intervened and ordered a march in the direction of Valmy, so as to cut off the retreat of the French on Paris.

But already on the 18th Beurnonville, with 10,000 men from Valenciennes, had joined Dumouriez, bringing up his total to 35,000 men. Nor was this all. On the 19th Kellermann, with about 16,000 men, came within touch of Dumouriez on the south-east, and, finding the position assigned to him defective, proposed to occupy the hill of Valmy and La Lune, the advantages of which were obvious to both generals. He did not, however, carry this out on the 19th, and much confusion resulted from the delay.

[1] Jomini, *op. cit.*, I, 124.

Servan having neglected to place Kellermann under Dumouriez' command, the latter could only give him advice, not orders; and M. Chuquet has proved that Kellermann had not finished posting his troops on those heights (hillocks they should more properly be called) until ten or eleven o'clock on the day of battle. Fortunately all but two of his thirteen battalions were well-trained troops, who had shown their mettle during the long march from Metz, in a style very different from that of the motley array of Dumouriez.

It was on Kellermann's force that the blow of the Prussians was to fall on that eventful September 20th. Thanks to the fog, and to the general slackness that reigned in their force, the invaders did not begin the attack on the Valmy position until Kellermann was almost ready to receive them. He had hurried his men pell-mell up to the small plateau crowned by the mill of Valmy; and it is now known that horse and foot were dangerously crowded together. Fortunately his men had only to stand firm. The army of Dumouriez prolonged their line on the right, so that the French force extended in a semi-circle pointing towards Paris. The support of Dumouriez was far more effective than Kellermann afterwards chose to allow.[1] Besides covering that general's right, he sent several squadrons to strengthen his left wing in the plain. He further planned to take the Prussians in flank on their left if they pressed home the attack on Kellermann, and he actually sent a band of horsemen who carried terror to the Prussian rear. In all the French had 36,000 men actually under fire; the Prussians only 34,000, but they had eighteen more cannon.

[1] Chuquet, *Valmy*, pp. 193–8.

As is well known, the invaders did not press home the attack. After an artillery fire, directed from the slope of La Lune, against the plateau of Valmy, which did no great harm, the troops trained in the school of Frederick the Great steadily formed three columns of attack; but, suffering severely from the French cannonade, they halted until their guns gained the mastery. Fortune did not deny them a passing chance. A shell exploded three powder-wagons, dealt death among the crowded French lines, and for a time silenced their artillery. Had Brunswick charged at once, he might have won the day. But before he gave the order Kellermann had rallied his men. The cry of *Vive la Nation* once more rang from the hill, and the French guns resumed their deadly fire. As the Prussian columns rolled forward, Brunswick noted Dumouriez' horsemen preparing to charge the Prussian right. He paused, pointed out the danger of attacking that strong position, held so resolutely in front and on the flank. To halt was to lose the day. A council-of-war decided to draw off the troops; and it is probable that the threatening position of Dumouriez on the north had no small effect in contributing to this decision. His left wing had been cannonaded, but had briskly replied. For the most part his rôle on that day was passive. None the less he helped effectively to cover Kellermann's wings and to checkmate Brunswick.[1] He had done more. He had sent a small force round the Prussian left flank, which fell upon the reserves and baggage with startling effect. This raid may have helped to decide Brunswick to call off

[1] Chuquet, *Valmy*, pp. 217–18, 243–4; where he shows that the *later* complaints of Kellermann against Dumouriez are completely refuted by his letter of that time.

his men; and to do that, as things were in the allied camp, was to end the campaign.

Neither Dumouriez nor Kellermann believed this at the time. They wisely took precautions for withdrawing the latter's force to a better position, believing that another attack would certainly be made. But Dumouriez, no less skilful in diplomacy than in war, took care to sow the seeds of discord in the enemy's camp. Chance favoured his purpose. His daring stroke at the Prussian rear had led to the capture of a Prussian Minister of State, Lombard. Him he liberated, but sent to him a memoir, setting forth the danger to the person of Louis XVI if the allies should threaten Paris, and the reasons why Prussia should abandon a war which could only benefit her rival, Austria.[1] Lombard and Brunswick eagerly adopted these views, and negotiations went on for a week, during which hostilities were suspended. We may note that the memoir is decidedly republican in tone and therefore tells against his later statements, in his *Memoirs*, of his consistent devotion to monarchy.[1]

The delay was all in favour of France; and though Kellermann chafed at the mental ascendancy of Dumouriez, and the frightened Parisians demanded his retreat to Châlons for the protection of the capital, he held firm to the Ste. Menehould position, knowing well that the Prussians could not find food in *la Champagne Pouilleuse*, and that every day increased the number of the French levies threatening their flanks. Meanwhile he urged ministers at Paris to seek to detach Prussia from the coalition. On September 29th the commander-in-chief (Dumouriez

[1] It is printed in the Appendix to Vol. III by the editors of the Dumouriez *Memoirs* (edit. of 1823).

gained this honour on September 27th) wrote a letter strongly urging the need of moderation so that a peace might be obtained. "A general peace [he wrote], which we might obtain on glorious conditions, would be better for us than the dangers of a long war."[1] Would that the demagogues then in power had hearkened to him. The Prussian monarch would probably have listened to reasonable terms. In place of them there came the defiant declaration—"The Republic does not discuss terms until its territory is evacuated."—Very fine on the stage, but in real life bad business.

As a matter of fact Danton, who had discerned the worth of Dumouriez, took care to send to the front Westermann, his right hand on August 10th; and through him the overtures commenced by Dumouriez went on, the general himself having some hand in them. Meanwhile the Prussian monarch had resolved to retreat. The jealousies of the allies respecting Poland, their fears of Russia, and their dislike of the French *émigrés*, all brought about this result. Dumouriez followed them cautiously, trusting more to negotiations than to the sword.[2] By the end of October France was free from her invaders; and Kellermann and Custine were preparing to strike at Mainz (Mayence). As for Dumouriez, his thoughts turned towards Belgium; and as the Republic had chosen

[1] Sybel, Bk. IV, chap. v.

[2] Jomini, I, 139, commends his caution, which was obviously due to his distrust of the steadiness of his troops.

Why does Mr. Belloc, in his excellent study, *Danton* (p. 195), say that patriotism played a very small part in Dumouriez' conduct, and that Danton, who approved his conduct, did so for the sake of France alone? Surely the general, who had twice seen his troops fly in wild and causeless panic, knew that they could not yet safely face the Prussian army on anything like equal terms. After all, was not the liberation of the territory the chief aim?

definitely for a war of propaganda, he indulged large hopes. To Kellermann he wrote, "I hope in the spring to shake hands with you across Cologne. The Rhine must be the limit of our campaign from Geneva to Holland, perhaps to the sea."

Before turning to Belgium, Dumouriez paid a brief visit to Paris (October 11th–19th). He was received with respect, not unmingled with suspicion. Marat appeared at one of the receptions in his honour and croaked disapproval of some of his actions. Dumouriez looked contemptuously at him and turned on his heel with the words, "Ah! you are he whom they call Marat."[1] It was a mistake, for Marat was even then a power to be reckoned with. He carried his complaints to the Jacobins and shrilled forth his insinuations in that singular print, *L'Ami du Peuple*. Thenceforth Dumouriez became suspect to the Sansculottes, who worshipped Robespierre and Marat. For these fanatics he had an instinctive dislike. Danton he esteemed as a man bold in bearing and straightforward in action. He sought to come to some understanding and to bring him into closer contact with the Gironde.[2]

The scheme came to naught, owing partly to the decline of that party in influence, but also to its invincible priggishness. An incident revealed this characteristic of theirs. Danton and Dumouriez were in the same box in the theatre when Vergniaud, the great orator of the Girondins, with Mme. Roland on his arm, opened the door. As soon as the lady saw Danton and the general she promptly withdrew her arm and retired. Hatred of

[1] *Memoirs*, Vol. III, p. 115.
[2] Sorel, Pt. III, p. 149.

the champion of the September massacres and distrust of the military adventurer doubtless conduced to her decision. As is well-known, the Girondins somewhat later formally repulsed Danton, and thus left themselves without any man of action.

Having repulsed the two men of action, they unearthed a fox. On the 19th of October, the day on which Dumouriez departed for the Belgian frontier, they succeeded in nominating Pache, a *protégé* of Roland, as Servan's successor. That sleek intriguer soon scented the weakness of his patrons, and forthwith carried their secrets to their rivals. He also gained the confidence of the extreme Jacobins—Marat, Hébert, and Chaumette —who now vigorously began their communistic propaganda. The result was doubly fatal to France. Pache, as War Minister, connived at irregularities in the supply of the armies, provided that the contracts went to approved Sansculottes; and, while the armies suffered, they were bidden to adopt aggressive measures which ultimately led to disaster. Further, the Girondins and Jacobins began to outbid each other in order to gain the favour of the rabble; and the result of this immoral competition was to be seen in the aggressive decrees of November and the trial and execution of Louis XVI.

Even at the close of October the triumph of the demagogues began to tell seriously upon the situation. Dumouriez, before he departed for the Belgian frontier, was treated with suspicion and contumely. His army was ill supported, and his request that the army of the Moselle should march upon Coblentz in order to support his operations in Belgium was disregarded. Everything tended to fill him with the disgust which that other great

soldier of the Revolution, Bonaparte, was destined to feel for Parisian politics, and their disgust increased the ardour with which they turned to war.

As we have seen, Dumouriez had always looked on Belgium as the weak point of the Hapsburg Power. The wars of Louis XIV and Louis XV had shown the advantages of an offensive in that quarter; and he foresaw that his favourite plan of extending the influence of France up to her "natural limits" could now be trenchantly executed. In Savoy the Republicans had easily driven the Sardinians up to the barrier of the Alps. Could not the double-headed eagle of Austria be chased beyond the Rhine? The Imperialists had utterly failed in their efforts against Lille, and were now falling back in disorder upon their Belgic lands, whence the ever-rising tide of national feeling promised to sweep them if they suffered one great defeat.

That defeat Dumouriez was resolved to inflict. Taking command of the Army of the North at Valenciennes, he issued, on October 27th, 1792, a stirring appeal to the Belgians to rise against their oppressors. He assured them that, if they abolished despotism and established the sovereignty of the people, the French would be their brothers and respect their laws and property. He knew, however, full well that, only after a great triumph of the French arms, would the Belgian people take decided action. In order to increase the perplexity of the Austrians he threatened their scanty and overburdened troops at several points along that open borderland; and, while compelling them to extend their front, he resolved to advance with all speed in order to crush their central force in front of Mons. He was not aware, however, that

shortly before the great battle of November 6th, Clerfait had come up from Champagne and joined the Duke Albert of Saxe-Teschen at that once formidable, but now dismantled, fortress. Even so the Austrians numbered certainly not more than 25,000 men, with fifty guns. Some authorities, including Jomini, reckon them at 20,000 men.[1] The numbers of Dumouriez are not easy to assess. The French historians are shy of entering into that subject because he had a considerable superiority. Probably he disposed of 55,000 men, if we include the corps of 10,000 men of General Harville, which took very little share in the fighting. The French had 100 guns.

Nevertheless, the position of the Imperialists was by no means desperate. Clerfait's left wing was entrenched in the large village of Jemappes, which lies partly on the spurs of a hill, partly in the valley of Trouville. The main hump of the hill to the south-east dominated the marshy ground to the south, and formed an excellent post for the batteries and troops at the centre; while its eastern and south-eastern slopes in front of the village of Cuesmes were crowned with works which promised to defy the attack of the French. The chief fault of the position (as Dumouriez pointed out in his criticism on the proposed defences of Clayton Hill to the north of Brighton) was that retreat from it was difficult and hazardous.

Dumouriez' tactics at Jemappes have been blamed as costly and hazardous. But it must be remembered that he believed Clerfait had not come up, and, therefore,

[1] Boguslawski, *Leben des generals Dumouriez*, II, 98, 99, says the Austrians numbered only 17,000; but this is surely too low after the arrival of Clerfait's corps of about 10,000 men. Dumouriez, in his *Memoirs*, reckons the Austrians at 28,000, which is too high. Jomini's estimate of 20,000 is probably below the mark.

wished to crush the Duke Albert at one blow. Just as Wellington fiercely attacked the French at all points at Vittoria before Clausel's force could arrive from Pampeluna, so, too, Dumouriez was surely justified in snatching at victory while it seemed certain; and he did it in the way that seemed most likely to inspirit his men. Further, it should be remembered that he had ordered Harville with 10,000 men from the Maubeuge Camp to march with all speed towards Cuesmes, in order to outflank the enemy's left, and, if possible, cut off his retreat on Mons. But for reasons that are far from clear, that general failed to appear in time to do more than threaten that flank.

Early in the day Dumouriez dislodged the enemy's vanguard from the village of Quarégnon, some two miles in front of Jemappes, but then checked further movements until noon, doubtless in order to allow Harville's force time to draw near. Not until late in the afternoon did young Macdonald (the future marshal of Napoleon) inform him that Harville's column was in sight but needed a long rest before it could attack.[1]

Meanwhile Dumouriez, seeing his men chafe at the delay, had opened the battle by a heavy cannonade upon Jemappes and the enemies' entrenchments that crowned the slopes towards Cuesmes. The Austrians briskly replied, and it was soon clear that by the bayonet alone could the Republicans decide the day. Having formed his columns of attack, Dumouriez launched forward dense masses on Jemappes, while a smaller, but still formidable, array rolled into the valley and sought to breast the central heights. On the left Beurnonville moved against the redoubts and lines in front of Cuesmes.

[1] *Recollections of Marshal Macdonald*, chap. II.

The attack failed at all points. Clerfait had strengthened Jemappes, and nerved his men by his soldierly bearing. Stoutly the Imperialists beat off onset after onset. Thereupon Dumouriez sent Thouvenot with reinforcements; but even he was brought to a stand. Luckily for the French, they at last discovered a weak point in the part of the village on the slope, poured in with shouts of triumph, and compelled the brave Clerfait to retreat in haste across the Trouville with the loss of some hundreds of men in the passsage.

At the centre the tide of battle had also flowed and ebbed perplexingly. Sending forward his troops across the marshes against the salient angle of the hill held by the Austrian centre, Dumouriez saw them falter under the plunging fire of the Austrian cannon, and then break into rout before a bayonet charge of the defenders. The moment was critical; for Jemappes had not yet been pierced, and Beurnonville, on the French right, had gained little ground in front of Cuesmes. Then it was that Dumouriez showed his power of animating men with his dauntless courage. With his staff officers he rode up to the disordered troops of the centre and exhorted them to renew the fight. With him rode a brave Irishman, Kilmaine by name, who was to gain renown under Bonaparte. Most conspicuous of all, perhaps, was the young Duc de Chartres, son of Philippe Égalité (*ci-devant* Duc d'Orléans). Young Égalité had shown his pluck at the battle of Valmy; and now, with a good comradeship that touched the soldiers' hearts, he formed a solid column, which he called *le bataillon de Mons*. At its head he rode forward; and it succeeded finally in battering in the Austrian centre, which at that time felt

the pressure of the French left swinging round from Jemappes.

In the meantime Beurnonville, on the French right, had sustained a sharp repulse before Cuesmes. A timely charge of Coburg's dragoons overthrew the French, both horse and foot, and flung back the whole wing in disorder. Had not the brave Germans been stopped by ditches and other obstacles they might possibly have swept Beurnonville's command from the field.

Even as it was, their onset placed everything in doubt. The aspect of affairs was threatening when Dumouriez rode up to his shattered lines. He re-formed them, electrified them by his warlike bearing, and appealed to his children (for they had served under him at the Maulde Camp) to conquer for *la patrie*. With shouts of affection they swore to die for him. Once more they struggled on towards Cuesmes, and by a final effort wrested the batteries and the village itself from the slackening grip of the enemy. Already the defenders saw the advance of Harville's corps on their left, while the French from Jemappes and the valley of the Trouville were closing in on the north-east. Accordingly the brave Clerfait drew off his troops, weary and hopelessly outnumbered, into Mons. The joy of the Republicans knew no bounds. As the light waned they cried out for an assault upon Mons, but Dumouriez promised to them that exploit as the work of the morrow. A panic, which seized on two regiments as they were encamping, justified his caution. Moreover, early on the 7th the Austrians filed out towards Brussels; and the citizens, with shouts of joy, admitted their liberators.

The results of the victory were very great. The

Austrian losses are assessed at seven thousand in killed, wounded, and deserters, along with thirteen guns.[1] The French losses, almost equal in numbers, attested the staunchness of the defence. Jomini has blamed Dumouriez for showing more pugnacity than skill, and for hurling his men against a strong front when he might have extended his right so as to outflank the Austrians to the east of Cuesmes, and threaten to cut them off from Mons, thus manœuvring them out of their positions. The criticism would be decisive, had not Dumouriez ordered General Harville to come up and prolong Beurnonville's right for that very purpose. As we have seen, Harville did not arrive in time to take part in the fighting, but his advance had some effect (as Macdonald testified); and if he had fulfilled Dumouriez' design, the result must have been disastrous for the Austrians. Even as it was, Dumouriez achieved his main purpose, that of proving to his men that they could drive trained troops out of fortified villages and entrenchments. The French gained immensely in *morale* because, disdaining manœuvres, they succeeded in pitchforking the enemy out of a strong position. At Valmy they had merely stood their ground; at Jemappes they learnt to conquer.

More serious is Jomini's criticism on the strategy of the whole campaign. He claims that Dumouriez should have threatened the communications of the Austrians with Germany by way of Namur and Liége; for there the invaders would have cut at the root of their whole political system in the Netherlands. But we may venture to point

[1] Boguslawski, *op. cit.*, says eight thousand, which is surely impossible if their total was only seventeen thousand. Jomini, *Guerres de la Révolution*, Vol. II, pp. 231–3, puts them at only four thousand, probably far too low.

out in reply that, by operating on that line, Dumouriez would have drawn on him the whole weight of the Austrian forces in Belgium. In self-defence they must have concentrated in order to make good their retreat. Surely his aim was to attack them while they were spread out widely along their frontier and overwhelm them by weight of numbers. In quality his men could not compare with theirs, as was seen even at Jemappes. With his unsteady troops he could not hope by one blow to cut off their disciplined forces and compel them to surrender—a most difficult enterprise, as Napoleon found at Marengo. To the present writers it seems that Dumouriez adopted the course of action which promised a success decisive enough to inspirit his own troops, rouse the Belgians to revolt, and ensure the downfall of the Hapsburg power in the Low Countries.

The policy of Dumouriez was to gain the confidence and friendship of the Belgians. He therefore on November 8th issued at Mons a proclamation urging the citizens to consolidate their newly won liberties by electing representatives who might help in the establishment of a democratic Belgian republic. As we have seen, he desired to extend French influence, not French rule, as far as the "natural frontiers" by means of allied republics founded in the liberated territories.

This aim is clearly set forth in his letter of November 10th to Pache, Minister of War, in reference to a letter of Custine, the successor of Kellermann at the army of the Moselle.[1] Custine, writing from Mainz, had announced that, after occupying Coblenz, he would make a powerful

[1] *Corresp. de Dumouriez avec Pache en 1792* (Paris, 1793), pp. 60–3, 66–73.

diversion into the Holy Roman Empire, a statement which caused Dumouriez much concern. He saw in it a host of dangers.

"I am altogether opposed," he wrote, "to every external and aggressive war, especially to one which takes us beyond our natural frontiers, that is, on the south the Pyrenees and Alps, and the Rhine on the east and north-east. I would even oppose the invasion of the Low Countries if I did not see in the liberty of our neighbours a barrier far stronger and less expensive than that of strongholds."

He then pointed out that in his eyes Austria was the only enemy of the French, as having fomented "the conspiracy of kings" against them; and that he had consistently sought to separate her from her present allies. His plan had had much success and ought therefore to screen him from the suspicions and jealousies which were the bane of republics. He adjured ministers to hold Custine in check.

"If we plunge into Germany; if we throw our armies beyond the Rhine, we no longer know whither we are going, nor how we shall come back. Our war then becomes a war of adventure, ruinous in men and money. It must lengthen out; and it will necessarily cement to the Austrian alliance the German Powers which, according to my plan, it is essential for us to win over, in order that we may throw our whole weight upon Austria."

He then stated that he had urged that the army of the Moselle should march, not to Mainz, but to Coblenz, in order to cut across Clerfait's communications with Germany. As for himself, he would endeavour to press on as far as the Rhine, though he thought it better to stop at

the line of the Meuse, namely, at Liége. He added these noteworthy words:—

"I hope that we shall have peace promptly, unless we commit the folly of pressing on beyond the Pyrenees, Alps, and Rhine. As soon as this peace is made, I will abdicate entirely, and by that action I hope to silence both my calumniators and those who, from excess of republicanism, pretend to believe them."

These sage counsels of "the adventurer" passed altogether unheeded. As we have seen, Pache and his new communistic allies distrusted him and even began to plot his downfall. Already they had allowed Custine to push on a column to Frankfurt, where it levied a heavy fine (October 27th). The influence of that general rose at Paris in proportion to the amount of money which he sent back. Dumouriez, on the contrary, levied only small contributions, and those on the privileged classes alone. He paid for rations, and suggested that France should settle accounts with the Belgian Republic at the close of the war. This course of conduct did not please the ministry at Paris. Plundering raids like that of Custine brought in immediate returns, a matter of importance to a half-bankrupt treasury. Moreover, ministers objected to his founding a responsible Belgic administration, whose powers would necessarily curtail those of the French commissioners and limit the freedom of army contractors. The workmen of Paris inveighed against him for depriving them of the profit of supplying the army. In fine, jealousy and greed found their vent in the grotesque charge that he was laying his plans in order to become Duke of Brabant.[1]

[1] Thibaudeau, *Mémoires*, I, chap. I.; Sybel, Bk. V, chap. III.

While thoughts such as these were dimly taking shape in Paris, Dumouriez proceeded to push the Imperialists hard. After providing to the best of his ability for the needs of his troops, already scandalously neglected by Pache, he left Mons on November 11th and advanced towards Brussels. Scattering an Austrian force at Hal, he entered the Belgian capital on the 14th. In the evening he attended the opera, and sang with his officers and the vast audience the strains of the Marseillaise.[1] On the 18th November deputies popularly elected in the great church of Ste. Gudule declared themselves the representatives of the Belgian people; and he electrified them by his appeal to forget the names of Flemings and Brabanters, and form a Belgian nation.[2] Difficulties soon arose owing to the strong Catholic feelings of the populace; but the conduct of Dumouriez was not of a nature to offend their susceptibilities.

Meanwhile the French army of the left, under Labourdonnaie, had occupied Tournay; but that commander acted with imprudent harshness. He levied exactions upon the inhabitants and exasperated them in other ways. Dumouriez not only sent him a sharp reprimand, but requested the Minister of War to replace him by some more competent and conciliatory leader.[3] The Executive Council accordingly chose and substituted Miranda, and it was under his command that that army marched into Antwerp on the 18th. The castle surrendered a few days later.

In order to help Valence and the French army on the

[1] *Défense nationale dans le Nord*, Vol. I, pp. 289-91.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 291, 300.
[3] *Corresp. avec Pache*, pp. 124, 125.

right, Dumouriez marched on Louvain, drove the Austrian rearguard from a strong position in front of Liége, and entered that city on the 28th. Lady Wallace, who witnessed that event, was greatly impressed by the dignity of Dumouriez and the self-restraint of his soldiery amidst a populace which welcomed them with a frenzy of excitement. Their behaviour was worthy of liberators.[1] On December 2nd Valence received the surrender of Namur; six days later Dumouriez' vanguard entered Aix-la-Chapelle.

Thus, in one month from the time of entering Belgium, Dumouriez swept the Imperialists from that land, an exploit which will bear comparison with the most brilliant feats of the French arms in the Low Countries. It was the work of a man who, at fifty-three years of age, first took command of an army in the field. The plan of campaign was wholly his. He carried it out with the vigour of youth, and, best of all, he sought to extend French influence, not by absorption, but by the formation of a sister republic. The French were soon to forget this wise self-restraint in the hour of triumph. By substituting annexation for alliance they vastly increased their territories, but correspondingly weakened their influence. In seeking to grasp all they lost all.

[1] *The Conduct of the King of Prussia and Dumouriez Investigated*, by Lady Wallace (London, 1794).

CHAPTER VI

DUMOURIEZ AND THE JACOBINS

La catastrophe du 21 Janvier nous donne vraisemblablement pour ennemis tous les peuples de l'Europe.

DUMOURIEZ to MIRANDA, January 23rd, 1793.

A RAPID advance always imposes great difficulties upon a victorious commander. The question of supply becomes more complex the farther he moves away from his base; and if the organization at head-quarters is inefficient, his cares will be quadrupled. A great general once said that while he was supposed to be always looking forward, he really gave two thoughts to his communications for one directed to his advance.

Far from being puffed up by his successes, Dumouriez was painfully aware of the insecurity of his position. At Liége, on November 30th, he wrote to Pache that, owing to the lack of money, bread, and forage, his army was melting away. Already he had had to protest against the decree of prosecution against the only honest and competent contractors, the Masson Company, and the substitution of a vápouring Jacobin versifier, Ronsin by name, whose chief recommendation for the post of overseer was his glorification of Pache and his charge against Dumouriez for neglecting the wounded at Jemappes. The army now went from bad to worse. Most

of the volunteers who had come forward to the cry of "The country is in danger" now decided that France no longer needed their services. Consequently few battalions numbered as many as three hundred men. Dumouriez therefore saw great danger in Pache's order of November 23rd bidding him press on to Cologne; and he pointed out that as Custine had pushed on to the valley of the Maine, instead of threatening Clerfait's rear at Coblenz or Trèves, the Imperialist forces now in Luxemburg might attack the French at Liége.

There was every reason to expect renewed efforts by the allies. Custine's raid to Frankfurt was an insolent challenge to the German Powers, and could not fail to cement their alliance. Not without reason was Frederick William of Prussia *enragé*. William Pitt was also deeply concerned. Closely allied to the Dutch Republic by the treaties of 1788, the British and Prussian Governments heard with annoyance a decree proposed by the Executive Council at Paris on November 16th, that, if the retreating Austrians entered Dutch territory, Dumouriez was to pursue them, regardless of its neutrality. As if that was not enough, the Council on the same day decreed that the navigation of the Scheldt estuary, which had been rigidly controlled by the Dutch since the year 1648, should be thenceforth free to all nations. The abrogation of a privilege which was highly valued by the Dutch[1] caused equal alarm at the Hague, Berlin, and London; and it is now recognized by all impartial students as the chief cause of the rupture between England and France which occurred on February 1st, 1793.

Finally, on November 19th, the Convention decreed

[1] *Malmesbury Diaries*, Vol. II, p. 90.

that it would grant help to all peoples desirous of recovering their liberty; it further ordered its generals to give effect to the present declaration. The news of the triumphs of Dumouriez and Custine had turned all heads at Paris, and ministers looked forward eagerly to a raid into the rich Netherlands. Lebrun, Minister for Foreign Affairs, wrote to Dumouriez, on November 22nd, in these terms: "To the glory of having freed the Belgian Catholics, I hope that you will join that of delivering their Batavian brothers from the yoke of the Stadtholder." Six days later the Girondin leader, Brissot, wrote to Dumouriez that no Bourbon ought to remain upon a throne, and that, through his friend Miranda, South America would speedily be revolutionized and rescued from the Spanish yoke. He added that the Rhine must be the boundary of France, and burst into this rhapsodic strain: "My friend, do not let us take up our time with these plans of alliance with Prussia or England—contemptible scaffolding as they are. All that will have to go."[1]

Dumouriez by no means shared these illusions. He had wished to see Belgium and the Rhineland under French influence, but not French. In the long and important letters of November 30th to Pache, he pointed out the danger of moving either towards Cologne or the Dutch fortress of Maestricht, garrisoned by 9000 men.[2] He declared that he felt by no means sure of the Dutch. If he moved on Cologne they might show their resentment at

[1] Rojas, A., *Miranda dans la Rév. Française* (Caraccas, 1819), pp. 3-4. On December 19th, 1792, Miranda wrote to Brissot that his papers on revolutionizing South America, shown to Pitt in 1790, were now at Paris in the hands of P——n (probably Pain).

[2] *Corresp. avec Pache*, pp. 171-8. In his *Mémoires* (Bk. VI, chap. XX) he contradicts this, and says the garrison was feeble and incomplete.

the decrees of November 16th by attacking his left, while Clerfait moved against his right. The weakened French army would thus be destroyed, and the liberty of Belgium would be for ever lost. Moreover, if he were to be hampered at every turn he declared he would resign his command. On all essential points he must have a free hand.

The manner in which he urged his claims left something to be desired. It was brusque and domineering, but the claims themselves were unanswerable. A commander must command, or he must resign. That was the alternative which Bonaparte put before the unpopular civilian rulers at Paris in 1796; and he carried his point. Dumouriez was in a weaker position, having to do with determined and successful fanatics. Therein lies the difference between them which led to the ruin of the Provençal and the triumph of the Corsican.

Already Dumouriez was beginning to weary of his work. On the 24th he threatened to throw it up so soon as he had established his winter quarters about Liége, behind the line of the Meuse. Certainly he advised ministers against a march as far east as Cologne; and he showed at first little enthusiasm for their plan of revolutionizing Holland. He felt that either enterprise would be fraught with danger to France, danger to his army, and danger to the cause of liberty in Belgium. There is not a word in his correspondence up to November 30th which warrants the assertion of Sorel,[1] that he had pushed on the Dutch "patriots," or exiles, at Paris to procure the passing of

[1] Sorel, *op. cit.*, Pt. III, p. 167. Why also does he assert (p. 173) that Dumouriez looked on Belgium merely as "a base of operations and a line of retreat, in case of need." Everything tends to show that he wished to establish there a friendly republic. See his proclamation to the Belgians, of December 2nd, 1792 (*Corresp. avec Pache*, pp. 193-4).

Dumouriez

From an engraved Aquatint

the aggressive decrees of November 16th. They contravened what had been his leading principles, friendship with England and the limitation of the campaign of 1792 to Belgium and Coblenz.

At the end of November, however, his views underwent perplexing changes. If we accept as genuine his letters of November 30th to Lebrun, he then proposed an expedition into the Dutch Netherlands, in order to get possession of their naval resources. "Masters of the Dutch navy," he wrote, "we should be strong enough to crush England, especially if we interested the United States in the support of our colonies, and executed a superb plan of General Miranda." We may probably regard this as tall talk inspired by Miranda, the would-be revolutionizer of Spanish America; for it contradicts the far more practical details of his missive to Pache of that same day, which spoke of his army as dangerously weak and open to attack on both flanks. But he now began to consider the desirability of taking possession of the Dutch fortress of Maestricht, in order to secure his cantonments about Liége from a sudden attack on that side. As he pointed out, the line of the Meuse was far from safe, while the Dutch menaced him along its lower course.[1] Military considerations, then, led him to contradict his earlier professions of friendship with England; for an attack on Maestricht involved war with the island power. It is not surprising that this fertile weaving of contradictory schemes brought him under suspicion at Paris.

Partisan politics served to embitter the struggle between Dumouriez and Pache. The general was more moderate than the Girondins, while Pache, formerly a *protégé* of

[1] *Mems.*, Bk. VI, chap. x; Bk. VII, chap. II.

Roland, had promptly gone over to the Jacobins, and was now playing into the hands of their communistic vanguard. To these rabid Republicans, led by Hébert and Chaumette, a successful commander, who sent to Paris frequent reproaches and no money, was suspect. Custine, the "liberator" of wealthy Frankfurt, lavish in promises and German florins, fulfilled their ideals, until the evil consequences of his raid became patent.

In truth, the Republic was now at the turning point of its destinies. If the Moderates had held their own—and they had a majority, thanks to the support of many of the Girondins—Louis would not have been put to death, and France would have abstained from that aggressive and irritating behaviour towards her neighbours which launched her upon a vast cycle of war. Unfortunately Custine's raid proved to be exceedingly popular at Paris, while the many enemies of Dumouriez succeeded in misrepresenting the statesmanlike conduct of that general towards the Belgians.

For the liberated Belgians did not respond suitably to the wishes of their liberators. In vain were some of the high priests of the Republican cult sent into Belgium to fan to a flame the flickering zeal for democracy. That simple people loved their priests, except in the bishopric of Liége, where the bishop's rule had awakened irreligious and democratic feelings; and not even there were the Belgians imbued with a due sense of hatred against the nobles and wealthy. Danton thundered to them about the Rights of Man; but to the masses it was stage thunder. Great tact was obviously necessary if French principles were to take root in those clannish and contented communities. Dumouriez pointed out that Van der Noot, the leader of

the clerical reaction, had the support of two-thirds of the population, and cautioned ministers repeatedly not to inflame their prejudices. Danton soon came to see that the Belgians, irritated as they were at the high-handed actions of Labourdonnaie and others, would never of themselves espouse French democracy. He, and still more so his colleague Delacroix, advised the use of compulsion in conferring the boon of freedom. Above all, they both insisted on drastic financial measures. It was not enough that Dumouriez had raised 60,000,000 francs by loans exacted from the Belgian clergy. He must strike at the wealthy more rigorously by means which would not burden the State for the future. He must compel the Belgians to accept French assignats at their face value. In vain did the general point out that he had cashed assignats at the Bank of Amsterdam at a very fair exchange. On these and similar questions he came to an almost open rupture with Danton, though the great leader of the Sansculottes tried to convince him that Paris must have the last word in this matter. Dumouriez, on the other hand, felt himself pledged to a course of clemency and toleration by his proclamations to the Belgians.

Certainly public opinion at Paris ran strongly in favour of exactions and confiscation. It is piquantly mirrored in an anonymous article in the *Moniteur* of December 4th defending the forced contributions levied by Custine on the rich burghers of Frankfurt. "The French are waging war against governments, not against peoples. But who governs at Frankfurt? The rich. Our principles are that we must be free, that is Frenchify (*franciser*) all Europe. Will you free yourselves? You do not dare to? Very well then; pay, and we will free you."[1]

[1] Quoted by Sorel, Vol. III, pp. 207, 208.

It so happened that on that very day the French were driven out from Frankfurt by the Prussians, largely by the help of the working men of that city. But, heedless of that lesson, the Assembly proceeded to pass the singular decree of December 15th. It resulted directly from the report on the state of affairs in Belgium, drawn up by Danton, Delacroix, and Camus, which censured Dumouriez for excessive deference to the independence of the Belgians, and claimed that the privileged classes there and elsewhere must be crushed, or at least must furnish to France the sinews of war. Their property would be held as security for French *assignats*, which the liberated masses were thenceforth to receive as legal tender. The Convention unanimously passed the following decree:—

"Wherever the French armies shall come, all taxes, tithes, and privileges of rank are to be abolished, all existing authorities annulled, and provisional administrators elected by universal suffrage. The property of the fallen Government, of the privileged classes and their adherents is to be placed under French protection; and lastly, Conventional Commissioners are to be sent into the country to fraternize with the people, and commissioners from the Government to provide for the maintenance of the French troops."

It is curious that men who were ever prating about civic virtue should have passed a measure which was certain to degrade the crusade for liberty into a series of filibustering raids. The ignorance of human nature displayed in this decree is incredible, especially in view of the rebuff sustained at Frankfurt on December 4th. The warnings of Dumouriez respecting the unrest of the Belgians were likewise rejected; and the policy which

naturally led to rapine and disaster received the *imprimatur* of the Republic. Its effects soon showed themselves. The Belgians were especially indignant. Already, on December 4th, they had petitioned the Convention to recognize their independence both then and at the ensuing peace; but the President, the versatile Barère, put them off with a flowery harangue, in which he carefully avoided any allusion to their independence. Now, again, they protested against this monstrous decree, which handed their country over to French commissioners. The same result ensued. Thus, while Dumouriez sent on his vanguard to occupy Aix-la-Chapelle (December 8th), Belgium became ever more discontented in his rear. Liége had voted for union with France, but Belgium proper rejected this proposal.

This it was which brought Dumouriez to Paris at the end of the year. In his *Memoirs* he claims that he pitied Louis XVI, then upon his trial, and even tried to sound his army with a view to the expression of an opinion on his behalf.[1] But this is very doubtful. Nothing in his correspondence of that time bears out the statement; in fact, the King's doom was sealed from the time (November 20th) of the discovery of the iron chest at the Tuileries which contained parts of his correspondence with the *émigrés* and Austria. No general could have ventured to plead for a ruler in face of these damning proofs. The most that could be hoped for was a referendum to the primary assemblies of electors, or a reprieve, or detention in the United States. This last suggestion, made by Thomas Paine, then a member of the Convention, fell flat; and the referendum, in which Dumouriez had

[1] *Memoirs*, Bk. VII, chap. II, 6–9.

some hope, was negatived as being likely to lead to civil war. He felt great concern at this vote, and after the fell event of January 21st expressed the opinion that Louis was a traitor, but that his execution was a stupid blunder.[1] The same opinion is seen in the sentence of his letter to Miranda quoted as a motto at the head of this chapter.

But there was a subject more important even than the fate of Louis XVI, namely, the policy of the French Republic towards the Belgians. It is impossible to exaggerate the gravity of this question. It concerned more than that people alone. On its solution depended the behaviour of the French in Germany, Savoy, Nice, and later on in Holland, Italy, Switzerland, and Spain. We can picture the course of events as being entirely different had the French Republic been true to its earlier principles and set its face strongly against wars of conquest and spoliation. In that case there would have been no risings of the liberated against their liberators, but people after people would have formed an ever-widening belt of self-governing states around France, and against that natural accretion the efforts of the decadent monarchies of the Continent would have been helpless. All this was bound up in the efforts of some far-seeing men at Paris who sought to procure the abrogation of the stupid and debasing decree of December 15th. It was in vain. The King's trial and the expected rupture with England and Spain overshadowed every other question; and the coterie of agents, contractors, and hangers-on, who looked forward to a rich harvest of plunder, barred

[1] *Minerva*, V, 525, quoted by Chuquet, V, p. 2. Macdonald (*Recollections*, chap. 1) states that the aim of Dumouriez, whom he then accompanied, was the planning of the conquest of Holland.

the way in the lobbies of the Convention. Under the plea that the earlier and more generous decrees were a mere dream, the men of action clung to that of December 15th; and Danton, in his great speech of January 31st, declared in favour of the annexation of Belgium to France.[1]

The results were to be disastrous. On all the frontiers of France the same story was sooner or later to be repeated. The commissioners and agents of the Republic descended like locusts upon Belgium, the Rhineland, Switzerland, and Italy, and their blighting influence fell finally on the cause of freedom at Paris. Montesquieu finely observed that "if a democratic republic subdues another people and governs them as subjects, it exposes its own liberty to risks, because it entrusts too great a power to the officers sent into the conquered countries."[2] This was so with France after 1793. The wealth which her agents and generals were allowed to extort proved to be one of the most potent means of assuring the subservience of officers in the army and the connivance of politicians at Paris. Bonaparte could scarcely have gained his hold over the army and the Directory in 1796–7 had he not made dexterous use of the wealth of Italy which the improvident legislation of 1792 placed under his control.

[1] Robinet, *Danton émigré* (p. 154), scouts the idea of federated republics as "utopique"; that was Danton's view. The Belgian publisher of the first edition of Dumouriez' *Memoirs* showed the feeling with which that people regarded the general by the following note: "The name of Dumouriez will always be dear to, and respected by, the Belgians. It is because he desired to save them from the decree of December 15th that he was ruined. They will never forget his generosity and humanity."

[2] Montesquieu, *Esprit des Lois*, Bk. X, chap. VI. For the depredations of French agents in Italy see *The Recollections of Marshal Macdonald*, chaps. VI, VII.

In a less important matter Dumouriez carried the day. He had long looked on Pache as either grossly incompetent or grossly corrupt; and to prove his case he published in January, 1793, his correspondence with the Minister of War. The complaints from the other armies were nearly as bad; and, seeing that the Girondins felt deep resentment against Pache as a deserter, he was compelled to resign (February 3rd, 1793). On the next day the Convention appointed General Beurnonville, and on him was to fall the brunt of war with a new and mighty coalition. On February 1st the Convention declared war against Great Britain and Holland.

This sinister event cut athwart the schemes of Dumouriez. They are not easy to fathom. On the one hand, he had received with ardour the proposal of some Dutch exiles to lead an expedition against Zealand, whither it was expected that the unpopular Prince of Orange was about to flee for refuge from the democrats of his land. These proposals were strongly favoured by the Executive Council; for Maret, then high up in the Foreign Office, wrote to Miles on January 7th that the first blow struck by France at England would fall on Holland.[1] The scheme engaged Dumouriez' attention during the days January 7th–18th, which he affirms to have been filled with his efforts for saving the life of the King. His letters to Miranda, whom he had left in command at Liége, show that he believed England would be the aggressor. "This is the main question at issue," he wrote on the 10th. "War seems to have been decided on by England. Their plan is to seize Zealand." The Stadtholder (he continued) was about to retire from his rebellious cities to the island

[1] *Correspondence of W. A. Miles*, p. 36.



William Pitt

From an Aquatint in Colours by Alex.r after Russell

of Walcheren, where a British fleet would protect him. Miranda must therefore prepare for a rapid move against Dutch Flanders and Walcheren, so as to thwart the scheme; and, as a preliminary, he must make a dash at Venloo, a Dutch fortress on the Meuse. Meanwhile he (Dumouriez) would seek to annul the hateful decree of December 15th, and if he failed, would resign and go to weep in some corner.

On January 19th, when the condemnation of the King was a certainty, he makes no mention of the matter in a letter to Miranda of that date, but sketches a plan preferable to that of the seizure of Zealand. He states that, as war with England and Holland will probably be the result, Miranda must prepare to advance against Maestricht and Venloo; while he (Dumouriez) from the side of Antwerp and Breda will invade the Dutch territory and join hands with Miranda at Nimeguen. This would bar the entrance of Holland to the Prussians and assure its conquest. On January 23rd, during the brief, lucid interval which followed upon the execution of the King, Dumouriez wrote to his second in command the following important letter:—

"The Executive Council, according to the desire of the English and Dutch here, has thought of sending me as special ambassador to England, in order to make that nation decide categorically for peace or for war. Consequently an order has been given to our ambassador, Chauvelin, to return. To-morrow they will send a secret agent, very well known by Mr. Pitt and Mr. Fox, to ask the two parties [that is to say, the whole nation] for a safe conduct for me and an assurance that I shall be welcome.[1]

[1] The agent was Maret. See his interview with W. A. Miles at the French embassy in London on January 31st (*Correspondence of W. A Miles*, II, pp. 54–6, 61–3).

As I have to ask for *yes* or *no*, like Cato at Carthage, this mission will not last more than eight days. Pending the reply, I set out to-morrow for Dunkirk, whence I shall go to Ostend, Nieuport, Bruges, and Antwerp, which I shall reach by the 30th at latest. . . . A confidential person is being sent to The Hague to warn Lord Auckland and the Grand Pensionary, Van der Spiegel, to come and converse with me, according to their own request, on the frontier between Antwerp and Breda, so as to set on foot a negotiation."

He then states that, if England allows him to proceed thither, he will proceed from Antwerp to Calais; if not, he will arrange for an attack on Maestricht within eight days, while Miranda is to dash at Venloo. During his stay at Antwerp, he (Dumouriez) will exact a loan from the wealthy. These negotiations ("grand and noble" though they are) must be kept secret. If they succeed, France will have one enemy the less; if not, the French must forestall the English and Prussians in the Dutch Netherlands. "We shall astonish them by the attack on Holland."[1]

This singular letter shows Dumouriez at his best and worst. Along with a desire for peace with England and Holland, he is obviously nursing ambitious schemes of conquest. He skilfully arranges matters so that, whether peace or war is the outcome, he will be the most important man in France. The proposal to wring a loan from the merchants of Antwerp is a flagrant offence against his own principles;[2] and it is to be undertaken for a war of aggression,

[1] Rojas, *Miranda*.

[2] In his *Memoirs*, Bk. VIII, chap II. Dumouriez makes no mention of compulsion in raising the loan (1,200,000 florins); but the terms of his letter to Miranda show that he meant to enforce it, if necessary.

probably of plunder. The note of self-seeking is very obvious throughout the letter. Worst of all, Miranda at Liége and Valence at Aix-la-Chapelle are to bear the brunt of the Austrian and Prussian onsets from the east, while Dumouriez reserves for himself the easier and more profitable task of revolutionizing Holland. True, he could plead in defence of his scheme that the French treasury was empty, and that in the approaching coalition of all the Powers the Republic could survive only by the most prompt and determined effort to gain new resources, and that these, both financial and naval, would be found in the Dutch territories. Finally, the letter seems to show that he had condoned the murder of Louis XVI, and was about to throw himself ardently into the greater cycle of war which that event would almost certainly open up. Whether he really entertained the idea, as stated in his *Memoirs*, of conquering Holland so as to be in a position to dictate terms to the Convention in a sense favourable to the Belgians and to the cause of monarchy in France, is a matter which will be discussed later.[1]

On the other hand, it is clear that he made a sincere effort to prevent the rupture with England and her Dutch allies. On January 23rd he wrote to Lord Auckland at The Hague the following hitherto unpublished letter:—

"PARIS, *January 23rd*, 1793.

"MY LORD,

"My true friend, M. de Maulde, French minister at The Hague has informed me that in several conversations

[1] *Memoirs*, Bk. VIII, chap. I. He says that only four men were in his confidence. Miranda was doubtless one; and he (Miranda) states that Danton, Delacroix, and Westermann were the three others. It seems impossible that Danton and Delacroix, to whom Dumouriez was opposed since November, 1792, should have had his confidences.

with M. Van der Spiegel and him, you have testified a special esteem and consideration for me, which my moral conduct will always merit. The Grand Pensionary has evinced the same sentiments. While visiting the quarters of my army I shall be for some days near to Holland. Would it not be possible that we should have a conversation upon the frontier, either alone, or in the presence of M. Van der Spiegel, and derive from it results useful to England, to the United Provinces, to France, to Humanity, and even to Europe? Knowing your insight and your desire for peace, I submit to you whether every honest man will not favour this proposal from the bottom of his heart. On the 30th I shall be at Antwerp, where I can receive your reply, and I will wait for it two days. I pray you, etc.,

"DUMOURIEZ."[1]

Lord Auckland, in reply, augured little good from such an interview after the horrible event at Paris, which altered everything; but stated that he would submit the matter to the British Government. Van der Spiegel, however, would be unable to leave The Hague, much as he sympathized with the present effort for peace. In his letter of January 28th to Lord Grenville, British Foreign Minister, Lord Auckland said that de Maulde had reported Dumouriez' efforts to prevent the execution of Louis. Auckland assured Grenville that he looked on that event as altogether altering everything he might have said to de Maulde in time past, and he considered the provocations given by France to England and her ally as "great, multiplied, and continued." A day or two later he received the assurance that Dumouriez' troops would not advance until the British answer was received; and that

[1] Brit. Mus. (Auckland MSS.), Add. MSS. No. 34,447

the French general would gladly meet him on the frontier south of Breda. It is gratifying to know that Lord Grenville, while feeling many qualms of conscience, gave permission on February 6th for Auckland's interview with Dumouriez; but six days earlier the French Convention had ended the matter by unanimously declaring war on England and the United Provinces.[1] Dumouriez heard of this at Antwerp on February the 7th.

Ministers at Paris being wholly occupied with party strifes and intrigues, the plan of campaign for 1793 was drawn up by Dumouriez. It aimed at nothing less than the conquest of the United Provinces. For this enterprise he had the following forces. According to Miranda's report to him of January 23rd, the Army of the North cantoned at and near Liége numbered 24,101 men, the Army of the Ardennes 22,844; troops in garrison in Belgium numbered 13,319, thus giving a total of 60,264 men, besides smaller garrisons at Furnes, Nieuport, Ostend, Courtray, Tournay, Ath, and Bruges.[2] They were still terribly lacking in supplies of all kinds. At Dunkirk and Nieuport Dumouriez found nothing but disorder. But nothing daunted his spirit. On February 5th, that is, two days before he knew of the declaration of war, he directed Miranda, having the support of Harville from Namur, to press on to Venloo. Valence meanwhile with the forces around Aix-la-Chapelle was to hold the line of the River Roer, east of that city. "Let us perform incredible, nay, impossible feats," he wrote to Miranda.

[1] Brit. Mus. (Auckland MSS.), Add. MSS. No. 34,447. In the forthcoming *Life and Times of William Pitt*, by Dr. J. Holland Rose, an account will be given of these last efforts for peace, especially the mission of Maret to London.

[2] Rojas, *Miranda*. The figures are official; Sybel's estimate of 100,000 is far too high (Bk. VI, chap. v).

Again on the 11th: "We must astonish the enemy, and deal blows with the courage of despair."[1]

In Miranda the daring Provençal recognized a kindred soul; and indeed his career rivals that of Dumouriez in dramatic interest. Born at Caraccas, in what is now the Republic of Venezuela, he entered the Spanish military service, but left his native land in 1783 either from disgust at Spanish tyranny, or, as some say, owing to irregularities in his conduct. He then travelled for many years in the United States, and in most countries of Europe and the Levant. In 1790, when war between England and Spain seemed likely, he offered his services to Pitt for what was his chief aim in life—the revolutionizing of Spanish America. Foiled in that hope by the blowing over of that dispute, he repaired to France, and, as we have seen, came into contact with the Girondins and Dumouriez in the spring of that year. Later on his military capacity appeared during the campaign of Valmy. After temporary absence at Paris during the campaign of Jemappes, Miranda returned at the close of the year, and won the complete confidence of his chief. His tall, square-set frame, restlessly-inquisitive hazel eyes, and a look that bespoke confidence and command, marked him out as a leader of men. Of dark complexion and thoughtfully severe mien, he everywhere attracted notice, and his conversation evinced great powers of mind along with wide knowledge of men and affairs. Dumouriez pronounced him the most skilled of all the French generals in the art of war, but deficient in point of practice. An American seaman who served under him in his liberating expedition of 1806 to Caraccas thought him too sanguine and opinionated to

[1] Rojas, *Miranda*.

be a good leader, and declared that in his fits of anger he quite lost command of himself and was capable of every cruelty.[1] Ultimately, after sacrificing the men of that expedition, he fell into the hands of the Spaniards, and died in prison in 1816.

Early in 1793 Miranda had shown only the better side of his nature, and to him Dumouriez entrusted the difficult but far from hopeless task of taking the Dutch fortresses on the Meuse. Meanwhile he himself with 17,000 men (in his *Memoirs* he reckons them at only 14,000) intended to revolutionize Holland.[2] His plan was as soon as possible to reach the rich interior, after masking the strongholds of Breda, Gertruydenberg, Bergen-op-Zoom, Steenberg, Klundert, and Willemstadt; to cross the estuary of the Meuse and Rhine between the towns of Moerdyck and Dort, and march rapidly by way of Rotterdam, Delft, The Hague, Leyden, and Haarlem to Amsterdam.

The plan, it is true, rested partly on a political basis. Dumouriez counted on the goodwill of the Dutch and their hostility to the Prince of Orange since his re-establishment in power by the Prussians and England in 1787. None the less the scheme must be pronounced Quixotic. With those scanty numbers he could scarcely do more than mask the six fortresses above named. And, even if he were joined by throngs of Dutch "patriots," he could scarcely hope to carry through the last part of his scheme, which was to march back from Amsterdam to Nimeguen, and there join Miranda in reducing that important fortress

[1] J. Biggs, *History of Miranda's Attempt . . . in 1806* (Boston, U.S.A., 1810), chaps. XXV–XXVII.

[2] Sybel (Bk. VI, chap. V) gives 17,000 as the official figures.

and beating back the Prussians. One may admire the boldness and originality of this conception, but its success depended on the torpor of the Austrians and Prussians. If the latter occupied Nimeguen in force and marched down the bank of the Waal, or if the former struck hard at Miranda during his bombardment of Maestricht and Venloo, Dumouriez' communications with France would be threatened, and his northward march necessarily suspended.

Accordingly Jomini and all military critics have condemned the plan; but, as General Thiébault has well pointed out, it belonged to an age when campaigns turned on the siege of fortresses and occupying of positions. Dumouriez doubtless counted on this. Nevertheless, his plan soon showed signs of breaking down. Miranda's vanguard moved rapidly from Liége down the course of the Meuse upon Venloo, and seized a *tête de pont* on its left or eastern bank; but floods prevented his crossing the river, and a Prussian force was thus enabled to occupy the fortress itself.[1] Miranda then proceeded to ply Maestricht with bombs and red-hot shot; but the stronghold was stoutly held by the Dutch and by French *émigrés*, who thwarted every effort. Dumouriez had counted on his taking it in two or three days, and had urged him to use his utmost endeavours, as the safety of the French in Belgium was bound up with that enterprise; for they were now hated there, since the Convention had rejected the petition of the Belgians for independence and relief from the decree of December 15th.[2]

[1] Sybel (Bk. VI, chap. v), Miranda to Beurnonville, February 14th, 1793.

[2] Danton, in his speech of January 31st, 1793, had carried the Convention with him in his declaration that the Belgians really *wanted* union with France. He pleaded passionately for the natural frontiers (the Rhine,

If zeal and energy could have conquered Holland before the allies came up, Dumouriez would have achieved that feat. Inspiring his little army with his own fire and impetuosity, he entered the United Provinces on February 17th, invested Breda, and took it within four days. Fort Klundert fell almost at once under a terrific bombardment; and Gertruydenberg, larger but weaker, also succumbed. Thence he diverged to the left, and encamped his troops on the banks of the broad estuary near Moerdyck, which the Dutch patrolled with gunboats. A regiment of British guards was also thrown into Dordrecht. Here, then, the active little Provençal was brought to a halt. While he fumed at the delay, and his troops shivered in the rush shelters hastily thrown up, bad news came from the south-east.

Dumouriez had hoped everything from Miranda's energy. From Zevenburgen he wrote on February 26th: "Come, let us soon dance the carmagnole together at Nimeguen: drink your wine neat: be gay"; and again (March 4th), he calls him, "Proud republican, my brother, my friend," and bids him celebrate the capture of Gertruydenberg.[1] But no efforts could batter in the defence of Maestricht. Her citizens held out as they had resisted the troops of Alva; and the French *émigrés* fought with the rancour of hatred against the regicides. Farther east, Lanoue, with the French vanguard on the Roer, was beset by the Prince of Coburg's forces, speedily driven from that river line, and thence through Aix-la-Chapelle in headlong rout. On

etc.), and used the simile, "Let us fling down to the kings the head of a king as gage of battle." The speech proves that he had no sympathy with Dumouriez' aims for Belgian independence. See Robinet, *Danton, Homme d'État*, p. 340.

[1] Rojas, *Miranda*.

March 2nd Valence wrote despairingly from Liége to Dumouriez:—

"Our dream about Holland is all over, my dear general. What I foresaw has come to pass. The foe has attacked Lanoue in his cantonments on the right and left. . . . Fly hither: I declare that if you do not come I am not able to command in such a position as the present. Minutes are centuries."[1]

Dumouriez angrily refused to give up "the dream," and bade Miranda breathe his own courage into Valence and Lanoue. But on March 4th that general felt constrained to give up the siege of Maestricht and retire to Tongres, in order to rally the French forces. On the next day Coburg's army forced him from Tongres back upon St. Frond. It is to be noted, however, that Miranda, far from blaming Dumouriez for a risky plan of campaign, urged him not to give up the invasion of Holland. Both of these daring spirits saw in it the means of replenishing the resources of France. Dumouriez was lavish in his praises of Miranda. "Let us be worthy one of the other," he wrote to him. "It is you and Thouvenot alone who can save the Republic." "The evacuation of Aix-la-Chapelle and Liége is nothing," he wrote on the 7th of March from Moerdyck. "Press on the fortification of Malines. Hold up for fifteen days: then we shall have Holland." Miranda replied that he could make a stand at Louvain.

Meanwhile, however, the authorities at Paris decided to recall Dumouriez to the neighbourhood of Louvain; and on the 9th he informed Miranda that he was coming to join him, and to raise the spirits of the Belgians by repressing the tyranny of the Commissioner Cambon and

[1] Rojas, *Miranda*.

his satellites. Leaving his forces at Moerdyck under de Flers, he repaired with haste to Antwerp and Brussels. This implied the abandonment of the Dutch scheme, which no one but Dumouriez could carry through with the zeal and energy that command success.

On his way to join the main French army at Louvain Dumouriez found many proofs of the hatred of the Belgians to the new tyrants, the commissioners and agents sent by the Convention. Everywhere, on the report of French defeats, the devout peasants assembled in armed throngs, and at some places routed the French garrisons. The fruits of the policy of plunder being glaringly proved, Dumouriez held a session of the representative assembly of Brussels on March 11th, and informed that body that he was aware of the crimes perpetrated against the Belgian people, assured them of his resolve to restore the silver which had been stolen from the churches, and to arrest Chépy and others who had been guilty of sacrilege and robbery. His words aroused general enthusiasm; and at the end of the meeting the deputies accompanied him to the Grande Place, where he embraced their president.[1] On the same day he issued a proclamation, stating that it was not the will of the French people to carry profanation and brigandage into Belgium, though some of their agents had been guilty in that respect.

"This act of sordid avarice," he added, "ought to be repressed, to prove to all peoples that we respect religious opinions, and that justice and uprightness essentially belong to the character of the French nation, which in con-

[1] The *procès-verbal* of this session is in the British Museum pamphlets on the French Revolution (R. 277).

quering liberty ought to have gained new virtues, and to employ its arms only for justice."

He therefore commanded that all silver and valuables taken from churches be forthwith restored.[1] In a second proclamation he ordered that official complaints against all "tyrannical vexations" should be formally drawn up, but appealed to the Belgians to be true to the French cause.

French historians themselves, still more so the Belgians Delplace and Levae, affirm that the conduct of French commissioners and agents had been disgraceful. In this matter Danton has been to some extent exculpated by Robinet and by later admirers; but it is certain that he upheld the policy which made plunder possible. Barère seems to be responsible for the orders which legalized the plunder of churches and the seizure of works of art from museums and private houses, especially in the orgies of March 6th–8th at Brussels. Among the vulture tribe Guyton and Captains Frère and Hendrick seem to have gorged most deeply;[2] and by his punishment of this foul crew Dumouriez earned the gratitude of the Belgians.

Far different was the impression which his acts produced in France. A head commissioner named Chaussard, whom he had ordered to carry out his behests at Brussels, repaired straightway to Paris to denounce his "dictatorship" in Belgium; and the general, by his southern impulsiveness, played into the hands of his enemies. On the 12th, at the head-quarters at Louvain, he wrote a letter to the Convention in which

[1] Brit. Mus., pamphlets on the French Revolution (R. 277). For the *order* of the commissioners as to the seizure of church plate see *Thiébault's Memoirs*, Vol. I, p. 151 (Eng. edit.).

[2] Robinet, *Danton émigré*, pp. 154–6. Chuquet, V., 79–83. Sybel, Bk. VI., chap. V.

he blamed it in the most outspoken terms for allowing its agents to make enemies of the Belgians under a system of robbery and sacrilege. As for the proposed union of Belgium with France, it would be a fatal act. He, Dumouriez, had therefore taken steps to appease the Belgians and save the Republic.

So daring a defiance had never been received by that jealous and exacting Government. Though not read out in the Assembly, it created the liveliest scenes in the Committee of General Defence; and only by the efforts of Danton and Delacroix, who knew something of the state of things in Belgium, was a decree of accusation averted. "In politics he has lost his head," cried Danton; "but his military tactics are unimpaired." These two men then promised to go and persuade him to retract his letter.

Already at the camp of Louvain he had had two stormy interviews with the French commissioners, in the course of which he blamed them with causing the military disasters which he had come to repair. Camus bitterly reproached him with playing the part of Cæsar; to which he replied ironically, "My dear Camus, I am not Cæsar, and you are not Brutus; your threat of murdering me is for me a warrant of immortality." As for the soldiers, they paid no heed to the commissioners of the Convention, but they received Dumouriez with transports of joy. They thronged about him, some even kissing his boots and his horse. Troops which had deemed it a success not to be beaten, now saw in his weather-beaten form the omen of victory. Speedily he raised the *morale* of the whole force, cashiering and sending to the rear some of the worst officers, while 6000 disorderly re-

cruits, hastily raised by the commissioners, were sent back into France.

With the 40,000 men remaining, he designed to strike a blow as soon as possible at the advancing Imperialists. Coburg's difficulties had also been such as to hinder that somewhat timid commander, and he was now behind the valley of the Great Geete, near Tirlemont, awaiting reinforcements from Hanover, Prussia, and Holland. Dumouriez was not the man to give time for these succours to come up; and on the 16th, though Harville's and Lamarlière's corps were not yet at hand, he attacked the Imperialists at Tirlemont and drove them back on Gutzenhoven and Neerwinden.

Following the enemy towards these villages on the Little Geete, Dumouriez found them posted on a plateau stretching from the village of Neerwinden towards the little town of Leau, farther north. This town was weakly held, but the mass of Coburg's force was on the plateau north of Neerwinden, also in that village and its neighbour, Oberwinden. Between them there rises the mound called the Tomb of Mittelwinden. The Austrian left rested on the village of Racour, in a hollow. The position was strong, for the French had to cross the stream of the Little Geete and advance up the open slopes in order to close with the foe. Nevertheless, as Coburg hoped to take the offensive on the morrow, he had not broken the bridges at any of the villages from Leau to Heylissem. A second time, then, Dumouriez' prompt attack stole a march on the Imperialists. Hastily throwing a few more light troops into Leau, and strengthening his right centre under the command of the Archduke Charles of Austria, Coburg purposed to wait until the heavy columns of the

French reached the open slopes, and then drive them back into the stream. Disposing of 39,000 men, and holding a position interior to the arc on which the French were advancing, he had the chances greatly in his favour.

Convinced that Coburg must have massed his main force on the right in order to guard the road to Liége whence came the Austrian supplies, Dumouriez resolved to throw his chief strength against the enemy's left. He therefore directed three heavy columns on his right wing, under the general command of Valence, against the villages of Racour, Oberwinden, and Neerwinden. Meanwhile the two columns of the centre were to pass the Geete at Esmael, Elissem, and Wanghe, assist in the attack on Neerwinden, and clear the plateau to the north of it. To Miranda and the French left wing, consisting of three columns, fell the task of occupying Leau, driving the Archduke Charles through the village of Dormael, and holding up the tide of fugitives which Dumouriez pictured as streaming down from the Neerwinden plateau to that line of retreat. Having some 44,000 combatants, he might hope for success if his troops speedily gained a lodgment in the two villages near the centre. But the salient angle of the Austrian defence at Neerwinden more than counterbalanced his slight advantage in numbers. The odds were against him, far more so than at Jemappes; but he scorned the disgraceful alternative, retreat, which must involve himself and his army in ruin.

Taking his stand on a mound above Esmael early on that eventful 18th of March, he watched his columns dip into the valley of the Geete, cross its bridges without resistance, and breast the opposite slopes, until the sputter of fire near Laer and Racour outlined the Austrian van-

guard. Miranda meanwhile on the north menaced Leau and Orsmael, while a movement on the plateau showed that Coburg was reinforcing the Archduke Charles opposite the latter village. From his lines on the plateau he also fed the defending force at Oberwinden and Neerwinden, on which, it was clear, the main attack would fall. There it was, indeed, that the severest fighting took place. The French, thanks to the surprise, early gained a footing in Racour; but their two columns of the right wing hindered each other's progress, and made the attack on Oberwinden ineffective. Only by weight of numbers was that place carried about 2 p.m. A little farther to the north, at the French centre, the Duc de Chartres (the future Louis Philippe, King of the French) led on his columns with signal bravery and took Neerwinden. A rally of the Imperialists regained for them the key of their position, until a third French column, under General Neuilly, again dislodged them. Still the day was not won; for, struggle as the French might up the slopes beyond, they could do nothing but perish on that storm-swept glacis. Worse was to befall them; for, a timely charge of the Austrians under Colloredo drove their shattered relics out of the village itself.

Then it was that Dumouriez rode up with reinforcements, rallied the fugitives, raised the war chant of the Revolution, and by the force of his will turning the ebb into an irresistible flood, carried the village for the third time. But yet a third time the fire from the heights covered the advance of fresh troops, under whom Colloredo drove the Republicans out into the open. Like a tornado the horsemen of Austria had driven through the space between the two villages, and the French, though rallying fiercely

finally lost Oberwinden. At these points, then, the French suffered a repulse; but their left wing, dangerously severed from the centre, was by this time flying in hopeless rout.

At the outset Miranda had prospered. His three columns pushed the Archduke Charles back along the road beyond the village of Dormael, while a division under Champorin occupied Leau. But now, beyond Dormael the assailants gave their flank to an attack from the plateau. Covered by a close and deadly fire from his guns, the Archduke pushed on his reinforcements, regained Dormael, and then let loose his hussars and dragoons on the wavering mass. At once the French volunteers broke into headlong flight and swept away the troops of the line. In a few minutes all was lost. The division which had occupied Leau and was threatening Halle hastily withdrew towards the bridge of Bingen, where the crush of the routed corps caused terrible confusion. At dusk Miranda could scarcely assemble his men at Oplinter. Dumouriez meanwhile had drawn off his centre and left in good order; but as Miranda very strangely sent him no news from the left, he set out with a few orderlies towards Orsmael to find out the truth.[1] There on the bridge German patrols challenged him, and he nearly fell into their hands. Not until then did he recognize that the day was irretrievably lost. On the next day he drew off his forces towards Tirlemont, and but for the disbanding of some battalions of volunteers, the army seemed not to have lost its spirit. Coburg with his usual excess of caution did not pursue. That he won the battle was due to the skill of the Archduke Charles and the unsteadiness of Miranda's troops.

That general, proud and vindictive by nature, could

[1] Thiébault (*Memoirs*, Vol. I, p. 158), censures Miranda.

not brook the disgrace, and later on charged Dumouriez with sacrificing him.[1] The charge is absurd. Miranda had more troops than the Archduke Charles, whose position was far weaker than that of Clerfait at the Austrian left. The plain fact was that the French volunteers were unable to withstand the onset of regular troops, especially of the fine Imperial horse. Tacitus, in his day, noted the tendency of a victorious army to take all the praise to itself, and of beaten troops to lay all to the account of the commander. So it was now. To whisper a word as to the untrustworthiness of the volunteers, especially those of Paris, was treason. Miranda, therefore, discreetly chose to ascribe his disaster to the mistakes of Dumouriez, whereas his capital fault was that of giving Miranda too many men and urging him to press home the attack on that side.

Critics generally agree that, as the French line was to pivot on Miranda, his duties should have been merely to "contain" the Austrians on that side. With 5000 more men at the other extremity, the assailants could have outflanked Oberwinden and compelled Coburg to reform his lines on the plateau. But Dumouriez was too ardent. As at Jemappes, he delivered a frontal attack at all points, though now he had not enough men for these costly tactics. But in those days the supreme need of concentration on one essential point had not been illustrated by Napoleon. Neither did Dumouriez discern the necessity for calling up Harville from Namur and his own army from Moerdyck. With his usual excess of hopefulness, he believed he could beat the Austrians and

[1] *Correspondence between Dumouriez, Pache, etc., since January, 1793* (London, 1794), pp. 123–5.

then resume the conquest of Holland. He did not see that the former of those actions was a necessary preliminary to the latter. In trying to effect both, he ruined the campaign and his own future.[1]

Conscious that another defeat would lead to the break-up of his army, Dumouriez resolved to treat for a suspension of arms. Having checked the Austrian advance on the 22nd at the Pellenberg, he could, on the morrow, enter with dignity into a discussion with the Austrian Colonel Mack, at their camp outside Louvain. Through Colonel Montjoye, who went to treat for an exchange of prisoners, he requested Coburg to refrain from molesting the French in their retreat through Brussels, promising, on his side, not to offer battle, and peacefully to evacuate that city. Thereafter they could come to a further understanding. Coburg accepted the proposal on condition that the French would evacuate Belgium. This was inevitable, as few of the French troops could be trusted in the battle array; and Coburg may be more censured than Dumouriez for acceding to these terms. The hatred of the Belgians for their liberators showed itself during the retreat. At Brussels, as the troops filed out on the 24th, the populace burnt the tree of liberty on the Grande Place: and at some towns their retreat was harassed. Still, when part of the army of Holland joined him behind the line of the River Dender at Ath, his position was by no means desperate, and by the left bank of the Scheldt he could keep in touch with his garrisons at Antwerp, Breda, and Gertruydenberg.

Meanwhile his relations to the Convention were rapidly nearing a crisis. Danton and Delacroix had seen him at

[1] Jomini, III, 117–19; Chuquet, V, 115–17.

Louvain on the 20th and 21st, but failed to procure a retractation of the letter of the 12th. The utmost Dumouriez would do was to write a request that the Convention would entertain no prejudices respecting that missive until he had time to explain it. Thenceforth there could be only the briefest truce between him and his implacable enemies at Paris. This consideration it was which led him to renew negotiations with the Prince of Coburg.

That commander on the 25th dispatched his chief of staff, Colonel Mack, to the head-quarters of Dumouriez at Ath; and there occurred the famous interview which decided the future. The French general, along with the Duc de Chartres, Generals Valence and Thouvenot, and Colonel Montjoye, all of whom he could perfectly trust, unfolded his plan of prolonging the informal armistice, the Prince of Coburg further pledging his word not to attack the French outposts, while he, Dumouriez, led the best part of his army against the Jacobins at Paris. In reply to this Mack insisted that the French must entirely evacuate Belgium and the Dutch fortresses held by them. After some demur, Dumouriez agreed to these conditions, stipulating that his garrisons were to be supplied with provisions during their retreat from Holland to the French frontier. As to his plans at Paris, he intended to proclaim the little Louis XVII king, seize the members of the Convention and the Jacobins' club; and proclaim the re-establishment of the Constitution of 1791, which the Parisian rabble had overthrown on the 10th of August. When Mack remarked that that Constitution had many defects and urged him to restore the old order of things, Dumouriez made the following spirited reply:—

"That would be the surest means of ruining all my plans and turning all France against me. If, on the contrary, I proclaim the monarchical Constitution framed by the Assembly, nine-tenths of the people will side with me. The great majority of them want nothing else. I know full well that that Constitution has its faults; but it is easy to improve it by assimilating it to the English Constitution. The powers of the King will be enhanced. The lands of the clergy, which are pledged or sold, cannot be restored; but at least nobility will be restored and will make good its losses. A nobility is essential to the existence of a well-ordered monarchy. However, we must now give it that name; it would be lost, and I with it. Let it wait some little time and there will be nothing to find fault with. Moreover, the *émigrés*, most of all the Comte de Province, must have no hand in the organization of the government. It is they who by their flight and their unreasonable conduct provoked all the crimes and perpetuated anarchy. They will have to submit absolutely to the Constitution. But they are our relatives and friends, and will be in good hands."

Dumouriez warmly scouted Mack's next suggestion, that Austrians should garrison some of the French frontier fortresses; for such a step would arouse suspicion and hatred in the French army and the nation at large. He trusted entirely in his army; an assertion which the French officers present heartily corroborated. The only thing for which he pleaded was 20,000 louis d'or for judicious distribution at Paris.

This, it is needless to say, was the worst part of the whole transaction. In other respects it has much to recommend it. In the first place, Dumouriez was consistent with the principles which he had avowed up to the time of the overthrow of the monarchy. True, at

that time he had accepted the Republic as inevitable; but, the more he saw of the cruelty, greed, and incapacity of the men who had seized on power at Paris, the greater was his disgust. In his eyes they had committed every conceivable crime against the glory and welfare of France. By putting Louis XVI to death they had challenged England, Spain, and the empire to a war which they seemed utterly incapable of conducting. They had starved the French armies, plundered the liberated peoples in Belgium, Savoy, and Nice, and associated the idea of a republic with tyranny, greed, sacrilege, and disaster. The welcome everywhere accorded to the Austrians in Belgium showed what foreigners thought of French methods, and the beginnings of a monarchical reaction in France seemed to presage the overthrow of the regicides.

We of this age, who know how astounding were the efforts put forth by the Jacobin minority in the following months in crushing royalists and Girondins within and hurling back the armies of the coalition on all the frontiers, find it difficult to put ourselves exactly in the place of Dumouriez during the retreat from Brussels, which resulted so largely from the despotism and incapacity of the regicide Government. But it is the alpha and omega of fair criticism to look at events, not from the pinnacle of our wisdom, but from amidst the uncertainties and perplexities that beset the actors in those ever-shifting scenes. What is clear to us was dim to them. Who could then foretell that the great majority of Frenchmen would be so inert as to allow a desperate minority, which probably never numbered more than one-tenth of the populace, to terrorize France during sixteen months?

And what signs of Herculean vigour were to be detected in the Caliban that writhed cruelly but helplessly in Paris? Its armies were flung back with ease from Belgium and the Rhineland, and the levies which later on were to flood the neighbouring lands had as yet distinguished themselves only by their cowardice. All the hard fighting had been borne by the old regiments of the line, which scoffed at the volunteers and the ministers who sent them. It is not surprising that most of the officers of the army were weary of the regicide Government, and saw hope for France only in the monarchy.

That feeling was widespread. La Vendée and Brittany were preparing to revolt. The south was restive. The inhabitants of the Cevennes, Auvergne, and Dauphiné were preparing to raise a force of from 24,000 to 30,000 men, along with artillery, in order to march on Paris and proclaim Louis XVII with the Constitution of 1791. They requested the allies to allow Lafayette to come and lead them.[1] Nothing came of their request. But this incident and many others showed that France was longing for the overthrow of the regicides, and needed only a leader to change the course of her destinies.

Dumouriez sought to be that leader. After retiring to Tournay he had an interview, on March 27th, with three men who claimed to represent the feelings of the Jacobins' Club, and besought him to overthrow the Convention on behalf of the club. He refused, unless they promised to aid him in re-establishing constitutional monarchy. He protested that he had never thought of putting forward Philippe Égalité, Duke of Orleans, or his son, and declared that he had the support of presidents of several districts

[1] *Correspondence of W. A. Miles*, II, 74.

of Paris. If the regicides threatened the royal family with death, he would march on Paris and speedily starve it to surrender, seeing that the stupid declaration of war against England had already brought about dearth.[1]

In truth, he scarcely expected to have to use force. With his usual hopefulness and audacity he pictured France as rising around him and overthrowing the Convention by an irresistible movement. This it was which led him to take a high tone with the commissioners of the Convention who came to his head-quarters at St. Amand, on French territory. They had bidden him come to Lille to answer the charges against him, a request to which he sent the ironical refusal that his head did not enable him to conduct two kinds of warfare at once. But on the 30th he invited them to meet him at his head-quarters near St. Amand.

The result is well known. They read to him the decree deposing him from his command, and he politely but firmly refused to obey it. His officers applauded him. Camus, the boldest of the commissioners, declared him deposed, whereupon Dumouriez ordered a lieutenant to call in hussars, who placed them under arrest, and shortly afterwards hurried them across the frontier to the Austrians. Among them was Beurnonville, Minister of War, whose presence it was thought would determine the behaviour of the army. Not until Christmas Day, 1795, were they set at liberty, being then exchanged for the Dauphine, the future Duchesse d'Angoulême.

Dumouriez had now crossed the Rubicon, and warned the army and the authorities of the neighbouring Departments that he was about to purge France of assassins and

[1] See the account in full in the *Memoirs of Dumouriez*, III, 277–87.

agitators. Obviously his enterprise could not succeed unless he gained over at least one of the fortresses, Lille, Valenciennes, or Condé. The last named was assured by the presence of Neuilly, but Valenciennes shut its gates against the troops sent by him to carry out the plan of seizing the commissioners and the town itself. At the critical moment his emissary declined to act, and read out the proclamation launched against Dumouriez. At Lille also the enterprise failed, largely owing to the clumsiness of his envoy, Miaczynski; but Marshal Macdonald's version of the failure there is that one of that general's orderlies had ridden on and warned the civil authorities of the plan. However that may be, Miaczynski was held fast in Lille, while Macdonald's column found the gates shut in their faces. Many of the men shouted "Long live the King"; and it is clear that if they had gained an entrance, Lille would have declared for Dumouriez. As it was, the commissioners and the municipality had the upper hand; for Macdonald's troops straggled away in search of food. So narrow was the margin between success and failure at Lille, as also elsewhere.[1]

Dumouriez undoubtedly erred in dividing his army in order to gain possession of the three fortresses above named. Had he kept it together and promptly begun his march towards Paris, affairs might have gone differently. The checks at Lille and Valenciennes and the vigour now shown by the Convention decided the attitude of the troops. Even those at the camp of Maulde received him doubtfully. Neuilly was vacillating at Condé; and General Dampierre by a strongly Jacobin proclamation caused Dumouriez' own army to waver. The regulars,

[1] *Recollections of Marshal Macdonald*, chap. II.

especially in the cavalry, clung to him staunchly; but, strange to say, the artillery was decidedly Republican, and the volunteers rampantly Jacobinical. The word "traitor," now publicly applied to Dumouriez, everywhere had its effect, especially when emphasized by the lie that he intended to hand over the fortresses to the Austrians.

A slight incident sufficed to tilt the balance. On April 4th, before setting out for a final interview with Mack, between Mons and Condé, Dumouriez sought to settle matters in his favour at this latter fortress. On his way thither he fell in with three battalions of volunteers marching to Condé against orders. He stopped their officers, and was about to write an order countermanding the march when the men broke their ranks and threatened "the traitor" with violence. At their head was a young lieutenant destined to become famous, Davout, the future marshal of Napoleon. Riding hard across fields amidst a volley of bullets, Dumouriez and his suite with difficulty escaped with the loss of four of their number, and made their way to Mack's quarters. To him he reported the slanders circulated by the commissioners and the volunteers, and pointed out that a proclamation by Coburg could alone save the situation. Mack somewhat doubtfully assented; and Dumouriez with his help drew up the following extraordinary document, which Coburg signed on the next day (April 5th).

The Austrian commander declared that he recognized the good and patriotic intentions of Dumouriez, who wished to end the time of anarchy and bestow on his country the blessings of a wise and solid government. The allied sovereigns shared these sentiments, which would find support from every sensible and virtuous Frenchman.

He (Coburg) would therefore support Dumouriez to the utmost of his power, and declared, on his word of honour, that he would make no conquests, but would enter France solely for that purpose. If he had to enter a fortress he would regard it as a sacred trust, to be given back as soon as order was re-established in France. He would also repress violence and refrain from exactions of all kinds.

By closely allying himself with Coburg, Dumouriez committed an act of treason of the gravest kind. It is reasonable to assume that he lost his mental balance during the flight. His previous conduct is defensible. By imposing on Coburg the obligation not to enter France, he rendered a great service to his country. Now, however, he proposed to admit him to French fortresses; and he must have known how valueless is the declaration of a single commander that he would hold them as "a sacred trust." Dumouriez' consciousness of his desperate position is seen in his request to Mack that, if things went ill, he and his supporters might look forward to a safe retreat at the Imperial army, to which Mack assented.[1]

One last effort for the royal cause was made on April 5th. With an Austrian escort Dumouriez repaired very early to the troops at Mortagne, and thence to the camp at Maulde. At Mortagne most of the troops greeted him and cheered for the King. At Maulde he formed the troops in hollow square and addressed them, only to meet with mournful silence in the regulars and muttered threats from the volunteers.

While his fortunes trembled in the balance, came tidings that the artillerymen at St. Amand were making off for

[1] Mack's account of this affair is in the *Oesterreichische Mil. Zeitschrift* (1865), Part III, pp. 1–18; quoted by Chuquet, Vol. V, p. 223.

Valenciennes. This news filled the Republicans with hope, and inclined the doubtful regiments to their side. One battalion after another filed off towards Valenciennes. In vain did Dumouriez beg the line regiments to stop them. They refused to use force against their comrades; and thus the general's last hopes ebbed quickly away. The troops at Bruille held the same course; and, as generally happens in troublous times, the cause which was simplest triumphed. Had the troops then known Coburg's proclamation, there could have been no wavering. Even as it was, the sight of the Austrian escort marred the general's efforts.

Nothing remained but to cross the frontier with as many troops as possible. Most of his supporters shrank from this extreme step, or dropped away afterwards, and those who clung to him numbered only 458 foot-soldiers and 424 horsemen. Among them, however, were the Duc de Chartres, and Generals Valence, Marassé, Ruault, and Thouvenot. With the exception of the two first, who made their peace with France, nearly all the seceders died in exile.

The wider questions connected with Dumouriez' desertion will be treated in the last chapter of this volume. Here we may notice briefly the question mooted earlier in this chapter, whether, in the expedition against the United Provinces, Dumouriez was seeking to gain resources which would enable him to strike a blow against the Convention. The evidence is contradictory. On the one hand there is not a phrase in his letters of the month of January which shows such an intention. Apart from his condemnation of the King's execution as a cruel and stupid act, there is nothing that shows his design to over-


Aha. Mon. Grenouille. I trow'd that you them fight
Mons. Orange. I will seal up your Papers, Make ease of your Cash
PRINCE OF ORANGE'S PAPERS

CARICATURE. DUMOURIEZ AND HIS AIDE-DE-CAMP ON FULL MARCH TO SEAL UP THE PAPERS OF THE PRINCE OF ORANGE BY ORDER OF THE CONVENTION, BUT PREVENTED BY MESSRS. FROG AND CO. *Published March* 13, 1793, *by S. W. Fores, No.* 3 *Piccadilly,*

throw the Jacobins. As we have pointed out, his chief concern was to liberate Belgium from the exactions and tyranny of the French commissioners; and that question had not been definitely settled when he left Paris for Antwerp. Equally certain is it that many Jacobins looked on the conquest of the Dutch Netherlands as the only means for assuring to France the sinews of war. At the outset, then, it is unlikely that Dumouriez had in view the restoration of monarchy, as he asserts in his *Memoirs*. Neither would he have trusted so implicitly to a good Republican like Miranda for the protection of his flank and rear.

On the other hand, it seems probable that, as vexations multiplied, his royalist tendencies speedily became pronounced. The continuance of Jacobinical methods in Belgium, the lack of due support to the French armies, the declaration of war against Spain on March 9th, probably imparted vitality to plans which may always have been in the background of his teeming brain. In the seething vortex of Parisian politics, every one was more or less concerned to find a way of escape or of reconciliation with the monarchy in case of a seemingly inevitable reaction. Accordingly, a general who had earned the devotion of his soldiers and the gratitude of the Belgians, would naturally look to his hold on Holland as another weapon against the cruel and unscrupulous despotism at the capital. Only so can we explain the feverish eagerness with which, right up to the disaster at Neerwinden, he clung to his conquests on the Dutch frontier. In a military sense they were a weakness. He must have known that to leave a considerable force hard by the Meuse when everything was at stake at the very centre of

Belgium, set at defiance all the rules of war. We may be sure that by that time he had come to look on the resources of Holland as a most important factor in his great design of restoring constitutional monarchy.

But here, as so often in his career, his eager and hopeful spirit led him to try too many things at the same time, with the result that we have now seen. Had he concentrated all available forces at Louvain, he would probably have triumphed at Neerwinden, and, with a united and devoted army at his back, he would have had a good chance of succeeding in his political enterprise. For, triumphant in Belgium, he need not have entered into any negotiation with Coburg. This it was which ruined him. A General Monk, if he is to become Duke of Albemarle, must have no dealings with the national enemy.

CHAPTER VII

TEN YEARS OF EXILE (1793–1803). NELSON AND DUMOURIEZ' CALL TO ENGLAND

No man can fear to be suspected of falseness if he is really well-intentioned, and from my heart I believe Dumouriez was.—NELSON, May 1st, 1802.

DURING the first part of the eventful year 1793 few Frenchmen were more talked of in England than Dumouriez. For a time his name was on every one's lips, and the attitude he assumed soon gave rise to all sorts of speculation. As a rule he was the object of adverse comment, and on February 18th Mr. Burke made a violent attack upon him in the House of Commons, as well as on the "Duke of Orleans *alias* Orleans," Condorcet "the most humane of murderers," and Brissot "the most virtuous of pickpockets." "If any such men, or Dumouriez," said the speaker, "was to be treated with, send and treat with them, but who would be the ambassador?—who would treat with this hierarchy of anarchy, where the only man of common decency was the common hangman?" The caricaturist was also occupied with the Dumouriez problem. On March 13th Mr. Fores, then at 3 Piccadilly, produced a plate showing the victor of Jemappes resisted by an army of frogs while on his way to seal up the Prince of Orange's papers. A fortnight later his rival, Mr. Humphreys, of St. James's Street, gratified his

customers with a view of Dumouriez dining in state at St. James's, the *pièce de résistance* being the head of Pitt served up by Fox, while Sheridan offered him a ragout made of a battered crown.

Dumouriez, however, was not without his champions, for in April Horace Walpole wrote as follows, from Berkeley Square, to his friend Miss Berry:—

"'Tenez, mon enfant, il n'y a que moi qui ai toujours raison.' Was not I in the right to take a fancy to Dumourier? He has declared himself Duke of Albemarle, and sent to the Regicides, that all the armies France can raise now would not be able to resist the mighty powers coming against them; that there must be an end of folly, and kingly government must be restored. The Municipality got wind of his intentions, and stormed the National Assembly, demanding vengeance on Dumourier. They answered they were apprised of his treachery, and had actually named Commissioners to fetch him to justice, with many bloody resolutions. Those five Commissioners, of whom *Beurnonville* was the chief, arrived, and were instantly clapped in chains by Moncke the second, and sent by him, with his compliments, to General Clairfait, only desiring a receipt for them, which he granted, and has sent them to Mons.

"Dumouriez harangued his army, whose pulses, to be sure, he had previously felt; and tearing his tricolour cockade out of his hat, took a white one from his pocket, and hoisted it above his damaged laurels, and was followed by the whole army, at least with bits of white paper; and he and they are on full trot to Paris, denouncing bitter revenge for any mischief that may ensue there. I hope this menace will not have the consequences that the *Duke of Brunswick's had!* The notorious chiefs will probably prefer the Dauphin for King to the Pinchbeck Regent, or

DUMOURIEZ DINING AT ST. JAMES'S

Caricature by James Gillray, published March 30, 1793, by H. Humphrey

carry him and the Queen away as hostages to the south; but what may one not fear from the brutal madness of the mob!"[1]

Pretty much the same ideas were entertained by Count Axel Fersen, who anxiously followed the negotiations between Dumouriez and the Prince of Coburg from his retreat at Düsseldorf. For the moment he believed that Dumouriez would carry all before him at Paris, and save the life of Queen Marie Antoinette. Between April 5th and 7th Dumouriez issued from Mons or its immediate neighbourhood an address to the French nation, apparently as a supplement to that of April 1st, referred to by Walpole in his letter to Miss Berry. The following is an exact translation from one of the original broadsides[2]:—

"When I published my first Proclamation I had sounded the sentiments of all the corps forming the Army: all seemed to me imbued with the misfortunes that anarchic tyranny, exercised in the name of the National Convention, was causing our fatherland: all recognize fully that we cannot live without laws, all seemed to me agreed that the re-establishment of the Constitution would bring back order and peace, without which we cannot exist.

"I had no reason then to expect the least vacillation in an opinion so well founded, and which seemed so unanimous. Who would believe that there are some generals who have endeavoured, moved by ambition or by foolishness, to change the resolution of the Army? Dampierre, Stettenhoff, La Marlière, Rosière, Chancel, Ferrand have worked against their fatherland, against the good cause, against their brothers in arms and against me, to whom they had been prodigal with assurances of belief in our

[1] Miss Berry's *Journals and Correspondence*, Vol. I, p. 382.
[2] Broadley MSS.

views. I will not reproach them for their ingratitude: their consciences will punish them one day: none of them respects the scoundrels whom they are now serving. The Jacobins in their blind fury will be their Nemesis; they will be victims of their own degradation, for several of them are of the hated tribe, and the anarchists will throw upon their shoulders the disasters that cannot fail to accompany the senseless and bloody plans that this troop of obstinate criminals will set against the regular plans of attack of the Allied Powers.

"The defection arranged by these traitors has changed for the moment the appearance of affairs. The Commissioners of the Convention, who have met again at Valenciennes and at Lille, have used means worthy of them, to mislead the army and to strangle the so-called conspiracy which we all look upon as a necessary act since it is the only means of saving France. They have employed the weapons of cowards and rascals.

"On the third of this month six fanatical volunteers came to St. Amand to stab me; I saved them from the fury of the soldiers and sent them to join the four Commissioners. They will augment the number of hostages. On the fourth three battalions of National Voluntaries left the camp, without orders, to throw themselves on Valenciennes; I met them on the road from St. Amand to Condé, half a league from the latter town. I was without escort, like a father amongst his children (such was the dear name they had given me in the army); I had at the most fifteen or eighteen people with me, all mounted. They were cowards enough to fire on me, killing several people and many horses.

"They cut me off from the camp on which I sought to retire, and I was forced to escape, with a few of the officers who were accompanying me, by crossing the Scheldt in a boat to get to the first outpost of the Imperial Army! Our intention was not to emigrate: we had been

assured that the army would forcibly express its indignation with these assassins and its devotion to the cause of the re-establishment of peace and order, so at daybreak we returned to the camp: but in spite of repeated protestations of devotion to the principles which animated us we noted a dull and sullen agitation, from which we judged that there was considerable vacillation in these opinions. I spoke to each corps: each replied as on previous days, but after our observations we wished to rejoin headquarters at St. Amand. We learned that the artillery proposed to move to the great park at Valenciennes and that the plan of the villains who were misleading them was to carry us off there to sacrifice us to the vengeance of our tyrants. There was but one thing left for us to do, to withdraw to the Imperial Army, which we feel bound to regard as our ally after the noble and generous proclamation of the gallant General in command. Several companies of cavalry have already joined us, some infantry have done the same, and as soon as the Imperial Army shall enter the territory of France, not as conquerors wishing to dictate laws, but as generous allies who come to help us re-establish that constitution which alone can stop the crimes and calamities with which France is threatened, many other corps will come to join their companions in arms.

"I know the spirit of the army and above all that of the troops of the line. In reality its principles are pure. It can be, for the moment, misled by the exaggeration of the views presented to it. But since the invincible courage it has shown during this war must be accompanied by a desire to have laws, which can only be obtained by the Constitution able to destroy the hateful tyranny of the anarchists, the army will be jealous of public opinion. It will be ashamed that it could join for one moment its flags to those of criminal license; it will rally to the heroes who have accompanied me in my momentary withdrawal,

only to return two days later at the most, to stop the degrading disorders that plunge all France into mourning and terror.

"I swear, in the name of my companions, that we will not put down our arms until we have brought our enterprise to its end; that our sole aim is to restore the constitution, and the constitutional monarchy; that no desire for revenge, no passion of ambition leads us; that no foreign Power influences our opinion: that everywhere we shall be found friends and brothers if anarchy ceases when we and the combined armies appear: that where we find resistance we shall know how to discover the guilty, to spare peaceable inhabitants, the victims of the rascality of the Jacobins of Paris, the horrors and calamities of war: that we do not fear the daggers of Marat and the Jacobins: that we will destroy them root and branch together with the infamous writings by which they have sought to pervert the noble and generous character of the French nation, and lastly I repeat, in the name of my companions, the oath to live and die free.

"The General Commanding in Chief
of the French Army,
DUMOURIEZ."

As the French Army declined as a whole to follow the lines thus laid down by Dumouriez, the Prince of Coburg withdrew his earlier proclamation, substituting for it one in which he declared his resolution to invade France as an enemy. The plan to which Horace Walpole alluded consequently failed, and on April 17th[1] Dumouriez reached Düsseldorf, where Count Fersen saw him. He found the French commander-in-chief in a lower room "alone with three aides-de-camp." Dumouriez said he

[1] *Diary and Correspondence of Count Axel Fersen* (London: Heinemann, 1902), pp. 289–90.

had had no relations with the Duc d'Orléans (Égalité), whom he despised as a scoundrel. Count Fersen continues :—

"He said much good of the Duc de Chartres, who, he told me, did not resemble his father in any way. . . . He complained much of Dampierre, who had betrayed him, and in whom he had confidence, being, he said, a man of quality and born to think rightly. He said his plan had been to capture and deliver up (to the Prince de Coburg) Lille, Condé, Valenciennes, and Maubeuge, with the commissioners who were there to serve as hostages; that this plan had partly failed through the imbecility of those he entrusted with it; but the proposal had also been made to exchange the four commissioners against the royal family; that his opinion had been that everything should be granted to get possession of the royal family; after that, no terms should be kept with those wretches; and finally, he said that even if the republic were recognized, the war should be continued to see which were the stronger, it or the Powers. On the whole, I found him a true Frenchman, vain, confident, heedless; with much intelligence and little judgment. His scheme failed through excess of confidence in his strength and in his influence with the army. He did not sufficiently prepare the thing. I noticed that he was very uneasy and nervous at the noise made by the crowd at the door and windows; he seemed to be afraid of some mishap. His valet came in and complained of being insulted by an *émigré*; he sent him away and said to us: 'If those gentlemen push the thing too far I shall show them that I can still make myself respected.' His man was in the wrong; he said that his master had always been a good patriot. The *émigrés* were very angry and wanted to knock him down. I left him with the fear that some hot-heads might make a scene. As he got into his carriage he was insulted. He told me, in order to justify

the different proclamations he had made, that one had to talk to those fellows in their own language, for they would not pass from the state of anarchy in which they were to despotism without going through various gradations."

Three days before, on his road to Düsseldorf, Dumouriez addressed the following letter to Charles James Fox :—

"Celebrated Man, You have for a long time commanded my interest and esteem, I believe I enjoy the reciprocation of these sentiments. I do not address myself to Kings nor to Ministers in my misfortune. I am Dumouriez, I write to Fox. I make you no apology for my conduct, History will be my Judge. Read the *Monitor* (*sic*). See there all the portions which imprudence and the Convention has given to be printed, and judge me. I retired from the Imperial army. I found there an honourable welcome, the Warriors have a fund of freedom and generosity which has not been spoilt by Politics. A first Proclamation of the Prince of Coburg drew me there, a second obliged me to fly, I cannot be the instrument of Machiavellism and oppression. I have no home or money. My *mémoires* which I am going to write will I fancy give me à modest but honourable income, and one which I shall owe to myself alone. Do you think in case the Cantons should be weak to fear compromising themselves by giving me asylum, that I could find one in London? Do you think I should be noticed there among the too imprudent and unhappy emigrants? Do you think I could open there the subscription for my memoirs? They are all my worldly goods, I am only 54 years of age, I have three or four people depending on me and because of them I must renounce the pride of remaining poor like Epaminondas. Answer me on all these points. Look on my demand as a proof of my sincere esteem. Address your letter Post

Restant at Schaffouse and believe me your admirer and consequently your friend."[1]

It is somewhat difficult to trace Dumouriez' movements after leaving Düsseldorf. According to a writer in *The Gentleman's Magazine*,[2] he was afterwards at Hesse-Darmstadt, where he distributed his portraits and had wordy passages of arms with the Landgravine and the Princess Frederica of Mecklenburg. In May he must have been at Mergentheim, for there he received the following communication from the Elector of Mentz (Mayence), which doubtless prompted him to endeavour to obtain protection in England as foreshadowed in his letter to Fox :—

"COLOGNE, *May 16th*, 1793.

"I have received, Sir, your letter of the 12th instant, and am strangely surprised to find that you still reside at Mergentheim. I once had hopes you would have made a better use of the indulgence which I had shown in the orders given to my governor, to induce you to seek some other place of residence. But it appears that you want, by your letter, a farther declaration of my sentiments, which I will not delay giving you.

"France, whose interior parts were shaken by divers profligate factions, inspired me at first with nothing but compassion: a horde of ruffians have since changed that sentiment, by their iniquitous deeds, into abhorrence. I beheld

[1] This curious letter, written in English, was sold by Messrs. Sotheby with the Bunbury MSS. in the summer of 1905. The writers have failed to trace its present whereabouts. It is believed to have gone to America. It is printed as written, with all faults. The letter, however, abundantly shows that Dumouriez left France literally penniless.

[2] *Gentleman's Magazine*, Vol. LXIII, Pt. II (July–December, 1793), p. 723.

the events which then occurred, as the madness of the moment; and although myself, and the Teutonic order of which I am director, sustained great losses by them, yet I considered the whole as mere catastrophes, and flattered myself with confidence, to see a new order of things, from the moment their minds should have recovered from their phrenzy. All spirit of order and constitution was destroyed in France, but the rest of the world remained quiet. To your ministry alone, Sir, the greatest part of Europe stands indebted for its participation in those unlucky events. You was (*sic*) the first that advised France to invade foreign countries, to attack neighbours, and to spread among them all the horrors which convulsed your own country. All the blood which has been spilt, all the cruel extortions and oppressions which so general and disastrous a war brings not only upon France, but upon all the world, reflect upon you, its first author and promoter; and the signal and splendid successes of your generalship can neither palliate nor obliterate the injury you have committed upon mankind.

I will forbear speaking of the manner in which you quitted the army; my judgment, which, as a private man, is only founded on a sense of candour and rectitude, would not please you; and I congratulate you upon your interpreting as a token of regard, the curiosity which the people manifested when they saw you, the author of their misfortunes, and the object of their apprehensions, deprived of the power of ill-treating them in future. Nay, it is not your principles, but the times alone which are altered; and if the powers of Europe are of opinion that you might be of service to them, or if you imagine they owe you thanks, I assure you, on the contrary, that, as a simple private individual, whom some countries have chosen for their chief and governor, I neither can reconcile myself to such a thought, nor have any direct or indirect connexion with you; I rather find myself under the necessity of renewing

the orders to my governor to urge your departure from my dominions.

With these sentiments I am,

FREDERICK CHARLES JOSEPH,

Baron von Erthal, Primate of all Germany, Archbishop and Elector of Mentz.[1]

Within a month of receiving the Elector's warning to "move on" he arrived in London, for under the date of Friday, June 14th, *The Gentleman's Magazine*,[2] between a detailed account of the various minuets danced at the Court Ball of Tuesday, June 4th, and the sentence of Mr. Justice Ashhurst condemning Mr. Frost to imprisonment, the pillory and other penalties for sedition on Wednesday, June 19th, records the fact that "General Dumourier (*sic*) arrived at Mr. Carceau's, hatter, Piccadilly, and immediately gave notice of the event to Lord Grenville." The next day he addressed the following letter to the British minister:—

"*Saturday, June 15th*, 1793.

"MY LORD,—

"I charge Monsieur de Lacoste, a merchant of Brussels, to deliver to your Excellency this letter, and two passports from the Arch-Duke Charles: the one under the name of Charles Peralta, the other under my real name. I found great inconvenience in travelling through Germany without this precaution; and it was by the advice of Messrs. de Metternick (*sic*) and de Mercy, together with their friends, that I took an Italian name.

"My intention is not to stay in London, being too well known there to make my situation agreeable. I seek

[1] The views of the Elector as to Dumouriez being the *fons et origo* of the war, have already been discussed and disproved in this work (see Chapter IV, *ad med.*).

[2] Vol. LXIII, Pt. I (January–June, 1793), p. 573.

a house at a distance from London, where I can remain quiet, and wait the end of the troubles of my unfortunate country. If the greatest statesman in Europe, Mr. Pitt, and you, my Lord, will agree to this, so necessary for my safety and my repose, I shall remain in the greatest privacy.

"My Lord Auckland will acquaint your Excellency of what the Chevalier de Maulde informed him during the negotiation. My Lord Gower will also give you an account of my conduct towards England during my ministry; but it is not for these that I claim the generosity of the English nation.

"Your Lordship will see that it was necessity alone that made me change my name when I came to seek an asylum in England. I respect the laws. The fiction I made use of when at Dover was merely local, and I hasten to repair it by a true declaration of myself.

"If my request can be granted, I will comply with whatever the prudence of the minister shall require of me.

"I have the honour to be, &c., &c.

"(Signed) DUMOURIEZ."

Next day he received the following reply:—

"WHITEHALL, *June 16th*, 1793.

"I received, Sir, this morning, the letter you did me the honour to address to me. It is the business of the Secretary of State for the Home Department to take the orders of his Majesty relative to the residence of strangers in this kingdom, and to notify the same officially; but as it is to me that you have addressed yourself on this occasion, I could not do otherwise than acknowledge the receipt of your letter, and answer the demand contained therein.

"Your stay in England will be subject to too many inconveniences to make it possible for the Government of this country to permit it. I cannot but regret that

you had not gained information in this particular before you came to England. If your wish had been made known to me before you undertook the journey, I would have informed you without reserve that it would have been a useless one. It remains now with me to point out to you my opinion that you must conform, without delay, to the decision I have been under the necessity to communicate to you by this letter.

"I have the honour to be, &c.

"(Signed) GRENVILLE."

"M. Dumouriez."

Under date Saturday, June 22nd, we are informed that

"This night, at ten o'clock, General Dumourier sailed from Dover in the *Express* packet, Captain Dell, with the mail for Ostend. An armed cutter accompanied the packet as a convoy. As it was known that the general had agreed for his passage in the *Express*, curiosity drew together a crowd of people who were eager to get a sight of a person who has been so much the subject of general conversation. He was, however, treated with respect due to misfortune, nor was there the smallest insult offered him."

Similar courtesy does not, however, appear to have been extended to the exile on the other side of the Channel, for we are told that

"On Dumourier's landing at Ostend he was put under arrest by the order of Prince Coburg. He was struck by some person as he walked along, and, but for the protection of two British officers of the 37th Regiment, probably would have been put to death by the mob. He is now on his way to some German prison."

Within two years Dumouriez found a haven of rest in the neighbourhood of Hamburg, and here he com-

menced to write the series of books[1] with which he beguiled the tedium of exile, and earned a precarious livelihood. In March, 1795, he published at Hamburg a very interesting little volume entitled *Political Survey of the Future of France.* In this work of 197 pages Dumouriez examines the position of the Republic in the world, and lays down a certain number of rules for its future guidance and government. He deals with the military successes of the past, the question of Holland and her relations to France and England, the various conquests of France and their value to her, the dangers of a long-drawn-out war, and the problem of the best form of government to adopt for the future.

The war which broke out in 1792 he contends, was caused by political faults of the various courts of Europe, and cannot be considered as an aggression on the part of France. In the conduct of the war the French attacked with confidence, and in accordance with a daring plan which could not have succeeded had the allies (who were warned well in advance of the state of affairs) taken wise and methodical measures.

The invasion of Holland by the French was not a conquest, and the proof of this is that their Government was still treated like that of an allied people. Should Holland not conclude an alliance with France she will be ruined by the indemnities demanded. Neutrality is impossible, for neither France nor England could allow it. Such is the fate of the smaller nations which are mixed up in the quarrels of the great Powers. Their enemy profits by their weakness; their ally takes advantage of it.

[1] See *post*, Bibliography. Appendix II.

By joining France, Holland would gain firm government, strong naval support for the defence of her colonies, and the reparation of her damaged commerce. France, again, cannot be indifferent to the fate of Holland. It is necessary for the safety of the Republic that Holland should remain a naval power (for her position to the eastward of England constitutes a standing menace to that Power), that Holland should retain her colonies in the Indies, and that she should have stable government. It is therefore recommended that the French troops should evacuate Holland, that no exorbitant terms should be demanded, and that the Dutch Government should be allowed a free hand.

These reflections upon Holland lead to an interesting and delicate question. Is it to the advantage of France to retain conquered provinces? A nation must be wary of conquering more countries than can be governed. The more her territory expands, the more will expenses grow, more troops will be needed, and revenue will never equal expenditure, however tyrannical the yoke of taxation may be made. In regard to the provinces then actually captured, Dumouriez says that the country of Liége could form a republic apart, and that forcibly to unite France and Belgium would necessitate military government of the province. It is an amalgamation which should be left to time to effect.

As for the little States along the left bank of the Rhine, they belong naturally to the Germanic confederation, and the difficulties experienced in spreading their revolutionary principles in Alsace, which for one hundred years had belonged to France, should show the French the perplexities that must be met on the other side of the Rhine.

When, and to whom, the captured provinces should be made over is the next problem, to which the answer is—on the conclusion of peace. The author then proceeds to point out (1) the impossibility of concluding peace if the captured provinces are retained, and (2) the dangers of a continuation of the war. Depopulation is one of these. To the end of December (1794), according to a report presented to the National Convention, the war cost France 650,000 men. If one adds to this number the losses by emigration, the guillotine, misery, and civil war, it will be seen that the state of anarchy in France has cost 1,200,000 men. If the population of the country be reckoned at 24 or 25 million, of whom 12 million are males, and we allow for old men and children, there are left some 6–8 million men able to carry arms and run the risks of war. How long can France bear this drain?

This, moreover, is only on the assumption that the French army is favoured by the fortunes of war. England would restrict herself to hostilities on the high seas and the defence of the island, but a raid would be practicable, especially if Germany left the coalition and relieved France of a lengthy land campaign. But the more she was victorious the more she would be losing men.

In all probability the campaign would open with the sieges of Luxemburg and Mayence, which, even if they succeeded, would be costly, and it is round these two centres that the two nations would fight *à outrance*. If the French were beaten their retreat would be very dangerous, and if they won they would still require 100,000 men to face the Germans on the other side of the river. There is uncertainty of success in Italy and Spain so long as the allied fleets oppose ours in the Mediterranean.

The future form of government that Dumouriez recommends is a limited monarchy. The French nation delegated the exercise of sovereignty to certain representatives dependent upon the whim of the multitude. The National Convention, if it is to be useful, should seek to attain dignity, expel undesirable members, and by respecting itself command respect. All the same, the Republic can only be maintained in France as an aristocracy, by the establishment of a senate. France can remain a Republic one and indivisible if the people retain the legislative authority and give to one man executive power.

Book after book was produced with almost bewildering succession by Dumouriez during the earlier years of his exile, and English translations of his autobiography appeared almost contemporaneously both in London and Dublin. In the spring of 1797 he was residing in the village of Bilwerde, near Hamburg. In the memoirs of the Comte de Montgaillard,[1] an avowed secret agent of the French, appears the following letter, supposed to be written by Dumouriez to one M. Frederic Westphalen, No. 98, Hoxter Strasse, Hamburg:—

"I am slowly recovering from the injury to my leg. . . . Kindly post the enclosed. I thank you for the attention paid on my recommendation to the sportsman Le Maistre (member of the Legation of the French Republic at Hamburg). Inform him that there has arrived here from London the Comte de Botterel, charged by Pitt, in conjunction with two other persons whose names I am unacquainted with, to recruit officers for another projected rising in Brittany, arranged at Edimburg Castle and com-

[1] *Histoire des Émigrés*, by H. Forneron. Vol. II, pp. 344-5.

municated to Blankenberg. Embrace Le Maistre for me, and tell him to carefully follow up this affair and not to mention my name."

That Montgaillard should also call Dumouriez a "political spy" is astonishing, and so contradictory is this letter to all we know of Dumouriez' doings at the time, that its genuineness may well be questioned. More cogent evidence would unquestionably be necessary in order to establish the contention that Dumouriez sought thus meanly to purchase his peace with the French Directory, a Government for which he professed supreme contempt.

In 1799 Dumouriez' literary labours were interrupted by a journey to Russia, where he met Louis XVIII. An unfriendly allusion is made to his journey by the author of the *Histoire des Émigrés*, who writes: "Dumouriez professed to adore the King, and received 400 ducats for his journey to St. Petersburg, for which he received instructions from the King in December, 1799. He had little success at St. Petersburg."[1] Nearly eighty years later Sir John Bowring recalls some curious reminiscences of Dumouriez' stay in Russia. According to his literary executor,[2] the hero of Jemappes used to say:—

"When I was first introduced to Paul at Petersburg, I found him, with Alexander, acting the part of a page, and the courtiers before him arranged in straight and formal lines, according to their rank. He said to me: 'How comes it that you—vous autres Français—do such fine and glorious things, and gain such splendid victories? What can I do with a sty of pigs like these?—un tas de

[1] *Histoire des Émigrés*, by H. Forneron. Vol. II, pp. 344–5.

[2] *Autobiographical Recollections of Sir John Bowring, with a Brief Memoir by Lewis N. Bowring*, pp. 307–8. Henry S. King & Co. London, 1877.

cochons comme voilà?' pointing to his Court. I answered, 'C'est par impulsion de la gloire, l'appliquant à recompenser la bravoure et à punir la lacheté.' 'Bah,' replied Paul, 'de la gloire!!! Parlez de la gloire à ces cochons là,' and swept away abruptly as usual."

The next time he went to court Dumouriez was nearly hidden behind a column when Paul entered, with the Empress hanging on his arm. He was dressed in his usual uniform, with white silk stockings and kid gloves. He marched on, and, perceiving Dumouriez, smiled, and when he came opposite to him, turned off at right angles, shouting, "Général! je vous présente ma femme," having said which, he broke off the conversation abruptly, and hastened forwards. Paul's vehemence of character is well known, and when irritated he seemed to have all the ferocity of a demon. A young lady of whom the Emperor was enamoured—Nellidov by name—was once present during one of Paul's paroxysms (she was, Dumouriez said, small and short and ugly, as himself, but with *l'esprit d'un diable*). She seized the Emperor violently with both hands by the collar, and dragged him to a mirror, to which she pointed, exclaiming, "See what a horrible countenance you have." Paul sprang upon the glass, and broke it into a thousand pieces with his feet. "Now, sire!" said she, "you have only multiplied your hideous figure!" She was banished, and her recall could not be obtained.

"Paul," said Dumouriez, "gave me his picture, which I presented to the Prince Regent (George IV). I visited Gustavus Adolphus in his cabinet (closet). He had the smallest room and the biggest sword I ever saw, so that he was constantly tumbling over it, or obliged to

hug it in his arms in order to move about. He consulted me about his campaigns, and took out of his pocket a vile little map of post-roads, by which he began to explain his military plans, but it was so small that Pomerania, to which all his projects were directed, was not there. However, he talked on. He had a plan for making Stralsund an impregnable fortress, and meant to build bastions out of the bricks of the merchants' houses, which he said he would destroy. Il n'avait pas le sens commun."

The next glimpse we get of the industrious exile occurs nearly some twelve months later, when Dumouriez had entered on his sixty-first year. It was in October, 1800, that Nelson met Dumouriez at Hamburg, where many illustrious personages connected with the *vieille cour* had taken up their abode. Their first interview and subsequent intercourse is thus described by "the far-famed" Cornelia Knight[1] who travelled with Sir William and Lady Hamilton during that much-prolonged homeward journey from Palermo: "After breakfast came General Dumouriez, who had been very anxious to see Lord Nelson, though he did not wish to show too much *empressement.* However, the two distinguished men took a great fancy to one another, and we saw much of the General during our stay at Hamburg." Miss Knight goes on to say that "Dumouriez was in person short, and far from handsome, although his appearance was prepossessing and his manner very natural. There was an apparent frankness in his conversation, which could not fail to please, and he possessed the art of saying agreeable things without descending to flattery, and seemed perfectly to understand the character of those with whom he associated after a

[1] *Autobiography*, Vol. I, pp. 155–6. (Third Edition.)

very short acquaintance. . . . He was at that time regarded as a decided Royalist, and was said to be in correspondence with Louis XVIII. He had, however, no objection to talk of the battle of Jemappes, and showed us a box, with the portrait of a lady on it, which he said was presented to him, just after the victory, by an officer who came with despatches, and who, after congratulating him upon his success, produced this box, and added 'Général, voilà votre recompense.' With this lady—a sister of the well-known *émigré* Count de Riverol, he was then living at a little village near Altona. She was a widow and had a son in the Danish service. Dumouriez at that time maintained himself by his writings, and Lord Nelson forced him to accept a hundred pounds, telling him he had used his sword too well to live only by his pen. He was said to be very poor, and his poverty did him honour, as it had showed he had not abandoned the revolutionary party from motives of private interest."

The battle of Copenhagen was fought and won, and on the 20th April, 1801, Dumouriez hastened to offer his congratulations to the victorious Admiral, in the following letter, penned, like that of 1793 to Fox, in English:—

OLTENSEN, ALTONA, 20th *April*, 1801.

"My dear and glorious Nelson, Victory is for ever bounded to your name, as my friendship to your character. I hope the Peace with the northern Powers will give another turn to your constant successes, more profitable for the public cause. Paul's foolish brain destroyed our hopes, they revive with the successor. If you have the charge of the Mediterranean sea we can together deliver Italy and France of the democratic tyranny. I desire nothing else. After that take your leave, and spend the

remnant of your life in the calmness, shadowed with the laurels you for yourself implant'd. Farewell, dear Nelson, and be constant in friendship as you are in triumphing of internal foes and external enemys.—Your for ever affect. friend."[1]

Later in the same year Nelson wrote as follows to Henry Addington :—

"'MEDUSA,' DOWNS, *August 22nd*, 1801.

"MY DEAR SIR,

"I send you two letters and a note from General Dumouriez. What weight to put on them you know best.

[*Translation of letters.*]

'OLTENSEN, NEAR ALTONA, *August 6th*, 1801.

'My dear Nelson, my heroic friend. You will have found two or three of my letters on your arrival in London. I should like to have promptly news of your precious health; you are necessary still to your country, and it would be fortunate if she could duplicate you, but your copies are not so good as the original. I am not sufficiently good in your language to spare you to-day the trouble of reading French. There are some very serious questions for the safety of your country and of Europe. I have put down my fears in the enclosed note, and I address it to you. Make the best use of it you can and add a little confidence in my age and my meditations. My kind regards to Lord Whitworth. I am full of friendship and gratitude for him though he has forgotten me.

'I have given much study during twenty years to the contents of this note: once as a French military man I studied the means of a descent on your coasts; at present a more noble interest unites us to the same Cause, that of

[1] This letter, now in the British Museum, is reproduced in facsimile. It was purchased at the Bunbury Sale of MSS. and has never before been published.

Oltensen par Altona N° 43. le 20 Avril 1801

My dear and glorious Nelson,

Victory is for ever bounded to your name, as my friendship to your character. I hope the Peace with the normern Powers will give another turn to your constant successes, more profitable for the public Cause Paul's foolish brain destroyed our hopes, they revive with the Successor If you have the charge of the Mediterranean sea, we can together deliver Italy and France of the democratic tyranny. I desire nothing Else After that take your leave, and spend the remnant of your life in the calmness, shadowed with the laurels you for yourself implant'd. Farewell, dear Nelson, and be constant in friendship as you are in triumphing of internal foes and external enemys. your fever affectionate friend Dumouriez

FACSIMILE OF DUMOURIEZ' FIRST LETTER TO LORD NELSON, DATED OLTENSEN, NEAR ALTONA, NO. 43, 20 APRIL, 1801

Acquired at the Bunbury Sale for the British Museum

Kings, Religion, Manners and Laws. Their fate, that of Europe depends upon the safety of your country, which is the reason I desire to assist it. To this common interest is added that of the kindly friendship which unites me to you for life. DUMOURIEZ.

'P.S.—Do not believe in a change in the points of attack, the sort of boats which make up the flotilla are only suitable for crossing the Channel, and cannot be used either for Scotland or for Ireland.'"[1]

[The note referred to in this letter has not been found. SIR H. NICHOLAS.]

The second letter of Dumouriez to Nelson, sent by the latter to the then Prime Minister of England, was as follows:—

[*Translation.*]

"OLTENSEN, NEAR ALTONA, *August 11th*, 1801.

"My heroic friend. When I wrote you my letter of the [6th] I did not know that you were charged with the naval defence of your country: I send my congratulations as much to your nation as to you. Do you remember the wish you expressed to me to have me as a brother in arms? It is not against my fatherland that I wish to bear them, but against the usurpers and the tyrants. You will have found my note important, and will certainly have communicated with your ministry. They will ask for details that I can only give verbally, with a map or, better still, on the spot. If it is thought desirable you could send a frigate for me; I will leave incognito; I will arrive so. A lodging out of London could be arranged for me, or I would stay near you to help you, and in rendering these services to your country and to my friend Nelson, I could hasten the hour of the downfall of a Government that will overthrow all others if it lasts.

[1] Sir H. Nicholas, *Letters and Despatches of Nelson*, Vol. IV. p. 474.

"I have just received a letter from a captain of one of the frigates of the Brest fleet. He says that the entire fleet is provisioned for six or seven months, which indicates a voyage of some length. Perhaps it is intended, complete or in part, for the expedition to India which was arranged two years ago by Admiral Villaret. If this fleet or one of its divisions goes to India it is to take possession of Goa and to snatch from you the Cape, or else Ceylon. This may be really a secondary aim if Napoleon loses hope of the raid on England. We must foresee everything, without false calculations.

"I await eagerly news of you, and I count on your friendship as you may count on mine. Farewell and be happy.—D."

On October 8th, 1801, in reply to a letter from Nelson, Addington wrote:—

"The letters from Dumouriez are at Wimbledon, but shall be returned to-morrow. I beg your pardon for having kept them in my possession so long."[1]

In the course of the following spring Nelson wrote thus to Sir Brooke Boothby[2]:—

MERTON, SURREY, *May 1st*, 1802.

"MY DEAR SIR,—I feel very much flattered by your kind remembrance of our very pleasant party at Hamburg. . . . I am truly sorry for Dumouriez; but, alas! it is not in my power to assist him. If his country receives him, he will be the worst enemy we ever found, for he must hate us for our treatment of him. No man can fear to be suspected of falseness if he is really well-intentioned, which from my heart I believe Dumouriez was."

[1] Sir H. Nicholas, *Letters and Despatches of Nelson*, Vol. IV, p. 507.
[2] *Ibid.*, Vol. V, p. 12.

Then came the "illusive Peace of Amiens" and the lull in the storm, only too quickly followed by the renewal of hostilities. The threat of invasion once more assumed a practical shape, and again became the momentous question of the hour. During his sojourn at Oltensen Dumouriez had written a pamphlet on the subject, which he had dealt with from a French point of view a quarter of a century before while commandant at Cherbourg. Rightly or wrongly, Lord Nelson is credited with the idea of summoning to England as a *Deus ex machinâ*, on the all-absorbing and all-important topic of national defence, the man who had received such scurvy treatment on the part of the British Government ten years previously. Be this as it may, the following article appeared in the *Gentleman's Magazine* towards the close of the year:—[1]

"STRAND, *October 20th*, 1803.

"MR. URBAN,—

"The following copy of an Address sent to the Prince of Wales and his Royal Brothers by the post the 9th ult. is at your service.

"TYRO.

"'The reason of the present liberty taken with your royal Highnesses is to recommend him a proper Opponent to curb his insolence, namely a Dumorier for a Buonaparte, who is an able General, and a native of France, and who has doubtless many friends and well wishers among his countrymen, and Buonaparte a mere unprincipled foreigner, a truce-breaking Corsican! The former, at the head of the French emigrants, may enable the French people to discover their minds, what sort of Government they chuse (but Britons by no means to interfere with their choice); whether they wish to change their present tyrants, or like

[1] Vol. LXXIII, Pt. II, 1803, p. 931.

to continue wearing their chains and shackles. Dumorier may be supposed to know the genius of his country best, and to love it most; which as a man of understanding he will evince by encouraging Christian principles and morals.

"'If Dumorier were to open a correspondence and, set up his Standard, the French people might yet have a chance to be free once more; and Britons might be speculating and considering the propriety of circumstances to visit the French, if the French do not chuse to visit us. Therefore (let no man's heart fail because of them).

"'I hope your Royal Highness will excuse my zeal in the national cause, which I am endeavouring to serve with the best weapon I have: and am with the most dutiful respect, yours and my King's and Country's ever,

"'SENEX.'"

This letter is dated October 20th, 1803. The previous day had been appointed for a general fast,[1] and "the volunteers trooped to places of worship throughout the length and breadth of the land to invoke the aid of the God of Battles. . . . On the 26th of the same month the King held a grand review of volunteers belonging to the London district in Hyde Park, at which Monsieur, 'dressed in green, with red facings, the Prince de Condé, in white, faced with blue, the Duke de Bourbon, in white, faced with red, and the Duke de Berri, in green,'"[2] were present. A scarcely less conspicuous figure was General Dumouriez, then about to undertake the compilation of the great project for the defence of England against Napoleon, which will be given in the detail it deserves in subsequent chapters of this book. Meanwhile certain other schemes for

[1] See *Napoleon and the Invasion of England*, by H. F. B. Wheeler and A. M. Broadley, Vol. II, pp. 130-1.

[2] *Gentleman's Magazine*, Vol. LXXIII, Pt. II, p. 975.

effecting the same purpose must be mentioned and explained. Between the autumn of 1803 and the end of 1805 the subject engrossed the attention alike of sovereign and people. Nobody assuredly spent more time in endeavouring to solve the much-discussed problem than King George III.

CHAPTER VIII

PROJECTS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

1796–1803

Hee that commands the Sea is at great liberty, and may take as much, and as little, of the Warre as he will.—BACON.

GREAT BRITAIN was in little danger of invasion by the French until the year 1796. The year 1795, indeed, saw the beginning of the break-up of the first coalition, owing to the defection of Prussia, Spain, and some of the lesser German and Italian states. But it was not until August, 1796, when the Court of Madrid formed an offensive and defensive alliance with the French Republic, that British maritime supremacy became for a time imperilled. The formal declaration of war by Spain against the Island Power followed in October of that year, and the breakdown of the negotiations for peace which Pitt set on foot in that month, together with the astonishing triumphs of Bonaparte in Italy, left England face to face with an enemy whose power was ever increasing. Holland had been overrun by the French in the winter of 1794–5, so that, with the exception of Portugal, the whole continent of Europe from the Texel to Nice furnished naval resources to our enterprising enemy.

The efforts which he put forth have been fully described

in the work *Napoleon and the Invasion of England: The Story of the Great Terror*, by Messrs. Wheeler and Broadley. It also describes the beginning of the volunteer movement, and many other particulars connected with the defence of Great Britain. In the present chapter, which must be considered as supplementary to those in the above-named work, a brief description will be given of the plans of coast defence and of the protection of London which were framed in the years 1796–1803.

The first detailed and systematic scheme of defence seems to have been drawn up in the month of August, 1796. Portions of it bear that date, and they form part of a coherent whole. It was drawn up in the office of the quartermaster-general, Sir David Dundas, an officer of much experience and ability, who in 1792 had drawn up the "Rules and Regulations for the Formation, Field Exercises and Movements of His Majesty's Forces." In drafting the plan of 1796, he must have had the assistance of General Sir Harry Calvert, who had been deputy quartermaster-general in 1795, and in April, 1796, became adjutant-general of the forces. There are notes on the plan in the War Office Archives (Invasion, No. 113), but it has been printed in full in his *Journals and Correspondence*.[1] The following are its chief features:—

Beginning with a general description of the country south of the Thames, the compilers point out that the district most threatened is divided by the South Downs, trending from Beachy Head to Winchester, by the ironstone ridge stretching from Fairlight Head, near Hastings, to St. Leonard's Forest and Hindhead, while the third

[1] *The Journals and Correspondence of Sir Harry Calvert*, ed. by Sir Harry Verney. London, 1853.

FRENCH PLAN, SHOWING INVASIONS OF ENGLAND UP TO 1798

range, the North Downs, begins at Dover, and runs almost continuously, near to Maidstone, Reigate, Guildford, and Alton. Parallel to it is another ridge, which begins near Ashford and extends through Coxheath, Sevenoaks, and Leith Hill to Hindhead. Between these four main ridges there lie tracts of low land, in parts marshy and thickly wooded, along which an enemy can advance without much difficulty, the country being fertile and ill suited, except at open commons, for the operations of cavalry, in which the defenders are assumed to be far stronger than the invaders. The four ridges are themselves deeply furrowed by rivers, which allow of a passage from south to north.

Assuming that the invader effected a landing in Kent, he might choose the coast near to Sandwich, and, to oppose him, the British force would find at first no strong defensive position, Nonington or Hougham being the preferable points, while a force guarding the Isle of Thanet would threaten his flank from the north. The line of the River Stour near Canterbury and the hills beyond would form the next rallying point, beyond which, in its turn, the far stronger barrier of the Medway must be held as long as possible. The valley of the Darent from Dunton to Farningham and Dartford must also be disputed, and the British forces, if driven thence, would fall back on the strong positions afforded by Knockholt Hill, the high ground near Chiselhurst and Holwood, together with Shooter's Hill—the last an essential feature of the defence. In those pre-suburban days it was suggested that a last stand might be made behind the Ravensbourne stream, the right wing holding the hills near Norwood and Dulwich. At all the later positions the defenders' right wing would rest on wooded heights, while their left, extending into the

lower lands near the Thames, would have the protection of that river.

If, however, the enemy forced a landing to the west of Dover, the most favourable points would be between Hythe and Rye—a district to which, as we shall see, Dumouriez directed the attention of the War Office in the most emphatic manner. In the plan of 1796 this district of Romney Marsh does not figure very prominently, but the advantages of flooding it from the sea at Dymchurch sluice are noted. Thereafter the strength of the defensive positions at Appledore, the line of the upper Medway at Edenbridge or Tunbridge, and the hills about Sevenoaks are commented on. The hills between Norwood and Streatham are recommended as the last position for the defenders on this route.

The dangers of a landing near Bexhill or in Pevensey Bay are next considered. The suggestion is made that the defenders' right wing should hold the rising ground at Eastbourne and communicate with their centre, holding positions behind Pevensey Castle and Bexhill, and their left at Hastings—a dispersion of force over a space of fifteen miles which it is impossible to admire. When driven from this extensive front, the defenders would rally at Wytch Cross on Ashdown Forest, and thereafter at Sevenoaks, Kent Hatch, or Ewhurst, according to the line of march taken by the enemy. The reader, who with a good map, follows out this plan of defence and compares it with that sketched by Dumouriez in 1804, cannot fail to remark the superiority of the latter.

Dundas and his coadjutors next call attention to the coast west of Beachy Head, where the most practicable landing places, namely Seaford and Littlehampton, had

very inadequate defences. The lines of advance, firstly through Lewes, East Grinstead, and Godstone, along the Adur valley from Shoreham to Horsham and Dorking, or again up the Arun, or again through Midhurst and Guildford, are then examined. Curiously enough the route from Shoreham to Horsham is dismissed as unlikely, because it traversed "the deepest part of the Weald"—a phrase which shows that the face of the country has much altered. Facilities for watering large bodies of troops are examined and the rallying points are indicated.

Turning to the interesting question, where the enemy might be expected to attempt a landing, the compilers of the 1796 plan dismiss the coasts of Essex and Suffolk as practically out of the question for a flotilla of small vessels, owing to the length of the voyage, the difficulties of the navigation, and the commanding positions held by the British fleet at the Nore and Yarmouth. This assumption seems far too sanguine, considering that the French had the great naval resources of the Netherlands at their disposal, and that the interior of Essex offers many facilities to an invader. The Dundas scheme bestows by far the greatest attention on Kent and Sussex. In a survey of the coast defences, it mentions small works at Margate, Broadstairs, and Ramsgate, notes that there are no defences between the latter town and Sandown Castle, and commends the strength of this castle and that of Deal and Walmer. The notion of a landing at St. Margaret's Bay, under Dover Castle, or within fire of the Folkestone batteries, is scouted. But it remarks that to the west of Folkestone there are no defences except a battery at Shorncliffe, the weak Sandgate Castle, three temporary redoubts near Hythe, and an enclosed work of

no strength at Dungeness, together with some flanking batteries. Rye Harbour was poorly protected; and there were no defences between it and Beachy Head except batteries at Hastings and Langley Point. West of Beachy Head there were small works at Cuckmere Haven, Seaford, Newhaven, Rottendean [*sic*], and Brighthelmstone. As already stated, the defence of the coast beyond that town was limited to insignificant earthworks at Littlehampton and Selsea Bill.

Dundas and his colleagues assumed that no attempt would be made on Portsmouth, which by the care of the Duke of Richmond had been strengthened despite the foolish vote of the House of Commons in 1785 against extra works there. An attack on the Isle of Wight, with its inadequate defences, was deemed improbable, except from Cherbourg. Descents on Poole Harbour, Weymouth, or Portland were also curtly dismissed, and no notice was taken of the coast beyond. George III, however, was always singularly apprehensive of an invasion of Dorset; and we may therefore give a personal touch to the narrative by pausing to notice the ideas of the monarch on that subject. The originals of the following letters of the King, hitherto unpublished, are in Mr. Broadley's collection:—

King George the Third to his Son, the Duke of York, Commander-in-Chief, Weymouth, August 5th, 1796.

"My Dear Frederick,

"The Weekly States and memoranda of Commissions as well as the Quarters of the Troops Monthly Blue book and Monthly returns of the Foot Guards arrived this morning. I approve of the proposed successions, and as I think Major-Genl. Stevens can by no

Duty at Weymouth to be done by.

1. Bat. the 8 Flank Comp. of the Old Brig. & 3d. Regt. of Foot Guards

4 Batt. of the said two Regts. Edw. Finch to command the G.

These may all be encamped on the Common leading to Radipole

1. Bat. 25th } these two
1st Bat. Staffordshire Militia } Bat. may be
2 Bat. Somerset Militia } encamped on the same ground the Somerset & Devon Militia.

M. G. Fitzroy.

R. R. He. Gds. & 15th L. D. to cover the King's Quarters, a Squadron of each to mount a 10 Piquet at the temporary barracks the rest to encamp at the Common above the Rector of Radipole's Parsonage House to be hired for the D. of Cambridge; He will keep his Aide Camps, Deputy Adjutant Genl. there, and give his dinners when necessary.

The Hanoverian Legion to be all Encamped at Radipole where the York Hussars were in 1801.

The King will lodge the Quarter Mastr. Genl. the Deputy Adjutant Genl. and six Aide de Camps.

The King Hopes to have secured an House that will lodge the Dukes of York Kent and Cumberland, as also the D. of York's Secy. Lt. Col. Taylor, and two aide Camps. Col. Clinton and the Officer who prepares the List of Successions had best remain in London to forward them busy.

The Ds. of York and Cumberland to have their Quarters in the Barracks General Ds. of Cambridge at Dorchester. Gwynn Lt. G. Grant Cavalry at Dorchester Camp

4th B. Gds. } M. G. Hawley
2d. Dragoon }

13th } 7th Dragoons. M. G. Cartwright
14th }

7th } M. G. Ld. Paget
20th }

4th } M. G. Hugonin
6th }

King's German Legion } ~~M. G. Garth~~

1st Dragoons } M. G. Garth
German D. }

15th } Light G. Dragoons } M. G. Wilford

Infantry
Genl. D. of Cambridge
Lt. Genl. Ed. Chatham
Officers.

Berks, Northampton, Lancashire 3d } Militia Forbes or Ledlow

30th } 2 B. G. Spencer Regulars
40th }

3d Brigade Regulars
4th Brigade Militia

MS. MEMORANDUM OF KING GEORGE III ON A PROPOSED CONCENTRATION OF THE ENGLISH TROOPS BETWEEN DORCHESTER AND WEYMOUTH, GIVEN BY HIM TO THE DUKE OF YORK IN JUNE, 1804

means be spared at present from the Foot Guards, chuse to confer the 38th Regt. on Major-Genl. Rooke and the Battalion of the 60th on Major-Genl. Hunter and the Government of St. Maws on Colonel Morrison.

"I am entirely of your opinion that the only time of danger is in the winter season, when the troops are retired from the Coast and in wide cantonments; that therefore it is essential to have temporary Barracks prepared that when the Troops remove from camp they may be kept compact; that Chelmsford, Canterbury, Ashford and Horsham seem well calculated for the Eastern and South-East districts.

"I have had much conversation with Genl. Pitt, Lord Rivers and Lord Paulett on the subject of driving[1] the coast and having places fixed on to where they can be collected and properly foddered; they all agree in the propriety of the measure and seem certain this can be done without giving any alarm; Lord Rivers is gone to Blandford Races, he will there see many of the gentlemen will hear their sentiments and enable his Brother to send some Materials to you. If this is done in every district some regular plan may be in time formed.

"Believe me ever

"My Dear Frederick

"Your most affectionate father

"GEORGE R."

The Memorandum which next follows is also reproduced in facsimile. It shows the close interest which the King took in military details at Weymouth :—

Memorandum handed by George the Third to the Duke of York on 11th June, 1804.

"Duty at Weymouth to be done by the 1st Bat of the

[1] To "drive" is the technical term for "desolating" or "emptying" a district of population and food of all kinds.

8th Flank Company of the Coldstreams and the 3rd Regiment of Foot Guards etc. 4 Batts of the said two Regiments. Edward Finch the L. G. to command. These may all be encamped on the Common leading to Radipole.

1st Bat 25th
1st Bat Staffordshire Militia
2nd Bat Somerset Militia

These two Bats may be arranged on the same ground [as] the Somerset and North Devon Militia. M. G. Fitzroy R. R. H. Gds and 15th Lt D to cover the King's Quarters. A Squadron of each to mount as Piquet at the temporary Barracks the rest to camp at the Common above. The Rector of Radipole's Parsonage House to be hired for the D of Cambridge. He will keep his Aid-de-camp Deputy Adj Gen there and give his dinners when necessary. The Hanoverian Legion to be encamped at Radipole where the York Hussars were in 1801. Major Gen Garth, Major Gen Whetham.

"The King will lodge the Quarter Master Gen the Deputy Adj Gen and six Aid-de-camps. The King hopes to have secured an house that will lodge the Dukes of York, Kent, and Cumberland as also the D of York's Secy Lt Col Taylor and 2 Aid-de-Camps. Col Clinton and the Officer who prepares the List of Succession had better remain in London to forward their business. The Dukes of York and Cumberland to have their quarters in the Barracks at Dorchester Gen Gynn Lt Gen E of Moira or another Lt Gen Hugh Field (?).

"Cavalry at Dorchester :—

6th D Guards 2nd Dragoons	.	M. G. Horsley
13th 14th Lt Dragoons	.	M. G. Cartwright

7th and 20th	M. G. Lord Paget
4th 6th	M. G. Hugenin
Kings German Legion	M. G. Garth [erased]
1st Dragoons German D	M. G. Garth
15th Light G Dragoons	M. G. Wilford

"Infantry:—

Genl Duke of Cambridge, Lt Gen Earl of Chatham, Ed; Manners

Northampton Berks Lancashire 3rd	(Militia) Forbes or Ludlow
30th 40th 2 H. G.	Spenser

Regulars.

3rd Brigade Regulars

4th Brigade Militia."

Reverting to the general course of the narrative, we note that Dundas deemed the most dangerous parts of our coast were (1) the Isle of Thanet and Pegwell Bay; (2) the district from Folkestone to Dungeness; (3) that from Rye to Hastings; (4) Pevensey Bay. Points farther west were thought to present fewer advantages to the invader in proportion to the length of the voyage across the Channel and the distance from London. The want of a good anchorage for the defending squadrons between Dover and Portsmouth also seriously compromised the safety of the coast, especially between Dover and Beachy Head.

The eastern parts of Kent were thought to present the greatest attractions to an invader, owing to the facilities of landing, the easy progress towards London, and the

plentiful supplies which the country would afford. The compilers of the 1796 plan point out that Boughton Hill, west of Canterbury, is a position to be held to the uttermost, in order that the supplies and resources of the rich country about Faversham and Sittingbourne may be withdrawn to Chatham, and so leave the invaders in want of common necessaries. Similarly the defence of the Medway is to be prolonged stubbornly, in order to deplete Western Kent.

These considerations lead the authors to point out the means for "driving" the country, that is, sweeping it clear of corn, live-stock, and vehicles of all kinds. The breaking up of the roads is further recommended, and detailed accounts are furnished of the points to which all supplies withdrawn from the threatened districts should be brought together for safety out of reach of the invader. The survey here takes in not only Kent and Sussex, but Hampshire and the south-western counties. All the districts from Essex to Northumberland are likewise mapped out in this comprehensive scheme for starving out the invader.

The scheme is probably the most systematic ever drawn up at the War Office up to that time. It has many defects, notably the omission to include the eastern counties in the danger zone.[1] Reliance on the device of "driving" the country before the invaders also occupies far too prominent a place. For the next two years, however, this appeared in the front rank of the plans of national

[1] In this respect Sir John Moore showed far more insight. In October, 1797, he went over the east coast with Major Hay, R.E., who was charged to inspect it. They considered the coast from the Thames to Harwich as "the most vulnerable." Moore thought the defences of Landguard Fort, opposite Harwich, most inadequate. (See *Diary of Sir J. Moore*, pp. 261–7.)

defence. A considerable part of the official reports and correspondence on this subject refers to measures for "driving" the country. Powers were given to the Lords-Lieutenant of counties for assessing the value of stock and grain, arranging for the depots of refuge, and the means of removal of the population and all movables.

The Defence Act of 1798 extended their functions and empowered the authorities to map out England and Wales "into such divisions as may appear to His Majesty most convenient for removing the inhabitants, with the cattle, corn, grain, and fodder from such parts as may be necessary on the approach of the enemy, and likewise to appoint proper places in which such inhabitants, cattle, corn, grain, and fodder so removed shall be lodged." Powers were given to military commanders to remove the inhabitants, except the sick and infirm, together with all articles that might be of service to the enemy, and to destroy the corn if there were no time to remove it.

By degrees, however, the feeling spread that such wholesale removal or destruction was impossible. At an influential meeting held at Lewes on August 13th, 1801, for enrolling volunteers, it was pointed out that Sussex produced in all about 177,000 quarters of grain, the removal of which would take 17,688 wagons, together with 35,000 for the carting of the hay. What, then, would happen to the 57,837 aged and infirm persons in the county who could not move of themselves, seeing that there were in all only 36,828 horses and oxen able to draw wagons? It was therefore resolved that the measure of depopulation and wholesale removal would be impracticable as

well as cruel; that the destruction of corn would cause famine for the natives, and that the burning of all mills and the removal of all vehicles would meet the needs of the case.[1]

These recommendations seem to have had some effect, for in the War Office volume, which gives a summary of all the defence measures, it is stated that by the year 1803 or 1804 the Government had abandoned the proposals for "driving" the districts in front of the invader, except with regard to the removal of horses, draft-cattle, and wheeled carriages. The Lord-Lieutenant of Sussex strongly insisted on the impossibility of carrying off the infirm and children; and the force of his arguments was admitted by Mr. Addington, then Prime Minister, and Lord Hobart, the Secretary for War. In a letter which the Commander-in-Chief, the Duke of York, wrote to the Deputy-Lieutenant of Essex in November, 1803, he admitted that only horses and draft-cattle would be driven off. All other live-stock was to remain.

Nevertheless, at a meeting at Canterbury about that time, presided over by the Lord-Lieutenant, Sir Charles Grey, suggestions were made as to the "driving" of eastern Kent, especially by means of the yeomanry, in case of invasion. The roads by which the stock and produce were to be removed to the several depots in the interior all received careful consideration. This, however, may be taken as a sign of the extreme importance attached to that district. Elsewhere the scheme met with disfavour, but in some places arrangements were made for breaking up the roads leading from the coast. It is stated that General Sherbrook, who commanded in the

[1] War Office Archives (Invasion, No. 70).

north of Norfolk, actually carried out that measure at and near that coastline.[1]

Meanwhile the defence of London had received much attention, especially during the invasion scare of 1798. The authorities rightly considered that either the capital, or Ireland, would be the objective of all serious attempts at invasion. Raids like that on Fishguard, which was originally aimed at Bristol,[2] might do much harm locally, but could not decide the fate of the nation. On London, therefore, and the adjacent coasts, the Government bestowed every care, and the plan, bearing date April 25th, 1798, for the defences on the south bank of the Thames and the patrolling of the streets when necessary, shows signs of urgency.[3] For this purpose the volunteers, who had latterly been enrolling in large numbers, were to be utilized; and the accompanying plan, reproduced from the original in the War Office archives, shows how minutely the authorities had provided against the not improbable contingency of rioting by the disaffected.

In a memorandum of Sir David Dundas, dated April, 1799, the number of troops in London in January, 1798, are given as 5400 infantry (regulars and militia) and 2370 cavalry, together with numerous but undisciplined volunteer corps. The latter, owing to the spirit and exertions of the people, are given as 10,424 foot, and 908 horse in April, 1799; and the total forces then available in London as 16,532 men. They were distributed in case of need as follows: To the Tower, 2719 men; to the Royal Exchange, 2836; to St. Paul's, 2941; to Bloomsbury, 3366; and to the

[1] War Office Archives (Invasion, No. 70).
[2] *Napoleon and the Invasion of England*, Vol. I, chap. II.
[3] *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 122–3.

Horse Guards inclusive of Southwark, 4664. In case of a revolt, signals were to be given by guns and rockets from St. Paul's, or the Mansion House, and to be repeated in the outer districts.[1] No detailed plans for the fortification of London seem to have been drawn up till the years 1801 and 1804. They will be noticed later on in this chapter.

Soldiers and sailors concurred in thinking that the French would certainly strike at Ireland. The failure of the attempts of Hoche and Humbert, in 1796 and 1798 respectively, by no means dulled the fears of our ancestors on this subject. Pitt, in his letter of May 31st, 1798, foretold an effort against Ireland, and the correspondence of Nelson, Collingwood, Cornwallis, Sir John Moore, and Castlereagh, contains many references to the subject. It is certain that if the plans of the French Directory had not been thwarted by the premature rising of the Irish malcontents in the late spring of 1798, British supremacy would have been in the greatest danger. The bulk of the defending force consisted of undisciplined and lawless militia, and Sir Ralph Abercrombie summed up his opinion in the sensational phrase: "The army [in Ireland] is in a state of licentiousness that must render them formidable to any one but the enemy."[2] There seems to have been no systematic plan of defence. Memoirs on the subject were drawn up by Colonel Hope, Adjutant-General in Ireland, and by Lieutenant-General Dundas. But they seem to have been slight and vague. In truth it is difficult to defend that island on a systematic plan, because the number of landing-places is exceedingly

[1] War Office, I, No. 1137. The dots in the plan show the muster-points for the troops.

[2] See especially *The Diary of Sir John Moore*, Vol. I, chap. XI.

VISCOUNT MELVILLE
After a picture by Sir T. Lawrence engraved by H. Meyer

large. Sir John Moore, however, who commanded in the south-west, reported that among the many natural harbours there, only Bantry Bay and Cork Harbour were really suitable for a landing of the enemy in force.[1]

The survival of British rule in Ireland may be considered due to the storms which wrecked the enterprise of Hoche, to the diversion of French military and naval resources to Egypt by Bonaparte, to the lack of concert between the Irish malcontents and the French Directory, and last, but not least, to sheer good luck. It is certain that Bonaparte would have dealt a far more terrible blow at Great Britain by directing his great armada to Bantry Bay rather than to Alexandria. In Egypt he found no sympathizers except a few unwarlike Greeks. In Ireland, after his first victory, he could have enlisted three-fourths of the adult male population; and the country would have supported his army.

As soon as there seemed a probability of the outbreak of war with Bonaparte, Colonel Twiss, R.E., drew up a plan of defence for Ireland. It is dated Quartermaster-General's Department, January 15th, 1803. He states that he has made use of the memoranda of Hope and Dundas on that subject. Firstly, he points out the hopelessness of attempting to protect a very long coast line abounding in good harbours. The main defence must therefore be concentrated at certain commanding points in the interior, which should be fortified so as to resist an enemy for at least three weeks, and give time for a relieving force to rally and come up. On the score of expense, he dismisses great fortifications as out of the question. Small works, on the other hand, would soon be taken, unless constructed on

[1] *The Diary of Sir John Moore*, Vol. I, pp. 282–3

islands. The islands in rivers seem to combine the maximum of advantage with the minimum of cost. He therefore hints that the places named by General Dundas—namely Cashel, Limerick, Athlone, Londonderry, Enniskillen, Omagh, Kilkenny, and Charlemont—would in most cases need too extensive and costly fortifications. In his opinion, the most urgent need is, firstly, to protect Dublin, and, secondly, to choose commanding positions for forts and depots in the interior.

He therefore recommends a pentagonal fort on the high ground in Phœnix Park, Dublin, a large fortified tower to protect the harbour, and two similar towers on the outskirts of the city. An army will then with safety operate on Dublin as a fortified base. For the fortified depots he advises the selection of Derry Holmes in the River Shannon; Spike Island and Haulbowline in Cork Harbour, where the work may be done by convicts; Mt. Elliot at the confluence of the rivers Barrow and Nore in Kilkenny; while Duncannon Fort at Waterford should be strengthened; he further points out Tarbert, near the mouth of the Shannon, and Bearhaven in Bantry Bay. To protect and command the north, he suggests the fortification of Enniskillen and points in Lough Neagh and Lough Swilly. He estimates the cost of these works (exclusive of Derry Holmes and Tarbert) at £1,430,000.[1]

Far more extensive and ambitious is the plan of defence of Ireland sketched by Dumouriez in 1804. But as this work deals with England, we can give only a brief account of it. Proceeding from the same standpoint as Twiss, namely that Dublin is the all-important point, he advises, nevertheless, that the island should be divided into

[1] War Office, No. 73.

four great military districts, in each of which there should be an important place of arms. He selects Cork, Limerick, Athlone, and Enniskillen as places for entrenched camps and depots. Other towns to be less extensively fortified are Londonderry, Sligo, Killala, Castlebar, Galway, Tralee, Kenmare, and Kinsale. These fortifications would delay the enemy's advance, even if he escaped the covering fleets and landed in force.

Dumouriez foresaw little chance of the French landing in St. George's Channel or the Irish Sea. But he called attention to the great bays of the south and south-west, notably Cork, Kinsale, and Bantry. Against a landing on the west coast Athlone and Enniskillen were the natural bases for the defending army. In the north, Lough Swilly should be better protected. On the whole he decided that Ireland would be easy to invade but difficult to hold against an efficient defending force. The Irish would soon come to dislike the French troops and their method of warfare.

In a later memoir on the same subject, dated January, 1808, when the French seemed to have Portugal and Spain completely at their disposal, Dumouriez returned to the same subject and pointed out the danger to Ireland which their occupation of the Iberian Peninsula involved. He therefore went over the coast line more in detail, pointing out especially the value of Valentia Island and Bearhaven, off the coast of Kerry and Cork, for defensive purposes. Fortified naval stations at Cork, Dublin, Rathlin Island (!), and Valentia would serve to cover the coast line and render a landing very dangerous.

For the land defences there must be an army of at least 75,000 men (one-tenth of it cavalry) operating at or near

Dublin and the four great entrenched camps above-named. They would unite as quickly as possible to threaten the invader as soon as he landed. Descents in great force are not to be apprehended except on the coast between Cork and the mouth of the Shannon. In that mountainous country a guerilla warfare should be maintained with spirit, and great battles should be avoided, a lesson which the recent disasters of the allies on the Continent emphatically prescribed. He concludes by insisting on the importance of Ireland, especially while Napoleon holds Spain and Portugal, from whose ports he can readily menace that island with invasion. The loss of Ireland he predicts will be the break up of the British Empire. The importance of this memoir was soon to be discounted by the national rising of the Spaniards against Napoleon, which deprived him of the great naval resources of that country and detained great armies in that peninsula for the next six years. But the memoir shows the watchful care of Dumouriez over the fate of the Power on which, in his view, depended the liberty of the Continent and the welfare of mankind.

It is now time to give a short account of the official report on the defence of Great Britain, signed by the Duke of York on August 25th, 1803. Pointing out that the recent occupation of Hanover by the French exposed our east coast to more risks of invasion than in recent times, he points out the need of providing for the defence of Edinburgh and the rivers Tyne and Humber, as well as the southern coast line. Consequently the existing armed forces were wholly inadequate, despite the efforts of Parliament to increase them. He therefore proposed to Lord Hobart, the Secretary for War, a new disposition of the



FREDERICK, DUKE OF YORK, AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE BRITISH ARMY

After engraving of A. W. Warren after R. Corbauld (1803)

armed forces, mainly with a view to the defence of London, even to the prejudice of other points which were important, but distant from the capital.

Assuming that 13,000 would be required for the defence of Scotland, he allocated 139,000 men needed for the defence of England as follows:—

Southern district	55,000
Eastern district	30,000
Western district	12,000
London and Midlands	10,000
North-west	10,000
South-west	8,000
Yorkshire	6,000
North	6,000
Severn	2,000
	139,000

The southern district, comprising Kent and Sussex, appeared to him to offer most advantages to an invading force, and he suggested that considerable stores should be prepared on a large scale at central points, as Ashford, Sevenoaks, and Horsham, while bread might be baked and stored at Tunbridge and Malling. Similarly he surveys the other districts, but in a style which is far from illuminating.

On the subject of fortifications he points out that as the line by which the invader would strike at London is exceedingly short, every possible means must be taken to delay his advance. Such works, however, should be limited to those which command the most important anchorages, safeguard Portsmouth and Plymouth, and check an enemy's advance upon London. On the last topic he quotes with approval the recommendation of Lord Cornwallis and

Colonel Hope in 1801, that a fortress should be erected on the hills to the south of Chelmsford, and a similar one to guard London on the south. As regards coast defences he advises the strengthening of those which were erected in the late war with France. He advises their extension by means of towers (afterwards called Martello towers), the plan of which had recently been drawn up by Colonel Twiss and Captain Ford. Their advantages were their cheapness (they cost less than £3000 each), their need of only a very small garrison in time of war and none during peace, the impossibility of taking them, save after a heavy artillery fire, their mutual support, and their protecting a coast as much as a body of troops could do.[1]

For the defence of the vulnerable districts, Romney Marsh and Pevensey Bay, he had already given orders for works which would ensure the flooding of the lowlands. The coast between Deal and Ramsgate he thinks sufficiently protected by the castles at Walmer, Deal, and Sandown, and still more by the roadstead of the Downs. Even to the west of Folkestone, he thinks the only points favourable to disembarkation were Hythe Bay, Rye, and some miles of coast on each side of Hastings. Equally vague is his treatment of the "most material line of coast" between Beachy Head and Selsea Bill, where he opines that several local circumstances tell against the chances of an invader.

[1] W.O., No. 76. The name Martello is generally derived from Mortella, in Corsica, where there was a similar tower (see *Diary of Sir J. Moore*, I, 35, 56), which beat off an attack by two British warships, inflicting a loss of sixty men killed and wounded. Earl Stanhope, however, following a suggestion of Sir G. C. Lewis, derives them from Torre da Martello, towers with a hammer for striking the bell and so giving the alarm against pirates. They were common on the Italian coasts. (Stanhope, *Miscellanies*, II, 59.)

Colonel Twiss having reported on the need of "a respectable fortress" on the Western Heights at Dover, far larger and stronger than the works begun there during the American War, the Duke of York commends this suggestion.[1] And while that stronghold would clog the advance towards London of an invader who landed in the east of Kent, the proposed lines at Chatham would either stop him dead or threaten his right flank while he attempted to force the line of the Medway. The natural obstacles attending an advance on London from the Sussex coast being greater than those on the line from East Kent, which runs between, not across, the ranges of hills, special attention should be paid to Kent.

For the protection of London on the north-east, works were being constructed behind Chelmsford. As Colchester was equally important, the duke had directed Sir James Craig to report on the advisability of making that town an entrenched camp for some 10,000 or 12,000 men. That general, however, recommended in preference the erection of lines north of Colchester; but, for the present, the Duke was satisfied with the works under construction near Chelmsford. He recommended, however, careful attention to the range of hills stretching through Brentwood, as offering the last line of defence before the vicinity of London was reached. Farther out, field-works at Sudbury and Braintree were needed to command the more inland road to Norfolk.

He advises few works on the rest of the coast, except the strengthening of the Gosport lines, opposite Portsmouth, and the lines around Plymouth. In Yorkshire he advocates the completion of the works on the Humber;

[1] War Office, No. 76.

and in Scotland he points out the need of protecting Leith and Dunbar.

It is significant, as showing the decline of democratic sentiment and the corresponding rise of patriotism which resulted from the aggrandisement of Napoleon, that, whereas up to 1798 the dispositions for the defence of London were directed mainly to the repression of malcontents within, they now turned to the warding off of an attack from without. On this topic the Duke of York refers to a scheme drawn up in the year 1801, at his orders, by Sir David Dundas. It was now greatly elaborated. In a preliminary memorandum of July, 1804, the Duke states the needs as follows:—

"The line of defence to the north of the Thames requires twenty-six redoubts, besides intermediate works of less magnitude, which, it is thought, may be done by 5000 men in four days, with the assistance of nearly 800 horses. It is expected the southern position, from Blackheath to Wandsworth, being of somewhat less extent, would not require so much labour, and possibly might be accomplished by 500 men and 300 horses in three days."[1]

In the plan itself, of August, 1804, the duke describes the line of fortifications as starting from the Thames at Deptford (Blackheath and Shooter's Hill being advanced works), following the range of the Sydenham and Norwood hills and retiring upon the Thames at Wandsworth.

"On the north bank the line takes the course of the River Lea to Stamford Hill, then follows the line of Highgate and Hampstead, passes near to Willesden Green, and again turning takes the direction of Holland

[1] *Pitt Papers*, No. 245.

House and seeks the Thames at Little Chelsea. The position is singularly favourable, and whilst it is not more extended than the scale so vast an object requires, it affords angular points of great command, behind which the troops intended for support have in all directions comparatively short lines of communication. It is assumed that the great population of the capital and its vicinity, and the means of transport, and every other necessary resource which it contains, could in a few days place such a position in a respectable state of defence, affording useful and animating labour to an overgrown population which might otherwise became either dangerous or desponding."

We need not accompany the royal duke through the rest of his plan, which is less clear, systematic, and detailed than that of Dumouriez, further than to say that the only part of the defences of London which took material form was an outwork on Shooter's Hill and sluices for flooding Hackney Marsh. But the Londoner of to-day cannot read the foregoing plan for the defence of the capital without a feeling of amusement, not unmixed with envy, at the conditions of that age when Blackheath was an outpost far in advance of the suburbs, and the hill at Holland House formed a bulwark on the west; when it was possible to hope for the transmutation of metropolitan vivacity into a system of protective earthworks "in a few days."

HISTORICAL NOTE

Mr. Walter H. Tregellas, in an excellent paper on "The Permanent Coast Defences of England" in the *Professional Papers of the Corps of Royal Engineers* (Occasional Papers Series, Vol. XII, 1886), points out the great activity in defending the coast which characterized the years 1666 and subsequently, when we were at war with France, Holland, and Denmark. The previous years had seen the construction of Portsmouth Lines, Plymouth Citadel, and works at Sheerness and Harwich. In and after 1666 two forts were built for the defence of Gosport, and the old works in the Isle of Wight were greatly strengthened. Weymouth and the Scilly Islands were protected. The castles at Walmer, Deal, and Sandown were repaired. Sheerness was fortified, and Gravesend, Tilbury, and Woolwich received better defences. Harwich received such an accession of strength as to defy an attack by the Dutch.

Little more was done until the reign of Queen Anne, when Portsea Lines and Hilsea Fort added to the protection of Portsmouth. The reigns of George I and II witnessed the construction of Chatham and Devonport Lines, besides outworks at Portsmouth, and small batteries along the coast at Milford Haven, Littlehampton, Brighthelmstone (Brighton), Blatchington, Seaford, Hastings, Rye, Hythe, and Folkestone. In the early years of George III Portsea and Hilsea Lines were thrown up around Portsmouth, and near Stokes Bay Fort Monckton and six small works were erected. At Plymouth the Maker Heights were crowned with a line of redoubts.

It will be seen that the increase in the coast defences has been progressive; but no period is of greater importance than the years 1793–1807. Contemporary authorities, quoted by J. D. Parry in his *Historical Account of the*

Coast of Sussex (1833), show that great activity had been shown in the erection of the Martello Towers in Pevensey Bay up to November, 1806, when work was suspended for a time, but soon resumed. Military camps were formed on Beachy Head, at Southbourne (the old part of Eastbourne), Bexhill, and Hastings. Rye and Winchelsea were strongly held. Camps had been constructed on the hills around Brighton in 1793 and 1794. The troops there and in barracks in the town sometimes reached the number of 15,000. (*History of Brighton and Environs.* By Henry Martin (1871), pp. 63, 79, 85, 141.)

CHAPTER IX

DUMOURIEZ' GENERAL REFLECTIONS ON THE DEFENCE OF ENGLAND

If I can save a single one of her peaceful cottages from ruin and rapine I shall consider myself happy.—GENERAL DUMOURIEZ.

THE Dumouriez MS. opens as follows:—

I have brought together under the heading of general reflections all those principles which I have pondered or have deduced from my life's experience, and whereby I have been guided in the compilation of these detailed memoirs on the defence of England. No author of my acquaintance has ever treated this subject in a methodical manner, though it is a distinct branch of War, possibly the most essential of all, seeing that the security of nations turns upon it. It would apparently have been disregarded altogether but for the extraordinary conjuncture with which the British Empire is confronted to-day.

One cannot commend too highly the wisdom, method and foresight of which the Commander-in-Chief and his subordinates have given proof in their elaboration of the details of the defence: they have proceeded in accordance with the true principles of the art, and they deserve to stand as exemplars to any State that should ever find itself in like circumstances.[1] It is this consideration which encourages

[1] From these expressions it is reasonable to infer that Dumouriez had some knowledge of the general plan of defence drawn up by the Duke of York and printed in the Appendix.

me to set down with confidence the rules I have drawn up for this species of war, rules that I shall apply in every section of my work, and adapt to the particular nature of the ground likely to become the battlefield of an invading host. These reflections of mine fall under ten heads.

I. NAVAL DEFENCE

However numerous the means of transport the French are now collecting in the various ports of France and Holland,[1] it is easily conceivable that were this flotilla massed at one starting-point capable of holding it, a small part only of the English naval forces would amply suffice to prevent it from landing on English soil an army corps of such dimensions as to endanger the British Empire. The greater the number of craft in any one roadstead at the time of departure, the more thorough would be the havoc wrought by English stationary squadrons adequately strengthened; and those which escaped would either regain the port at the head of that roadstead or would be wrecked on the neighbouring strand: the great armament would bear the semblance of a gigantic wreck or a bloody sea-fight; and the few vessels that escaped in scattered disorder would seek the refuge of the smaller harbours on the French coast under the protection of the countless batteries wherewith these harbours now bristle at Buonaparte's bidding.

Moreover, if one of the Generals [in command] of this foolhardy enterprise, deluded into the hope of speedily crossing the narrow Straits of Dover, were bold enough to get under weigh with what ships had survived the terrible butchery, he would be pursued by the victorious squadron and annihilated in full view of the 100,000 troops lining the English coast, and of an unexhausted [*fraiche*] fleet of craft of similar construction to the French, manned by better sailors and supported by shore batteries no less

[1] In most of the ports between the Helder and Brest.

numerous than those oversea. If, haply, any could escape from this pursuit and these successive attacks, they would but fall into the hands of a united People, armed to protect its national existence, its hearths and homes, its wives and children, burning with energy, revenge and emulation, and fired by the example of its own seamen and by the well-nigh certain prospect of consummating their victory and sharing their triumph.

II. ATTACK OF THE FLOTILLA IN THE ROADSTEAD

We may look upon the notion of destroying the Flotilla in the Roadstead of St. Jean as gaining in feasibility with the increase in number of the assembled craft. This roadstead is formed by the Bank of Baas, and stretches S.W. before the Point of Alprecq and N.E. before that of Vimereux. The coast line is nearly straight and affords few promontories from which gunfire could be poured upon the open roads. The shore batteries are numerous and would be dangerous to those English cruisers sent in coastwise pursuit of the vessels that singly or in small divisions proceed from Flanders and Normandy to swell the great gathering at Boulogne. This everlasting chase, which I refrain from condemning since it braces the nerves and alertness of English crews, vexes the French navy and retards the great muster, is nevertheless not so beneficial as was fancied at the outset.

This assemblage is proceeding apace, and the decisive moment draws near when 1200 to 1500 small vessels, mostly armed, shall evacuate the harbour and line up in the roads to attempt the passage of the Channel. At least four[1] tides will be required to dispatch the Flotilla and order its divisions aright; and as soon as it is drawn up outside its long line will be found to extend in the very front of the coast batteries and so mask and muzzle their fire. The rising

[1] Note here from Desbrière.

tide runs swiftly from the S.W. to the N.E. along the Picardy coast to Cape Grisnez and beyond, crossing the Roadstead of St. Jean, whence it flows between the two banks, the Baas and the Batteux. The former is no dangerous impediment to vessels of the line, having nine fathoms of water at its south-westerly and seven at its north-easterly extremities. The receding tide courses even more rapidly in the opposite direction, owing to the contraction of the Straits of Dover.

All the evolutions performed in the Roadstead of St. Jean can be seen from the English shore, especially at that season of the year which by virtue of its short nights and its untroubled skies must needs be selected for the enterprise of so frail-bottomed a flotilla as the French. Over and above the small squadron of cruisers permanently stationed off Boulogne and the ships of the line detailed to support them, there are now between Dungeness and Beachy Head 127 "small craft," whereof the half or even two-thirds might be detached to reinforce the cruisers without unduly denuding the coast. These boats, whilst possessing an armament similar to the French, are not encumbered with troops, horses, food-stuffs, munitions, etc.: and to increase their firing capacity they might have attached to them some ten bomb-ketches and a score of fireships.

All the foregoing warships anchored within or without the Bank of Baas according to their draught would form up in line and open a murderous fire upon that forest of small vessels before them; and during the attack the fireships, supported and, if necessary, towed by the "small craft," would take advantage of the flowing or the ebbing tide and, with their stay-sails, sheeted straight for the middle of the roadstead, penetrate to the heart of the Flotilla and set it aflame: at the very least great confusion would ensue, and the line would break up to avoid the conflagration. Unable to make the harbour again, especially if the thick

of the fight had raged in the centre of the roads and at half-ebb, it would seek to escape by hugging the coast of Picardy, and whilst part would be wrecked under the batteries of those shores the remainder would meet with capture by the vessels, frigates and small craft of the victorious English. Thus it would seem that, far from fearing the muster in the Roads of St. Jean, one should rather desire it, provided of course that everything is in readiness to profit thereby and to annihilate at one blow the assembled flotilla.

III. THE CHANNEL CROSSING

As for this expectation to take over in battle formation 1200 to 1500 vessels, dissimilar in build, rigging and freight, and to steer them through the tides, currents and winds of the Channel in a kind of square battalion so as to reach the English coast in exactly the same order, it is a piece of absurdity which discloses the most profound ignorance of the element on which this "tactical" march is supposed to take place. But even granting that an unruffled calm should allow the navigation of row-boats, while ships of the line and frigates would perforce be reduced to absolute immobility, the invading flotilla would none the less be compelled to give battle off the enemy's shores to a line of rowing-craft supported by block-ships, land batteries and troops, and would at the very best be put to confusion: furthermore, since a dead calm cannot last over three or four hours in so narrow an arm of the sea as the Channel, incessantly perturbed by the winds and the tides from E. and W., the ships of the line and the frigates would very soon follow in the rear of the flotilla and, placing it between two fires, shatter it in the shadow of the coast it had had the pretension to assail.

This auxiliary naval force known as "small-craft" can never be too numerous: and it must have with it a

large number of fire-boats to dart into the midst of the flotilla as the latter approaches the coast; in a calm they might be towed out on the tide and strike the enemy at sea. These fireships, too, could be utilized to set alight the flotilla in the Roads of St. Jean because the tides alone would take them into the centre, and this manœuvre would compel the flotilla even in calm weather to make for the open and fall before the attacking line or else return to port: but few would achieve this, and the bulk would be wrecked under the batteries. Had Lord Nelson been provided with fire-boats in his attack on the Roadstead of Boulogne he would not have failed in his attempt.[1]

The drawbacks and dangers of crossing are even more numerous and more imminent for the Flushing and Texel divisions, and especially for those of Cherbourg and St. Malo, on account of the longer journey.

As for the Brest squadron, the more numerous its constituents the greater the obstacles it will have to overcome on its expedition to Ireland, which one may look upon as its most likely objective. Doubtless it will have orders to give battle so as to enable its convoy to slip away under the escort of a few frigates. The squadron would meet with certain defeat, and Buonaparte expects as much; but he is prepared to make that sacrifice in hopes that a successful landing will outweigh it. But since this squadron will engage the attention only of the ships of the line of the English Admiral, the latter's frigates will certainly start in pursuit of the convoy, and even should it make good its escape it would be but to fall in, off the Irish coast, with all the stationary vessels and the "small-craft" devoted to the defence of the Island.

Thus it is almost proven that no section of the Army

[1] On August 16th, 1801. See James, *Naval History*, III, pp. 65, 67.

of Invasion can succeed in reaching any part of the British Empire, given the advantageous distribution and the constant vigilance of the naval forces of all sorts that are drawn up for its protection.

IV. LAND DEFENCES—THE INVASION

It behoves us now to examine in detail what obstacles the invading army will have to cope with, whether of nature's making or elaborated by hand during the long-drawn-out preparations of the French. The coast line of the Three Kingdoms is sub-divided into counties, and, in order not to go astray when dealing with the distribution of the defence, it is county by county that we must consider its strong and its weak features.

The armament devoted to the transport of the enemy's troops consists of two kinds of vessels, combined in accordance with the nature and the distance of the coast that is to be assailed. A fleet of light boats of shallow draught, capable of being stranded without capsizing, thanks to the fitting of false keels, now threatens the S.E. coast of England, where several spacious and level beaches are to be found. The Brest squadron with its troopships is best adapted to the deep waters and the bluff coast line of the S.W., W., and N.W. of England, of Scotland and Ireland. Here we find that the suitable landing-places are all situated in big bays, such as Portsmouth, Torbay, Plymouth, Mount's Bay in England, the Shannon estuary and the bays of the west in Ireland, and the Dee, Solway, and Clyde in Scotland. No rowing-vessels could navigate such seas nor be beached on such shores, with their huge breakers and their swift tides. The ordinary transports, which alone can be utilized against Ireland, would be forced to enter the bays and there be annihilated previous to or whilst attempting to land troops, by the manifold means of defence drawn up to

resist them[1]: the convoy would be shut in, and attacked in the bay by English vessels and, thus caught between two fires, would meet with total destruction. The easterly and south-easterly coasts of England are the most suitable for landing, owing to the shorter crossing and the larger, flatter beaches.

Every beach even though practicable is not suitable for a descent. There must be a headland which either flanks the landing-place on the right or the left, or which can be hugged on both sides by the flotilla if the latter is too numerous to spread out on a single strand between two capes. For instance, Dungeness can be embraced on its two sides by a landing force whose right wing would descend on the New Romney sand and whose left on the beach of Rye Bay: the two sections would be mutually supporting and would make for a common goal, Oxney [Isle] Camp, supposing it was not held in force by the English. On the other hand, if the enemy tried to embrace Beachy Head in his descent, with his right at Pevensey and his left at Brighton, then his two wings would be too far asunder for co-operation, and if the one failed the other would soon have to go under as well.

The Sussex coast from Brighton to Selsea Island Peninsula has several long and broad beaches at the foot of lofty downs, and landing is an easy matter. But, firstly, in the absence of capes or bays or coves, the flotilla would find no shelter and would be smashed during the very confusion of descent by the English guardships, and its destruction would be completed by the small craft and the fire-boats; and, secondly, disembarkation would be even more perilous in the small rivers which constitute the harbours of the county. They run N. to S. at right angles

[1] Dumouriez here somewhat over-estimated the means of defence in Ireland.

to the coast line, and with the downs that hem them in they form natural flank defences insuperable to an enemy just landed. It is in accordance with this configuration of the country that the permanent and the movable camps of the first, second and third lines have had to be arranged.

Rivers are even more dangerous landing-places than open beaches, because, firstly, the defence is better prepared beforehand and the means of resistance more numerous; secondly, the banks are more contracted and afford less room for a flotilla to effect a landing and expose it to heavier gun-fire and hence more losses and disorder; thirdly, the flotilla can there be easily blocked in, attacked and burnt, the same wind which had borne it into the river's mouth not only aiding the entrance of the enemy but preventing its own exit and reducing the range of its own fire. The most dangerous rivers to attack are the Thames, Blackwater, Stour, Wash, Humber, Severn and Dee in England, the Firth of Clyde, the Solway Firth in Scotland, and the Shannon in Ireland.

V. PORTS—REDOUBTS

Seaports open to invasion must be fortified only on the front parallel to the sea, in order that they may be entered without difficulty if the enemy carries the entrenchments, and that he may be driven out again before he can strengthen his position and set up a "place of arms."[1]

[1] "Place d'armes" has several meanings in French. Dumouriez uses it in one sense only throughout his work. He thus defines it in a footnote on p. 296:—

"J'apelle (*sic*) Place d'armes un point central fermé, où l'on peut rassembler, à l'abri d'un coup de main, tous les aprovisionements (*sic*) de guerre et de bouche. Les Places d'armes doivent être faciles à évacuer par les derrières en cas de retraite."

[By "place of arms" I mean a central enclosed spot where one can gather and secure from sudden attack all military stores and foodstuffs. Places of arms must be easy to evacuate by the rear in case of retreat.]

This applies to the less important harbours: in the case of the chief ones they must be supported by redoubts or by camps of the first line, from which troops can be promptly dispatched to the waterside to defend it, pending the arrival of detachments from the second and third lines. These redoubts, I have suggested, within reach of seaports or of beaches must be constructed on a height or at the confluence of streams. They must be well made, with flanks, palisades and double fosse, with room for four or five hundred men. They are meant, firstly, to serve as refuge for troops compelled to retire from the shore when the enemy has carried the landing-place; secondly, to hold out by themselves if the enemy's movements force the general to withdraw, either to turn his flank or subsequently attack him; thirdly, to support the line of battle of the defenders either on the right or the left, in front or in the rear. Near every redoubt a battle field must be selected which it is intended to subserve.

VI. SHORE BATTERIES

These batteries must be armed with heavy iron guns on naval carriages, because, firstly, the construction and upkeep of such carriages are less costly; secondly, the abundance of old seamen in England makes the service of the batteries an easier matter; thirdly, the parapets need not be built up to the usual height, as the pieces cannot be taken in flank; fourthly, the carriages being provided with small wheels are workable only, in the battery itself, and in case of capture are useless to the enemy.

Coast batteries may be divided into three kinds. (1) Open batteries, with a simple parapet: these are the most numerous and are on the front of seaports or within reach of camps. (2) Closed batteries placed in redoubts with flanks, palisade and fosse: these are required on headlands or at some distance from the camps and surrounding

forces, so that the continuity of their fire may determine the point of attack, and that the enemy may not seize or surprise them nor leave them in his rear, for then they would act as supports to the troops that threatened his flanks. The preparations and the means the enemy must adopt to take possession of these batteries will give the defenders time to collect and to rescue their redoubts and attack the assailants. The shores of the three kingdoms teem with old castles, Roman camps, Danish and Saxon strongholds, placed with much intelligence, which can be restored and fitted out up to date, and made to serve that end [batteries]. (3) Isolated batteries: these are closed in, with flanks and palisades, and surrounded with a moat full of water. They are suited to marsh land or a country cut by canals, such as the Pevensey coast, that between Rye and Hythe, the Blackwater in Essex, the Wash, etc. They must be placed as near the beach as possible inside bays and coves in which the enemy might land, or at the head of sluices, a riverside, etc. They prevent the descent of the enemy and his deployment should he manage to land. They form an obstacle which he is bound to overcome before he can advance; and since they can be supported from behind and act as *têtes de colonne* to the defenders' troops dispatched from the camps of the first line, not only would this obstacle necessarily retard but it might entirely stop the enemy's movements and expose him, ere he could deploy completely on the strand, to an attack by land or sea. It is chiefly on the east and south-east coasts where the water is less deep and the beaches spacious and cut up by marshes and canals that these isolated batteries would be most useful. The position of coast batteries must be thought out and guided by the pilotage. It is not a question of placing one on every seaward projection; for if you place one on a headland merely because it juts out, vessels might well sail past within gunshot without being much troubled by a few stray balls fired haphazard. Bat-

teries on headlands, where deemed necessary for nautical reasons, must form a horseshoe or a right-angle, whose two sides will give them a greater range and keep the enemy longer under fire. For the defence of bays and coves, batteries must be placed on both shores, with large earthworks on the side of the sea to prevent them from being silenced by the ship's guns: their embrasures must have a diagonal direction, so that a cross-fire can be directed upon the arc which forms the inside end of the bay. It is not the large number of cannon which makes a battery formidable to the enemy, but its position. Six batteries of four pieces each, spaced on the two flanks of an anchorage, would be of more avail than a single battery of twenty-four. The latter might be easily silenced by the vessels and gunboats moored below, in the middle or in the upper part of the roads or the bay, whereas the six could not be attacked altogether; and even if two or three of the more exposed were destroyed by the fury of the enemy's fire, the latter's ships would sustain more damage from the half-dozen batteries on their flanks than from the single one parallel, because they could not all be silenced at once and there would always be enough fire left to prevent the landing by exposing it to a flank fire. When it is necessary to fortify a tall headland to protect a wide beach, such as, for example, in the Isle of Sheppey or at Brighton, the embrasures of the batteries must not open out straight to sea, but slantwise, so as to sweep the beach lengthwise at the foot of the cliffs; and one must turn to account the undulations of the downs and place the batteries at the salient angles in order to get a flank fire along this natural curtain.[1] On a coast line such as this there should be several batteries so as to keep up a continuous fire from several points. If the cliff is too straight and presents too long a curtain without natural sides one must try to make in it diagonal cuts and

[1] That part of a fortification contained between two bastions.—*Burn.*

zigzags, as I suggest in my memoir on the defence of Sussex.

Mortar batteries can be placed at the inner end of bays and coves or on side headlands in a parallel line to the anchorage; they risk little from the fire of the vessels, being low, sunken and covered by earthworks, that are proof against destruction by the bombardment however heavy.

Coast batteries should be manned by fencibles and old sailors, and guarded by the fencibles of the villages hard by. Under the French monarchy the inhabitants of all villages within two leagues of the coast all round the kingdom formed a special militia known as *Coastguard Gunners*, devoted entirely to the service of these batteries and exempt from ordinary military duties.

VII. ROADS—SIGNALS—TRANSPORT

I have nothing to add to the dispositions made by the Commander-in-Chief and his staff in the matter of transport, whether for men or guns, of commissariat and munitions as well as of signalling—the arrangements do honour to all concerned and they may serve as models to any nation threatened with a naval invasion.[1]

VIII. CAMPS

Camps of the first line should be of medium size and lightly entrenched. They are meant only to support harbours or cover towns of some importance that lie within seven or eight miles of the shore, or else to act as rallying-points for the troops detailed for the initial defence of a predetermined stretch of strand or coast line. They are only places of passage or assembly. If the enemy has effected a landing and takes up a position

[1] This sentence proves that the present plan was designed to supplement that of the Duke of York printed above.

between the shore and a camp of the first line, then the latter must be strengthened by camps of the second and third line in correspondence with it, and in this case a few redoubts may be thrown up hastily to make it still stronger.

The two camps of the first line on each side which flank the enemy right and left must be similarly strengthened and provided with defences. Beside, or in front of, every camp of the first line a battle-ground must be selected where the enemy may be awaited and engaged, whilst the troops on the right and left manœuvre to outflank and cut him off from the sea.

The bodies of troops on the enemy's flanks must not only cut off all the small detachments that leave the main army, but must also incessantly harass him by frequent and audacious attacks on the latter at all hours of day and night, especially at dawn and at dusk and on the march. These attacking bodies must consist chiefly of artillery and light cavalry chasseurs. When falling upon the enemy in the twilight, either at daybreak or after sunset, they must use cold steel and refrain from firing; and it is from the more or less sustained fire of the enemy that they must estimate his strength or his weakness and what direction to give to their attack. If the enemy has not found time to entrench himself and show signs of confusion they must boldly follow up the advantage they have gained, and do so without firing so long as they meet with success; in this kind of fighting they should keep their own powder to ensure their retreat or to put the enemy to flight. These attacks need not be made by large bodies, but by numerous small columns, and on the flank or flanks or on the rear-guard, which can always be more easily routed than the van or the main body, always composed of picked troops ready to make or receive an attack. Camps of the second line must also have at hand a battle-ground, meant for a larger force

than those of the first line, since it is presumable that reinforcements from inland troops will have swollen the army opposing the enemy's march. These camps must as much as possible be placed in chess-board formation (*en échiquier*) behind those of the first line, so as to shut in the enemy always in a re-entering angle, of which the two movable sides shall hem him in on the march, hamper him, harass him, and seriously attack him when opportunity offers itself.

Camps of the third line similarly must be placed in chess-board formation. They serve as rallying-points for inland troops and positions of stubborn defence. They are meant to cover the places of arms and allow the speedy evacuation of them if need be, and also to protect the retreat of the inhabitants, cattle, etc., from the coast, these being withdrawn in echelon behind the third line. This third line must not be more than twenty miles from the sea-coast, and it is within this perimeter that one must organize the defence with as many troops and as much energy as the English nation can boast of.

The places of arms are designed to contain munitions and provisions of all kinds, and must lie behind the third line of camps. The sole exception is Edinburgh, which is situated too near the Firth, but the naval defence of the latter puts the city beyond the bounds of sudden invasion, and having to be reached by land from afar it is virtually in the third line too.

Up and down the coast there are a good many places which deserve to be fortified in perpetuity, and in the most thorough way, because they serve as cardinal points of the defence or as pivots of communications, and as such must never be allowed to fall into the enemy's hands: amongst them are the Isle of Sheppey, Landguard Point opposite Harwich, Yarmouth, Hull, Lynn, Berwick, Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Dover in England; Leith and Fort

George in Scotland; Cork, Valentia Island, and Limerick in Ireland.[1]

In case the enemy effected one or more descents and carried the three lines of defence, far from losing heart and forestalling slavery and a shameful capitulation with so insolent and rapacious a foe, the nation must put forth its entire energy and map out a great inland war, which would be very easy, given the numerous mountains, rivers, forests, woods, enclosures, etc.: and it must dispute the ground foot by foot and fight as often as there are natural obstacles to favour it. It is especially the approach to London that would abound with natural advantages in favour of the natives and hamper an enemy unacquainted with the ins and outs of the country, no matter how good the maps he might have provided himself with. Certainly the fall of the Metropolis into Buonaparte's hands would be a dire misfortune: England would feel the effects for a very long period; but whilst the nation remained standing, the British Empire would not even be seriously shaken by this dreadful catastrophe.

IX. THE ARMY

In the eleven memoirs which form the ensemble of my work will be found my scattered ideas on the kind of troops which must be devoted to the defence. This is a very delicate matter to treat of, particularly for a foreigner, whom national jealousy, rightly or wrongly understood, has denied access to communications that are essential on this head. I have ventured only upon one single memoir, and that by order of the Commander-in-chief, on the need of forming corps of light troops under the denomination of chasseurs. This want of communications leads me

[1] Here Dumouriez is in substantial agreement with the Duke of York's report, except that the latter does not include Lynn or Berwick among the important points.

to protest against the errors of my work. They do not proceed from me; they are topographical mistakes, due to the very varying correctness of the small scale-maps that have been vouchsafed to me as my only help. I have been refused even the permission to verify them on the spot. These errors are purely local. It may be that, misled by these maps, I have selected positions which are in a measure faulty; but as I can demonstrate that my work is based on incontestable principles, these errors can lead to displacements if only a mile or two in extent, and can easily be set right by such as seek the truth in good faith. For the past forty years I have been accustomed to the precise use of geographical maps, and I have applied to them the principles of war, and by them traced plans of attack and defence; but it is only after verifying the land that I venture to fix my conclusions. I am fully convinced that there are plenty of generals and staff officers who see, and see well, as a whole. In war, genius often supplies the place of experience. But in the matter of reconnaissances I put my trust only in my own observation [*coup d'œil*]; it serves to understand aright detailed memoirs, which may always be put to good use when based upon true military principles. It is thus that I deem that mine should be read. The Commander-in-chief and his Staff should possess them as a whole, but in detail each memoir should be sent to the general of division entrusted with the particular defence of one or several counties.

I have insisted upon the amalgamation of the light artillery and light cavalry with the infantry of the same species, thus constituting new bodies bearing the denomination which may be approved. Besides the 12,000 chasseurs I have proposed, and the marksmen, rangers and flank companies, I hold that use should be made of the volunteers in this kind of warfare, and that their services and instructions should tend thereto. It would seem desir-

able that a third or quarter of these corps, selecting alert young men, should be entirely withheld from the line [of battle?] and become the "volunteers of volunteers"; it is thus that sprang up quite naturally in France in 1792 the system of sharpshooter warfare which has disconcerted and vanquished all the armies of Europe.[1]

I know roughly that the armed forces of England form the imposing mass of 600,000 men. I have no doubt that this total has been distributed over several military divisions, consequently in several armies. I know nothing of this distribution, and I am not aware of the number and species of troops devoted to the defence of each county. I doubt not that they are suited to the nature of the ground and the importance and dangers of each military division; and that the order of march of each each army corps, and the rendezvous and the dispositions for mutual support have been decided upon and combined with wisdom, lucidity and precision; and that at every point the enemy's potential attack is to be met with a superior force.

This work of mine must be looked upon as the *tableau raisonné* of the squares of the chess-board: it remains for the players to set out the pieces wisely and to move them well.

I end this section with a word of advice: Every army should have a reserve force, a fourth its own size, composed chiefly of horse artillery and light infantry and cavalry, ever ready to march, capable of mustering speedily and proceeding to the help of a threatened, attacked or invaded country: this without disturbing the defensive of the other points of the coast, equally menaced by the dispersion of the five or six chief rallying-spots and places of departure of the great army which Buonaparte has

[1] The characteristic formation of the French in and after 1792 was heavy columns preceded by a swarm of sharpshooters. This was adopted and developed by Napoleon.

collected for the invasion of the British Empire. Each of those reserve forces must have its own arrangements, its means of transport, its roads and starting and rallying-points, and its instructions made out beforehand, so that new orders need not be awaited from London.

If the French carry out the expedition all their movements are sure to be abrupt. Eight days will decide the fate of the war: it is only by meeting them with similar promptitude that their first onrush can be checked, and this can only be done if every movement and disposition of troops have been most precisely decided upon beforehand. If all these arrangements had to be made at the moment of the enemy's landing things would never go right, and confusion would become general and increase with the number of troops to be put in motion. The greatness of the means of defence would become an additional danger. The enemy would take advantage of the disorder and irresolution, augmenting them by the celerity of his march, and would soon overthrow one upon the other several armies, mixed up with baggages, field-carts, cattle, inhabitants in flight, etc. Numbers and bravery would be beaten by their own disorder far more than by the strength and talents of the foe.

X. MILITARY PRINCIPLES

I have followed in these dispositions, for the protection of the coasts of the United Kingdom, a method which must ever be borne in mind in any system of defence against naval invasion. An enemy landing at any point must needs seek the interior, especially if, like the French, he wages fillibustering warfare. Hence the three lines of camps must be set out in chess-board manner, so that, whatever the direction in which he attempts to get through, he shall always find himself in a re-entering angle of which the apex is a camp intended to resist him

voisine de mon commandement, que je jugeai pouvoir attendre 113
plus aisement que Guernesey, qui eut exigé une expedition combinée
de terre & de mer, qui eut entrainé des préparatifs dispendieux & tous
les inconvenients attachés aux expeditions mixtes, qui manquent
toujours en France, par la désunion qui existait perpetuellement
entre l'armée & la marine royale. Un autre motif pour simplifier
cette expedition était le secret, que je jugeais indispensable pour
réussir; Car mon opinion était, & est encore que Jersey ne peut
être enlevé qu'au début d'une guerre, par un coup de main hardi,
par surprise.

Dans l'hyver de 1777 à 1778, lors de la déclaration de guerre, je
proposai d'enlever Jersey, en partant de Granville avec 1500 hommes
des garnisons de la presqu'île du Cotentin. Nous devions partir par
une nuit d'hyver de Granville, nous rassembler dans des Chasse-
-marées aux Isles de Chausey qui nous presentaient un bon
mouillage, sous l'escorte de 4 chaloupes Canonieres & de deux
Corsaires du port de Granville, qui devaient aller s'établir devant
le chateau de St. Helier, pendant que 1200 hommes escortés de deux
chaloupes canonieres auraient executé leur descente à la rade de
St. Clement au Sud-Est de St. Helier, & que les deux autres chaloupes
canonieres auraient executé une fausse attaque, en débarquant
300 hommes à l'Anse Ste. Brelade.

Il y avait alors dans la rade de St. Helier plus de 150 prises
Françaises, & dans l'Isle plus de 1500 matelots prisonniers, apar-
-tenants

SPECIMEN PAGE OF THE DUMOURIEZ MANUSCRIPT
In the Collection of Mr. A. M. Broadley

and the two movable sides bodies of troops supported by other camps or by redoubts. These mobile side-lines are meant to press, harass and attack him on the flank or in the rear, so as to cut him off from the shore, prevent his extending his battle-line, starve him, and drive him against the army posted at the apex of the angle that shall stop him and fight him in superior numbers. By this arrangement, if he pierces the first line, he will still wedge himself in the re-entering angle of the second line and so on to the third line. His progress will be very slow, his losses many and irreplaceable, and he will end by being quite unable to withstand a general attack, especially if English energy does not degenerate into a rash *fougue*;[1] if all measures for every emergency are prescribed beforehand, and if the generals entrusted with the detailed execution of the plan of defence put as much constancy and prudence as zeal and courage into the punctual carrying-out of the clear and methodical instructions given them betimes.

CONCLUSION

Moreover, it is time to cut the thread which holds the sword of BUONAPARTE suspended over England. It is high time to end this protracted disquietude which is keeping afoot in this Empire an immense standing army, cramping the energy of a nation and holding it up to the gaze of furious and apprehensive Continental Powers, without ever terminating the war.

Naught is more perilous than perpetual defensive, nor offers a vaster field for attacks of all kinds, whether near or remote, on the part of a foe. One would like to believe that every year saw a step further towards perfection, were it not in man's nature to let his energies abate after

[1] *Fougue* = rush.

bringing them to the highest pitch at the outset, under the benumbing influence of a life-long suspense.

And, all said and done, when every measure taken for the safety of the Motherland should have had the seal set upon it, whither, I ask you, would this everlasting defensive warfare, tend, the duration of which might lull to sleep the spirit and chill the ardour of the people, and which would invest the whole Empire with the inglorious semblance of a stronghold beleagured by a lesser host than its own garrison? How could the Powers of Europe ever take heart anew if this system, so nearly akin to fear, were fated to endure much longer and if these swollen and ruinous armaments became a burden and a peril but to England herself? All this mighty apparel of war cannot deflect in the slightest the dire aims of BUONAPARTE, nor ever lead to peace so long as it remains amassed in England. It is out of proportion to the danger of the invasion, which two hundred thousand men were enough to repulse, in conjunction with a navy equivalent to all the fleets of Europe put together. Doubtless it behoved to attain to the offensive methods through, first, the defensive; but if from this present year on—1804—attack does not supersede resistance, then you will see the chances augment very speedily in favour of BUONAPARTE.

CHAPTER X

SYNOPSIS OF DUMOURIEZ' PLAN. HIS PROPOSED DIVISION OF ENGLAND INTO SIX MILITARY DISTRICTS. THE DEFENCE OF THE EAST COAST FROM THE SCOTTISH BORDER TO THE THAMES AND KENT

Take what you please, it shall all be your own. Arms and ammunition you shall have, and vessels to carry you over. Once landed, you will soon find your way to London.—HOCHE, to his soldiers, 1797.

THE present memoir will contain a kind of reconnaissance of the defence of the East Coast of England only, for it does not appear that the French ever intend to invade Scotland or engulf themselves in the Irish Channel. So I shall examine the coast from Northumberland down to Essex inclusively, with more or less detail according to the degree of importance with which I invest it.[1]

I am in the dark as to the position of camps, the numbers and species of troops available, and the entrenchments thrown up on the said ground: I have not so much as gone over the coast of Essex, where I believe the Dutch part of the Descent will take place if it ever takes place at all. My work is done in the study, and is based, perchance, on somewhat faulty maps,[2] but certainly on immutable military principles, which will put me in agree

[1] Dumouriez afterwards saw reason to think that Kent, Sussex, and a few points farther west were in great danger.

[2] See *ante*, p. 242.

ment with what shall have been decided for the essentials of the defence.

This defence I confine within a parallel twenty miles inland from the coast: the enemy could not penetrate even so far, seeing the forces arrayed against them. Given the patriotism of the nation, their love for a good King, the example of the royal Princes, the talents and zeal of the Staff, the experience of the Commanders and the energy of the troops, one cannot suppose that the enemy could ever make any great progress if he had succeeded in landing: which he could do more easily with small boats, such as those he has collected, therefore, than with transports of greater draught.

I can only admire the measures that have been taken to ensure swift marches and musters at any given spot of the coast; it is only in England we could see such rapidity of movement, thanks to the roads and the means of transport by land and water. Nothing is hard to accomplish with such means, backed up by the wonderful spirit of so energetic and powerful a nation.

OF THE ARMY

Only one thing I have to say on the score of the employment of the numerous troops of the defenders; I think it would be found advisable to divide the whole army in divisions of 12,000 men, whereof at most an eighth should be cavalry, one half heavy infantry fighting stoutly in battalions and the remainder rangers, sharpshooters and light infantry fighting irregularly in the French way, as sharpshooters. Each division must have eight field-guns, four howitzers, four mortars, and two pieces of cannon *per* infantry battalion and two companies of mounted artillery to form the vanguards with the light infantry and the light cavalry.

Seeing that, in case of a landing and especially at first

on English soil, the French will have little or no cavalry, there will never be occasion to draw up a division or an army composed of several divisions in the usual European order, to wit, the whole infantry in the centre and all the cavalry on the wings; in a country so destitute of open plains and cut up by countless hedges that are all so many impediments one must parcel out each of the five arms—heavy infantry, light infantry, heavy cavalry, light cavalry and artillery—in small portions and amalgamate these. Thus in every case there must be some light cavalry with light infantry and mounted artillery for the vanguard. In the line of battle, if attacking or being attacked, there must be heavy cavalry in the second line behind the heavy infantry, in order either to restrain and stop the enemy's rush or to charge him by lashing through the intervals between one's own battalions, make him waver, rout him, and pursue him.

In case of a battle the vanguard must be brought to retire slightly from before the main body and throw itself right and left in order to turn and outflank the enemy. The divisions should be trained to these manœuvres, so that every officer, every private even, should know the strength of his own arm, and be emboldened by the support given him in the amalgamation of the other arms with his own.

This novel kind of tactics, much more simple and easy for new troops than that of the armies against which the French have practised it with so much success, will have two great advantages: firstly, it will inspire with confidence the infantry of each division, for it will know that it possesses cavalry and that the enemy has none, and that that cavalry will always be either in front of it to protect it or else just behind to give it immediate support. Secondly, it will fill the foe with apprehensions, for he will know and feel that after fighting with a line of infantry he will suddenly, amidst the disorder either

of victory or defeat, be charged by a body of cavalry with none to oppose to it, and outflanked by numerous light troops.

To make the fighting decisive the infantry must be used to doubling its files while advancing, so as to be in six ranks at least for the charge, and must fire little and have instant recourse to cold steel.

The whole defence should be divided in first and second lines, or in *stationary* divisions intended to dispute foot by foot the different points on the coast, and *mobile* divisions meant to afford them immediate support. Every general in the first or *stationary* line must have his positive instructions and a full acquaintance with those given to the generals of the *mobile* divisions that co-operate in his own part of the defence. He must know how, when and where to withdraw if, despite all resistance, the enemy should have carried the point of descent. Likewise, every general of a *mobile* division must be made aware of the orders issued to the *stationary* divisions he is meant to assist. All instructions must proceed from the Commander-in-Chief and to him return.

There must be no thought of *denuding*[1] any counties threatened with invasion—that is, removing the inhabitants, cattle, &c. This fearful and ruinous measure could never be carried out even if it were to pass into law. The French themselves have never had recourse to these barbarous means, whether at home or in a hostile country.

[1] Dumouriez here probably used the verb "déserter" in its old and rare sense of "to make desert." This scheme of "driving" the parts threatened with invasion had been prepared for from 1793 onwards, and figured in the Acts of Parliament of 1798. By the year 1801 there was a consensus of opinion that it was impossible. Dumouriez, however, certainly overrated the "barbarity" of the expedient.

DIVISION OF ENGLAND INTO SIX MILITARY DISTRICTS

I have thought it advisable to follow the same method for England and Ireland, and I have divided the former into six military districts, so as easily to classify the general defensive. I repeat that it is not possible to go into full details without knowing the strength in cavalry, infantry, and artillery of these six districts, which represent six armies. I again express the hope that there may be raised a large amount of light infantry and horse artillery, for these are beyond a doubt the kind of defenders most usefully opposed to the French sharpshooters in so cut-up and enclosed a country as England. I will enumerate these six districts from N. to E.

I.

The country north of the Trent and the Liverpool Canal[1] naturally forms a military district consisting of Northumberland, Cumberland, County Durham, Westmorland, Lancashire and Yorkshire. The above six counties are little threatened on the west by the Irish Sea. Thus their chief rallying-point, in case a fleet should leave Holland to threaten the East Coast, is YORK, whence the left bank of the Humber can be especially defended, easy communications kept up with Lincolnshire for the protection of its own shores, or a march made on to Harwich and to London if the enemy should land further south and menace the Metropolis. I need not dwell upon the details of [the organization of] this military district, which of course must be proof against invasion.

If the enemy landed within its bounds, a position at York between the canal and the Ouse would hold him

[1] By "canal de Liverpool" Dumouriez probably meant the estuary of the Mersey.

in check whilst the mobile divisions of the second and third districts came up to take him in front and on the flank, and those from Scotland in his rear. He could make no progress and would soon be lost if he persevered, or else compelled to put to sea once more.

II

The course of the Severn, and a line drawn from the new Chester Canal through Market Drayton, Newport and Albrighton, marks the second military district, consisting of the Principality of Wales, Shropshire, Herefordshire and Monmouthshire. This district will be but little occupied on the Irish Sea side, and so at least half its troops can be used to reinforce the third, and give it a somewhat more central rallying-point, such as Leicester. I will not dwell upon the employment of the troops of this district, which in all likelihood will never serve but as auxiliaries away from their hearths and homes.

III

The third district extends along the coast from the Humber to the Wash, and consists of the counties of Derby, Nottingham, Lincoln, Stafford, Leicester, Worcester and Warwick. These seven are specially entrusted with the defence of the ports and coasts of Lincolnshire.

The Humber is navigable to Hull with six fathoms of water: landing would be impracticable on the left bank by reason of the cliffs,[1] but on the right there is a spacious beach between North Coates and Halton.

The Wash could receive, with some difficulty, a convoy of troops for landing; but its sandbanks make it impracticable for armed vessels in escort. The most suitable spot for landing would be King's Lynn.

[1] Here Dumouriez was in part led astray by his maps. The left, or north, bank has few cliffs.

On general lines one may suppose that the enemy would avoid bottling himself up in rivers, where the tides would beat him back and where he would be crushed by the coast batteries without being able to open fire himself. In preference he would select an outer coast, sheltered by a headland such as Yarmouth, Solebay, Orford, with six or seven fathoms of water near the shore. These three last points are proof against descent so long as the naval station of Yarmouth exists; but it is to be feared that it cannot be maintained through the winter in these narrow seas, bounded by the Dutch shore and swept by powerful currents and tides from north to south-east. In general, it must be remembered, with regard to the naval stations around the coasts that are open to attack, that the same wind which brings the enemy drives away or immobilizes the guardships entrusted with their defence.

Doubtless there will have been erected a closed battery at the chapel of South Island,[1] and another at Spurnhead, for the protection of the Humber; and Hull and Grimsby placed beyond the possibility of a *coup de main*. YORK is the rallying-point in case of a threatened landing on the left bank of the Humber, with a body of troops at Beverley and another at Howden, the latter being needed for the communication with Lincoln[shire] by the Thorne road. Similarly the rallying-point for the Notts troops is Gainsborough, for those of Lincolnshire, Market Rasen and the heights of Binbrooke; with the vanguard at Caistor to keep watch over the enemy if he attempts to land on the right bank of the Humber and to hold him till the arrival of the mustered host.

IV

The fourth military district comprises the counties of Norfolk, Suffolk, Northampton, Huntingdon, Cambridge

[1] Now the Old Hall.

and Bedford, entrusted with the defence of the coast between the Wash and the Stour. The central positions in the second line are Norwich and Ipswich. The susceptibility of this coast to descent, particularly at Yarmouth, Solebay[1] and Orford, make it imperative to examine all points most scrupulously and reconnoitre exactly the ground and the obstacles it can provide to the progress of the enemy once landed.

V

The fifth district consists of Gloucestershire, Devonshire, Somerset, Wilts, Dorset and Cornwall; its duty is to defend the British Channel and the south-west and south coast as far as the Avon.[2] From time immemorial Exeter has been the rallying-point, equally handy for the Bristol Channel and Plymouth Sound.

PLYMOUTH

In 1779 preparations were made at Brest and at St. Malo for a double expedition against Plymouth. I was then Assistant Quartermaster-General, under the chief command of Marshal de Vaux, attached to the St. Malo division of 17,000 men, whereof 600 dragoons, on board more than 400 transports. Luckily the project was abandoned owing to the sickness and scarcity [of water?] rife in the Count d'Orvilliers' combined fleet, which had to put back into Brest.[3] We were badly prepared for this expedition. Some wanted to land in the Yealm, to avoid Mt. Edgcumbe and St. Nicholas, and march by Brixton to Saltash and there throw up entrenchments. Then the Tamar was to be crossed, not an easy thing to do if the Cornish militia posted themselves beforehand at St. German's. Others wanted to land beyond Queanna

[1] Solebay is Southwold.
[2] This is the Hampshire Avon.
[3] For further details see *ante*, chap. III.

Point,[1] and occupy Maker, Millbrook, St. John's and Anthony. Others, again, were for making the two descents simultaneously and joining forces at Saltash. We should certainly have failed in so ill-combined an effort as the arms and outlets of the Tamar would have been between us.

If the defence of Plymouth is ready, it can always defy attack; the invading force cannot be protected by vessels of war; it cannot march on the narrow stretches between the various arms of the Tamar in the face of the slightest obstacle; it cannot carry the Saltash position if it is entrenched and guarded.

VI

The most important military district is the sixth, comprising the counties of Oxford, Bucks, Herts, Essex, Berks, Middlesex, Hants, Surrey, Sussex and Kent: it is entrusted with the defence of the coast from the Stour to the Isle of Wight. Here it is that the great defensive must come into play, for presumably it is here that the principal attack will be made: the capture of London is no doubt the chief object of the dreams of Buonaparte, as the sack of the Metropolis which he has promised to his army is the great desire of the soldiers and the generals whom he has turned into brigands in order to attach them to himself. This district is at the same time the central point; thence start and there terminate all the radii of the general defensive.

SYNOPSIS OF THE DEFENCE OF THE EAST COAST FROM SCOTLAND TO THE STOUR

In all likelihood the main invading body will leave for England from the Texel, the Meuse and the Scheldt.[2] No doubt the Government is casting a very alert eye upon

[1] In Whitsand Bay.

[2] Dumouriez underrated the forces then mustering at and near Boulogne.

the armaments afoot in Holland, Flanders, and Picardy, which form so many portions of the army of invasion. The east coast from the Humber to Rye must be held to be the chief front of attack.

A descent in Scotland were foolhardy, for the French could neither maintain themselves nor stay there.[1] Besides, they could not find sufficient there to cover the immense costs of their armament. LONDON is the avowed objective, to be reached from several sides, but presumably chiefly from the east coast. If they landed in Northumberland, they would be shut up between the Tweed and the Tyne, and the [English] squadrons would cut off their retreat by sea and so compel them to lay down their arms.

If they landed at Durham they would be shut up between the Tyne and the Tees, the Wear would be disputed there, and they would be hemmed in by the hills west of the county and from there fallen upon, with the same result as in Northumberland. A landing in Yorkshire would be either north or south of the Derwent.[2] If north, the position at York would stop them dead, seeing that the English army would have the Ouse and Swale covering it: if south, the English would be covered by the Derwent and the Ouse and so gain time to await the divisions from the north and the south to box the enemy up in a small space and cut him off from the sea. This country lies fifty leagues from London, and the French would take too much time crossing the Ouse and the Don in the face of the English army. But supposing they forced this passage they would find the Trent before them, which they could never cross, not even at a higher spot, in face of 100,000 troops hurried up from all parts: and the divisions of Scotland and the north and north-west of England coming up behind the

[1] This is sufficient reason for the omission of the details which he gave later upon Scotland. They will be given only in brief.

[2] North, that is, of the Yorkshire Derwent in its upper reaches.

Ouse and Swale would cut them off from their ships and hem them in.

I repeat, it is London the French are bent on reaching by the shortest road: they will never land in Scotland, especially in the bad season, or even in the counties of the north-east of England. These parts are hilly and the population hard and poorly off: several rivers run in the direction adverse to the invaders' march: and so the kind of warfare to be waged there is obvious seeing how toilsome progress would be; and the defence would be supported by mountains, rivers, forests, castles and old strongholds.

Hence the real danger begins at the Humber (1) between the Trent and the Thames; (2) between the Thames and Beachy Head. The country is thickly populated and very fruitful, the natives well off and therefore less hardy, and their number, far from helping the defence, is perhaps a drawback. The French have conquered all Europe with their sharpshooter methods; and here the advantage would lie with them, seeing that the English would come up against them in [serried] masses,[1] and the greater their dash the greater their losses—that is what happened to the Russians in Switzerland. The French would make their way more easily in a country cut up by hedges, trees, parks, fences, where each estate acts as a kind of entrenched position facing the high road, than across more open ground; they would show to advantage there against massed troops unaccustomed to the same style of fighting. I have pointed out in the section entitled "The Army" how to remedy that unfamiliarity very promptly.

It is noticeable that from the [Essex] Stour down all the rivers run eastwards, and that there is a total lack of

[1] Dumouriez did not know that the essentially British formation (at least for regular troops) was the line, not the column.

mountains offering positions in favour of the defenders. Nevertheless, one could turn the rivers to profit if the foe landed between the Humber and Stour; the further from the Stour that he landed the more rivers and other obstacles would he have to pass and overcome, for in no case would he dare leave the coast and plunge into the inland counties. No matter where he landed in Lincolnshire, he would find against him the Welland, Glen and all the channels that empty themselves into the two portions of the Wash.

If he landed in the Wash, an impracticability in the opinion of most sailors, the Ouse would be the line of defence; if at Yarmouth, then the Waveney would be the first line, the Deben and Orwell the second, and the Stour the third. If the French decided to land on the east coast between the Trent and Thames, it is presumably the Stour, Colne, Blackwater, or Crouch that would form their objective point.

DEFENCE OF ESSEX[1]

This county possesses four places of arms in the second line, which support the old defence of the coast between the Stour and the Thames. These places of arms or entrenched camps from N. to S. are Manningtree, Colchester, Maldon and Rochford: they must never be abandoned. If one should fall into the enemy's hands the entire forces of England must be sent forward to retake it, confine and turn the enemy by means of the two places of arms on either side, and cut him off from the sea and shut him up.

[1] From a contemporary MS. in Mr. Broadley's collection the defence statistics for Essex in 1803 seem to have been singularly complete, both as regards means of transport and the capacity of bread supply. A broadside shows that in the same year no less a sum than £1392 16s. 6d. was raised in Colchester for Volunteer uniforms.

STOUR AND WASH

The entrance to the Stour is not easy to make. I took note of two rocks that compel all craft to steer close under *Landguard Fort*.[1] This latter point must bristle with batteries, firing hot shot, as in the case of all important coast positions. Its subsidiary defence must consist of a mortar battery on the heights of Ramsey Bay, some gunboats and batteries along the whole front of Harwich Docks, at Shotley Ferry-house, and on Ramsey Height. If, in spite of this terrible disposal of cross fire the enemy managed to land at Harwich, then one must first dispute Tithe-Coom Farm, then retire gradually on Ramsey Street, drawing a line from N. to S. through Wrabness, Great Oakley to Beaumont. Redoubts should have been constructed, and cuts (*coupures*) made beforehand at Little Oakley, overlooked by Great Oakley.

If too impetuous an attack should compel a retirement from this first line of defence, then it should be made to the great camp of Colchester, putting the Colne in front, but a rear-guard of irregulars should be maintained as long as possible in Soamewood and Highwood. Cavalry, light artillery and a few battalions of the line would then hold the heaths of Horkesley, Boxted and Mile End [Myland] to prevent the enemy extending his right and to drive him into the re-entering angle of the Colne, whose mouth all available vessels would at once proceed to close up. In this position the reinforcements from E. and W. could be safely awaited; and as soon as all had come up the northern divisions, forming the left wing, would debouch by Manningtree and Bradfield, the centre, from Colchester Camp, by the two Bromleys, and the southern division, or right wing, by Wivenhoe on to the two

[1] As Dumouriez previously stated that he could not go over (*parcourir*) the coast of Essex, this phrase shows that in 1803 he must have landed at Harwich.

Bentleys,[1] pushing forward a column on to Weeley along the little river. The above march alone would oblige the invader to reimbark. If he persisted in keeping his position and giving battle, the English right would go by Thorpe to Beaumont to turn the enemy's left; the left would take up the position in front of Bradfield; the centre would attack Hundred Heath, Goose Green, and Marjoram Hall, and during the progress of the fight would make for Great Oakley, Wrabness and East Hall; whilst the right, after seizing Beaumont, would extend its line on to Little Oakley and Harwich. If, instead of landing in the Stour, the enemy managed to get a footing under Pewit and Holmes Islands at the Landsmore [Wharf(?)] (a thing I deem impracticable, especially if closed batteries protected the Walton Tower and Walton Point), then Beaumont would play the same part of first defence as Ramsey in the Harwich case, and that would make no alterations in the Colchester muster and the subsequent operations I have indicated.

COLNE, BLACKWATER, CROUCH

The Colne and Blackwater form a bay 3 to 4 fathoms deep as far as Tolesbury Point [Shingle Head Point]. No landing is probable between the Wash and the Colne, but the descent would be dangerous on Mersea Island; and here batteries cannot be multiplied too much. It would be well to station 2 floating batteries, supported by a few gunboats, between E. Mersea and Waymark Point. A battalion in barracks or cantonments on the height of St. Osyth is indicated, with a battery of 2 mortars and 6 heavy cannon; then 2 guns at Jaywick, 2 at Wigborough Wick; a battery of 3 pieces at Browan's Farm, 3 pieces at Ruesal Hall, 3 at Ruesal Farm, 3 at W. Mersea,

[1] These are the Bentleys east of Colchester, not the Bentley near Ipswich.

and 6 battalions with their field-guns and 2 squadrons in barracks on the island.

On the left bank of the Blackwater, 4 cannon and 2 mortars at St. Peter's Chapel, 4 between Waymark and Whitehouse, and 3, together with 2 mortars, on Ramsey Height. Three battalions would be required at Tolesbury, with a battery between Millhouse and the Wick, a camp on the height of Great Wigborough, another on that of Abberton with entrenchments, and a good battery at Strode Mill to prevent the fording of the Strode, in case the enemy had beaten down all land and sea defences and had established himself in Mersea Island. His flotilla could easily be set on fire with hot shot and bombs from St. Osyth, Brightlingsea, Abberton and Great Wigborough. The English forces as they came up, and they would not be long, would take up their position with the left at Abberton, and the centre at Wigborough, the right at Tolesbury, and a strong vanguard entrenched between Peete Hall and Sampson's.

In this second position the army would wait for a squadron to close the entrance to the Blackwater and destroy the enemy's vessels. If the latter, in his despair, managed to force the ford of the Strode and advance on Peldon and Virley, he would be swept by the fire from the heights of Abberton, Wigborough and Tolesbury, and would have to stand repeated cavalry charges in the plain. If he carried the heights of Wigborough the fight would begin again on those of Tolleshunt Knights and Layer-Breton. If, again, he continued to press back this central body, then the divisions of the N. and S. would come to the rescue by the high road from Colchester, whilst the said centre retired by several bridges over the Blackwater.

In this third position the enemy would be attacked all round if he continued his advance, as he would be bound to do after his initial success and in face of his desperate

position. He would try to get through to Maldon to turn the Blackwater; but then his left flank would be enfiladed by infantry and cannon posted in Northey Island, and he would be crushed by the guns on St. Mary and Hatfield Peveral heights.

So soon as the enemy appeared bent on piercing through in this direction, the English left would make for Inworth from Kelvedon, to regain the two Layers and Great Wigborough. If, on the contrary, the enemy after his initial success directed the brunt of his attack against Kelvedon, the English right would make for Tolleshunt-Major, Tolleshunt d'Arcy and Tolesbury, by the two Tothams, and also try to get back into Mersea Island, which would simultaneously be attacked by sea; and in this case the further the enemy advanced the more would he hasten his own destruction. The great object is to hold the excellent position of Maldon, which I consider proof against capture, covered as it is by the Chelmer, even if the foe had crossed the Blackwater. I have taken it for granted that if the enemy makes his descent in the Blackwater, he will try to seize Mersea Island, and will attack the left bank as being the easier. But he might possibly combine his descent in the Blackwater with one in the Crouch, in which case he would choose the right bank and join forces in the Hundred of Dengie. But I consider such a descent as well-nigh unfeasible if Bradwell Hall, Beacon Hill and Ramsey are held in force. Whitehouse and Bradwell on the one hand, and Ramsey Island on the other, flank the beach where boats could land. Wide marshes would impede the communications of troops descended in the Blackwater. A tongue of land stretches from St. Peter's Chapel to St. Lawrence, and should be disputed foot by foot.

It is the broad stretch of country from Tillingham to Asheldham ground that must be seriously fought should the enemy contrive to oust the English from the elevation

between St. Peter's Chapel and St. Lawrence. In this second position the line of the army after receiving reinforcements would extend between Steeple, St. Lawrence and Tillingham, their right and left flanked by the Tillingham marshes. The second line, facing the Crouch, would extend from Southminster through Ratsboro' to Burnham.

When the enemy appeared off the coast to effect his double descent the English should take the precaution of evacuating the Great Tillingham Marsh and piercing the dykes by Burnham, so as to render it impracticable. If this second position was carried, a third would be taken up, with the centre at Norton [Cold], supported by the right at North Fambridge, where the army would recommence a great attack on the enemy, extending on the march from Latchingdon to Steeple.

Owing to the sudden flooding of the Tillingham and Burnham marshes the descent in the Crouch could only be effected in a restricted space below Burnham Ferry-house. The Crouch has at least the same depth as the Blackwater as far as Wallasea Island ferry, although the soundings inside Foulness Point are marked on the charts only as 2 to 2½ fathoms. But the river is very narrow and affords no scope on its left bank for an extended landing, supposing a descent is to be combined with one in the Blackwater.

Batteries at Foulness Point and Gray Farm on Foulness [Island], crossing others at Burnham Heights, entrenchments at the latter place and the ferry-house, and more batteries firing hot shot, forming a continuous line between Paglesham and Canewden, would present insuperable obstacles to the invader's progress. Add all the available naval defences, at Burnham and in the Broomhill River: at low tide the craft would retire to Potter [Potten] Island, and at high tide advance as far as Foulness Point to dispute the river's mouth.

The number of armed craft in the Crouch can be

augmented or decreased at will from the Thames through the Wakering Canal [Havengore Creek], and it is this possibility which should dissuade the enemy from descent in the former river.

Even if the enemy designed to seize the low-lying islands of Foulness and Wallasea to use as depots, these two islands and that of Potton, lying just behind, would serve no useful purpose in a descent, seeing that at the very moment of capture the dykes could be pierced and the three places put under water.

So the invader can attempt no great descent on the right bank of the Crouch, and here ends the defence of Essex, the stretch from Shoeburyness to Leigh coming within the particular defensive of the Thames, which is connected with that of Kent.

DEFENCE OF THE THAMES AND THE COUNTY OF KENT

I have stated at the end of the first part, or memoir, that the defence of South Essex is connected with that of Kent. It is the Thames which at once forms the link and also parts them. This river is so important, and its defence is so essential, that we must go into special detail. The mouth of the Thames from Foulness on the N.E. to Foreness on the S.E. must be defended by naval forces. I have no doubt that it has been well provided with blockships, gunboats, bomb-ketches, and armed sloops. London must boast too many resources of the kind to fear a successful attempt at disembarkation in the Thames itself. The left bank of the river starts at Foulness and passes by Shoebury, Prittlewell, Leigh, Thorndon, Scarhouse in Canvey Island, and Shellhaven, and then contracts as far as Tilbury, where the stream is but a mile across. The right bank runs from the Isle of Sheppey, past the Isle of Grain, under Lobster Island [Yantlet Island] to Allhallows, Slough, St. Marychurch,

Northward Island, and likewise ends, for defensive purposes, at Tilbury.

Tilbury must be considered the re-entering angle of this defensive, its pivot and point of communication between the two coasts. Hence pontoons must be held in readiness there to form a bridge of boats at a moment's notice, to enable the troops and guns to cross over from N. to S., or vice versa. It would be too inconvenient, physically and morally, to have to ascend to London for the passage. This bridge must be protected on its outer face with blockships and all other kind of naval defence. If one of the two lines of defence, Kent or Essex, was forced, the bridge would have to be opened and all the pontoons and armed craft withdrawn to the opposite shore, supposing time failed to bring everything back to London, which would be the wiser step. In no case must the foe be allowed to penetrate higher than Tilbury, which covers the shipyards, the powder-stores, the arsenals and the Metropolis itself—it must be defended to the last extremity.

I have given the first and second lines of defence for Essex. That for Kent possesses by way of places of arms Gravesend, Rochester, Canterbury, Ashford and Tunbridge. The line covering the first three starts at Eastbury, crosses the Thames at Mount Pleasant, passes through Lower Shorne, Halfway House, Litty Church, and Upnor Castle. There it crosses the Medway at Hoo-ness fort, proceeding through Upchurch, Netfield and Milton, and ending at Faversham, in front of which a battery must be erected on the height of Oare Hill to sweep the course of the East Swale.

The first line of defence for the left bank of the Thames begins at Shoebury [in Essex] and ends at Leigh. It consists of a few batteries and the holding in force of the entrenched heights of South Church Hill, Milton and

Burnt Oak below Leigh. In front of the latter town a masked battery is called for, firing in the direction of the Popling Bank, and another battery is needed at Canvey Chapel, in the isle of the same name.

In case of a descent at Leigh on the left bank, the enemy's first advance would be checked by the Rayleigh and Laindon positions, and he would be hemmed in by the Hadleigh and Benfleet heights, and would lack room for deployment between these heights and the Broomhill river, which covers Rochford on that side. Confined in that small space, blockaded by land and sea, he would witness the burning of his ships without being able to save them, and as the English would increase in numbers against him on a very narrow front, after vain attacks, which would require more steadiness than courage to repulse, he would be compelled to lay down his arms.

But the enemy must not be allowed to boast of a descent at any point in the Thames. Its defence is too well thought out not to cover every possible case of attack; and all means are at hand in proportion to its importance, especially as regards naval protection. The attack on the Medway in 1666 succeeded only by surprise. That river is covered by the isles of Sheppey and Grain and the forts of Hoo-ness, Gillingham, Cookham, Upnor and Brompton. One cannot ascend the Thames and the Medway without having taken the isles of Sheppey and Grain: hence it is on the fortification of these two places that pivots the first line of defence.

The Isle of Hartley [Harty], at the S.E. extremity of the Isle of Sheppey, protects the entrance of the East Swale, if Hartley [Harty] Church is fortified and armed with batteries.[1] On the Isle of Sheppey the heights of Leysdon, Nutts and Mustards protects the beach from Shellness

[1] There is a Hartley in Kent also, in the Dartford district 5½ miles S.S.W. of Gravesend.

Point to below Mustards. The coast between Warden and Redhouse is bluff, but seeing that landing is practicable on the beach under the very cliff, out of range of the Sheerness guns, in addition to three mortar batteries in the Warden, Swanley and Minster marshes one must set up some guns to sweep the length of the beach from the flanks of the cliff, without which precaution the disembarkation could be effected. Besides, naval defences are sure to be provided for the Isle of Sheppey and the whole coast as far as the point of the Isle of Thanet.

A battery on the hillock in front of Redhouse crossing fire with Sheerness would sufficiently defend the dyke-path leading from Minster Abbey to the fort; while one at Queenborough would cover the entrance of the West Swale. The position of Sheerness Fort and the works certainly added thereto make it impregnable.

If the Isle of Sheppey was taken, it would be necessary to set up against it batteries of cannon and mortars on the heights of Iwade, Milton, Murston, Blacket's Farm, Teynham, Uplus and Oare, with two camps, one at Milton and the other at Teynham, to recapture the island as soon as the navy should have destroyed the enemy's transports. It is by Sheerness Fort that one would get back into the island to make him surrender.

The Isle of Grain deserves special, even permanent, fortification at St. James' Church and a battery above Salterns. Lobster or Yantlet Island already possesses a fort, which prolongs and flanks the Isle of Grain. It can be flanked itself by batteries, one on the Allhallows' Height and one on that of Stow. It appears that two ancient batteries still exist, one at the end of the cliff marsh and the other at the end of Gravesend marsh. These defences properly restored are enough to prevent any landing in the Thames and Medway.

Between the Isle of Sheppey and Foreness Point in the

Isle of Thanet the coast is practicable at several points and requires special defence. From the East Swale to Bishopstone and Reculver landing can be effected, and here a battery girt with a ditch is needed at the Decoy-house [in Hoversham marshes]. When erecting batteries in the Polders [marshes] care must be taken to make them inaccessible so that they may not be stormed or abandoned too soon. A battery of guns and mortars is needed at Graveney Hill, one at Seasalter Level, and one at Seasalter, halfway up the cliff, to protect the great Whitstable beach, which must be taken in flank by a battery at Whitstable Point and in front from the heights of Coperas and St. Anne.

Batteries are also needed at Swale Cliff, Hampton, Belfound [Beltinge], and a flanking one at Bishopstone. A camp of six battalions at Broomfield would protect this beach, so practicable without these previous defences. From Bishopstone to Reculver no descent need be feared because of the rocks lying under water that cut up the beach. It is to be wished that the enemy would come to land there under the Bishopstone-Reculver guns. He could do so on a beach more than 2½ miles in extent, between Reculver and the stream of Brookend, in the Polders, watered by the canals of the Stour. He would be surrounded by the guns of Reculver, Chisle, St. Nicholas, Shoar [Sarre], Hale and Brookend. Besides small irrigation canals, this beach is cut up by the three canals of the Stour, which would break his line of battle and prevent him advancing to gain the heights where would be posted on the one side the Canterbury troops and on the other those from Mount-pleasant camp in the Isle of Thanet, with the right at Grave-end, by Birchington, the left at Sarre, and the centre at St. Nicholas, with the Stour in front of them. The troops from the camp above Sandwich would change front, placing their right at Stourmouth and their left at Preston Chapel. If the enemy could be held in check for

twenty-four hours in this position and prevented from crossing the canals and storming the heights right or left, sufficient troops would have time to arrive to compel the invaders to take to their ships without having done any harm, supposing the English navy allowed them the opportunity.

The Isle of Thanet is practicable for landing only at the quay at Margate, which is not large enough for a descent in force, and which, I am sure, is well fortified on the sea-side, from Hartsdown to West-north Down. The rocky shore starts anew near Margate and girds the remainder of the isle to Ramsgate in the S.E., which is even more easily defended than the other, if the slightest thought had been expended upon it. The rocks continue to Pegwell, where a bay opens up as far as the Sandwich river. A descent might be attempted on the more extensive beach here, but it would be exposed to fire from Cliff End and Weatherless Heights on the right bank of the Stour and from the excellent post at Richborough on the left. The castle of that name[1] must certainly have been restored, for it is of the utmost importance. A camp of six battalions and 200 dragoons, posted at Mountpleasant, suffices for the defence of Thanet.

If this isle was attacked, the troops after a stubborn defence would have to retire in two bodies parted by the Stour Valley, one with its right at Richborough and left at Stourmouth, the other with its right at Upstreet and left at Reculver. In front of the camp of the left-hand [body], which would speedily be reinforced from Canterbury, one would entrench the points of Reculver, Chisle, Broomfield, Chitty and Groveferry. In front of the right camp, similarly reinforced, one would fortify the heights of Stourmouth, Elmstone, Overland, Goldstone and Sandhills; the right of this camp would rest against the castle

[1] One of the finest Roman camps to be found in England.

of Richborough. In these two camps one would wait for a second position to be taken up by the second line in front of Canterbury, and then retire on to that second position if the enemy pressed too strongly against the first, and there tarry till his fleet was burnt, in order to attack him on the Isle of Thanet.

Sandown Castle has doubtless been put in a proper state [of defence], and it would be easy to make advantageous use of the downs which overhang Sandwich. This town is surely armed with batteries at Stonar, at the head of the harbour at Worth, besides being covered from the heights of [St.] Bartholomew, Woodnesborough, Each [? Ash] and East Street [? Eastry]. This position could easily be held, and time would be given to take up a very important one between Richborough and Ham.

The Deal coast, which comes next, is defended by the two castles of Sandown and Deal, and by batteries. Walmer Castle protects its prolongation to the Beacon [Oldstairs Bay]. Then comes a rocky coast to Dover, not open to descent. Dover is proof against all attack. Even if the invaders had landed, they could never make their way through this country so cut up and so hilly, where all is in the nature of obstacles. East Wear Bay is impracticable, likewise Folkestone. Sandgate is rock-bound, and it is only at Hythe that, thanks to the stretch of beach to Dungeness, a descent appears feasible, and there, too, begin the rich and dangerous pastures of Romney Marsh.

PROJECT OF DESCENT ON RYE AND ROMNEY

The most important, best-thought-out and most dangerous plan was the old one for a descent in the roadstead of Romney, and simultaneously in that of new Romney, thus embracing Dungeness on its two flanks. This project existed even before the American War. I first knew of it in 1770, and in 1779 it was looked upon as a supplementary

expedition contingent upon the success of the attempts against Portsmouth and Plymouth.[1] Seeing that this plan belongs to the sphere of high tactics and is decisive for every war between France and England, I have worked at it with care, and at the time I made detailed notes on it that have impressed it upon my memory.

This plan is still quite new, and its execution is made easier owing (1) to the kind of craft the French have just adopted for their attempts against England; (2) to the proximity of Holland, Flanders and Picardy, whence their army is to start; (3) to the facility with which such small craft can be collected even in the least spacious tidal harbours which ordinary vessels approach with caution, or in the rivers along the coast, where one cannot muster or shelter a large number of vessels as soon as they get beyond one hundred tons; (4) to the swifter and surer passage of these row-boats and the possibility of beaching them on the very strand; (5) to the facility of making the landing at any point, even on cliff-bound shores, with little tidal rise or fall, where vessels drawing over five feet would be chary of approaching lest they should touch bottom, or on flat beaches where the sea goes out very far and where vessels drawing over a fathom cannot land, but *chasse-marées* of three or four feet draught can easily come up and coast batteries have less effect and can barely oppose a descent; (6) to the speed of embarkation and landing.

From considering the above joint advantages it is clear that if a descent upon England is feasible it is by means of *chasse-marées*. If on the way they fall in with a hostile squadron, dispersal will be easier and losses less. All the above advantages must make less negligeable any project for crossing the Channel in *chasse-marées*: the thing is bold but not absurd. An army of 40,000 men will not require

[1] See *ante*, chap. III.

1000 of these vessels, and the more like fillibusters they go the less hampered will they be in reaching England, where they will find everything to hand. In 1779 we only numbered 17,000 men for embarkation at St. Malo and we had nearly 400 vessels to take us over. At Havre 12,000 men had 270 at their disposal. William III's fleet was of 400 sail to carry 14,000 men. An army taking much baggage with it tries to preserve it, but one with little or none at all tries to acquire it. This is a great motive power for all nations, but especially for the French, who for the past fifteen years have been used to living by rapine.

If a French army in *chasse-marées*, or flat-bottomed boats, is lucky enough to reach the English shores, it may be considered as having effected its descent, and starting from Flanders and Picardy to make for Rye, it would not take more than two days at most. As soon as it has crossed the Channel it will closely hug the coast and land at all points, where only craft of similar design and armaments to its own will be able to strike at it. Hence England, convinced that Buonaparte is resolved to undertake the descent, cannot multiply too much these small armed vessels for the defence of her coast, although their equipment may interfere with that of the squadrons she destines for her great expeditions.

I will now detail the project for a descent upon Rye and Romney, such as I knew and studied it in 1778. Its nature has altered only in so far that the English are better prepared to counter attack; but on the other hand it has gained great advantage in respect of the species of vessels to be utilized. The project was to leave from that part of the French coast lying between Dunkirk and Havre, the rallying-point being, as usual, the Roadstead of St. Jean at Boulogne. There were these drawbacks: (1) a poor escort by the Royal Navy; (2) loss of time in reaching the starting-point from the various ports, some to windward and others to leeward; (3) an enforced delay for one

another's arrival in an open roadstead, without shelter in case of attack, or of being driven shoreward by a strong north-west or north-east wind. All these disadvantages have disappeared with the new means of execution the French have adopted.

The landing was to be made on the beach between Jew's-gut and Rye Pier. A division of sloops (gunboats) was to carry a body of grenadiers and chasseurs into New Romney [Sand] Bay, separated from the main descent by Dungeness. Once landed, this body was to make as rapidly as possible for Appledore and take post there. The first contingent disembarked at Rye was to press on to Oxney Island, the position of which is excellent and forms a camp absolutely impregnable both from land and sea. It was to ensure its communications by the left bank of the Rye Canal and take some two or three days to land its artillery, horses and train. Meanwhile detachments would occupy the heights of Kenardington, Wearhorn, [Warehorn], Ruckinge Aldington, Belleview and Hythe Turnpike. Each position would be carefully entrenched. A French army would find itself in possession of all the horses and cattle grazing all the year round in the Romney marshes.

At the end of a week at the outside, the army, leaving behind a body of 10,000 men in the entrenched camp at Oxney to keep open communications with the sea and its stores, would start well rested and refreshed, with its cavalry properly mounted, forming a fifth of the total strength of 40,000 to 50,000 men. The army would leave camp in three columns. The right, 8000 strong, would debouch by Stone, cross the Appledore and Woodchurch heath, and encamp on the heights of Martin-green, some ten miles off. The centre, 20,000 men strong, would debouch by the two bridges of Reading Street and Smallhythe, and march through Kenhill Farm, [Kench Hill], Gallow's Green and Tentherden, to encamp at Biddenden,

some ten or twelve miles off. The left, 12,000 strong, would debouch by Portsman [Potman's] Bridge, march without its train along the heights of Rolvenden, Benenden and Hartley, and encamp above Goudhurst, fifteen miles off. Two small intermediate bodies of 1200 men apiece would march between the three columns, keeping at the same distance. That on the right would encamp at Further-quarter, (?) that on the left at Sissinghurst Castle. The second march would be made in the same order. The right would go from Martin-green to the King's Wood, to the right of Coxheath, twelve miles, leaving behind its train. The centre column would pass through Frittenden, Marden and Hunton Street, to encamp on Coxheath, with its left at Shinglebarn, a distance of eleven miles. The right connecting corps would go to Loose; the left through Horsemonden and Brenchley, to encamp at Tonbridge, sixteen miles off. The left intermediate corps would proceed to Hadlow. The third march would be as follows: The right from the King's Wood to Rochester, fifteen miles; the centre from Coxheath to the Wrotham Hills, nine or ten miles; the right intermediate corps to the woods above Halling; the left from Tonbridge to Dunstal thirteen miles; the left intermediate body to Knock Mill. This march would have the advantage of bringing about the fall of the great position of Malling Heath. Then a halt of twenty-four hours, with detachments pushed forward and on the left flank.

Fourth march:—The right from Rochester to Galley[1] Hill [Gravel Hill], five miles; the centre from Wrotham Heath [Hills] to Farningham, four miles; the right intermediate corps to South Darent; the left from Dunstal to World's End, five miles; the left intermediate corps to Westwood Farm.

[1] There is no *Galley* Hill shown on modern maps. There is *Gad's* Hill by Rochester and *Gravel* Hill. The former would make the march too short. The *latter* brings the column abreast of the others.

Fifth march:—The re-united army will march with its colours to encamp on the heights between the Cray and the Darent, its left resting against Foyden's Wood.

Sixth march:—The battle order between Forest Hill and Deptford.

Seventh march:—Entry into London. The last marches might be doubled, and the entrance made two days earlier into London, or peace on Blackheath Heights.

Such was, in brief, this project, which is certainly still one of the great diversions and possibly the main attack contemplated by Buonaparte. It had the merit of turning the elevated positions of Tunbridge Wells, which could no longer serve the enemy; of crossing the streams almost at their source; and taking up a wide front without weakening the force, and of always being able to concentrate easily on one of its three heads. Its defect consisted in the slowness of its possibly too-methodical marches, especially at the end, and in the sudden contraction of the front in the two last camps, where too much importance was assigned to resting the right flank against the Thames, for if the English army was at hand it could outflank the French left by marching from Bromley to Farningham whilst a strong position between Deptford and Bromley disputed the passage of the Ravensbourne. But the Count de Broglie, author of this plan, knew that he would have no regular army to meet, and conformed to the less speedy and more methodical species of warfare in vogue in his day. His chief aim in arriving in London was to destroy the naval yards and arsenals, and he could compass it by resting his flank on the river and by marching slowly.

If the French to-day had that aim in view, they would traverse in less than four days the distance between Oxney and London, because they would have no train or heavy artillery, always go straight ahead without caring whether their flank was turned, and would make for London as the one objective, not to compel a peace but to sack and

destroy everything. This kind of warfare, with such soldiers, is more to be feared than the methodical one of former days.

Let us base our reasoning on this plan as if it was adopted by Buonaparte in combination with the invasion of Essex, much as I have detailed earlier, by the Blackwater, with subsequent junction at London. In which case the Essex expedition, 30,000 to 40,000 strong, would start from the Maas and Scheldt ports. The Kent one would leave from the Picardy and Flanders ports to land at Rye and New Romney. A third would leave from Cherbourg and perhaps from Havre, 15,000 or 20,000 strong, to threaten the Isle of Wight and maybe Shoreham, or some other spot in Sussex, and co-operate with the other two, of which it would form the left wing. Meanwhile the invasion of Ireland would take place on the west of that island. In every case I make abstraction of naval defences.

I began (this work) by giving a memoir on Ireland—a mere sketch and framework to fill in—and I was happy enough to be in agreement with the wise and deep views of the Government. I have no doubt that the French will attempt[1] to land in Ireland; and things will be made easier for them by what is now going on in Spain by way of preparations. This expedition will total 25,000 to 30,000 men. As to the others, time and combination of forces rest with Buonaparte. I have detailed the measures to be taken for the defence of Essex, and I have no doubt that, if the French attempt to land at any spot of which I treated, the steps taken by the Commander-in-Chief and the Ministry, joined perhaps with some of my ideas, will ensure their complete failure, especially with the help of an invincible navy. When the Rye project is once known, it is easy to bring it to naught by taking beforehand every

[1] See *ante*, chap. IX.

measure to oppose the landing itself and by entrenching sufficiently strong positions in the rear to check the enemy even if he gain a footing.[1]

The coast between Dungeness Lighthouse and the Jew's Gut presents a contracted strand with two batteries commanding it. Behind is the slightly-higher point of Dungemarsh Court, where a battery could be set up, crossing a second one placed at the point of the Decoy-house. The shingle of Wigmore Pit, Abnor Pit, Stones Holms [Holme Stone], the Wick, Misdrips [Midrips], as far as Lydd, should be flooded and the latter entrenched from the mill to Pigwell, following the configuration of the ground, which forms a re-entering angle upon Lydd. The flank of this work would be defended by a second battery at Scotney House [Court] surrounded with water. From Jew's Gut to Rye Old Harbour a battery would be set up on the embankment at the point of Seed's-gate (?), one behind Broom Hill and one at Camber. These batteries would be isolated, in order that they should not be taken or abandoned too soon. Two other batteries would be formed on the triangular downs between Jew's Gut and the pier-head. An armed *tête-de-pont* would be made at the Drawbridge, Winchelsea Castle would be restored and a battery placed at the point of Rye New Harbour. Then an impregnable camp should be made in Oxney Isle and a well-fortified post at Appledore, which could easily be surrounded with water, with a second post at Aldington Knoll to cover the magazines of Ashford and mask the Aldington Heights [Forehead] camp.

So much for the defence from Rye to Dungeness. From the latter to Hythe the coast is more extensive, and presents a greater semicircular front for landing. There

[1] Probably the formation of the Hythe military canal, with a view to the isolation of the coast from Rye near to Sandgate, was due to the extreme importance attached by Dumouriez to the defence of that part of Kent.

is a redoubt at the Flag Point and two batteries at Northlade in front of Lydd, and these suffice to contract the landing-place and throw the invaders back upon the bay of Romney Sand, especially with the help of two isolated batteries at Northlade and Belgar. On the right and the centre the Romney Sand is very dangerous for the enemy, because of the presence of a marsh which can be made impracticable for reaching the New Romney Dyke. A couple of batteries should be fortified and isolated, south of the town, on the two hillocks which dominate the bay. The battery in front of New Romney should be entrenched and isolated, another placed at the Warren House and several more on the downs to the north-east which end at Little Stone [Point]. An entrenched battery should be placed on the sea-wall leading to Dymchurch; and the front facing the said wall should be entrenched and provided with guns and mortars; and one would take up flanking positions in the rear of this defence, in case the front was crushed by isolated batteries at Tatnam Bridge, Orgarswick, Mill Bank and before Burmarsh. The angle of Brockbarn should be fortified: the two batteries between the latter post and Hythe suffice, with the rampart of the sea-wall, along which it would be useful to cut an inner footway for the service of the infantry. This footway must run all the way from New Romney to Hythe. The latter is commanded by the turnpike height and by Sine Farm (?), and flanked by Shorncliff. It needs no other defence.

A first trench must be made across the highway between New Romney and Old Romney. The head of the latter village should be entrenched. Similar trenches should be formed across the corresponding highways at the spots of Great Cheyne Court, Brentzett's Corner, Wye [Ivy] Church, New Church, East Church [Bridge], and Burmarsh, in order to withdraw cattle and inhabitants behind Oxney camp if the invader should have carried

the first obstacles and effected his landing. Then the marshes should be disputed with him foot by foot and time thus gained. The division allotted to this guerilla warfare would retire to Oxney camp, and as a last resource the dyke under Hythe would be cut to allow the sea to come in and the marshes to be flooded up to the foot of the hills.

Then the Kent division would come up and make an entrenched camp at Aldington Forehead, two posts of communication with Oxney camp on Kennardington and Warehorn, and two others on the left at Belleview and Hythe turnpike, with a detached camp on Saltwood. In this position one would await the enemy's next move, if he pushed boldness so far as not to take ship again before the English navy came up and burnt his flotilla in this open bay—which would not take long.

If he persisted in penetrating into the country he would try to carry the posts of Appledore, Kennardington and Warehorn. In this case the Kent army would come up to protect them, and take up the position of Redbrook and Woodchurch Beacon, the detached corps at Saltwood would replace the camp at Aldington Forehead, and it is in this superb position that a first battle could be risked. During this first movement all the western divisions would unite in the excellent camp of Goudhurst, which would constitute the second great position, if the first was carried. Goudhurst would serve as rallying-point for the army marching before the strong position of Halden Place, which flanks the marches in the plan of the Count de Broglie. The Kent army would withdraw to Ashford, that is, upon Chart Magna [Great Chart] and Beaver Green. Then the French army would find itself hemmed in between three strong camps of Charta Magna,[1] Oxney and Halden Place.

[1] Great Chart.

On the other hand the enemy might try to force the passages between Aldington Forehead and the Hythe turnpike; in which case the Kent army would construct its front by marching on the left so as to reach Belleview to stop him, and a portion of the troops from Oxney camp would come up and occupy the position of Aldington Forehead. If the passage was forced the Kent army would retreat to Brabourne and Postling, with a small corps on Paddlesworth. The Sussex divisions would occupy Oxney camp, the troops of which would go and occupy the camp on Orleston Heights, and the front of this camp could be covered with *abatis*.[1] The Halden Place force would come and occupy Charta Magna. During these movements, the continuous development of which on the enemy's part is not very probable, all the northern divisions would have time to advance, without denuding Essex, by the great chain of hills above Charing, by Challock, ending at Godmersham on the Stour.

In the alternative case the enemy, seeing the impossibility of forcing the hills on his right and not daring to attack Oxney camp, would try to cross the river at Rye to penetrate into Sussex by Winchelsea in order to turn the two camps he had not dared to attack. In this case the Kent army would prolong its march as far as Goudhurst, and the division assembled there would take up the excellent position of Tunbridge Wells. The western divisions would march along by the left, and so make for Hampshire and Sussex to prevent the enemy's turning aside to Portsmouth, which he could not succeed in capturing with no heavy artillery nor time for a siege. This French army would find itself at a distance from the sea, without hope of reinforcements, and would soon be lost.

It is presumable that in no case could the enemy pass the first, or at most the second, great position or line of

[1] Trees cut down to form a barrier.

defence. The third line presents the two great chains of hills west and south of Maidstone, which the English would occupy wholly if they were forced to construct their defence and concentrate it upon London. Then they would divide into as many bodies to defend these two ranges and that of Coxheath.[1] The largest body would defend foot by foot the two first chains, where posts abound. Another corps would entrench itself at Challock camp, whence he would cover Canterbury and Dover by means of detachments posted on Barham Downs. In this third line of defence everything would be a military position, and there would not be a single height remaining undisputed to damp the ardour of an enemy, that incurred fresh losses every day without hope of retrieval.

Again, let us suppose that the enemy might carry the Brabourne Down position, or enter the Stour valley by Wye, in the direction of Chilham, to take in reverse the great position of Challock and penetrate to Faversham. In which case the eastern division would entrench itself behind the Stour in the Fishpond Wood. The troops from Malling Heath camp would come and occupy the heights between Davington and Doddington, and the great force from Challock camp would march against him, force him back towards the sea and compel him to surrender.

In short, if this excellent line of defence was carried, there would be a fourth and last position on the heights parting the third and fourth by the Medway and Darent valleys. Between these two rivers are such a number of excellent positions, as also between the Darent and Cray, and the Cray and Ravensbourne, that a foolhardy enemy penetrating so far would undoubtedly be crushed by all the assembled forces of England.

[1] Coxheath formed the site of an important military centre during all the wars of George III.

I will not speak of the particular defence of London, for I refuse to believe that an enemy could ever get near enough to the Metropolis when the whole of England was up in arms; when patriotism was firing one of the bravest nations in Europe; and when that nation was fighting for all it held most dear and most sacred.

Charles the Fifth, having penetrated into Provence, asked Captain La Roche du Maine, whom he had made prisoner, how many days' marches there were between Toulon and Paris. The brave Chevalier replied: "Sire, if by days you mean battles, there are more than twenty!" The same reply may be given to Buonaparte if he puts the same question—though the distance is very much smaller.

I have given an account of the projects for descent upon the Isle of Wight and Portsmouth.[1] I fancy that all precautions have been taken in respect of them, and that the whole coast between Selsea Bill and St. Alban's Head has been put in a good state of defence. Plymouth will not be attacked, and all armaments from Brest and the west of France will be intended for the invasion of Ireland, which presents certain chances that foresight can frustrate.

I have no doubt that the posts of the first line around the coasts will be fortified in advance, such as, in Essex, the batteries, forts, and entrenched camps of the Stour, Mersea Island and the left bank of the Thames; in Kent, the isles of Sheppey and Grain, the coast defences to the Isle of Thanet, all the natural obstacles of the Romney marshes, the entrenched posts of Hythe turnpike, Aldington Knoll, Oxney camp, Challock and Coxheath camps. There would be no time to carry these works into execution if the enemy had once managed to land. The artillery may be mounted on naval carriages, which the invader could not take with him if these camps had to be evacuated. I have no doubt, too, that the camps of

[1] See *ante*, chap. III.

the second line will be traced, or at least marked out, if only to safeguard the magazines of the places of arms previously chosen and make known beforehand the refuges for the inhabitants and the rallying-points for troops of the respective counties. In addition two great central camps will be previously entrenched on the heights of Ingatstone in Essex and Malling Heath in Kent, in order to receive all the reinforcements from distant counties and distribute them so as to strengthen the camps of the three first lines, and also to harbour, in case of a great disaster, the troops forced to beat a retreat from outer lines of defence. I believe that Essex can be perfectly defended with 40,000 men and Kent with 60,000, if simultaneously attacked. It is this proportion which must decide the size of these two great camps.

Finally, I have no doubt that upon all these particular works will be based a general plan of solid, invariable defence, except in matters of local details, which will also serve at all times and prevent England from ever being taken unawares.

NORFOLK AND SUFFOLK

[The following note in the original MS. comes after the chapter entitled "Examination of the Western Ports of France," whence the invasion of Ireland could be attempted.]

These two counties, from the Stour to the Wash, do not offer military positions as decided as the foregoing,[1] or mountain ranges, or pivots, or fixed camps. In those regions nature has spared art the devising of obstacles. In Norfolk and Suffolk places of arms such as Ipswich, Debenham, Bungay, Norwich, Swaffham and Ely (in Cambridgeshire) are more open and accessible to the enemy. The rivers Orwell, Deben, Alde, Blythe, Yare,

[1] Kent and Essex.

Ouse are mostly wide-mouthed, but contract very soon, and flow through unwooded plains, affording fewer natural impediments than Kent, Sussex and Essex. The course of these rivers is shorter; and though they trace the line of defence fairly well, yet they do not fortify it. These drawbacks are made up by the ease with which cavalry and light artillery can be usefully deployed against a foe weak in those two arms, and the facilities afforded for many small skirmishes, which involve little risk to the defenders, even if they should be beaten, whilst a single one might be decisive for the assailants. In the long run, they could not resist the multiplicity of these attacks, which must prevent all progress on their part and overwhelm them in their retreats.

The fixed camps of the second line, with positions to fortify or to hold in these two counties, which are intended to cover the places of arms or the magazines, and which must serve as rallying-points, are: (1) Henley, on the left (?) bank of the Deben, covering Ipswich; (2) Letheringham Lodge [Hall], on the left (?) of the Deben, with a well-entrenched redoubt at Beden's Grove on the right bank; (3) the big heights between Saxmundham and Benhall. The Letheringham and Saxmundham camps cover the place of arms of Debenham; (4) Beccles camp, to cover the place of arms of Bungay; the latter, situated on an isthmus, is in itself almost an unassailable camp if the neck is fortified; (5) the camp of Poringland Heath; (6) Strumpshaw Mill, or the camp of Buckenham; (7) the camp of Horsford Heath, with an intermediate post at Wroxham. These three camps, 5, 6, and 7, cover the important place of arms of Norwich; (8) the camp of Castle Acre, or Bartholomew Hills, (9) the camp of Pentney. The two last cover the place of arms of Swaffham. The fixed camps of the first line are: (1) Harkshead, to defend the mouth of the Stour; (2) Felixstowe, to protect the Landguard Fort and the mouth of the Deben; (3) Buckney, a large well-armed

redoubt, to defend the mouth of the Alde;[1] (4) Orford; (5) Cosewith (Covehithe), to protect Southwold; (6) Oulton, to defend Lowestoft; (7) Bradwell, on the heights between Gorleston and Burgh Castle, to cover Yarmouth from the south; (8) Caister, on the Nova Section heights; (9) Happisburg [now Hazeburgh]; (10) Sheringham Heath; (11) Blakeney; (12) Barrow Hill, on the Stiffkey, to protect Wells; (13) Burnham, on the height of Burnham Norton, Heneham; (15) Lynn, on the height of Bawsey, (16) Tottenhill.

The fixed camps of the second line need not be occupied in advance, if one wishes to spare troops and inhabitants; but they must be traced out and two or three of them fortified. They are to serve either as retreats for the camps of the first line or else as rallying-points for the divisions of the other counties. At whatever point of Suffolk or Norfolk where the enemy may land, the troops occupying the camps of the first and second lines distant from the landing-place ought successfully to rally on the two flanks of the enemy and in front of him, to reinforce the first camps, press the enemy hard and surround him.

In my memoir on the defence of the coast of Essex, at the mouth of the Stour, I said that a battery was needed at Shotley Point. A second is required on the height of Blofield Farm. No doubt Landguard Fort has been put beyond reach of a *coup de main* by means of additional works. There must be some gunboats at the mouth of the Orwell and of the Stour. A battery at the Ferry-house under the camp of Felixstowe, one at the point of the cliffs on the left bank of the Deben, suffice to defend this narrow river, barred by a sand bank.

[1] In October, 1803, a landing of the French was reported in the neighbourhood of Aldborough, where the Rev. George Crabbe, the poet, a native of the place, happened to be staying. Vide *Napoleon and the Invasion of England*, Vol. II, pp. 135–6.

As landing is practicable in the Alde as far as as Aldborough, this place must be fortified and provided with cannons and mortars along its front. The same precaution will no doubt have been taken in the case of Thorpness, which gives scope for flank-fire on to that anchorage. An entrenched battery on Oldchapel defends Minsmere Haven, which can be flooded by means of the sluices as far as the foot of the Dunwich Cliff. The head and two flanks of the Blythe will surely have been fortified with low isolated batteries on either bank of the mouth, and an entrenched battery on the Walberswick Height. Southwold has, no doubt, been armed with batteries, besides those that can be placed on Reydon Common, which could be occupied by the Covehithe camp in case of a landing at Southwold. Lowestoft may be defended by flank batteries, both north and south, and by a fortified front. The buoys would have to be removed in good time from all these ports.

The mouth of the Yare is sufficiently protected by the fort if it is put into a good condition, and by the batteries on Gorleston Cliff. These batteries are supported by Bradewell camp, which covers Yarmouth on the south, and which would stop the foe if he landed on the left bank of the Yare. Yarmouth presents a bastioned sea-front and several forts and batteries. These works have doubtless been overhauled, and should suffice to prevent a landing.

This town must be guarded against a *coup de main*. The coast is protected as far as Winterton Ness by banks, and the buoys must be removed in case of landing and pilots held in readiness with their boats for the purpose. Downs stretch from Winterton to Happisburgh, and there, doubtless, batteries will have been placed, especially if flanking positions are procurable. But this coast is too open, the tides are too swift, and the seas break too strongly on the strand for a descent to be attempted, which moreover would be prevented or repulsed by Caistor

and Happisburgh camps. Mundesley may be defended by batteries on Paston Hill, crossing that on the Mill Hill to the north-north-west.

Cromer[1] is adequately protected by fortifying its front, and by batteries to the east on the Light Horse Height, to the west above the Parsonage, and on the hill above south of the town. Cross batteries must have been placed at Cleyhaven, Morston and Brancaster.[2] Beyond

[1] William Windham commanded a volunteer corps at Felbrigge during the Great Terror. In his diary under date January 11th, 1798, he writes: "Saw Sir W. Howe. Much impressed with danger. He thought force insufficient in '95, when North was threatened by 12,000 men; said so, and got rebuked for it. Could not in his present district, viz. Essex, bring against an enemy who should land at Clayton, or Clacton (near Ipswich River as it would seem) more than 6000. River Lea ought to be provided with sluices. Thinks there should be much light infantry; present arms as good as any; must endeavour to teach use of bayonet. Great difficulty with light infantry to teach them to disperse. Only three positions—Colchester, Chelmsford, and Brentwood—Lord Petre's, not Warley. Two former would require 25,000 men." (*Diary*, p. 387.) There is another reference at p. 390.

[2] Mr. Coke, of Holkham, afterwards Earl of Leicester, despite his sturdy Whiggism, was roused to patriotic enthusiasm by the common danger. On May 6th, 1798, he wrote to the Prince of Wales as follows: "Feeling eager to show my zeal in defence of my King and Country at this alarming crisis . . . I think the best service I can render is by raising a Squadron of Horse, of the most respectable Yeomanry in this neighbourhood. . . . All descriptions of people, from the biggest to the lowest, are equally zealous to exert their utmost powers to repel the French and to fight to the last gasp in defence of their King and Country. Military operations are forming in every part of this County, the Merchants and inhabitants of Lynn and Wells are arming all their small craft as expeditiously as possible, which is a very wise measure, as the object is to prevent the landing of the enemy in such ships as they must make an attempt in, with any prospect of success on our flat shores." Again, in 1804, we read that "on November 10th he was gazetted Captain of the Holkham Gentleman [*sic.*] and Yeomanry Cavalry; and to crown all, on Christmas Day, which fell upon a Sunday, the troops at Lynn were formally presented with a most elegant banner worked by Lady Andover herself." In January, 1805, Mr. Coke became lieutenant-Colonel of the Western Regiment of Yeomanry Cavalry (*Coke of Norfolk and his Friends*. London: John Lane, 1908. Vol. I, pp. 432–3; and Vol. II, p. 39).

that start the salt marshes and the Wash. The whole coast from Cley to Hunstanton is impracticable, thanks to the salt marshes, which may easily be flooded.

The Wash begins at St. Edmund's Point, in front of which lies the great bank of Burnham's Flats, under only four feet of water. The tides run swiftly, and the entrance is quite open to the north-east winds. To land on its eastern shore between Hunstanton and Lynn one must enter a difficult channel, the Gore, where navigation is out of the question if the guiding buoys have been removed. To this natural and almost insurmountable obstacle may be added three or four blockships, supported by a few gunboats. After overcoming these obstacles one would come under the coast fires. So one may look upon a landing in the Wash as impracticable.

Hunstanton is situated on a height commanding the beach. By fortifying its front and placing batteries all possibility of invasion would be prevented, especially with the support of Heacham camp. The entrance is through a small, narrow channel into Heacham Harbour, which is covered by a point of land where, no doubt, a battery has been placed. A second line of defence consists in a dyke, irregular in form, running from South Row to North Row. Salt marshes serve as the fosse of this excellent entrenchment, and the batteries installed on the Heacham front, supported by the camp of that name, complete this defence.

These salt marshes extend as far as the port of Snettisham and may be flooded. The dyke bounding them presents many angles, and consequently affords opportunities for flank-fire and renders a landing almost impossible, particularly if care is taken to cut a footway on the inside of the embankment, so as to facilitate the use of musketry. There is a hillock behind the old haven which could accommodate a strong battery, enfilading all these marshes and fore channel. A few mortars, too,

would play havoc with an assembled flotilla. The above sort of defence, with many angles and cross-fires over salt-marshes capable of inundation, extends to Lynn. No flotilla could venture, without risking total loss, to enter the narrow *Deeps* which lead into this port if the buoys had been removed betimes. It would be wrecked on the banks and remain exposed to all the fires of the coast, the blockships, gunboats, and frigates sent down on the ebb.[1]

[1] The rest of Dumouriez' scheme for the defence of Norfolk and Suffolk is omitted, as containing few points of interest, and for the most part only emphasizing the facts already stated.

CHAPTER XI

DEFENCE OF THE SOUTH AND SOUTH-WEST COAST, FROM SUSSEX TO THE SEVERN SEA, WITH ADDITIONAL NOTES ON THE PORTS AND OTHER BASES OF ATTACK BY BONAPARTE

For this purpose it will be proper to reconnoitre the mouth of the Severn in the day time. . . . Colonel Tate is to advance rapidly in the dark, on that side of Bristol which may be to windward, and immediately to set fire to that quarter. If the enterprise be conducted with dexterity it cannot fail to strike terror and amazement into the very heart of the capital of England.—HOCHE's instructions to Tate, January, 1797.

THE county of Sussex presents a long depression lying east to west; bounded north by a range of hills which rest east against Winchelsea and Fairlight and, crossing from Kent through Surrey, form a continuous chain right on to Cornwall; and south, by the high downs which run along the coast from Bourne, west of Pevensey, to Portsdown. They leave the coast on the right bank of the Arun, forming the plain on which stands Chichester, and run up behind Portsmouth. This depression is intersected by five rivers, which rise in the north-east and cross the downs perpendicularly in very contracted beds to make the sea—the first at Pevensey, the Cuckmere between Pevensey and Newhaven, the Ouse at Newhaven, the Adour at Shoreham, the Arun at Arundel Haven [Littlehampton]. The coast affords five points open to a landing—Pevensey, Brighton, Shoreham, Arundel, and Pagham.[1]

[1] Newhaven should have been added.

The four natural places of arms or collecting-points for provisions and troops are Tunbridge Wells, Horsham, Guildford, and Chichester. Undoubtedly several positions will have been chosen to fortify and turn into fixed camps, so as to support from a short distance the defence of the coast and to prevent the enemy from penetrating into the country by disputing it successively foot by foot along several lines. These fixed camps are pivots on which must turn the whole defence. Similarly positions will have been reconnoitred for *movable* camps that give an opportunity to turn, outflank, or stop the enemy after his landing. The *fixed* or fortified camps of the first line appear to be (1) Broomhill or Playden, to prevent, in conjunction with Oxney camp, the enemy from crossing the Rother after landing at Romney and to support Rye and Winchelsea; (2) Fairlight camp and its continuation, which I call Beauport [Park] camp, to cut off communications between the enemy landing at Romney and one landed nearer Pevensey; (3) the rising ground of Bexhill to support the troops of Beauport camp, opposed to the descent at Pevensey; (4) Mount Caburn camp, to stop the enemy landed at Pevensey; (5) the fortified spot of Hollingsbury Castle which backs up the defence of Brighton; (6) Highden Hill, to support the defence of Shoreham on the one side and of the coast as far as the Arun on the other; (7) the camp of Arundel, with a *tête de pont* on Warningcamp, for the defence of the Arun; (8) North Mundham in front of Chichester to cover its magazines and defend Pagham Bay.

In the *second* line: (1) Bodiham, or the camp of Silverhill, which flanks three roads; (2) Uckfield camp, which flanks several roads; (3) Shermanbury camp, where the passage of two rivers may be disputed; (4) Stopham camp, which protects the passage of the Arun; (5) Houghton camp, which also defends the Arun; (6) Westbourne camp, back on the height, which connects the Sussex and Hampshire defences.

In the *third* line: (1) Goudhurst camp, which links up the Sussex and Kent defences; (2) Tunbridge Wells camp, on the height in front of that place of arms, which prevents a movement into Kent or the Maidstone Valley; (3) Horsham camp, to cover that place of arms and to bar several roads to London; (4) Fittleworth camp, protecting the entrance into Surrey and the roads leading to the place of arms, Guildford. There are several other good positions for intermediate camps in these first and second lines, which could be taken up successively, so as to annoy the enemy, whatever road he might choose, flank him, cut him off from the sea, and compel him to surrender. The *movable* camps along the coast, in the first line, are: (1) Hoo camp, to be occupied by the troops of Beauport camp; (2) Peeling [?] camp, on the heights behind Pevensey, with its retreat on Rye, Laughton, and Wellingham, to cross the Cuckmere at Barcumbe and Barcumbe Mills[1] and defend the passage of that stream, care being taken to destroy all bridges in the retreat; (3) [East] Bourne camp, at the extremity of the downs perpendicular to the sea; it must be entrenched along the eastern front, from above Northbourne to above Willingdon, the trenches following the curves of the downs, so as to give flank fires crossing and battering their foot. This camp must be under the command of a general bent on offering a long resistance; for the enemy, landed at Pevensey, after storming that spot and the camp of Peeling, could not advance into the plain before he had dislodged the English from [East] Bourne camp, which would overlap his left wing and would get round him in the rear if allowed to exist. The retreat of the troops, after defending stubbornly this excellent position, would be through Lullington on to Winton Street, destroying the bridge leading thereto. They would take up a position again on the heights to the

[1] Barcombe and Barcombe Mills as well as Wellington are on the River Ouse, about ten miles to the west of the Cuckmere.

right of Cuckmere, from Alfriston to Chynyng [Chinting] [east of Seaford], at right angles to the sea; and could hastily throw up some earthworks along that perpendicular line, which might have been prepared beforehand, even as similar ones beyond the Ouse. This second position I will term Seaford camp. If these troops were attacked afresh, they would, after a long defence, retire in three columns—the right making from hill to hill for the Seaford fort and castle, the left through Denton and East Tarring, passing the Ouse at Stokeferry, and the centre through Bishopstone and crossing at Newhaven. Then this united and reinforced body would pitch and camp alongside the Ouse at right angles to the sea from Newhaven to Southease, which I will name Telscombe camp, and they would entrench their front along the Ouse, commanding the two foregoing camps. The French would meet with a tremendous resistance before succeeding in storming the two movable camps of [East] Bourne and Seaford, supported by the fixed camp of Mount Caburn.

Help would arrive from all sides: troops from the coast would place themselves in two divisions in Hoo camp and Hurstmonceux camp, the right at Hurstmonceux and the left at Worthing, from where they would annoy the enemy's right. The northern reinforcements would post themselves before Hellingly in the camp of that name. The extremity of the plain would be disputed by them before they retired upon Wellfield camp, in the second line of defence. The downs by [East] Bourne camp, as well as those running on to Brighton, can easily be disputed foot by foot, and here the English would have the advantage, thanks to light artillery and cavalry moving easily across the greensward, over the French, who could oppose neither horse nor ordnance. Thus the resistance could be prolonged, seeing that reinforcements would come up speedily through Mount Caburn camp, the pivot of the defence.

Let us examine now the defence of the coast itself. I will begin by making a general observation that applies better to this part of the Sussex coast than to any other shore. The downs, between [East] Bourne and Newhaven end on the sea side in a very high cliff, with a wide beach at its foot when the tide is out. The foot of the cliffs is out of the line of fire from the top of the downs, but fortunately the bends and turns of the coast line provide several flanks, from which the beach may be enfiladed sideways. The remainder of the defence must be entrusted to gunboats and other naval means at hand in the Ouse and Cuckmere.

From Newhaven to Brighton, however, the coast line presents very few bends, and so there is an absence of flanks from which to sweep the beach. The suggestion is that cuts should be made diagonally from the elevated batteries of Rottingdean and Ovingdean through the portions of the downs cliffs where the gradient renders it feasible, and through these apertures the horse-artillery and cavalry could descend to the beach and attack the French at the moment of landing.

From Rottingdean to Coperas Mill, past Brighton, seven or eight of these cuts could be made, and so one might get flank fires which would command the beach in its length to the foot of the cliff. I think this expedient feasible, and it could be verified on the spot. In addition, owing to this dangerous drawback, one must multiply naval defences along the coasts that have that conformation, which is only found in Sussex below the straight cliff-line between Rottingdean and Coperas.

It is possible that as a complement of the great movement upon Romney, the enemy might plan the simultaneous arrival of the Cherbourg division, which would have the duty of turning Oxney camp or the Goudhurst position by making rapidly for Tunbridge Wells and so forcing back the English right. But this expedition,

whatever the enemy may arrange, cannot be made to coincide exactly with the other, because in the first place the winds and tides bringing the Dunkirk and Boulogne flotillas would be adverse to the Cherbourg division; and secondly, the latter's passage would take several days, whether across the open Channel or across the Bay of Caen, to round Cape d'Atifer, or even (the height of temerity) along the English coast; and the English cruisers could not be avoided. Hence one may conclude that if the enemy effects his descent on the Sussex shore it will not be with the Cherbourg division but with a portion of the Flanders-Picardy army, which would weaken by dividing it.

To complete the defence of Rye, its right flank must be safeguarded by fortifying Winchelsea and placing closed batteries on the unnamed height between Wickham, Chick Hill, Hook Point and Cliff End. The enemy, landed in Sussex, must be prevented from passing the Rother above or at Rye or the Brede at Winchelsea. The essential thing is to prevent the junction or the future co-operation of the two invading bodies. Thus the defence of Sussex must be close-knit, concentrated, enveloping and of a guerilla character. The Tillingham river, which flows through a vale between two lofty positions of which Rye is the head, flows into the sea at the latter spot. This can be defended by a camp above Playden and a redoubt at Icklesham. These two camps will support Rye and Winchelsea on the Kent side, and the defence will also be safeguarded by Oxney camp on the east and Beauport and Fairlight camps on the west.

The coast from Hook Point to Hastings is inaccessible, being rock-strewn. Even Hastings lacks sufficiently spacious a beach to admit of a landing in force. It will be adequately defended by a battery on the eastern elevation above the town and another at the old castle on Windmill Height to the west. The fixed camp of Bexhill

suffices to defend the beach as far as the Pevensey sluice, with two isolated batteries on Bexhill Common and others at Barhorne Hill and Court Lodge. A division would encamp on the heights, with its left at Ore and its right at Telham Hill, constituting Beauport camp.

From the sluice to Langney Point is Pevensey Bay. It can be protected by the entrenched head of Pevensey and Langney Point similarly armed and isolated. The whole coast line could be flooded when the enemy tried to land, by means of two sluices in front of Pevensey. This defence would be flanked on the west by [East] Bourne camp. Supposing the enemy had managed to land at the same time at Rye and Pevensey and bore to the right to effect a junction, he would be stopped first by the fixed camp of Beauport, which could be held for a long time, being almost impregnable, and then by Icklesham camp. If the latter were stormed, then the reinforced division would cross the Brede and take up a final and imposing position between the Brede and the Tillingham, which I will call the movable camp of Udimore. The two sections of the defenders' forces would join hands to prevent the junction of the enemy's two-fold attack. The [East]Bourne camp division would advance behind Pevensey to Beauport camp, which it would attempt to recapture in the enemy's rear and occupy, with a change of front. The Peelings camp division, instead of crossing the Cuckmere, would hug the enemy's flank, with the Brede between the two. Thus his march would be taken in flank and in rear. Meanwhile the English Navy would sail up and destroy the flotilla in the two bays, and so after perhaps a few fatal successes the invader would be destroyed between the first and second lines of defence.[1]

[1] Dumouriez' plan of defending Pevensey Bay by means of flanking camps at the strong positions near Eastbourne, Bexhill and Beauport, seems in many ways preferable to that which was adopted by the Government, namely,

If the enemy, determined to make the attempts on his left, after storming the [East]Bourne and Seaford camps, thought himself strong enough to march unsupported across Sussex and make speedily for the Tunbridge Wells position, then one would hurriedly collect a sufficient force to surround and attack the jeopardized detachment, which could not be relieved by the main body landed at Rye, against which the measures I specified in the second memoir would be carried into execution separately. Presumably on no side could the enemy penetrate as far as Tunbridge Wells.

A landing at Cuckmere Haven, Seaford, or Newhaven does not appear to be dangerous. Besides the special defences at the two points of the Cuckmere and the Seaford and Newhaven forts indicated on the maps, which surely have been put into a good state, these three beaches are just below the [East]Bourne, Seaford and Newhaven camps. From Newhaven to Rottingdean the coast offers no pre-determined spot for descent. We have spoken of the risks and the resources of the coast between Rottingdean and Coperas Mill. If the cuts I have indicated are added sufficient defence would be secured by three batteries at the three mills, one at the Telegraph Point, one on the height above Brighton to the north-west, one on the pier, one at the head of Hove and one at Coperas Mill.

If the landing was effected at Brighton, Hollingsbury Castle should be defended to the utmost, then retirement made on to Shermanbury. It is in this plain, and to dispute the passage of the river, that the first pitched battle would be fought, whilst the eastern and western

of defending the shore of the bay by numerous martello towers. These were erected in the years 1805-6, together with the well-known redoubt at Eastbourne. But this plan of an external line of defence, besides being expensive, was open to the objection that when once that line was pierced, no adequate defence remained. Dumouriez assumed that no extensive coast defence was impregnable, and that preparation should be made to outflank, hamper, and overwhelm an enemy who had chanced to effect a landing.

divisions closed in upon the enemy's flanks. If the enemy stormed the first line and crossed the Ouse beyond Barcombe he would make for [West] Grinstead *viâ* Cuckfield or Horsham. If he marched upon Cuckfield the northern divisions would make for the Cuckfield Heights and take up a good position between Shermanbury and (?) Monhill, which I will name Bolney camp. The western troops would march along the coast and reinforce Shermanbury; [East]Bourne camp would reinforce Mount Coburn camp, which would take up again the Hollingsbury Castle position to surround the enemy. If he tried to make his way by Horsham one would dispute him the passage of the Adour, which he would have to effect between Bramber and Shermanbury. If he succeeded, then the northern divisions would take the camp of Horsham, the left resting on the Hammer ponds, the right on Newbridge Farthing. The eastern division would return and occupy the salient angle of Shermanbury; the western would post itself at Fittleworth camp.

No invasion need be feared between Coperas Mill and Shoreham, the river running under the mill parting the beach from the land. Still, this strand should be defended with five batteries in front of Lower Lancing, Worthing, Goring, Kingston and Rustington. The latter would cross fire with the fort at the Arun's mouth. To the right of the Arun three batteries would be placed before Atherington, Elmer and Midleton. A division would be posted on the heights of Portlade, another on those of Buckingham. The left division would post itself on the Lancing Heights, and would be supported by the fixed camp of Highden Hill. It seems from the map that from the Adour to the Arun the coast has no cliffs and that cross-sweeping fires can be obtained.

The Hampshire reinforcements would post themselves at Stopham and Houghton camps; the eastern division at Shoreham. If this position were carried then the

northern divisions would go to Stopham camp. In fine, the further inland the enemy penetrated the more would we seek to hem him in in a re-entering angle, the two sides of which would contract him more or less according to the degree of pressure they themselves received from his advance; and when he got involved in the second line such fixed camps of the first line as he would have left unstormed would cut him off from the sea. Stretches of rocks prevent all landing between Arundel Harbour and Pagham Bay, east-north-east of Selsea peninsula; the battery at the point of Pagham Point and another at Selsea Church would defend this bay. Also two batteries would be needed near Selsey Pond [Pagham Haven]. This peninsula is not accessible if defended ever so little. If the enemy was unfortunate enough to set foot thereon one would hem him in by posting one division at Pagham, one at Keynor and one at Earnley. The proximity of Portsmouth would provide abundant naval defences, and no landing so near that port would be ventured upon. Rocks stretch on from Selsea Bill to Brackelsham. As an extreme precaution three batteries can be placed as far as the watch-house at the mouth of the Chichester Canal, at Brackelsham Head, Southcote and Buycarne.

A MILITARY RECONNAISSANCE OF SURREY AND SUSSEX 1805

[SUBSEQUENTLY WRITTEN]

A range of steep hills runs west to east from Guildford to the Thames, several miles below London, and constitutes the last line of defence of the Metropolis on the south-west to south-east. This belt is unassailable, and presents two passes or gorges, the one at Dorking between Guildford and Reigate, and the other at Shoreham. These two gorges are impenetrable if they are defended by batteries of big guns on naval carriages. This extended front shows three big highways leading to London: (1),

the Dorking road, which may be defended by two camps astride the highway on [Ranmore Common and Headley Heath]; (2) the Reigate road, by an entrenched outwork about Sutton Park and the forces encamped on Walton Heath; (3) the Godstone road, by a camp between Caterham and Woldingham; (4) the Sevenoaks road, by a camp on the left bank of the Darent and a second on the Wrotham and Shoreham heights.

It is presumable that even in case of invasion the first belt, or last line of defence, could never be attacked, flanked as it is to the east by the strong defence of Kent, and to the west by that of the Thames above Windsor. So that there is only left for us to examine, on the whole front of Sussex, supposing an invasion took place, the second great line of defence, of which the right is Horsham, the centre Cuckfield, and the left Uckfield. This defence is joined to that of Kent by Tunbridge Wells. Between the last belt, or southern line of defence of the Thames and the capital, and this second line of defence, the ground falling from slope to slope admits of several good camps, where a very complicated and murderous guerilla war could be waged against a hostile army that had got so far, after having stormed the second line of defence, because it would be cut off from the sea and harassed on both flanks by numerous army corps.

The second line forms a second belt, which stretches in amphitheatre below the long valley of Sussex. Its central point, Cuckfield, constitutes a camp which may be made unstormable, and of which Cuckfield Cemetery is the outwork. On coming down into the Sussex valley by the Cuckfield road, there are three good positions to be found in a line, disputing the valley, Barcombe to the east on a height, St. John's Common in the centre, and Shermanbury to the west. In front of these three advanced positions of the second line of defence the ground may be disputed to the foot of the Downs.

The first line of defence is that of the Downs themselves. These very high downs cover the whole front of the county of Sussex along the seashore, beginning west of Pevensey and stretching to the north of Chichester. They are four, five, six, seven to eight miles deep, and are very steep to the north, and end in a very high cliff on the side of the sea. Between Pevensey and Lewes they offer positions for perpendicular defence, intersected by several rivers running north to south. But they present only one good camp, that of Mount Caburn, to the north-east of Lewes, covered by the Ouse.

As for the position of Clayton Hill, about which I have been consulted, it would be very dangerous and opposed to all the rules of the art of war, because, firstly, it lacks wood and water, and, secondly, it wants depth: and even if one had time to entrench oneself there the enemy could storm it in battle array along its whole front, and could even command its right from Devil's Dyke, in which case the army attacked in this position would have as its only line of retreat the steep and perpendicular hill which leads to the valley of Poynings, Clayton and Westmeston.

The enemy during his attack could even send a column round by Lewes to debouch into the valley, supposing that, counting on the so-called position of Clayton Hill, the capital camp of Mount Caburn had remained unoccupied; then the Clayton Hill troops would see their last retreat cut off and would be routed with the total loss of their artillery and cavalry. All positions, however well entrenched at their head, if they are backed against a steep slope or a river, are dangerous—witness that of the Austrians at Jemappes.[1]

So that there is no other fixed point of defence in the

[1] See chap. v, p. 135. Dumouriez' spelling of the name varies from the modern one.

Downs than Mount Caburn camp, which is isolated, steep on all sides, with its front covered by a river. In the Downs running west there is not a single position that one can hold. The enemy himself, who could find there no water, wood or supplies, would hasten to overcome the obstacles opposed to him on the Downs and leave them and come down into the vale. Thereupon they would be reoccupied in his rear, and if he tried to recapture them he would be shut in at their foot to his immense peril. Besides, what good would it do him to reclimb them? The coast is flat and harbourless, and the vessels that had brought him would have been either destroyed by our squadrons or forced to abandon these perilous shores.

So that one need not stand in fear of an invasion of Sussex, because even if it partially succeeded, the invaders would remain without communication with their ships and without the possibility of re-embarkation.

[The above was written in 1805, later than the main treatise on the defence of the United Kingdom, which Dumouriez ended in May, 1804. *Vide*, p. 366.]

DEFENCE OF HAMPSHIRE

The Isle of Wight[1] covers the whole front of Hampshire. I have given in detail the plan of attack upon it, quite feasible at the time it was devised, but impossible now that people are warned and that naval defences abound, summer and winter alike. Sandown Fort, which has surely been put into a state of efficiency, suffices for the defence of the east coast. The enemy cannot risk a division of his force in Brading Haven, which is well protected by two batteries, one at Bembridge Point and the other at Duffer (?). Two cross batteries at Chale, two at Brixton and two at Freshwater would suffice to

[1] See chap. III, pp. 47–65.

stop any landing upon the south coast. Alum and Totland Bays are impracticable owing to the swiftness of the tides. Still, by way of excess of care one can instal a couple of batteries. Gunboats and *chasse-marées* would never venture to sail past the Needles between Hurst Castle and Worsley Tower. If the enemy's flotilla got into this inner roadstead to take the island in reverse on its northern shore, it would be crushed by the Portsmouth ships. The Isle of Wight thus is proof against attack; Newport is its natural place of arms. The old Carisbrook Castle might with advantage be restored. Three signalling stations suffice to announce the enemy's movements, one at Foreland, the second at St. Catherine's Tower and the third on the Highdown west of Freshwater. East of the Isle of Wight lies Halling [Hayling] Island, which possesses four isolated batteries from East Stoke to the Passage House (Portsmouth Ferry), and is unassailable with help from Portsmouth and Chichester. If the enemy ventured there and managed to gain a footing, he would be shut in and starved into surrender. From the point of Hurst Castle, west of Isle of Wight, to Christchurch [Hengistbury] Head a few well-placed batteries suffice, with the Portsmouth navy, to prevent all landing. Warren Hill deserves to be fortified.

One cannot entertain the idea of effecting a landing of any consequence in Hampshire, and even granted it succeeded, the 1779 project shows that obstacles would have to be encountered. The required marches would form part of the great defensive war away from London, which could be reached from Hampshire only by the Basingstoke or by the Guildford road.

I do not believe that the enemy can ever have the temerity to attempt an invasion between Portsmouth and Plymouth for three reasons: (1) The expedition could only start from Cherbourg or Brest. If it left from Cherbourg it would have too long a passage across the Channel

between Cherbourg and the bay formed by Portland Bill and Start Point, and would be picked up on the way by the guardships of Portsmouth, Torbay, Jersey and Guernsey; (2) if the invader landed anywhere along this great bay, he would have to march right across England in all its breadth against the whole nation in arms, and would be beaten, cut up and annihilated; (3) the division of troops embarked at Cherbourg, which can be termed the left wing of Buonaparte's army of invasion, is too weak to operate so far off its centre, collected between Dunkirk and the Somme, and its right, which starts from Holland.

If the expedition left from Brest, it would be escorted by the men-of-war now blockaded in that port; and then the English squadrons from Plymouth and Portsmouth would pounce upon it and Buonaparte would lose at one blow both his fleet and its convoy.

JERSEY AND GUERNSEY

These two islands make the despair of France at the beginning of every war by their very active privateering, which at once proceeds to seize a large number of vessels and cut all communications and destroy all traffic between the Channel ports, ere France has had time to take the necessary steps to ensure due naval protection for coasting traders. During the progress of the war this coastwise trade can only be carried on by convoys that are always hampered and often attacked and captured by guardships of the islands. The French can utilize for escorting these convoys only corvets, cutters or gunboats, which lead them along from bay to bay without losing touch with the coast. Even this precaution is not enough, and if one or two frigates are added to strengthen the escort then they are promptly captured, and expose the convoy to fire and destruction, as I witnessed in 1778, when Admiral Arbuthnot burnt a convoy in the roads of Cancale, and sailed off with the escorting frigate, "La Belle Poule."

France can only attempt to seize these islands at the outset of a war, before they have received their armament. So soon as the measures for defence are taken, the attack becomes too difficult: the expedition would cost more than it can well be worth. At least 10,000 men would be required, and men-of-war in proportion to the armed vessels which the English have in station in time of war, and that number varies unknown to the French. Cornet Castle in Guernsey and St. Helier's Castle in Jersey are almost impregnable. The French could only blockade or storm them by sea if they held the mastery of the Channel. Then, of course, they would have weightier operations to attend to, and would not fritter away their resources upon a couple of puny rocks.

Inured as they are to braving the dangers of the sea, the island population are very hardy and bold, and constitute a militia of trained and disciplined good shots, who would be equal to repelling, almost unaided, an enemy that had set foot upon their soil. Their attachment to the English Crown is very strong and commensurate with their interest. Good neighbours in time of peace, having even close relations through smuggling with the natives of the Norman and Breton coasts hard by, they become most dangerous foes as soon as war breaks out. Or rather they are always in a state of war, now with the customs officers of both kingdoms and then with the French navy. Such a population adds to the natural strength of these islands. The fortifications which, according to the map of 1783, have been erected at all landing spots in Jersey, and which, no doubt, have been augmented and perfected since, render it quite unassailable even without the naval defences always in station there.

Being commandant [governor] of Cherbourg,[1] and fore-

[1] Dumouriez was appointed to the command of Cherbourg at the end of 1777 (see *ante*, chap. II), and entered upon his duties in January, 1778. But he had for some years previously been entrusted with missions along the

seeing [already] in 1776, that England's quarrel with America, in which we had meddled only too greatly, would very soon draw us into a war, I gathered all the information I could procure respecting these two islands, but especially Jersey, which lay nearer to my post of command. I deemed it easier to reach than Guernsey, which would have entailed a combined expedition by land and sea, prepared at very great expense, and all the difficulties belonging to mixed expeditions, which always fail in France, thanks to the perpetual discord between the royal army and navy.

Another inducement to simplify this expedition was secrecy, which I deemed indispensable to a happy issue, for my opinion was and still is that Jersey can be captured only at the beginning of a war, and that by surprise and a bold *coup de main.*

During the winter of 1777–8, when war was declared, I proposed to seize Jersey, by means of an expedition of 1500 men from the Cotentin garrisons, starting from Granville. We were to leave Granville one winter's night and muster in *chasse-marées* at the isles of Chausey, which afforded good anchorage, under the escort of four gunboats and two privateers from Granville. These were to take up a position before the castle of St. Helier, whilst 1200 men, escorted by two gunboats, were landing at St. Clement's Bay, south-east of St. Helier, and two more gunboats were making a feint by debarking 300 men in St. Brélade Bay.

There were then in St. Helier's roads more than 150

Channel coast, and had no doubt long laid his schemes. ". . . Dumouriez, who had foreseen that the American War would not fail to embroil France and England very soon, had added to it ['Report on Cherbourg as a New Naval Harbour, 1776'] a discourse upon this war, and the measures for collecting in a month the vessels needed to take over 50,000 men to England." (*Vie et les Mémoires du Général Dumouriez*, per MM. Berville and Barrière. Paris, 1822.)

French prizes, and in the island over 1500 seamen prisoners belonging to the said vessels. I had arranged to take 2000 muskets with me for arming these prisoners after liberating them, and to attach them to companies of regular infantry, as these were armed, in order to prevent their yielding to the excesses of a disorderly troop, whilst waiting to return to their respective ships, the rigging of which had been taken on shore. There were then in the island no regular English troops, no single battery in its place and no militia embodied.

My plan for a surprise attack was adopted, but was entirely altered. *Firstly*, I was excluded from its performance, under the very specious pretext that I was required at Cherbourg, the roadstead of which I was then fortifying as a preliminary to the commencement of the great works then still dimly projected. In vain I pointed out that, this expedition being but a *coup-de-main*, would entail an absence of but a week or two at the outside, whether it met with success or with failure. The project was given the Prince of Nassau to carry out, whose audacity was worthy of such an enterprise. But unfortunately he was in command of a newly-raised legion, consisting of ne'er-do-wells [galley birds]. It was to these that this bold attempt was entrusted, and it was looked upon as merely a filibustering raid, in which troops of the line could not be compromised, though, to be sure, there was need of order, precision and discipline if it was to meet with success. *Secondly*, the starting-point was altered and the means of transport changed: St. Malo was decided upon, and by way of escort two frigates were added under the command of a Captain Champberbrand, which at once set up the customary dissensions between the naval and military authorities. *Thirdly*, having altered the starting-point they naturally shifted the place of landing, which was fixed for the great bay of St. Ouen, from whence the island would have to be

crossed in its entire breadth to reach St. Helier. The legion would have got there in the greatest disorder, for not a single company of these undisciplined looters could have been kept in hand whilst passing through the well-appointed homesteads along the road.

The Prince of Nassau started under these unfavourable auspices and landed unopposed in St. Ouen's Bay, but whilst his troops were forming on the beach, upon the appearance of a few natives on the neighbouring heights, the naval captain sent him a message that he could not keep his anchorage nor give him any support. The Prince, after much disputing, was compelled to re-embark and the expedition failed.

The English Government dispatched a Scotch regiment to St. Helier and erected a few batteries in St. Ouen's Bay, but it took no further precautions, regarding this fruitless attempt as the last ever likely to be made. Whereupon the Prince of Nassau sold his legion to the Prince of Luxemburg, who gave the command of it to a daring and ingenious individual of the name of Rullecourt. The latter turned his attention again to an attack upon Jersey, and adopted my discarded plan. He started with his legion from Granville and, after a delay of a couple of days at the Chausey anchorage, his rallying-point, landed at night, on the eve of Twelfth Night, 1779, at St. Clement's with some 800 men, and marched so speedily at daybreak to St. Helier that he surprised the lieutenant-governor still in bed. He could have entered the castle with the fugitives, but was lost through over-confidence. The major in command of the regiment hastily collected it on the heights, attacked Rullecourt, who was killed in the market-place, and forced his troops to surrender. The island owed its safety to this brave major, who, I think, was named Pearson. As a matter of fact, the second division of the legion, 700 strong, under the command

of a lieutenant-colonel, never landed at all, and was thus in part the cause of the loss of its colonel [Rullecourt] and the failure of the expedition, which had had the advantage of surprise, though its preparations had lasted two months in no great secrecy.

I have cited this project only because it suited the age in which it was devised, as its execution proves. Rullecourt would have succeeded had he been in command of a troop of regulars and possessed more experience and less confidence, and especially if he had been backed up by his lieutenant-colonel. Such an attempt can no longer be made nowadays. Jersey cannot be surprised, still less Guernsey. A big expedition would be necessary, and I do not credit Buonaparte with any intention to undertake it. He is reserving his great resources for England and Ireland, and it is in London or in Dublin that he flatters himself he will embody Jersey and Guernsey in his empire, by means of the treaty he will claim to dictate.

EXAMINATION OF PORTS AND HARBOURS WHERE THE FLOTILLAS INTENDED FOR THE INVASION OF ENGLAND MAY ASSEMBLE AND START FROM

The defence of England must needs include a scheme for the destruction in the enemy's own waters of the means he shall have got together for his invasion, and so the following section is a branch of the work I have been commissioned to undertake by the English Government.

All the troops intended for the invasion of England constitute a great army, whose right wing is collecting in the ports and roadsteads of the Meuse and Scheldt, whose centre in those of Picardy and Flanders, and whose left wing is in those of Normandy, from Havre to Cherbourg. I will examine in that order these ports and roadsteads to see if the detachments of small craft there mustered can

be severally destroyed on the spot, and Buonaparte's day-dreams thus broken beforehand.

The vessels allotted to the right wing of the army of invasion are being built, equipped and collected in the Meuse and Scheldt. These two rivers are protected by the isles of Zeeland from all attack. Heading them lies Walcheren, sufficiently detached from the others to be open to seizure and occupation by English forces. It seems strange that such an expedition has repeatedly been talked about, and yet that during ten years of war it has never been attempted.

Walcheren is the key to Holland, and hence to the Low Countries, and its occupation by England has always been a matter of the utmost importance. By holding it she would become possessed of all military and political means for abetting the discontent of the Batavians and Belgians, and by a counter-stroke of the unfortunate and exasperated peoples of the banks of the Rhine, between the Meuse and the Moselle, for gradually arousing the Swiss and the disaffected Piedmontese and Italians, for rousing the King of Prussia from his apathy, and the Emperor of Austria from his stupor, and finally for setting up, without expense, brick by brick, a continental diversion which would set Hanover at liberty, light up a general war and rendering Buonaparate odious to France, revive the spirit of royalism and restore the ancient monarchy, without which no solid peace is ever to be looked for. Besides these advantages accruing from the occupation of Walcheren, there is the more directly immediate one of discharging all the paraphernalia of war that Buonaparte is collecting in the Meuse and Scheldt for his great expedition. It is a material interest which must be duly considered and couched as one of the branches of the defence of England.[1]

[1] In this eloquent passage we have, in all probability, the true genesis of the Walcheren expedition of six years later, which, if vigorously and intelligently carried out, might have realized the hopes of Dumouriez.

The French are very jealous on this point, and are giving it their most careful attention. They have made an entrenched camp holding 15,000 to 18,000 men, close to Flushing, presumably intending this force for the protection of the island. The greater the importance the French invest it with, the more eager must England be to occupy it, by storming it with a force proportionate to the defenders, i.e. 25,000 or 30,000 men if there are 15,000 to oppose. It would be a bold stroke, and if successful would change the whole face of the war and of the political situation. I fancy that this project could be veiled under the show of sending great succours to Portugal, or of seizing Sicily or Belle Isle or the island of Ré, or attacking some point or other of the French coast under pretext of reviving royalism. I think a descent upon Walcheren would be resisted, and would be costly, but that it might meet with success.

I am not now aware—in 1803—if there has ever been put before the Government a plan respecting Walcheren, but I think that if one or more exist they must be studied with scrupulous care, with the desire of carrying the one or the other into execution, unless proved impossible. Nieuwport and Ostend can provide a few flat-bottomed boats and gunboats or receive such vessels by the canals and pass them on to Dunkirk along the coast or by the Furnes Canal, but they are not strictly rallying-points and no useful attempt can be made against these harbours.

Dunkirk roadstead is a collecting-spot for all the Belgian boats that are not sent to the Scheldt at Antwerp to form part of the right wing of the expeditionary force. At low tide the roads may be attacked. If the flotilla had left the harbour to line up outside, the boats might be sunk, burnt and seized without being protected by the forts, and even if the English were caught by the tide during these operations, they would have time to complete them, seeing that confusion would be made

worse confounded by the retreat of the flotilla, which would crowd into the long narrow fairway of the harbour, and failing to enter it in any great quantity would lose the bulk of its boats right and left along the strand. Calais is too small a port to serve as anything but a temporary refuge for ships under pursuit passing by from north-east to south-west or vice versa. It offers no scope for a muster and deserves no expedition by land or sea.

Boulogne is more interesting. Like the rest it is a tidal port, formed by the Liane and stretching along the lower town. The interior is well defended on the east by the Tour d'Ordre, on the west by the fort of Chatillon, and in between by the batteries that must have been placed on the dunes commanding the harbour. All the projectiles that one may throw into the roadstead or the port will cause more fear than damage, and will fall rather upon the town than the harbour, which is at no point narrowed, but follows, on the contrary, the bends of the river.

The flotilla is to muster in the St. Jean roadstead, and it is there, when formed up in line, that it must be attacked. If Lord Nelson had had fire-boats with him when he made his attempt, approaching it as he did at low tide, not one single vessel would have escaped, for no battery protects this outer and open roadstead. The St. Jean roadstead is sheltered from the east to the north-east by the height of Ordre, which stretches to Winville; on the west by a rocky projection, exposed at low tide, named l'Heur, and in front by another projection named Linheur, lying at low tide under three or four feet of water. In 1775 the Marquis de la Rozière and I proposed to build on these two banks a jetty of some 1200 fathoms in length, which would have formed an inner roadstead of sufficient size to accommodate eight or ten vessels of the line, with a basin behind in the Capecure marshes, the entrance of which would have been under Chatillon, in-

stead of under the Tour d'Ordre, as is now the case. The left side of the great roadstead, in front of this artificial roadstead, could have been defended by a strong battery placed on the point of the Linheur mole.

There is some talk of the works the French are at present executing before Boulogne. I fancy that perhaps they are making this very jetty, in which case it will take several years to complete it, and it would always be advantageous to hamper the work. Meanwhile the St. Jean roadstead, despite its risks, is the most central and convenient rallying-spot for the centre of the expeditionary force, and it seems that it has been duly selected. I consider that if the time of the muster is known with accuracy the flotilla could be burnt in the roads. There it would be caught between the assailant and the coast batteries, which it would mask. This roadstead being open south-west to north-east by north is untenable in strong westerly winds, which are periodic and constant for six weeks in winter, whilst the easterly winds are more variable and short-lived in the Channel.

A *coup de main* against Boulogne would be bold and would need over 6000 men. These could land at the foot of the cliff between Ordre and Winville, one league to the north-east of the town. But on the other side it is defended by the fortified "upper town," which is proof against sudden attack, and by Mount St. Lambert, which has surely been strengthened.

If a landing were effected to the south-west of Boulogne the force would be exposed to the fire from Chatillon and from Renard Mill, which doubtless has been fortified. It would have in front the River Liane, which certainly is fordable at low tide, but the assailant would be exposed to the fire from the upper town, the front of which rises above the lower. On that side one could not have so much ground to cover, as landing might be made within half a league of the town; but Boulogne and its environs are

doubtless held by numerous troops, and retreat would be very difficult unless from the very start the Chatillon and Renard forts could be stormed; thence the re-embarkation thus supported would be perilous, even then being covered by the fires of the Tour d'Ordre, the upper town and the batteries set up along the lower town. True, one could do much damage if successful, but it would be at the cost of many men. It would consequently be more prudent to wait till the flotilla was in the roads and attack it at low tide. Then its destruction would be assured, and the coast batteries would no longer count, being masked by the flotilla itself.

From Boulogne on to St. Valéry-en-Somme are only a few small tidal ports at the mouths of rivers. Before the mouth of the Somme is an insignificant roadstead, formed by the Hurel bar. At the entrance of the Somme is the port of Crotoy which might provide not a rallying-place, but a refuge for a small part of the flotilla. One might from time to time pay a visit to the Somme and burn what vessels chance had collected there; but it is not a case for a landing, the object being too unimportant to risk the slightest discomfiture.

Cayeux, Treport and the town of Eu are of no interest. Dieppe Harbour is too small for a muster and too well guarded, especially in the west, to be attacked—no descent need be thought of. St. Valéry-en-Caux, Fécamp and Etretat call for no visit, being useless for rallying purposes.

The mouth of the Seine, from Quillebœuf to Harfleur on the right bank and at Harfleur on the left, gives scope for a very big muster. During the American War the English fleet anchored off Harfleur to shell Havre. They might do that again in case of an assemblage and attack and pursue it into the river without having much to fear from the Havre and Harfleur fires. The Bay of Caen, and as far as La Hogue roads, has only a few small tidal

ports impossible for a rally, not even at Colleville or Port-en-Bessin. It is a pity the English no longer occupy the St. Marcouf Islands, which were very useful during the war as a station for light craft and for cutting communications between Havre and Cherbourg, and diminishing and rendering useless the excellent roads of La Hogue. It would perhaps be advisable to seize St. Marcouf Islands once more and resume this station.[1]

Cherbourg is the best rallying-point on the Channel coast. It has a spacious basin, with a still larger harbour in front of it. This basin, being provided with flood-gates, can hold over one hundred and fifty *chasse-marées*, which may always be kept afloat for any emergency. The outer harbour is an excellent tidal basin capable of containing half as many again. Before it lies a well-appointed roadstead, protected by a submarine jetty with two openings. That on the east side is guarded by an impregnable fort, on Pélee Island, and that on the west side by the Querqueville Fort. Its anchorage can still be diminished by lining up behind Querqueville in a diagonal drawn to Homet Fort on the south-west.

The English frigate "Minerva," lately pursuing some gunboats into this roadstead, grounded on the jetty and stuck fast. It was got off by the French at high tide and brought back in triumph into the port.[2] This little misadventure should teach prudence in case one contemplates attacking a flotilla in the roads. One might bombard it from an anchorage at the foot of the outer slope of the mole, and there one would still be within good range of

[1] See *Napoleon and the Invasion of England*, Vol. I, p. 98 and p. 249. Some important information on this subject will be given in the second edition.

[2] In Mr. Broadley's collection of MSS. is the diary kept during eight years by William Sweeting, a first class boy on board the ill-fated *Minerva*, who, along with Captain Jahleel Brenton and the whole of the rest of the crew, became prisoners on July 2nd, 1803.

the bombardment, by crowding into the centre to avoid the fire of Pélee Island, Homet and Querqueville forts. Cherbourg is in no ways fortified, but it would be very imprudent to attempt a landing. It could be effected on the left, outside the roads beyond Querqueville, further than St. Anne's Cove, towards Viville and Ormonville, nearly at the same point selected by the English in 1758 for their landing. Now, however, they would find troops there in abundance and the whole country in arms. They could never reach Cherbourg, even if they entered it. They could neither besiege the forts nor penetrate into the roads they dominate. Retreat would be easily cut off and the whole force perish or be captured.

Between Cherbourg and St. Malo there are only a few small fishing coves, with the second-rate harbour of Granville. They are of no interest from our point of view. The roadstead of Cinente is open, and its left is covered by the Rimains Fort. Its right is unprotected, and if the French (?) were rash enough to land troops there the small Jersey squadron, which would be at once apprised of the fact, would be equal to going and burning, stranding or capturing the vessels. St. Malo is a very convenient tidal port, and its roadstead is well guarded: a muster of ships can be made at Dinard, Solidon, Tallards, and even in the river; and one may keep afloat in the roads in all security. A landing upon the coast would be very risky. Between St. Malo and Brest there is no point that can be considered at all suitable for an assemblage of ships. All the Breton ports are too distant, and the Channel is too broad, for them to serve for an expedition of boats.

Brest is well known. If an expedition were fitted out there it could only be with transports intended either for Ireland or for Torbay, which would be remote from the operations of the three sections of the great army.

It is the duty of the Channel Fleet to keep watch upon the Brest armament, and to make no mistake as to its

destination, which could easily be ascertained if a convoy was added to the men-of-war. M. de la Rozière has made Brest proof against all attack by means of the entrenched camp above Penfelt and by the surrounding forts. At least 50,000 men would be required to storm it, and the French would have to be too busy elsewhere to collect a sufficient force to raise the siege, an unlikely contingency during the course of this war.

From this examination it stands demonstrated that the only real rallying-points for the three sections of the great army intended to invade England in small craft, are the Scheldt and Meuse for the right wing, Boulogne roads for the centre, and Cherbourg Roads for the left wing, and that the further the expedition be extended outside of these three points the less strength and cohesion would it possess. The operations of the right wing can only be counteracted by the occupation of Walcheren, which acts as the barrier to the setting out of the collected craft. That occupation would entail other consequences of an advantageous nature which would change the face of the war and render it general and continental. The expedition of the centre can only be stopped by attacking and destroying the flotilla in the roads, a performance sufficiently easy and safe if carried out betimes and with adequate means. The left wing can be paralysed only by bombarding and destroying with fireships the flotilla gathered together in Cherbourg roads. So we may conclude that in order to checkmate the schemes of Buonaparte one must rely chiefly upon the attack on Walcheren, if plans sufficiently suitable can be devised for that end; and that any other less important landing, besides a considerable risk, would only put in confusion one branch of the general attack, which could always be carried out from the Meuse and Scheldt, even if the Boulogne and Cherbourg forces were destroyed, whilst it would fail all along the line if, by seizing Walcheren, the English were to shut up the Meuse and Scheldt.

EXAMINATION OF WESTERN PORTS WHENCE THE IRISH EXPEDITION MAY START

This survey begins with Brest. I am not aware if preparations for embarking troops are being made there at present. If so, I should look upon any such muster as a reserve intended to act separately before or after the others, under escort of the fifteen vessels of war now blockaded, which might be set free owing to physical causes that might render the blockading station untenable during the winter, or owing to the arrival of a squadron from Ferrol, Cadiz, or even the Mediterranean that would threaten Ireland, compel the Channel Fleet to raise the blockade and go out to meet it. The reserve leaving Brest may have [one of] two destinations: (1) Ireland, attacking it at some other spot than that chosen by the army corps leaving from Spanish and apparently Portuguese ports, or as a reinforcement for that corps; (2) a descent in one of the harbours of the great bay lying between Start Point and Portland Bill, such as Dartmouth, Torbay, Weymouth, Exmouth, Lyme, etc., etc., threatening Portsmouth and Plymouth equally, and enticing into that part of the country the troops from the north and the west of England, in order to prevent their succouring Ireland. The above diversion would be all the better planned for the fact that the right wing of the great army would hold in check and suspense from Holland all the east coast, unless England intended to seize Walcheren, whilst the centre and the left wing threatened as ever the south coast.

One must bear in mind that unless the British Government succeeds in diverting a portion of the French armies into the prosecution of a continental war, Buonaparte can allot 150,000 men for the invasion of England, whereof 100,000 for the great army and 25,000 each for Ireland and a Brest reserve. England has enough naval resources to cope with the reserve

expedition from Brest, whether destined for Ireland or the south-west of England. Her joint squadrons at the mouth of the Channel will always be stronger than any leaving Brest, the west of France and Spanish and Portuguese ports, supposing Buonaparte ventured to join forces in order to make a concerted attack. But he will never dare expose his navy and that of his allies to destruction at one blow. He will divide the whole force into two expeditions. Hence the Brest squadron and the convoyed reserve must be closely watched by a sufficiently strong squadron to crush them and to follow them and everywhere to engage them, or at least to force them to return to port without having done anything.

The other portion of the Channel fleet will no doubt have the duty of preventing Buonaparte throwing an army upon Ireland from Spain or Portugal. I will not further examine the western ports of France, seeing that as they lie outside the Channel there can be no question of fitting out flotillas open to destruction in their own roadsteads. If vessels of war should leave Rochefort or Lorient, and transports Nantes, La Rochelle and Bordeaux, it can only be in small numbers to join the armaments from Spain and Portugal.

I am too sensible of the trust reposed in me by the [English] Government, and I am too *eager* to deserve it more and more, not to declare to them with the most absolute truthfulness that all the reflections based upon this work of mine have forced upon me the rather grievous conviction that England's greatest peril is Ireland. One cannot blink the fact that, despite the utmost vigilance, it is well-nigh impossible to prevent an invasion of the western and northern coasts of that island, whose inhabitants are disaffected and rebellious. If such invasion is accomplished one must expect civil war, which would not only strengthen the enemy at his landing spot, but would occupy all over the island, and in Dublin itself, the avail-

able British troops. If the invading army is over 20,000 strong it will make rapid strides, for no such number of English regulars can be brought up against it, and no great trust can be put in the Irish militias. Further, a certain number will have joined the ranks merely to procure arms, and will go over to the rebels at the moment of upheaval. The remainder, given the uncertain issue of so terrible a civil war, will act without spirit, so as to reserve themselves a way out—to peace if the French gain the upper hand. The Irish militiamen and volunteers are not as fearless and patriotic as similar troops in England; and pre-occupied by its own danger, England will perhaps not be able to send over sufficiently great and prompt assistance to stem the flood of rebellion—and as soon as its effects are beginning to be felt it will be too late. I will not hide the fact that if the French land over 20,000 men in Ireland the chances will be with them rather than with the English, and that if England commits herself to a system of purely defensive warfare she may lose Ireland. If that misfortune befell her, the latter would turn to a new and nearer centre of hostilities, which would envelop England by exposing her western-northern shores to constant danger from that very quarter which at present serves as a bulwark. Lastly, the loss of Ireland would entail frightful consequences for England herself. I conclude, therefore, that it is of the most vital urgency to prevent all possibility of a French embarkation in Spanish and Portuguese ports: and *to compass this Portugal must be rescued.*

[It will be recalled that] the option of resistance or submission on the part of the Electorate of Hanover was left for the Regency itself, [with the result that] it has been invaded, and that Buonaparte has saddled it with the upkeep of 25,000 troops, and levied tribute of specie, horseflesh and ship's timber. [Likewise] if the Portuguese Government are left to decide their country's fate themselves they will look upon it as abandoned by England, and

they will receive unresistingly the French soldiers, supply the sinews of war, and the vessels and transports for embarking these alien troops forming the chief portion of the army of invasion of Ireland (the balance taking ship at Ferrol or in the western ports of France), and the Spanish and the Portuguese squadrons will constitute the escort of that great convoy. The Court of Lisbon can remain neutral only just as long as it suits Buonaparte: so a decision must be come to forthwith and the enemy forestalled.

If Portugal called upon us the objection may be raised, "we should be ready to protect her." But Portugal *cannot* call upon you, for such a step would ruin her hopelessly in French eyes; and your interests at stake are far too great for you to tarry for that application, as you might during ordinary war-times. But place Portugal once in a state of defence, and you are masters of the fate of Spain. With various means to hand for annihilating the Ferrol and Cadiz armaments, you have nothing more to fear for Ireland than the Brest expedition, which you can all the better keep under observation. "But," it may be added, "if we undertake to support and rescue Portugal we shall have to send an army thither, and we have not sufficient forces at our disposal." Well, if that course was absolutely incumbent upon you, you would have to make up your minds to prepare for it, rather than await passively a certain attack upon Ireland, whose safety depends on the step you take. But that course will *not* be imperative; for Portugal possesses 40,000 troops of the line and as many militia, all good of their kind; the country is suitable for a protracted and stubborn defence; and the sea approaches are open for assistance of all sorts. Only you will have to send money, a commander of ability and repute, and a sprinkling of officers.

To sum up. The Island of Walcheren is the *ægis* and the chief portal of the Army that is to invade England,

and its capture must be attempted. Lisbon will be the central point for the invasion of Ireland, and Portugal, left to herself, be forced to submit to the Law. The armament [of Bonaparte] against Ireland will be more than doubled by the accretion of the Portuguese Navy and sinews of war. This branch of the attack must be lopped off by putting Portugal in a position to defend herself. Portugal must be looked upon as the outwork covering Ireland: which outwork must be stubbornly defended to prevent the enemy reaching the vulnerable spot.

So I have had to treat the subjects of Walcheren and Portugal as essential portions of the outer defensive: and no one can look upon all I have advanced in relation thereto as foreign to the work that is imposed upon me.

DORSET[1]

The three counties of Dorset, Devon, and Cornwall, situated in the south-west and west-south-west of England, form an *ensemble* for defensive and field warfare which the eye can easily grasp, as one reflects upon the shape of that peninsula. The county of Dorset, which links it with the inland counties, is an important one to defend, according to all the rules of the art, foot by foot and with exceeding stubbornness. The aim of a landing upon the

[1] A special interest attaches itself to Dumouriez' remarks about Dorset, the possible invasion of which is fully discussed and illustrated in the various editions of General Lloyd's *Political and Military Rhapsody* (see 6th edition, 1803, pp. 38–40 and 56–7). At page 147 the editor alludes to the "notorious and sagacious Dumouriez," appreciative "of the difficulties attending an invasion of England, without the previous possession of Flanders and Holland." Between 1789 and 1805, George III visited Weymouth no less than fourteen times, and while there evinced a constant personal interest in all defence projects (see *ante*, chap. IX). The part played by Dorset during the Great Terror is very fully described in the pages of *Napoleon and the Invasion of England*. One of the first practical schemes of national defence was that for which Mr. Moreton Pitt, M.P., and Mr. Clavell, the High Sheriff, were jointly responsible. See that work, Vol. I, pp. 107–8.

Dorset coast would be only to establish an army at a spot threatening Portsmouth and Plymouth equally. This army would have to reach a large total, or else it would be easily defeated by the joint forces of the three great camps of Southampton, Dorchester and Exeter, which would act as rallying points for all the troops coming from the interior to repel this invasion.

If the enemy had designs upon Dorset these would be contingent upon some great diversion deemed necessary to aid a great invasion carried out in Ireland, or upon hopes of internal troubles and private intelligences, which is an improbable case. Without either of the above motives the enemy's presence there would be foolhardy and easily punished. The neighbourhood of Portsmouth and Plymouth, the naval station of Torbay, the quantity of ports, such as Poole, Weymouth and Lyme, provide a formidable naval defence between Portsmouth and Plymouth which should be enough to stop all attempts at landing.

Dorset is divided in its length by a range of hills running east to west. The Avon flows north to south, the Stour in a diagonal from north-east to east-south-east, and the Piddle and Frome in the same direction. The Avon forms a flank line which would stop the enemy's march on Hampshire, and which, if it had overcome the first obstacle, would put him ill at his ease between it and the hills and the Test or Southampton River. The Stour, Piddle and Frome provide three lines of defence between which the ground rises in amphitheatre and presents strong positions and camps already marked out and easy to entrench, which could hold the enemy long in check and by means of which he could be outflanked, surrounded and denied either progress or retreat. Between the isle of Portland and Weymouth the coast is cut up with downs, as in Sussex between Pevensey and Brighton, whereon may be established the same close vertical defence between the

landing-points with even greater advantage. The places of arms in Dorset are Fordingbridge (?), Blandford and Evershot. The camps of the second line, disposed so as not to allow the foe to get in between the rivers whereon is based the defence, are (1) Ringwood, covered by the Avon, forming a triangle with Southampton-Romsey, to defend the passage of the Test and the Avon to even Salisbury and Winchester; (2) Wimborne Minster, with an entrenched post on Dodsbury, to prevent the enemy's passage of the Stour and his reaching Wiltshire *viâ* Cranbourne; (3) Bere Regis on the Piddle; (4) Dorchester, the camp of 1757; (5) Beaminster, with an entrenched post on Pilsdon Hill.

The camps of the first line are (1) Catherine Hill, occupying also Ramsden Hill above Christchurch; (2) Naked-Cross, before Newton, supporting Poole; (3) Wareham, between the Piddle and the Frome; (4) Corfe Castle, which must be well fortified; (5) Chaldon Hill; (6) Broadway; (7) Abbotsbury; (8) Bridport; (9) Catherstone, the pivot or *point d'appui* of mutual defence for Dorset and Devon.[1]

The immediate defence of the coast starts with Christchurch, which can be covered by an entrenched post on Warren Hill. From Christchurch to Poole is a heath following the coast line. Batteries may be placed at the mouths of the streams of Boscomb, Bourne and Alum, which cross this heath perpendicularly. This ground would be suitable for light artillery and cavalry between the Stour and Poole. A camp on Cloud's Hill covers Poole on that side and ensures the defence of that long heath. Two batteries marked on the map at Sandhill and Windpool, forming a triangle of fire with the castle of Brank-sea Island, are enough for the defence of Poole Harbour,

[1] The contemporary map showing the plan of defence adopted in Dorset during the Great Terror is now reproduced. There is a very interesting series of these maps to be seen in the Dorset County Museum at Dorchester.

with the addition of a few naval defences. A camp at Ballard's Down and a few cross batteries in Studland Bay, at Swanage and Durlston, can defend all anchorages from Poole Harbour to Durlston Head and St. Alban's Head.

Strong batteries at Egmore Point, Hencliff, Broadbench and Gadcliff would stop all partial descent on that coast. A small entrenched post is wanted at Flower-barrow, with batteries at Warbarrow and Arish Mill to defend Barrow Bay, and a battery for Lulworth Cove; one at Old Ringshead Chapel, and two on the flanks of Ringshead Bay. A strong battery at Hamcliff, taking in flank the Boat Cove and Sutton Cove; one entrenched camp on Jordan Hill. a battery at Melcombe turnpike; one on the point in front of Melcombe, crossing fire with that in front of port jetty; one at the Look-out and old Sandsfoot Castle repaired are indicated. Portland Castle restored, a camp at Easton, batteries at the King's Pier, New Pier and Dirtle Pier; the old Waikeham Castle fortified and also the head of Southwell village would defend all the eastern coast of the great bay to Portland Bill. The western shore of Portland is not open to invasion.

Even if the foe seized Portland he could get no further, nor cross the entrenched line drawn at the Passage-house: he would be hemmed in in the island, starved, blockaded by sea, and would be compelled to surrender in the absence of assistance, nor could he re-embark. The Chesil Bank covers the coast for sixteen miles and allows no landing as far as Bexington. There a small entrenched camp is needed at Abbotsbury Castle. There should be an entrenched post above Charmouth covering Lyme to the east; an entrenched head at Lyme with batteries behind the Cobb, in front of the Weir and on the Cobb itself.

These manifold defences suffice to protect the Dorset coast against all invasion, especially one on a large scale. If the enemy managed to land an army, it could be easily

checked by the three rivers Frome, Piddle and Stour, which form the almost invulnerable lines of defence in an exceedingly difficult country through which he could not penetrate into Hampshire, Wiltshire or Devonshire. The two flanks of the defence could close in upon his two wings. The Portsmouth and Plymouth squadrons would destroy his flotilla and his naval escort, and finally after perhaps some fatal progress he would be shut in and forced to lay down his arms.

SOUTH DEVON

South Devon for my purpose is divided from North Devon by a line drawn from Taunton through Tiverton, Okehampton and Lifton to the Tamar. This line gives us four places of arms, serving equally for the defence of the Bristol Channel and the Channel shores. The most important point to defend is Plymouth, which is very hard to attack in front or to turn, protected as it is on all sides by rivers, the passage of which can easily be disputed. The pivot of the whole defensive of the three counties now under consideration is Exeter. It is the rallying-point for all the forces intended to stop the enemy's occupation in case he had landed, either on the south coast between the Lizard and Hartland Point or on the north-west coast in the Bristol Channel.

The rivers dividing the particular defence of Devon are the Axe, the Otter and the Exe, which flow north to south; the Teign west to east; the Dart, the Avon, the Erme, the Plym and the Tamar north to south. The country is not very hilly in the south, but it rises to the centre and forms an extensive and very barren stretch of high ground named Dartmoor Forest, between Okehampton to the north, Bovey Tracey to the east, Brent to the south, and Tavistock to the west. Hence flow several rivers between the Exe to the east and the Tamar to the west,

to join the Channel. The two latter bound this barren waste on either side.

The camps of the second line are: (1) Karner Hill and Deary's Hill above Dalwood, occupying the great and little fort, and Membury Castle; (2) Broadhembury, with the fort in front of it; (3) St. Thomas', in front of Silverton; (4) Crediton; (5) Manaton, above Bowerman's Nose; (6) Brent; (7) Meavy, on the Plym. The camps of the first line are: (1) Colyton, on the Axe; (2) Ottery St. Mary, on the Otter, occupying the big height between this town and Sydbury; (3) the great camp of Exeter between Heavitree [Sowton] and Tawton; (4) Chudleigh, on Haldon Hill; (5) Ashprington [Ashburton], on the Dart; (6) Yealmpton; (7) Saltash in Cornwall, on the right bank of the Tamar.

The immediate coast-defence from east to west demands a battery before Risedown Chapel, two cross batteries each side of the mouth of the Axe, and one at Beer Head. The coast is rocky as far as Sidmouth, where two cross batteries are needed. A small camp on Passaford Height; a battery at Pleasure House; two at the Otter's mouth; a battery at West Down, flanking the coast on either side of the Shag Rock [are also wanted]. In addition, there should be one at Highland-Orcumb; a fortified front at Exmouth; batteries at Starcross, Wick [High Wick] and Dawlish Strand; and a fortified post on Little Haldon Hill [Shaldon]. No doubt the Tingmouth [Teignmouth] fort[1] will have been restored and batteries placed at Wen Cliff and Teignmouth Head [The Ness]. To complete the defence of the Teign a battery is needed at New Point; another before Gibles [Higher Gibles]; and two in Babbicombe Bay, one at Hilsea [Ilsham], another at Hope's Nose. Both land and sea defences are wanted

[1] The "ruins of a fort" are marked in Carr's map, 1807. To-day the lighthouse marks the spot, facing the Ness.

at Torquay. A small camp is needed between Cockington and Paignton, with batteries to Berry Head, where the old Danish castle may have been restored to protect Brixham Quay.

The two castles at the mouth of the Dart will have been restored, or at least that of St. Petroc; a battery before Stock Hemming; one at Blackpool, one at Street, one at Slapton Cellar, one at Torcross, one at Middlecombe; a small camp at Charleton; a battery in Salstone Island, one at Portlemouth, one at Scoble; a fortification on Bur Island, two cross batteries at the mouth of the Avon, and two at the mouth of the Erme. Cross batteries at the mouth of the Yealm and at Wembury. A battery at Freshwater, in Plymouth Sound; a camp at Maker, which the French wished to seize and fortify in 1779. They hoped to seize Mount Edgcumbe, which must be in a sufficient state of defence.

Though the right bank of the Tamar belongs to Cornwall, its defence should be mentioned here to complete that of Plymouth. It was in Cawsand Bay that the French intended to land, and the invasion was to embrace Rame Head and Queanna Points to Port Wrinkle. All this coast must be well provided with batteries and supported by the Maker and Saltash camps. If the enemy, in the unlikely absence of naval forces, were to land an army here, his march on Plymouth would be stopped by the Erny position, where the passage of the Tidy would be disputed him and Plymouth covered. Even if he had seized the whole peninsula between the Tamar and Seaton, one would have time to collect all the forces of the west to prevent him from storming Plymouth and penetrating across the hills of Truan Moor and Wildey Moor to the shores of St. George's Channel or those of the Bristol Channel, in the hope of communicating or acting concertedly with or even conjointly with the army already landed in Ireland.

NORTH DEVON

Okehampton is the place of arms. The camps of the second line are (1) Holsworth, (2) Chulmleigh, (3) Tiverton. Those of the first line are (1) Torrington, (2) Barnstaple, (3) North Molton. The immediate defence of the coast requires a battery before Welcomb, one at Hartland Quay, one in front of Berry, one at Hartland Point, two at Clovelly, the head of Clovelly fortified, an entrenched camp on Northam Height, a battery at Grawsand Hill, one at Appledore chapel, one at the quay here, one at the ruins of St. Anne's Chapel, one at Instow Point, one at Instow Quay, a small camp at Branton, a battery at Sauntons Downs End, one at Baggy Point, two cross batteries at Wollocomb Tracey, one at Morle Point, one at Bull Point, two at Ilfracombe, one at Killage Point, one at Hangman Hill, two at Combemartin, one at Trenterhow, one at Martinhow, one at Lynton, one at the old fort before Countisbury, and a small camp at Parracombe.

CORNWALL

Cornwall is very mountainous; its widest part between Plymouth and Kilchhampton is parted in two, east to west, nearly in the middle by a range of hills and uplands named Wildey Moor and Travan Moor, somewhat akin to Dartmoor in Devon, which likewise divides its defence into north and south. Between Fowey Bay in the Channel and Padstow Bay in the Bristol Channel, the country has its defence along the course of two rivers, the Fowey and the Camel, which, flowing in opposite directions, rise near Bodmin, a central point of the defence and the natural place of arms of the country. Bodmin and these two rivers form a line of defence: on one's right is the western part of Cornwall; between this line and Land's End, which rounds off the peninsula, the western portion is so

narrow that its defence, places of arms and camps can serve for either shore equally. The natural places of arms are St. Michael, Truro, Redruth, Trowan, Ludgvan and Sancreet (?). If the enemy had landed in force in this western part, the course of the Fowey and Camel and the position of Bodmin would prevent his crossing over into the eastern, in order to turn and take in reverse Plymouth and overrun Devon. Thus the place of arms at Bodmin merits a fortified camp, with the greatest care, being the pivot of the defence of the two parts of Cornwall. It is not probable that the enemy will attempt a descent in a country that is so remote from the Metropolis, so mountainous, so easy to defend, and so inaccessible to assistance from the continent, given England's enormous naval superiority, unless he already possessed a part of Ireland, whence he could draw relief and supplies, in order to conquer foot by foot the Cornish peninsula, and establish himself in it with the help of those very obstacles of nature which then would turn to his advantage. Of course if the French ever managed to invade Ireland and dismember it from the United Kingdom and arm it against England, and even if they had established themselves in the island without having reduced it entirely, and waged a long and doubtful warfare, supported by the rebellious spirit and race hatred of the Irish, then it would be incumbent upon the British Government to keep especial watch upon the three counties treated in this memoir; to strengthen their troops and naval defences and fortify their camps and coast defences, because a descent in one of the three shires, particularly Cornwall, would be a foolhardy and useless *coup de main*, but a diversion in accordance with the rules of real war, if no attempt was made to prevent it. There is only one camp of the second line between Bodmin and Looe at Liskeard. As we proceed further west the central places of arms named above serve as camps of the

second line for both shores. The camps of the first line on the south coast from Plymouth, or rather Port Wrinkle, to Land's End are: (1) Tresilgen on the Seaton, (2) Duloc, between the two branches of the Looe, (3) Lostwithiel on the Fowey, (4) Grampound, (5) Perranwortham, (6) Penryn, (7) Mawgan, (8) Lelant, (9) St. Buryan. The immediate defence of the coast from Port Wrinkle, where ends the special defence of Plymouth, starts with a battery at Downderry, two at the mouth of the Seaton, one at Hay, an entrenched head at East Looe, a battery at West Looe Point, a fort on Looe Island, batteries at the two points of Talland and before Port Allow, an entrenched head at Polperro, an entrenched line before Polruan, with two batteries at the two points of its bay, a battery at Combe, one before Lanlivet, one at the point of Pencarrow, two at the points of Fowey Harbour and the head of the town entrenched, a battery south of the little river of Menabilly to protect Fowey and Polkerris, a battery to the west of Hamland, a fortified head at Polkerris, a battery at the point of Killmarsh, one at the south-eastern point of Mersen, one south of Little Crinnis, one at Little Polmear, one before Penrice, one at Rape Haven, one at Blackhead, one at Pentuan, one at Port Shirlly, two at Mevagissey, one at Portmellin, one at Chapel Point, two at Gorran Haven, one in the small cove between Carnview and Deadman Point, one at Penna, one at Greerl Point, two at the entrance of Porthluny, two at the entrance of Porthollan, one before Trenusson, one before Porthloe, two before Caregloss and Pennare, one west of Pennare Point, one south of Gwendra, one before Carguzel, one at Polwaddens Point, one at Portscatho, one at the Greeb, one at the three points of St. Anthony, a small camp at Tregony to cover all this coast. The Carreg road requires a naval defence of two or three block-ships, supported by several gunboats, to defend St. Mawe's Creek and Falmouth roads,

a fort at St. Mawes, Pendennis Castle restored, two batteries at Swanpool, one at Pendennis Point, one at Mainporth, one at Trevose Point, one at Mawnan Point and a strong fort put into good condition, a battery at the Nare, one at Porthalla, one at Coverack Cove, one at Chynels Point, one at Pentboar Point, one at Caregboy, one at Polltessia, one at Cadgwith, one at Landwecknocke, and a small camp at Ruan major. From the Lizard to Land's End the first point open to a small descent (though with difficulty) is Trenance, where a battery is needed, one too at Growse Point, one at Gunwalloe, one north of Winnington, one at Burgess Point, two at Looe, and one at Pentire Point, one at Port Leven, one at Trewavas Point, one at Pentreath Point, one at Caddan Point, one before Perranuthno, St. Michael's Mount Fort in good condition, a battery at Longrock, one at Chyendower, the head of Penzance well fortified, as well as that of Newlyn, an enclosed battery on St. Clement's Isle, one at Mousehole, one at Exmorna Cove, one at Penberth, one at St. Leven, one at Rolisto, one at Land's End, one at Peden-men-due, three in Whitsand Bay. The coast we have just detailed presents from Plymouth to Falmouth two or three points where descent is possible, though difficult. From Falmouth to Land's End there is none but Mount's Bay, but the worst misfortune that could befall the French would be to venture into this part of the country, where they could take neither artillery nor supplies with them, and where the sturdy and savage inhabitants alone would suffice to check them and starve them in a short space of time. From Land's End no descent is possible before St. Ives Bay; a battery is needed at Cape Cornwall, one at Carridjack Castle, one at Pendeen, one at Morva, one at Poldear Cove, one at Gurnard's Head, one at Zennor Cove, one at Wicen Cove, one at Barallan Point, one at Aire Point, one at the point north of St. Ives. This fort and castle are in good con-

dition. Batteries at Trelyon, Gunwin, Trengweth Point, before Lelant, Rovier Point, the points north-west of Gwithyan, north-east of Godrevy, at Menadarna, two cross batteries at Portreath, two at Porttown, one at Newdons, two at Trevounance, two at Zwenrhail (?), a small camp at Perranrabuloe, two at Gannal Creek, one at Towanhead, two at St. Columb, two at Mawganport, two at Porthcathan, one at Trevose, one at Porthlead, one at Trevose, one before Permizzen, two at Stepperd Point and the Camel, as well as the Padstow, well provided with land and sea defences, on the right bank of the Camel running up towards the north-north-west the defence takes up two lines again as the peninsula broadens. There are two camps of the second line, Wadebridge, on the Camel, and Warbston. The camps of the first line are (1) Endelyon, (2) Camelford, (3) Lesneuith, (4) Jacobstow, (5) Treleigh, (6) Stratton, (7) Kilkhampton. The immediate coast defence begins on the right bank of the Camel, two batteries at the two points of Penrith, one at Portheath, one at Portquin, one at Port Isaac, one between Port Isaac and Tintagel Head, one at Arthur's Castle, two at Bassiney, one at Parrbury, one at Batreaux Castle, one at Bulen Point, one at Cambeak, one west of St. Gennis, one east of Cleave Bay, one west of Marram-church, three in a re-entering triangle at Budehaven, one at Stow River, one before Harscatt, and one west of Moorwinstow. We have treated this defence of Devon and Cornwall with as much detail as if an invasion was expected in that part, because it really did give ground for fear if the French, backed up by the Spanish and Portuguese naval forces, managed to strongly establish themselves in Ireland, if so, they would be masters of several Irish ports on the Bristol Channel, and they would be in a fit state to attack the south-west and west coasts of England; hence the main points of the defence should be marked out beforehand. But in the actual state of the war

this multitude of camps and coast batteries is only indicated for a future which in all likelihood will never exist. Cornwall and all the west coast on the Irish Sea are not open to a great invasion, which would fulfill no useful aim, hence the dispositions of defence may be limited to the strictly necessary ones for safe-guarding from attack, Looe, Fowey, Falmouth and Mount's Bay. The remainder may be reserved for a more threatening epoch should it ever come round. Not so with South Devon and Dorset, which may be attacked as a diversion to the Irish expedition just as Sussex was invaded by the Boulogne division as a diversion to the eastern expedition starting from Holland. This Dorset and Devon coast, between Plymouth and Falmouth, is less wild and rugged than that of Cornwall; an army once landed might maintain itself there, and it would menace at once the two great naval arsenals, Bristol and Liverpool, if their progress had not been checked beforehand, and it would wage with advantage a field warfare. But the proximity of these two great ports renders the execution of this invasion almost impossible, thanks to the superiority of the English Navy. Nevertheless, one must add the most vigorous kind of land defences, so that the naval forces can, if needed, proceed to any other point and not be chained down to this coast. This defence, by means of the perpendicular line of the rivers, gives us flanks on all points of descent, and by the cross line of the uplands and mountain ranges running east to west, offers natural barriers to the enemy's inland progress, whether to turn the defences of either or both harbours or to reach the shores of the Bristol Channel.

CHAPTER XII

SYNOPSIS OF DISPOSITIONS FOR THE DEFENCE OF WALES, THE WEST COAST OF ENGLAND AND SCOTLAND—PRINCIPALITY OF WALES.

I have merely performed my duty which prompts me to propose and adopt whatever measures might tend to security or promote the welfare and prosperity of this important place, as well as guard this country against foreign attack.—Letter from PRINCE WILLIAM FREDERICK OF GLOUCESTER in command at Liverpool, February 23rd, 1804.

WALES is so mountainous and so poor a country that the enemy would never have sufficient motive for a descent, unless the possession of Ireland enabled him to re-recruit adherents in Wales and by introducing the spirit of rebellion use it as a starting point for a march upon England through Herefordshire, Monmouthshire, and Gloucestershire. The province is too distant, too difficult to march in; too denuded of supplies and transport, and its mountain ranges are too close and frequent, offering too many lines of defence for any fear to arise, that even with the most favourable disposition of the natives, the enemy could make dangerous progress for England. I will divide the Principality into two parts, north and south, for my purpose, without troubling about the minor sub-divisions into counties.

SOUTH WALES

This part presents a group of mountains in its centre, which divide it into north and south. Its coasts are cut by

several rivers which rise in either spur of these mountains and flow in opposite directions. The southern belt of coast is well cultivated, and the canals offer scope for guerilla warfare. In the northern half the mountains are nearer the shore, the rivers shorten and flow into Cardigan Bay. This part is sparsely inhabited and without canals. The southern half requires two places of arms (1) Llandeilo Fawr, covered by a camp in the Black Mountains; (2) Carmarthen, covered by a camp at the confluence of the Towy and Gwili. The northern part wants two places of arms: (1) Haverford West; (2) Lampeter, covered by a camp on the North Hill. Among the coast defences that will be required between Milford Haven and Cardigan will be two batteries in Fishguard Bay. It is inconceivable that the French should have selected so absurd a landing point in the absence of a call or intelligence from the inhabitants.

NORTH WALES

North Wales is almost impenetrable to the enemy. Short rivers flow through narrow vales with a few townships backed by pathless inaccessible mountains. A few towns and villages placed at cross roads open or cut communications along several lines of natural defence to which art has little or nothing to add. The coasts are very hard to land on. There are four rivers on the western coast, and the Menai Strait which separates the Isle of Anglesey from North Wales forms a special line of defence in case the enemy, being master of Ireland, should seize Anglesey and there be blockaded and starved if he had not been previously driven out. An invading army [in North Wales] could neither subsist, nor march, nor set up magazines nor transport munitions and supplies across the mountains, where the inhabitants alone could stop its progress.

There are three very important places of arms:

(1) Montgomery, the most central position to which all roads lead; it can neither be turned nor stormed if a camp is placed on the Castle Hill between Montgomery and Llandyffil and the castle is fortified; (2) Llangollen on the Penybran height, fortifying the castle and making entrenched forts in front of Llandissilio; (3) Ruthin, easily defended by an entrenched camp on Llanfwrog to check the enemy if he landed between the Clwya and the Dee, and had stormed the camps of the first and second line. If Anglesey were seized by the enemy, camps at Carnarvon and Bangor would mark out the defence against attack from the island. A number of other camps are also indicated, but no work need be put into them unless there is certain proof that Ireland is to serve as the starting place for an invasion of Wales, which would always be imprudent, seeing that its utility can never outweigh its difficulties and dangers.

An outline of the coast defence from the Dovey to the Menai Straits begins with an entrenchment and batteries at Aberdovey Castle, and includes the restoration of Criccieth, a battery at the point of Pwllheli Harbour, the restoration of the old castle of Porthlinlleyn, batteries at Abermeney and at Belan forts to defend the Straits. From the north point of Menai Straits to the Dee a battery in front of Bangor at Capel Ogwen, one at Llandudno, two at Lydd Bay, and a small camp at Abergeley, with, in addition, naval defences for the Dee and the Bog Sands.

ANGLESEY

The Isle of Anglesey is sufficiently well populated and rich enough in cattle to merit a special defence. The natural place of arms is Beaumaris, with an entrenched camp on the hill to the west which dominates the town. A second entrenched camp should correspond with it at Llanerchymedd where all roads converge.

The coast defence starts at Llandwyn Abbey, which must be fortified with an auxiliary battery to the east on the sand-hills. A naval defence is needed in Beaumaris port to secure communications across the Straits of Menai by Bangor and Carnarvon, which are the two keys of the island, which could easily be retaken if seized by the enemy provided the heights of Beaumaris and the entrenched camp at Llanerchymedd were still held.

All the foregoing details of defence are conditional and will probably never need carrying out. If the enemy landed in Ireland and established himself there with the help of a general rebellion, the King of England would soon march there at the head of his army. In any case, England could rely on her naval forces, and so far from seeing her western shores threatened could dispatch from them the assistance needed by her faithful Irish subjects.

CHESHIRE

Cheshire is cut up by rivers and canals whose passage can be disputed if the enemy lands in force between the Mersey and the Dee. It would be easy, by means of these obstacles, to arrange several lines of defence to prevent him from penetrating into Lancashire, whither he might be lured by the prospect of sacking and destroying the manufactories of Manchester, and from debouching by Stafford upon the midland counties to march on London, or again, from turning the rivers Weaver and Mersey on his left, to make for and seize Liverpool. It is always in the very unlikely supposition of an emancipated Ireland, or at least held by the French, that the descent upon the Dee and Mersey peninsula can be attempted. With this supposition in mind, the defence of Cheshire would consist chiefly in the defence of that peninsula, bounded on the north-east by Frodsham and on the south-east by Chester.

The remainder of the defence of this county enters into the plans of a great inland war, in which all the advantages lie against the defenders of their own country.

The peninsula, fifteen miles long and six or seven broad, is cut lengthwise by high ground beginning at Buckford on the south-east and ending at the point of [Hoy]lake in the west-north-west. On either side lies a plain along the Dee to the south, and another along the Mersey to the north. Tarporley behind the peninsula is the place for a great camp where all assistance would be collected: it would form a line of defence between the Chester Canal in the south and the Weaver in the north. Frodsham, where a small entrenched camp should be made, could cover the right of this position and Chester its left. The camp of Tarporley could be perfectly well placed on the two heights of Luddington and Othington. A small camp at Blackford, covering Chester, and another at Woodchurch would support the defence of the two shores of the peninsula.

The immediate coast defence in the south begins at Chester, where the castle must be restored and the inner bank of the canal entrenched from Boughton to the confluence of the canal with the Dee and the Mersey: an excellent post could be made there by fortifying the point of Brewers-hall on the left of the Dee. Chester is a place of arms and a point of defence which should never be abandoned.

To the defence of the north coast along the Mersey must be added a formidable naval defence for Chester and Liverpool for the Isle of Man and Solebay to intercept the crossing between Ireland and the west coast of England.

The peninsula must be defended with the greatest obstinacy: it is almost unassailable with the support of the camp at Tarporley. If, nevertheless, this first position was carried, a second could be taken up behind the

Weaver with the right at Northwich and the left at Middlewich. The Chester position should be defended to the last, for it would serve as a *point d'appui* for all the troops coming from the south. Those from the east and south-east would collect at Nantwich and be covered by the Weaver and the Cheshire Canal: those from the north would post themselves at Warrington between the Weaver and the Mersey.

If the enemy, unable to penetrate into the Midlands in the direction of London, tried to advance on Manchester, the camps of Northwich and Middlewich should proceed to Altrincham to flank his march; the northern divisions would hold the position of Warrington on the Mersey and the southern ones would cross the Chester Canal and march to the enemy's rear to cut him off from his place of embarkation, whilst the Navy destroyed his flotillas. So the momentary success he had gained by forcing the Tarporley position would tell against him and would occasion his ruin.

LANCASHIRE

The defence of Lancashire falls naturally into four sections, between the five rivers, Mersey, Ribble, Lune, Kent, and Duddon. The Liverpool Canal is of no great military utility, presenting a line of defence only in small stretches. The hills are infrequent and not continuous between Liverpool and Manchester, but the ground offers several lofty groups, among which that of West Derby, ending in heights which present military positions, where cavalry and light artillery may be brought into action and made to check easily an invading army lacking these two sorts of arms.

The First Part, between the Mersey and the Ribble, is the most important part, containing Manchester and Liverpool, where all the interest of the county of Lancashire centres. Manchester is the place of arms of this

part. The place for a camp where assistance can be collected is the plain of Pendleton, the right and left of the camp resting on the two banks of the Irwell, and a line of outposts stretching from Clifton, through Pendleton to Eccles.

In case the enemy missed the invasion between the Mersey and the Ribble and came down on the right bank of the Ribble, the assembled troops would dispute the passage of that river from Walton, forming a great camp on Billington Hill and on the Pendle Hill Range: in this position one would make out yet further high positions in the rear to keep the enemy away from Manchester and Liverpool, covering both cities until assistance came up in sufficient numbers to surround and fight him. A defence along the front of Liverpool would be needed; its fort should be put in good condition. Gunboats would be required in the Mersey, a battery at the Mill before Bennington, a small entrenched camp on the Everton height, east of Liverpool, and a battery in front of Bootle. Of the remaining three parts, the defence of which is short and unimportant, the fourth, that between the Kent and the Duddon, is least open to invasion.

WESTMORELAND.

The defence of Westmoreland consists merely in preventing the enemy from penetrating by the Ken into Kendal, where besides he could neither sojourn nor subsist after having committed his acts of brigandage, and where he could not advance either in the direction of York or into Cumberland, the country being very mountainous and roadless. Kendal is the only place of arms. If the enemy penetrated so far positions could be taken up in the hills overlooking the valley: he could be checked at every step, turned and cut off from the sea by the flanks of Lancashire and Cumberland.

CUMBERLAND

This county presents many hills belonging to the great chain which separates Scotland from England, and narrow valleys cut up by many lakes and rivers which flow to the sea in a west and north direction between the Duddon and Solway Firth. This configuration makes the defence very narrow and very easy. It can be divided into four parts: (1) between the Duddon and the Eden, with a place of arms at Olpha; (2) between the Eden and the Derwent, with a place of arms at Keswick on the Derwent; (3) between the Derwent and the Wamford, with a place of arms at Ireby; and (4) between the Wamford and Solway Firth, with place of arms at Brampton.

The two essential towns for defence are Whitehaven and Carlisle. At the latter town, whose ramparts must be restored, at least with earthwork palisade, the castle must be fortified as well as the southern front which was formerly a citadel. The town must be isolated by digging a canal between the Calder and the Petrill. In front of Carlisle a redoubt is required on the Stanton Height. These small field fortifications are intended to serve as a support to the positions taken up by the troops and stop or check the approach to Carlisle.

SCOTLAND

In no case does Scotland run much risk of a great invasion by Bonaparte, because (1) an attack upon it would take him too far away from the real goal of the war, London, and would not be decisive; (2) supposing the difficulty of landing has been overcome, his army would find itself shut up without resources or supplies and cut off by the English Navy from all Continental assistance and all retreat; (3) the Scotch are the most likely soldiers in the British Empire to stop the French, thanks to their similar mode of fighting; (4) the north and south

of Scotland are impenetrable to an army landed in its centre; (5) supposing the enemy tried a descent in the Teith, or the Clyde, or the Tay, in order to reach Edinburgh or Glasgow, the two most important cities to safeguard, he would find collected for the defence of these three rivers all the land forces of this kingdom and a formidable naval defence prepared beforehand.

The defence of Scotland falls into three parts, south centre and north. The first part lies between the Tweed in the south-east and the Solway in the south-west, the Teith in the north-east and the Clyde in the north-west. The second lies between the Teith in the south-east, Clyde south-west, Murray Firth in the north-east and Loch Lyne in the north-west. The third lies between the Murray Firth in the south-east, Loch Lyne in the south-west and the Orkneys and North Sea in the north.

I. SOUTHERN SCOTLAND

This comprises thirteen counties in three groups: (1) Four seaboard shires on the east and north-east—Berwick, Haddington, Edinburgh and Linlithgow; (2) five seaboard shires on the north-west and west—Renfrew, Ayr, Wigton, Kirkcudbright and Dumfries; (3) four central shires—Lanark, Peebles, Selkirk and Roxburgh. The two first groups call for detailed defences; the third for none, seeing that it is too mountainous to harbour a foreign army and that it shows only a few roads on the sides of the Cheviots, whose defensive belongs naturally to that of the eastern and western counties.

FIRST GROUP

COUNTY OF BERWICK

I have said, in treating of the defence of Northumberland, that Berwick is the most essential point of communication between England and Scotland, and laboured the

necessity of making this city what it used to be—*a strong hold*—and defending it to the last. To secure this place, a camp is needed at Garnslow, at the confluence of the Tweed and Blackadder, and supported by a camp of the second line at Greenlaw, with a camp of the first line at Ayton, on the Eye.

If the enemy landed between Berwick and Coldingham, stormed and forced back the camp of Ayton, and, unwilling to hamper himself with the siege of Berwick, left it behind him, and tried to reach Haddingtonshire and thence the plain of Edinburgh, then the camp of Greenlaw would proceed to Edrom in order to defend the head of the mountain range which separates these two counties. There are only four roads over it—that of Cockburnspath, that of Douse, that of Channelkirk and the Roman road. He could be stopped at any of the passages he tried to force, and still more easily if he tried to force more than one. It is especially in this hilly district that the Scottish infantry would be at least a match for the French, thanks to its mode of combat. Meanwhile Garnslaw camp, reinforced by the troops of the northern counties of England, would dog his rearguard, and cut him off from the sea. The same movement would be made in the reverse direction if the enemy, afraid of boxing himself up in the Highlands, proceeded to besiege Berwick in order to get into the north of England.

HADDINGTONSHIRE

The place of arms is Haddington, with an entrenched camp north towards Park Abbey, a small camp of the first line in the heights of Oldhampstock, a second at North Berwick-law and a third at Preston Pans.

The defence of this county is so bound up with that of Edinburgh that it forms but the latter's outer branch. As the chief rallying-point for Scotland is the capital

owing to its central location and its importance, the commander-in-chief would march in force to the Haddingtonshire shore if the invasion occurred in those parts. If his relative weakness in numbers compelled him to retire before a successful descent, then he would take up the position of Dalkeith, which he could isolate by means of a canal to the south, and dispute the enemy the passage of the Esk, and here in this strong position he could await relief by land and sea, in the certain hope of being soon rejoined by the troops of the north of England, which would come up and support his right by Channel kirk and the Roman road.

EDINBURGH COUNTY

This county has a very small coast line to defend, between the Esk in the east and the Almond in the west. Two camps of the second line, one at Dalkeith to defend the passage of the Esk, and the other at Ratho, or at the Kirkliston bend, to defend the Almond and stop the approach to Edinburgh from the west, because the defence of this town is of a piece with that of the east coast.

Coast defence.—Two batteries at the mouth of the Esk, a fortified front at Musselburgh, a battery at Duddington Brook, one at Restlerrigg, one at the Hermitage, Leith well fortified, a battery at Newhaven, one at Royston, one at Granton, one at Cramond. Edinburgh Castle put in good condition, an entrenched camp in the plain between Edinburgh and Leith, its left resting on the Leith. The camp of Edinburgh is the natural rallying-point of the greater portion of the forces of Scotland, specially light artillery and cavalry. I take it that the commander-in-chief has here at his disposal some 15,000 to 20,000 troops to oppose the descent.

But the main defence of the whole coast lies in the permanent naval forces stationed in the Forth, which must

comprise at least several blockships, twenty gunboats and fireboats. This naval defence, supported by batteries of big guns and mortars placed on the islands of May, Jura, Inchkeith, and Cramond, and augmented by the English cruisers preceding or following the invading fleet, would be adequate to stop the enemy from entering the Forth, and to destroy him had he penetrated so far.

COUNTY OF LINLITHGOW

This county lies in the rear of the land and sea defences, and the enemy's fleet cannot ascend so far.

SECOND GROUP

RENFREWSHIRE

Glasgow lies away from the sea and from sudden invasion, and the defence of Renfrewshire is vital to the safeguarding of Glasgow. The place of arms is Paisley, which can be made into a very excellent camp. If the enemy had landed either on the Ayrshire coast or that of Renfrewshire Glasgow should be defended from a distance, first by the camp of Paisley and then by the Clyde (bridges leading into the city should be destroyed). This barrier would give time for the Scotch troops to collect behind the Clyde, the English from the north-east to make for Lanark, from the north-west to collect at the rear of Ayr and behind the Gurnoch, according to the space occupied by the foe. He could be checked and surrounded until sufficient troops had come together to fight him successfully.

AYRSHIRE

This county has considerable coast line, cut by several rivers that water fairly populous plains, bounded by ranges of hills lying close together. There are three places of arms: (1) Stewarton, with a camp on the height of

Offyn Castle; (2) Mauchline, with a camp at the confluence of the Lugar and the Ayr; and (3) Barr, with a camp on the west-north-west height.

WIGTOWNSHIRE

The hilly moors lie between Ayrshire and Wigtown, so that even if the enemy had landed, either in the Stranraer peninsula or on the south coast between the Luce and the Cree, it would be easy to stop his progress by defending the three roads of Delvygone, Miltane and Maingoff pending the arrival of sufficient land and sea forces to attack and destroy him.

KIRKCUDBRIGHT

This county presents a small plain along a small stretch of coast, girt by close mountains belonging to a great chain. The Cree in the west, the Fleet, Dee and Orr cut this little province from north to south, and from Dumfries it is separated by the Frith. The place of arms is New Galloway, with a camp in Blackfell.

DUMFRIESSHIRE

This county is situated on Solway Firth and, like the foregoing, presents a very narrow plain with little coast line. The place of arms is Lochmaben, between three lakes, and therefore easy to entrench and defend.

THIRD GROUP

Of the four counties here comprised, only that of Lanark presents a plain or valley formed by the Clyde, and even this is very mountainous. It is bound to the north by the Pentland Hills, to the east by a chain stretching north and south between the Tweed and Clyde valleys, to the south by the range whence springs the Clyde, to the south-west by another range stretching to Eglesham, one spur

of which goes into Renfrew as far as Stainley, near Paisley, which may be looked upon as the key of these highlands, which debouch into the plain of the five seaboard western counties by nine roads, those of Paisley, Dunlop, Stuarton, Lerwick, Derval, Muirkirk, New Cumnock, Sanquhar, and Duresden.

The counties of Peebles, Selkirk and Roxburgh debouch upon the north of England by four roads—Moffat, Loughdin, Camaby, and Yedburgh; and upon the southeast of Scotland by five roads—Yetholm, Kelso, Channelkirk, Douse and Cockburnpath.

This group of mountains may be considered as a great lofty citadel, whence sorties may be made upon all points of the circumference and where one is sheltered from all direct attack.

CENTRAL SCOTLAND

This part consists of thirteen counties which may be divided for military purposes into two groups: the EASTERN, comprising Fife [Angus], Kincardine, Aberdeen, Banff, Moray, Nairn, and Inverness; and WESTERN, comprising Kinross, Perth, Clackmannan, Stirling, and Dumbarton.

The eastern group would be most exposed to invasion, along the coast line between the Firth of Forth and Moray Firth if the enemy took the strange resolution of attacking Scotland instead of England and Ireland. The coast line of Fife lies just under the naval defence of the Forth; there is not much likelihood that a descent would ever be attempted or brought off. If the enemy managed to land in Kincardine, the troops of the north could collect behind the Dee, those of the west in the hills round Fordoun, those from the south in a line from Bervie to Fordoun, and hold that position in order to protect communications until assistance was assured. The only interest in Aberdeen from the defensive point of

view is the long narrow plain bounded by its coasts which runs from south to north from the Dee to Pennard Head. The defence is so organized that the invader cannot descend upon the Aberdeen front between the Don and the Dee. If he landed between the Don and the Yethan all the southern troops should be collected between Aberdeen, Greenhorne, Kintore and Inverary (the place of arms for the county), in order to prevent him from getting south. Invasion of Banffshire would be foolish, while Moray and Nairn, like north-east Inverness-shire, offers little prospect to the invader.

In the southern group of Central Scotland, Kinross can only be invaded in the event of the enemy's making too rapid strides in the eastern counties, and trying to march on Stirling to threaten Edinburgh in the rear and push on to Glasgow. Stirling is the point of inland warfare if the latter were waged; if the invader landed in the counties north of the Tay, Perthshire would become the centre to prevent him crossing that river, penetrating to Stirling, placing the Deron between himself and the Scottish army, which would then be cut off from Edinburgh. Stirling, however, is the key of the defence, and covered to the north by the Teith, presents an unstormable camp, with a line of redoubts at all the salient angles of the river as far as Bandeth, where it meets the Forth. The troops of the north and of the west would occupy positions in the great range of Craig Benyon and continue to hold the Ochill Hills in order to hem in the invader who, according to the rules of war, should not enter this re-entering angle between this range of hills and the Teith, which he could not cross in the face of an army.

Dumbartonshire is little exposed to invasion by sea, and so long as Stirling was occupied there would be nothing to fear for the eastern part of Dumbartonshire.

NORTHERN SCOTLAND

This part comprises five counties, Caithness, Sutherland, Ross, Inverness and Argyle. These counties are really of no interest, presenting as they do but a few miserable valleys bounded by pathless uninhabited mountains. There are a few points on the coast of Caithness where small descents might be made to sack Wick and Thurso. Sutherland is even less open to invasion, Ross and West Inverness-shire require but little detailed defence, and Argyllshire is practically unapproachable. As to the islands in the North and West of Scotland, they require at the most partial defence and a few small havens.

CHAPTER XIII

NOTE ON THE INVASION
(*AUGUST* 1805)

So Bonapart,
With treach'rous heart,
If on some gibbet swinging,
With gen'ral voice
Would France rejoice,
And set the bells a-ringing.

Popular song of 1805.

THE following Note by Dumouriez was written at the crisis of the invasion period, when Napoleon had marshalled his great army at and near Boulogne, and every day eagerly scanned the western horizon for the first glimpse of the sails of Villeneuve's armada. As has been pointed out in chapter XIX. of *Napoleon and the Invasion of England*, his projects came to naught owing to the prescience of Nelson, the check which Calder was thereby enabled to deliver to Villeneuve off Cape Finisterre, on July 22nd, and the final retirement of the latter to Cadiz. At that very time the aggressive policy of Napoleon on the Continent was bringing Austria and Russia into the field against him ; and in the closing days of August he resolved to abandon, at least for a time, his scheme of invasion. Leaving behind a sufficient number of troops to disguise the departure of the great mass of them, he proceeded to Paris, while the

Grand Army began its rapid march towards the Upper Danube and brought about the surrender of General Mack's army at Ulm, two days before Nelson won his last and greatest victory at Trafalgar.

The following Note enables the reader to gauge not only the magnitude of the interests then at stake, but also the foresight evinced in Dumouriez' suggestion, that Napoleon would in all probability hail with joy a chance of turning away from his maritime schemes in order to renew the triumphs which he might reasonably expect to gain over "the old Coalition machines."

The invasion is on too many tongues and in too many minds for me not to share in the resulting interest.

The junction of the combined squadrons at Ferrol is an arrangement brought about by chance, but one which carries out the dispositions that Buonaparte might have made for his naval forces, with the object of attacking Ireland with the left wing of his army of invasion.[1] But, if, on the one hand, his good fortune in saving the combined fleet has granted him the advantage of a junction in a double port[2] most difficult to block up, because it stands out to sea with no headlands and is placed on the real route to all the west coast of Ireland, and to windward of the English squadrons (especially of the Channel and the south of Ireland stations), and near enough to the French frontier for the said fleet to be reinforced with soldiers and seamen, on the other hand, the English Navy can now observe at more definitely fixed points the total naval strength of France and Spain conjoined that is collected in only two places, Ferrol and Corunna and Brest.

[1] Dumouriez could not then know that Villeneuve's putting into Ferrol disarranged Napoleon's schemes. Dumouriez, like many others, then believed that Ireland was one of the objectives of Napoleon, especially with the Brest force.

[2] Ferrol and Corunna harbours form parts of the same gulf.

So long as the fine weather lasts, that is, another month, its two chief stations can keep watch upon these two harbours and get an idea of the two fleets, if they should venture upon a sortie. But once the equinoctial and winter gales begin the English cruisers will show to less advantage, but by drawing nearer to Ireland they will watch over these dangerous shores of the west of Ireland; and if they cannot prevent the landing because the Ferrol fleet will have escaped them, at least they will have the option of attacking and destroying it on the coast itself, seeing that the disembarkation from the vessels and troopships will necessarily take several days, especially at so dangerous a season of the year.

The main thing is that the combined fleet now at Ferrol is in a very bad condition, whether as regards the health of the crews and the troops, or the riggings and munitions, and that at least a month will be needed to cure the sick, receive from France reinforcements of troops and seamen and revictual itself so as to be able to make a second sortie.[1] The Brest squadron must leave before that of Ferrol, for their movements are to be combined, and the equinox approaches.

It follows that the left wing of the invasion force is necessarily retarded until the most dangerous season of the year, and that in consequence it cannot co-operate simultaneously with the centre and the right wing of the army of the coasts, which from the nature of their embarkations require the nights and the calms of summer to venture to sea, and [? must] put off its attempt to next year, and so successively from year to year. If the war lasts twenty years, the Argonauts entrusted for the past two years with the conquest of England will be able to bequeath that expedition to their children. The plan

[1] The bad state of the combined French and Spanish fleets was the chief reason for Villeneuve's retreat to Cadiz, where he could more thoroughly refit.

of operations of the right wing and centre appears to be riper. A Dutch squadron of at least seven vessels of the line is ready between the Texel and the Meuse with more than 300 transports, carrying at least 20,000 men. It is known that the Boulogne flotilla is ready and carries over 100,000 men. However numerous this flotilla may be, I do not think that it can at one time accommodate so great an army. It is much encumbered with artillery, munitions, supplies, horses, camp and hospital effects, etc.; and so I estimate this convoy at an outside capacity of 60,000 soldiers.[1]

It cannot venture upon a sortie without the support of at least the Dutch squadron to cross the Channel and reach the nearest shore: for it cannot risk making the passage and proceeding along the English coasts under the fire of the English squadrons which are awaiting it, with embarkations so fragile, so dangerous and so hard to manage. So the operations of the army of the centre, or Boulogne flotilla, depend on those of the Dutch squadron, or right wing, whilst those of the right wing are independent of those of the centre.[2]

The right wing [i.e. the Dutch force], sailing in excellent transport and escorted by men-of-war, can take the route it pleases, leave when it likes, and make for any point it chooses. But as it is to be presumed that its movements are to be in connection with those projecting for the army of the centre, one cannot suppose that it intends attacking Scotland (which would take it too far from its goal), and still less sail off north to round it and proceed to attack

[1] Dumouriez underestimates its capacity; but Capt. Desbrière (*Projets et Tentatives de Débarquement aux Iles Britanniques*, Vol. IV, p. 465) points out that out of the nominal total of 166,155 men encamped from Boulogne to the mouth of the Meuse, only 93,000 were available for active service.

[2] Dumouriez had not divined Napoleon's real plan, which was that Villeneuve should rally the French fleet at Brest, and then sweep the Channel in order to convoy across the Boulogne flotilla.

Ireland.[1] Such navigation, hampered by three hundred transports, would be foolhardy; it would be followed by Admiral Russell, if it had escaped him on leaving Holland. This admiral, with the addition of the cruisers in the north of Ireland, would give a good account of it, and not one single vessel would escape.

So that we are left with one or two supposed objects for this right wing. The *first* is to disembark its troops between the Humber and the Stour,[2] send its transports back, and at once proceed to cross the Straits of Dover in order to take and convoy the flotilla over to the Kent or Sussex coast, on which it is to land. The *second* is to cross the Straits at first in its entirety, warships and transports, anchor in the St. Jean roadstead, sally forth in order of battle, and make straight for the coast between Dover and Brighton, and there land the whole army.[3]

I know that English sailors will laugh at these two hypotheses. In the first case, the English squadron, charged to watch the Dutch fleet and prevent its reaching the English coast, will either attack it during its disembarkation, which must needs occupy three or four days, or else assail and beat the squadron of the Dutch admiral, whose only resource left will be to fly back to his own ports if he can, and in no case will allow him to cross the Straits of Dover and effect his junction with the flotilla. In the second case, either the English squadron will attack the Dutch squadron and its convoy on leaving port, or

[1] The notion of the Dutch fleet attacking Ireland seems fantastic; but it found a place in Napoleon's naval plan of September 29th, 1804; but it was to be by way of the English Channel (see *Life of Napoleon*, by J. Holland Rose, Vol. I, pp. 490–1).

[2] The River Stour at Harwich.

[3] The latter was almost certainly Napoleon's design. At Elba he told Admiral Ussher and Colonel Campbell that his aim was to have the allied fleets come up before the British fleet, convoy the flotilla across the Straits and land wherever the opportunity was most favourable, preferably *on the coast of Kent*. See *Napoleon's Last Voyages*, ed. by J. Holland Rose, pp. 89–90.

follow it towards Boulogne, to place it between two fires, or will join Lord Keith's squadron[1] to attack the whole of their right wing and the centre, whether in the roadstead at the time of departure or in mid-Channel during the passage, and a decisive sea fight will destroy in one day the flotilla, the army and the projects of Buonaparte.

But let us leave the naval part and examine the military part of both hypotheses.

FIRST HYPOTHESIS

Here our survey is confined to the coast line between the Humber and the Thames; for, if the landing were effected north of the Humber in Yorkshire, or even beyond, this invading army corps, overmatched with any other plan of attack, without hope of relief by sea, would soon have its supplies cut off, be surrounded on all sides, and compelled to surrender after having made but little headway.

If the invader landed in Lincolnshire, it would be at Grimsby, or Saltfleet, Wainfleet, or in Boston Bay. The camp of Spalding would check his march upon London, whilst the great army division collected round Lincoln would surround him, starve him, cut him off from the sea and make him lay down his arms.

If he landed in Norfolk it could not be at Lynn, because the men-of-war could not cover the landing. Even the transports could not venture into the Lynn Wash. It would more likely be at Yarmouth, where I have indicated land defences and the camp of Gorleston. In this case the army assembled, as would be the case at Norwich, Beccles and Bungay, would prevent him from advancing, and he would be starved out in a small space of ground, with no resource left but surrender in a few days.

If he landed in Suffolk it could only be at Lowestoft, Southwold, Dunwich, Aldborough, or Orford. I have

[1] Admiral Lord Keith commanded the squadron stationed in the Downs.

indicated the camps needed to place each of these landing-points in the re-entering angle of the line of defence, to press and overlap his two flanks, to cut him off from the sea, and compel him through small skirmishes and hunger to yield in surrender. In any event, even the most unfortunate one could stop his crossing the Stour, which would serve as a line of defence to prevent him from marching on London, and give time to the divisions of troops of the other counties to come up and constitute an enveloping army which he never could resist.[1] Between the Humber and the Stour, a landing would be an isolated partial operation, foolhardy for its lack of connection with those of the great army and the flotilla. It is more than probable that, if the Dutch squadron leaves port with its convoy and attempts a disembarkation, it will be in Essex between the Stour and the Thames. This near descent would join hands with that of the flotilla and facilitate Admiral de Winter's junction off Boulogne to convoy the flotilla across, after having got rid of his transports by landing the right wing in Essex.

If this were the plan of operations, which, without being good, would be the least unreasonable, seeing that it would be linked with the invasion by the flotilla and so threaten London from two sides, then in all likelihood the right wing would land, not in the Stour or in the Wash, but rather in the Blackwater and the Crouch. If the descent succeeded, the invading army corps would brusquely attempt to seize Maldon, which I have indicated as a pivot of defence for the county of Essex, as well as Manningtree to the north, and Rochford to the south. The camp of Chelmsford is too near Maldon and Rochford to allow the enemy to capture these two important points. But,

[1] See the remarks in the Duke of York's plan of National Defence (chap. VIII) on the importance of defending the line of the Stour above and below Manningtree.

supposing that in the first moment of surprise, he had managed to possess himself thereof and there fortify himself, then he would make an entrenched camp on the heights of Rayleigh, and in this position would await news of the operations of the army of the centre, or flotilla ; for he certainly would have orders not to venture single-handed on a march upon London.

If this attempt succeeded, as I have just outlined it, then the first thing to do would be to retake Maldon, fill Mersea Island and St. Osyth height with troops, in order to cut off this retreat from the enemy, then form a great camp on the heights of Langdon, besiege the enemy in his camp at Rayleigh, bombard him, starve him, surround him by Leigh and Rochford (which would have also to be retaken), and nevertheless do all this without denuding Kent or Sussex of troops: on the contrary, the divisions from the Midland and Western Counties would have to be assembled there in a great army to repulse the army at the centre, or flotilla, in case it ventured on the passage and threatened both counties. It is to be presumed that, with these precautions, added to the means of naval defence, one would have time to finish the siege of the invader's camp [Rayleigh] and take his force prisoners, without so much as running the risk of a battle with these desperate men, whose only remaining resource would be precisely to give it [battle].

Let it ever be borne in mind that Manningtree is the pivot of the defence for North Essex, Maldon for the centre, and Rochford for the south, and that so long as these three points are held in great force the invader can make no progress between these three posts, which flank him and form so many safe outlets for turning him and cutting off his communication with the sea and thereby his retreat.

SECOND HYPOTHESIS

On the second hypothesis, granted that the Dutch squadron manages to reach, without impediment, the St. Jean Roadstead, that the winds continue from the south-east and so facilitate the departure of the flotilla and keep the English cruisers at a distance, and that, in fine, all the obstacles by sea are momentarily surmounted (and this is granting the impossible); then, if the winds are south-west, the army can attempt to land only to the west of the Straits of Dover, either in the Thames estuary or in Kent between Foreness[1] and Dover. If the winds are full south it will make straight for the opposite coast between Dungeness and Beachy Head. If the winds are south-east it will be compelled to make for the Sussex coast between Beachy Head and Selsea Island.[2]

It is probable that the Dutch squadron will be taken and beaten, the transports carrying the right wing dispersed, captured and put to flight with no refuge but the Seine, Cherbourg and the Breton coast, and the flotilla smashed beyond the ability to regain its ports.[3] In any case the French army will lose a great deal by the [English] cruisers, by bad navigation and by the confusion of disembarkation.

The commander-in-chief will have to assign the rallying-points of the army according to the direction of winds and tides, and the telegraphic and other signals on the coast. If the winds are south-west and the enemy is making for the Thames, then Canterbury camp is the predetermined pivot of the defence of all this coast and the Isle of

[1] Foreness Point, near Margate.

[2] As has been already pointed out Napoleon expected that winds and tides would make his landing-place uncertain.

[3] This is a large assumption. A south-west wind might have hindered our cruisers and small craft in the Downs from getting through the Straits in time to intercept the flotilla, which was in part propelled by oars. With that wind the Boulogne flotilla could probably have made Folkestone.

Sheppey that for the safeguarding of the river. Dover is unassailable. Folkestone and Hythe, commanded by the Downs in close proximity, offer no scope for developing the landing of an army. Romney and Rye have a defence prescribed and arranged in advance and supported by the excellent camp at Oxney.[1]

If the winds are full south the army can attempt its landing only between Hastings and Pevensey, on a very marshy contracted front, flanked by the camps of Fairlight Hook and Eastbourne, where it cannot make much progress, being under the range of hills running by Ashford, Cranbrook and Goudhurst.[2] It would always fall into several lines of re-entering angles, overlapping its flanks, whilst other bodies of troops would cut it off from the sea. And so, lacking supplies and horses to drag its artillery and stores without grain and fodder, this army incessantly harassed and erring at adventure, would very soon be destroyed or taken prisoner in its entirety.

If the winds are south-east, the flotilla, which on account of its large numbers and the nature of its craft, can neither tack nor manœuvre, must necessarily try to land on the Sussex coast, and certainly in this case Brighton is the most favourable point for the development of its descent.[3] The pivoting-points of this defence are Caburn,[4] Hollingsbury Castle and Highdown; and the central rallying-point to support this line is Shermanbury.[5] The defence is the same as before, in re-entering angles,

[1] The Hythe Military Canal was begun about this time in order to isolate the Romney Marsh district.

[2] This is loosely put. A south wind is full abaft a vessel going from Boulogne to Dover. Further, horses were to be taken over in the flotilla; and the plan of denuding Sussex of supplies had been given up almost entirely in 1804 (see chap. VIII).

[3] A south-east wind would have taken the Boulogne flotilla straight to Dungeness or Rye.

[4] Mount Caburn is the high, isolated hill just east of Lewes.

[5] Shermanbury Park, just north of Henfield, in Sussex.

and here, as elsewhere, the hostile army cannot penetrate very far and has no retreat, if, besides great superiority of numbers and energy, the defenders possess skilful dispositions, order and sang-froid.

After having rapidly run through the most important features of this invasion-scheme, my opinion is (1) that in spite of strong appearances it will not take place; (2) that, divided into three portions with such unequal naval equipment, it can have no *ensemble*, either as regards time or movements; (3) that the expedition of the left wing, or of Ireland, is not feasible before the winter, seeing that the combined fleet now at Ferrol cannot leave it for six weeks, and that the Brest squadron cannot dare put to sea before the departure of the Ferrol squadron; (4) that the Dutch squadron, with its convoy, may indeed be ready, but that it cannot attempt to rally the Boulogne flotilla without exposing itself to certain destruction at the hands of Admiral Russell or Lord Keith, either on its way, because it cannot hug the coast like the small craft of the flotilla under the protection of the numerous land batteries, or else in the Boulogne roadstead for the same reason; (5) that if it leaves port to carry out a separate expedition, and that against Ireland, it will never get there at all by rounding the north of Scotland, without being beaten by the English cruisers pursuing it from all parts; and even if it reached Ireland, seeing the absence of connection between its centre and that of the left wing, this right wing would be insufficient and would be irretrievably ruined before the Brest and Ferrol squadrons had joined hands to go to its relief; (6) that wherever else the Dutch Squadron managed to land the right wing of the army, it would result in a pure waste of resources, either in Scotland, or Yorkshire, or between the Humber and the Stour, or between the Stour and the Thames; (7) that this insensate project can never succeed, and that very shortly Buonaparte will be only too

glad, under pretext of a continental war, to break off his immense and puerile preparations for invasion and march off all his troops to Germany or Italy; (8) that, although it is almost certain that the plan of invasion will never take effect, yet so long as this make-believe shall last one must in no degree relax the precautions for land defence, were it only with the object of keeping up that martial energy of the nation, which peradventure may yet find an outlet in the offensive during the course of the Continental War that is doubtless on the eve of breaking out.

This "note" of Dumouriez bears signs of haste in its composition. He must have drawn it up immediately on hearing news of the battle of July 22nd between Calder and Villeneuve and the retreat of the latter to Ferrol. Owing to fog, Calder lost touch of him, and this fact, together with some amount of uncertainty for a few hours as to the whereabouts of that Franco-Spanish fleet, had caused something like a panic in London. Probably Dumouriez wrote with the praiseworthy aim of allaying the panic, at least in official circles. Certainly his presentment of facts was very sanguine, and probably far more so than was warranted by the situation, *as known at that time.* Clearly, too, he had not fathomed Napoleon's design of using Villeneuve's armada to unseal Ganteaume's fleet at Brest in order, with united force, to gain the command of the Channel. At Elba the Emperor told Admiral Ussher and Colonel Campbell that he needed only three or four days of undisputed supremacy in the Channel to make good his passage in force.

Napoleon's plan, therefore, was more deadly than Dumouriez had divined, but he saw distinctly the great difficulties in the way; he set them forth clearly and

encouragingly in this Note, and clenched it by the truly remarkable prophecy that the Emperor would speedily give up his scheme and turn his legions towards Germany. The old general obviously must have kept closely in touch with the politics of the Continent, and he knew that the recent aggressions of Napoleon (especially his annexation of the Ligurian or Genoese Republic) had made a rupture with Austria and Russia a certainty in the near future. The Emperor afterwards avowed that he had kept the land war always before him as an alternative, and no one at the time pointed this out more incisively than Dumouriez in the Note now for the first time published. It forms a worthy finale to the comprehensive scheme of defence for the nation which he believed to be the chief bulwark of national liberties against the rising tide of imperial aggression.

CHAPTER XIV

PROJECTS AND WARNINGS

It is only by prudence, wisdom, and great dexterity, that obstacles are surmounted and important ends attained.—NAPOLEON.

THE detailed plan of national defence, of which only the most important parts have now been set forth, was far from exhausting the energies of Dumouriez. At sixty-five years of age he had the alertness of youth; and his correspondence yields abundant proof of his concern at the slackness of the British ministers. Their nonchalance and lack of foresight in military affairs—a result of our insularity, hopefulness, and pride—have often astonished continental observers, whose environment compels them to look far ahead and systematically organize their defence. The letters of Dumouriez are of interest as showing the surprise, tinged with amusement or contempt, which he felt at the want of ordinary precautions. There is a phrase in his memoranda, probably of the year 1811, which reveals his sense of the salutary uses of adversity. Speaking of the phenomenal triumphs of the French arms, he ascribes them to the fact that that nation had to rely on its own exertions from the beginning of the revolutionary war, and had therefore called forth enough of strength and organizing faculty to overcome the old governments

founded on class privilege and guided by tradition. This idea illuminates the course of history with a flash of insight which marks an original thinker. He might have added that it was in this sense a misfortune for Great Britain to be able to rely from the first on her allies and her navy, and therefore to jog along in the old military ruts.

Before we recount the advice and criticisms of Dumouriez, we may refer to a curious incident which proves that Napoleon had no small esteem for his powers. The First Consul, while tracking the mazes of the Cadoudal-Pichegru conspiracy in the month of March, 1804, heard from one of his agents that the young Duc d'Enghien, a scion of the House of Condé, had as his neighbour at Ettenheim, in Baden, no less a person than General Dumouriez.[1] The news inflamed Napoleon to a white heat of rage. If Dumouriez were at the Prince's side, that was another proof that Royalists and ex-Republicans were working together for the overthrow of the Consular régime. He declared that he would give them blow for blow, and accordingly issued the orders for the kidnapping of the young duke and his immediate transference to Vincennes. Long before the grave closed over the descendant of the Condés in the fosse of that castle, Napoleon had found out his twofold mistake—that the neighbour of his victim at Ettenheim was not Dumouriez but a harmless old man, Thumery; and, further, that the duke was not concerned in the plot hatched by the ultra-Royalists in London. But it was all one to Napoleon. The duke was shot.

We may further note that Dumouriez seems to have

[1] Boulay de la Meurthe, *Documents relatifs au Procès du Duc d'Enghien*, Vol. II, p. 58.

Napoleon Bonaparte Premier Consul

From an Aquatint in Colours by Levachez, 1803

known nothing of that conspiracy. He had no dealings with the Comte d'Artois and the furious Royalists about him; indeed they looked on the general as suspect owing to his adherence to the principles of the constitutional monarchy established in 1791. The young Duke of Orleans seems to have been the only member of the French royal house with whom he had any connection.

We now turn to the relations between Dumouriez and the British Government. Despite the efforts of the authors of this volume to discover all his memoranda and comments on the war, they have not succeeded in bringing together a continuous series. Their search in the archives of the War Office and in many other quarters has, however, enabled them to bring to light a number sufficient to illustrate his opinions on the shifting operations of the war. The letters show his unremitting efforts to direct aright the policy of the land which he believed to be the last bulwark of ordered freedom against the rising tide of imperial ambition.

His first suggestion of any importance is to be found in a letter dated Gunnersbury Lodge, Acton, October 17th, 1804, to Mr. Cooke, Under-Secretary for War. He advises that the Piedmontese prisoners then at Norman's Cross, near Battle, should be canvassed with a view to their taking service under King George. As soon as the well-affected were separated from the Republicans, they could form a serviceable battalion under General Merk, who should receive not less than one guinea a day.[1]

We find him writing two days later to Mr. Granville-Penn, an official of the War Office, urging him to pay heed to a method of curing the plague, then devastating

[1] War Office, No. 1110.

the garrison at Gibraltar, which M. Enjourbault, a French Royalist, had confided to him. He adds these significant words :—

"I hope that in this affair there will not be allowed the fatal delays which are causing me so much impatience in other affairs, less interesting it is true, but still very important. One may detain Mars in the ante-room, but one ought never to keep Æsculapius waiting. . . . I do not intend to go to London this week, unless my lord [Camden] has need of me and informs me of it.[1] I fear to be importunate, but none the less I will continue to send in my notes and my advice on matters which require them. Beware of an attack on Sicily by General St. Cyr, either for the purpose of forestalling the Runes [?] or by connivance with them. The French are always first in the field: they act while the others deliberate. I embrace you.

"DUMOURIEZ."[2]

The events of the years 1804 and 1805 were abundantly to justify these warnings. The Third Coalition could not be formed until the summer of 1805; and the resulting delays were in strange contrast to the precipitancy with which Austria at the last launched an army into the west of Swabia long before her Russian allies had appeared on the scene. These ill-concerted efforts gave to Napoleon an opportunity which he seized with ardour, seeing that Villeneuve's retreat to Cadiz had marred his naval combinations. With his usual promptitude he wheeled his

[1] Lord Camden [1759–1840] was then Minister of War in Pitt's second Cabinet. He had no high reputation for efficiency.

[2] War Office, No. 1110. St. Cyr had been sent with a French corps by Napoleon to occupy Otranto and other ports in the south of Italy. His presence there caused Nelson much concern about Egypt and the Morea.

GUNNERSBURY LODGE, ACTON, IN 1908

(The present house contains the basement and several rooms of the Lodge of 1804-1808. *The grounds remain unchanged)*

army of England away from the cliffs of Boulogne to overwhelm Austria's vanguard at Ulm.

Hitherto Dumouriez had been intent on the plans for resisting a French invasion. But the change which swiftly came over the scene in the autumn of 1805, with the counterpoising triumphs of the Land and Sea Powers at Ulm and Trafalgar (October 19th and 21st), called his energies into another channel.

In the month of November, 1805, when the disaster to the Austrians and the vacillations of the King of Prussia left everything in doubt, he undertook a secret mission to the Continent, the purport of which is obscure. If we may judge by the following letter, written on his return, its aim was in the main military, the hope of the Pitt Cabinet being to save the situation by means of the forces of Prussia and of some of the secondary German states. Probably Dumouriez was to have commanded a corps of Hessians in British pay.

These plans, whatever they were, received a death-blow at Austerlitz, after which Prussia tamely sheathed her sword. The death of Pitt and the advent to power of the Ministry of "All the Talents" early in 1806 also told against Dumouriez' claim for reimbursement, as appears in this letter of his to Mr. Windham, Secretary of State for War.

"*June 12th*, 1806[1]

"In setting out for the Continent at the end of November, 1805, General Dumouriez, at sixty-six years of age, braved the dangers of the sea, of a journey of five hundred leagues, and those caused by the persecution of the emissaries of Buonaparte, in the hope of saving the

[1] War Office, No. 1112.

common cause by rescuing the army of the two Emperors. He asked, as the sole favour from Lord Castlereagh, Minister of War, to be paid in advance his yearly stipend for the whole of the year 1806, which that lord immediately granted. Accordingly he received from the funds of this Department £1350 sterling, and nothing more is due to him up to the end of the year 1807.

"Such was the agreement of General Dumouriez with the Government, because he hoped on reaching the theatre of operations to find an army to command and funds sufficient to carry on the war with dignity. This hope has been cruelly deceived. Besides the annoyance of having undertaken a useless, painful, and dangerous journey in a rigorous season, he has brought back disease and perplexities as to his very existence. Having kept his furnished house near London, and having paid some pressing debts on his departure, he could take away with him only £700; and, far from finding this sum suffice for a journey of six months *en poste* with five persons, he contracted debts, and has nothing on which to live up to the end of the year.

"In this annoying position he has the honour to represent to Mr. Windham that he has too much confidence in the justice and generosity of the English Government to fear abandonment in the midst of this distress, which he has experienced solely from his having given a proof of zeal, which that Government applauded. It is true, his journey failed in its essential object owing to strange events which could not be foreseen; but it was not entirely useless to England. General Dumouriez, therefore, begs Mr. Windham to give back to him his stipend for the current year, 1806, that is, a sum of £600 sterling. The General has neither asked nor received any sum, except his stipend, for all the political and military works drawn up by him for the Government during his residence in England. It is more on the score of need than of recom-

pense that he implores this just assistance from a Government to which he is devoted and which will not allow him to be a victim of his zeal."

The following letters of Dumouriez to Sir George Shee, then Under-Secretary for War, speak for themselves:—

"GUNNERSBURY LODGE, NEAR ACTON,
"*July 4th*, 1806.

"I was not able, my dear Sir George, to remain in London to wait for the appointment which you had made for me to-morrow. I was tormented by a severe attack of sciatica, the result of my journey. As I was uncomfortable in an inn, I came to my country house to take care of myself for several days. There I wait impatiently for a letter from you, announcing the granting of my request for a stipend for this year. For its prompt settlement I count on the benevolence, justice and care of Mr. Windham; and I confess to you that I am in the most pressing need of it, as I am ill and have no money. Your Ministry is too just to punish me because the two Emperors let their splendid army be beaten at Austerlitz, and because I was sent off too late to prevent these calamities. It has in its hands the proofs of the steps taken by me to make this journey useful to England and the common cause, so basely abandoned by every one. If in these days you do not make a most fatal peace, surpassing in danger that of Amiens, you may be able to profit by my work. The only return I ask from Mr. Windham is to pay me my stipend for this year, which I used up so disagreeably in travelling expenses and which now leaves me at fault. If, as I hope, especially owing to my illness, Mr. Windham grants this request (to which, I presume, Lord Grenville will be found favourably disposed), he will return to me three-quarters' salary at £150 a quarter, that is £450."

He then requests the £20 due to his aide-de-camp, Colonel Count de St. Martin, the half of the year's pay of £40, fixed three years ago by "my friend Sullivan, and paid punctually at his order and that of his successor, Mr. Cooke."

"To Sir George Shee.

"*Wednesday, July 9th*, 1806.

"I waited for you, Sir George, nearly four hours, and I was obliged to set out at once for Gunnersbury Lodge. You have forgotten me entirely, and probably neither Mr. Windham nor you attended to the decision of my claim. You had promised to write to me on this matter; but you have not even answered my letter of the 4th. I beg you to believe that it is sheer necessity which compels me to urge the decision of the Minister on my claim. . . ."

Apparently Dumouriez gained the substance of his demands, for we find him sending to the War Office a memorandum as to the means of preventing disorder during the movement of troops—a subject too technical to be entered into here.[1] More interesting is his *Tableau de l'Europe*, dated December 5th, 1806, which he sent to his friend Mr. Nicholas Vansittart, who was soon to become Chancellor of the Exchequer.[2] At the close of 1806 the prospect was of the darkest. The negotiations for peace with Napoleon set on foot by Great Britain and Russia had come to naught. Prussia, irritated by a long succession of slights from the French Emperor, had challenged him to almost single conflict, only to meet with a dire overthrow at the twin battles of Jena-Auerstädt. Russia

[1] War Office, No. 112.

[2] Nicholas Vansittart [1766–1851] created Baron Bexley, 1853.

then came to her aid, but with little chance of success. Moreover, at Berlin Napoleon had issued the decree of November 17th, which vastly extended the system of commercial war against Great Britain and promised to ban her goods from the Continent. It was under these circumstances that Dumouriez wrote the plea for greater energy on behalf of our allies, which may be summarized as follows[1]:—

The plans of Buonaparte are prospering. French corsairs are in the Baltic, and soon Lübeck and Stettin will be full of them. The Danish navy must join the French when they demand it. As for Russia, she will be ruined on the side of Poland, because England, despairing of her powers of resistance, refuses to help her by the only means that can help, viz. by great diversions afar off. Perhaps parliamentary changes cause this apathy; but plans should be thought out and prepared for. It is always good policy to seem to be making ready great expeditions, as it revives the courage of the Continental Powers.

But it must be more than a pretence. For the existence of England is at stake. There are two alternatives. If Russia loses Poland and is chased out of Europe by being hemmed in in the limits of 1772, she will succumb.[2] Sweden will follow suit, and her fleet and those of her neighbours will be used to attack England. Or, if Russia, daunted by the progress of Buonaparte, and knowing the torpor of England, makes peace with him she will consult her own interests by a close offensive and defensive alliance with him and will draw all the northern Powers

[1] In the Vansittart MSS. in Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 31,230, folio 167 *et seq.*

[2] Before the first partition of Poland (1772), the Russian frontier on the west extended little farther than Smolensk.

after her.[1] Then, after a year of preparation, there will come a great attack on England in 1808 by all the naval forces of the Continent.

Buonaparte's progress will not be stopped by Congresses and negotiations, if he succeeds in conquering the Czar, whose present policy is, after all, only the fruit of anger, not of prudence.[2] The sending of a British fleet to the Baltic will be only a half measure. Only distant expeditions can furnish an effective succour. Expeditions to the two Indies will only cause jealousy to the Maritime Powers, and bring more allies to Buonaparte. His plans will be fully developed by the year 1808.

There are three ways by which he may humble England.

(1) By closing all the ports of Europe from Archangel to Alexandria [*sic*], a terrible expedient which the contraband trade will never nullify.

(2) By making naval diversions so as to scatter your naval forces.[3] The more widespread they are, the more formidable they are. When all the ports of Europe are in his hands, how will you blockade them? How will you track the expeditions sailing therefrom? If Villeneuve, instead of fighting at Trafalgar, had made straight for Gibraltar, he could have reached Toulon safely. How can you in 1807–8 defend India, Ireland, and all your possessions? For India can be attacked by land if Russia

[1] A remarkable prophecy, fulfilled in the Treaty of Tilsit (July 7th, 1807), except that Sweden held aloof from Napoleon's Continental System till 1810. The naval attack spoken of in the next sentence would have come about but for the outbreak of the Peninsular War in 1808.

[2] The Czar's policy resulted largely from his anger at the execution of the Duc d'Enghien by Napoleon, and the annexation of Genoa by the latter in June, 1805.

[3] Napoleon tried both these expedients in the years 1807–8. He extended the Continental System over nearly the whole of Europe (though not Turkey), and he planned naval diversions like those here foretold. (See Rose, J. H., *Life of Napoleon*, Vol. II, chaps. xxvii, xxxi.)

joins France. Your temporary successes in South America cannot be maintained.[1] Buonaparte will wrest them from you when he chooses to do so. Miranda's expedition has fortunately ended in a fiasco[2]; but you can revolutionize South America if you give it a king, as has been proposed, and thus ally it with England.

(3) By direct invasion. Though it has not succeeded hitherto, it *may* yet succeed. As soon as Buonaparte has arranged the north of Europe to his will, you will see the camp of Boulogne re-formed, and your defences scattered by diverse feints. "Then for the love of our country let us work hard to conjure this too decisive danger, and remove it from us by saving our allies. It is our duty and our dearest interest to do so."

The coalition of all the Continent against England results mathematically from the preceding events.

"Buon. flies from capital to capital; it is in the palaces of kings that he changes the fate of nations. He announces that it is in London he will give peace to Europe. In this he will succeed if there is a continuance of this feeble and do-nothing behaviour."

"Do not think to settle matters with him peaceably; he is following his destiny."

"Either he will perish in this war or he will dictate a universal peace in London. Then England will be no more; and the English will be the more hardly enslaved for having the longest of all braved his menaces and his power."

The personal reasons which led Dumouriez to trace the

[1] Whitelocke's expedition to Monte Video was a failure [February–March, 1807].

[2] Miranda in 1806 sought to revolutionize Caraccas, but in vain.

foregoing *tableau*, are stated in the following letters to Vansittart:—

"11 LEICESTER PLACE.

"SIR AND DEAR FRIEND,

"I went on Wednesday to Mr. Windham's house by appointment. He told me positively that my *Mémoire*[1] could not be adopted, and that therefore it was useless to enter into any discussion on it. Consequently I judged it useless to go to hear the same opinion about it from Lord Howick, who had given me an appointment for yesterday, Thursday. I do not know how to characterize the Minister's declaration to me. I am fully convinced that Lord Grenville does not share the apathy or the discouragement that now is evinced. It is to his great soul that my soul dedicates this *Tableau*, which I have drawn up *for him alone*, which I also beg you to place in his very hands. I make no apology for the liberty I take in tracing a *Tableau* so dark but, unhappily, so true. A reason for inaction has been stated to me, that it is possible Russia will make peace. But it is by this very inaction that she will be forced to make peace. Would any one dare publicly to confess this reason, and give it as an excuse to Russia and Sweden?

"I can assure you that, happily, public opinion is against peace; that the negotiation of Lord Lauderdale has already done harm to the Ministry, that every attempt to renew it would completely ruin its credit, strengthen its enemies, and make it altogether unpopular.[2] Certainly Lord Grenville has too strong a character to fear public opinion; but when it coincides with his own, he will assuredly profit by it for the safety of his country, which is bound up with that of our allies.

[1] This is not in our archives.

[2] Lord Lauderdale conducted the negotiations with Napoleon in the summer of 1806.

" This is my last word, my dear friend, on public affairs; but I pray that justice may be done to my motives, and that I may no longer be looked on as a stranger. I wish to live and die in England. She is my second country, and I wish to serve her and defend her as usefully as I did the first, until the hideous turn taken by the Revolution forced me to renounce her. Give this *Tableau* to Lord Grenville, and be sure of the sincere friendship and constant confidence of your servant,

DUMOURIEZ."

The reader must have noticed the interesting suggestion of Dumouriez in the foregoing *Tableau* that England could never make any permanent conquests in South America, and that her only means of wresting that land from Spain (our enemy up to June, 1808), was by giving its discontented peoples a king who would sunder it from the motherland and ally it with Great Britain. Dumouriez had, on June 12th, 1806, sent to Fox and Windham a Note on this subject, which he drew up at the express request of the former. It referred specially to Mexico, but was equally applicable to Montevideo, whither the British Government was about to send an expedition under General Whitelocke.

Dumouriez therein showed that the climate, the completely alien character of the Spanish colonists, and the vast extent of the country must render impossible any permanent occupation by British troops; but he urged the desirability of sending out a prince who would understand and sympathize with the Spaniards, help them to revolt against Spain, and so assure their alliance with England. He pointed to the Duke of Orleans as fitted by religion and character for this enterprise, and as desiring such an adventure owing to his grief at the recent death of his

brother, the Duc de Montpensier. He concludes in the following terms:—

"All the Spaniards of Monte Video and Buenos Ayres do not in the least hide their feelings from your officers and merchants. With one breath they tell them of their desire to be separated for ever from the mother land, and to live under a king, under their own laws and religion. The unexpected arrival of the Duke of Orleans in that country would make a great sensation, which would favour your cause by convincing the colonists that you have no views either of conquest or domination, that you bow before their wishes, that you wish only for their freedom and the civil and commercial prosperity of their land under a Government of their own choice."

In a postscript he adds that the proposed military expedition to Spanish America would take 6000 men and cost £500,000. The journey of the Duke of Orleans thither would need no troops, and would cost less than a tenth of that sum. If the Spaniards did not want him, he would of course return to England.

The bitterest enemies of Dumouriez can scarcely refrain from admiring the originality of this plan.[1] Its adoption by the British Government might have altered the history of the world. It is quite probable that Louis Philippe would have received a welcome in La Plata, and that the liberation of that part of South America would have taken place at once. La Plata, ruled by the young Louis Philippe under British protection, would have provided an excellent mart for our produce, as Dumouriez pointed out.

For reasons that are unknown to us, the British Govern-

[1] A copy of this plan was sent by D. to Lord Castlereagh on May 27th, 1807, from 11 Leicester Place. It is in the War Office Archives, No. 1114.

ment rejected the proposal, and chose to blunder on in its own peculiar way. It preferred to strike a blow at Monte Video, which roused the colonists to united action against a Power that might have been their liberator; and the expedition ended in disaster and disgrace.

Nevertheless, even the Ministry of all the Talents was not blind to Dumouriez' diplomatic gifts, and proposed to send him on an important mission. All that we know of it is from his letter of May 18th, 1807, to Lord Castlereagh, Minister of War in the Cabinet which had recently come to power.

"My Lord,

"I have a most just claim to urge upon you. You are the Minister set directly over me, and I forward it to you with the greatest confidence.

"Lord Spencer, and afterwards Lord Howick, announced to me after the month of September, 1806, a very important mission to the Continent. I was to proceed first to see the King of Sweden, in order to arrange with that monarch the military part of the diversion which he wished to undertake and had shown me the confidence to arrange with me. Thence I was to go to St. Petersburg to treat with the Emperor about the arrangements relating to that military diversion. Afterwards I was to repair to the King of Prussia's Court to concert with him the connection between the diversions arranged for those two kings, which would determine the action of the British Government. Finally I was to be resident at the Swedish Court, for the purpose of carrying out these projects.

"Such was my mission. The rapid course of the campaign occasioned a fatal delay at the outset. Next the Prussian part of my mission was withdrawn from me, and given to Lord Hutchinson, thus reducing my duties to the journey to Sweden and Russia. Its importance, however,

was the more urgent as the tale of disasters increased and imposed an ever greater need to reassure the King of Sweden. It is seen now that all the carelessness was fatal, both on this head and with respect to the military and political agreements to be made with Russia. Finally it was not till October 31st that Lord Howick decided on my journey, as you will see by the enclosed letter of St. Francis Vincent, with the appended copy of my reply.

"After recounting to you the story of my abortive mission, I come to my claim, which is only too just and which I pray you to submit to and support in the Cabinet."

He then states his various expenses, namely, of a temporary abode in London and of his inability to get rid of Gunnersbury Lodge, and asks for £500 compensation. The letters referred to above are missing. But there is no need to multiply proofs of the stupid apathy of the Coalition Ministry at that time. The torpor of ministers played into the hands of Napoleon, angered the Czar Alexander I, and so prepared the way for his alliance with the French Emperor at Tilsit, which endangered the existence of the British Empire. We find the Czar wrathfully exclaiming in May, 1807, to the British envoy: "Act anywhere, provided that you act at all!" The next ministry had by then sought to do something; but the frittering away of Britain's resources by "All the Talents" made it impossible to avert the military disaster which on June 14th overtook our allies at Friedland, and the utter break-up of the European system brought about by the Treaty of Tilsit (July 7th, 1807).

On May 19th Dumouriez wrote once more to Lord Castlereagh, urging the need of a vigorous attack on the French in Italy as the best way of helping the Czar; and

on July 12th, before he had yet heard of the collapse of all his hopes at Tilsit, he wrote from Ryde stating that the disaster at Friedland fulfilled his worst apprehensions. He had urged the late ministry and the Czar to avoid pitched battles and adopt an "environing defensive," such as had succeeded so well in Champagne in 1792. He had sent in memoirs to this effect both to the ministry and to Alexander I. They had been passed over in silence. But he would send copies of them to Lord Castlereagh if required. He concludes thus: "As for the peace, do not count on it. However disadvantageous and humiliating a treaty you could bring yourselves to accept, it would be only an armistice of short duration which would complete your ruin."[1]

Fortunately, while the British Government erred from sheer sluggishness, Napoleon's activity and ambition overleaped all the limits of sound policy. As is well known, his determination to exclude British goods from the whole of the Continent led him into risky ventures which sapped even his immense resources. The most fatal of these enterprises was that which led him first to Lisbon and then to Madrid. In order to carry out his scheme of partitioning Portugal, for the benefit partly of Spain but mainly of himself, he sent Junot with an expeditionary corps, which, aided in its march by the Spaniards, entered Portugal by the rough track along the banks of the Tagus and drove the Regent and the Royal Family to seek refuge in Brazil.

Writing on this invasion of Portugal, Dumouriez hazarded a prophecy which, though falsified by the

[1] War Office, No. 1114.

present issue of events, was to be justified in the sequel. In order to encourage the Court of Lisbon to a vigorous resistance, he wrote *A Military Note on Portugal*, which probably belongs to the early part of November, 1807. It was founded on his earlier work, *L'État présent du Royaume de Portugal*, published in 1775 and re-edited in 1797, which was the fruit of his observation while in that land. As being one of the very few accounts of Portugal by a competent military man, and founded on a study of the war of 1762, it attracted a good deal of attention and was much used by the Duke of Wellington during the Peninsular War.[1] The much briefer memoir of 1807 is in Mr. Broadley's holograph volume dealing with the defence of England, to which it forms a postscript.

In it Dumouriez surveys the topography of Portugal, and points out the importance of the roads leading to Lisbon by way of Coimbra from the north, and that from Elvas and the valley of the Guadiana on the south. He then briefly recapitulates the various attempts of the Spaniards to conquer Portugal and the causes of their failure. He therefore argues that Napoleon's attempt to conquer Portugal with the help of the Spaniards will meet with failure. Ultimately the prophecy came true; but, as is well known, Junot's corps met with scarcely any opposition in November, 1807, in its rapid march to Lisbon by the desolate track that leads to Alcantara, Abrantes, and Santarem. The French were utterly exhausted, but they won Lisbon, and largely because they rushed through a desolate country scarcely ever traversed by an army.

Dumouriez naturally counted on their entering Portugal either by way of Almeida and Coimbra, or by the Elvas

[1] Prof. Oman's *Peninsular War*, I, 495; III, 182.

road. Either of these is blocked by strongholds, while the natural obstacles are even more serious. Of the two roads Dumouriez pronounced the northern to be the less advantageous to the invaders, as it was long, winding, difficult, and capable of defence at many points. Seeing that the Elvas route, through the Alemtejo, had been almost invariably used by Spanish armies, owing to its greater ease and directness, he naturally inferred that the French would choose it; but, owing to their reliance on the Salamanca-Burgos route for their communications with France, they preferred the Coimbra line of attack, with results that are well known.

Dumouriez agreed with the French military engineer, the Marquis de la Rozière, who resided in Portugal, in thinking that the best defence of Lisbon on that side was to be found in the difficult pass over the Sierra d'Estrella, south of Coimbra. In the present memoir he scarcely notices the Torres Vedras position; but he points out the possibility of dealing a counter-stroke at the Spanish territory along the road not used by the invaders, and that the mere threat of such a movement must always lead the invaders to disseminate their forces. The upshot of his argument is that Portugal need not fear conquest at the hands of Bonaparte, especially if she has the support of the British navy—a sound conclusion, but one that was to be justified only after the course of the winter campaign of 1810–11 had evinced the skill and tenacity of Wellington's defence.

Somewhat later Dumouriez opened a correspondence with Wellington which throws an interesting light on affairs in the Peninsula and at Paris in 1815; but none

of the letters to and from the great duke have survived anterior to the date June, 1811. That correspondence will be dealt with in the following chapter. Here we may notice a memoir which Dumouriez drew up for Lord Castlereagh on Spanish affairs, dated Broadstairs, August 8th, 1808.[1]

Writing soon after the receipt of news of the disasters that had befallen the Spanish forces in the field, especially at Rio Seco at the hands of General Bessières, Dumouriez declares that he has foreseen this result. The Spaniards, he says, will always be defeated in the open. The British should therefore limit themselves to the defence of Portugal, which is impregnable. So long as they hold that land, communications can be kept up between the Spanish forces in Leon and Castile and those in Andalusia and Estremadura. If these can hold their own in the north-west and south-west of Spain the position of King Joseph Bonaparte at Madrid will always be precarious.

In order to defend Portugal, the British force must number at least forty thousand men, of which eight thousand must be cavalry. They must be under an experienced commander and act on a general plan, which must also be followed by the Spanish armies above referred to. An experienced general must also be sent to concert measures of general defence with the General Junta of Spain then assembled at Seville. He concludes thus:—

"That is how I conceived the general plan of the war even before it began; and I sent it to the Cabinet, as also

[1] See *Castlereagh Papers*, Vol. VI, pp. 396–8. There is no need to refer to his note, undated, but probably a little earlier, on the causes of the military failure against Norway and Denmark. *Ibid.*, pp. 237–42.

to the Central Junta. It was founded on my experience in France in 1792. It is the only plan hitherto. It may be followed or not, but I shall have done my duty. If the Cabinet approves it, will you testify to their satisfaction by a reply?"

The old general seems often to have despaired of any lasting success in the Peninsula. In a published but little-known essay, probably of the year 1811, he deals with the Spanish lands of the New World as affording the only hope for that nation. Spain herself (he declares) seems doomed to fall under the power of the French, because they had from the outset relied on the armed strength of the nation, which Napoleon now wielded with an invincible might. In that case the Spaniards of the New World must exist independently; and the only relations between the two hemispheres will be those of commerce between free peoples. Whatever may be the aberrations of the British ministers, the British nation will come to recognize this truth. He then adds these words, which presage the declarations of Canning:—

"The liberty of Spanish America is the welfare and salvation of England. The continuation or renewal of its servitude is the ruin of her trade. All the efforts she may put forth to bind it anew to Spain will but serve to exhaust her own resources and favour the aims of Buonaparte by enlarging the sphere of his insatiable ambition. If the Spanish colonies are again united to Spain, they will undergo her fate of submission to the yoke. . . . England's sole interest in South America is to assure her lucrative commerce with that continent.[1]"

[1] *Mémoires et Correspondance inédites du Général Dumouriez*, Vol. II pp. 285 *et seq.* (Paris, 2 vols., 1834.)

He then expresses the hope that England will acknowledge the independence of Buenos Ayres. This did not happen; but in other respects Dumouriez here misjudged England and underrated the powers of Wellington in the Peninsula.

Returning to our main theme, we find in his letters several traces of his concern about the defences of the Isle of Wight. On October 4th, 1810, he mentions to a colonel, without giving the name, his concern at seeing, in the account of a recent riot of the Brunswickers, stationed at the barracks at Newport, that those foreigners, nearly two thousand in number, were practically the only force defending that island. Seeing that several of the small craft had recently sailed from Boulogne to Cherbourg, our Government ought to keep a better guard in the Isle of Wight. He advises the strengthening of defences in Sandown Bay and at the Needles. He had visited that coast and was surprised to find no preparations for resisting a landing at points so accessible as Freshwater, Brixton, and Chale, which were constantly used by smugglers. He warns his friend to make due representations to the Government, for "no faults are small when you have to deal with so enterprising and active an enemy as the French."[1]

To the same effect is a letter of his from Bull Inn, Shooter's Hill, Kent, which probably belongs to the summer of 1811. In it he advised a vigilant watch on our coast defences, especially the Isle of Wight, as Napoleon's recent visit to Cherbourg portended activity at that port which might menace the island, especially at Freshwater, Brixton, and Chale. He concludes as follows:—

[1] War Office, I, 1120.

"In 1805 I was myself in the Isle of Wight; and I verified the fact that no batteries had been fixed on these three little ports. I made a note of this matter to the Duke of York, but, as all idea of invasion since then has been put aside by the great events which have happened on the continent, there was no question of it. As this attempt seems about to be renewed, I speak of it again, for it might be that, while Buonaparte is amusing us with this appearance of preparations in Holland and off the coast between Ostend and Havre, he may be preparing behind this, troops and boats at Cherbourg, to strike this blow (more easy than it is believed to be) which would give him a foothold that would cost much to retrieve and would be an annoying advance. Therefore, my dear friend, the Minister of War must, without ostentation, keep a watch on the Isle of Wight. Make what use you think proper of my letter."

Of course all fear of an invasion was ended by the rupture between Napoleon and the Czar and the breakdown of the French Empire which began with the campaign of 1812. We may, therefore, now concentrate our attention on the events of the later part of the Peninsular War and of the two restorations at Paris in 1814 and 1815, which are set forth in the correspondence between Wellington and Dumouriez. Those from the old general to the first Duke of Wellington are in the archives of Apsley House, and have been copied by permission of his Grace the present Duke of Wellington. They have not been previously published.

CHAPTER XV

WELLINGTON, VANSITTART, AND DUMOURIEZ

All public facts are to be individualized, all private facts are to be generalized. Then at once history becomes fluid and true; and biography deep and sublime.—EMERSON.

THE first extant letter of Dumouriez to Wellington belongs to the month of June, when the duke had clinched the results of the Torres-Vedras campaign by the hard-earned victory at Fuentes d'Oñoro.

"11 LEICESTER PLACE, LEICESTER SQUARE,
"*June 6th*, 1811.

"MY LORD,

"I have wished hitherto not in any way to distract you from your great and glorious feats by my sincere congratulations on your important victories which have not only saved Portugal, but are changing the character of the war and the fate of the Peninsula. England, fatherland and Europe are indebted to you for forming a Portuguese army worthy of being led by you to victory and by its example regenerating the Spanish army which distinguished itself at Albuera under your worthy second, General Beresford.[1] I hope that by your great actions you will succeed in conquering the prejudices of the

[1] Dumouriez cannot have heard full details of Albuera, where the Spaniards did *not* distinguish themselves and Beresford's dispositions were faulty. Beresford, however, was chiefly responsible for the excellent training of the Portuguese troops.



DUMOURIEZ CIR. 1810
From a lithograph by Delpech

Spaniards, and that they will become invincible like the incomparable English and like your worthy pupils, the Portuguese.

"The charm of French invincibility is now broken; thanks to your great talents, my dear lord, the two best generals[1] of Buonaparte have received a sharp lesson, which you will repeat if they once more try the lot of battle. But I believe that, on the contrary, they are going to concentrate all their forces so as to bar your advance by a vigorous defensive. To this end they may raise the siege of Cadiz and even evacuate Andalusia in order to cover Madrid by holding the positions at Toledo and the Guadarama Pass, so as to be able definitely to take post behind the line of the Ebro and thus keep the four northern provinces annexed to the French Empire.[2] They may abandon the rest of Spain, and Buonaparte may let loose on it King Ferdinand VII, so as to sow discord among the Spaniards and weaken their zeal and efforts. The capture of Figueras (a very important event) and the recent defeat of Macdonald near Manresa is another reason for them to withdraw behind the Ebro, failing which, if the Spanish Regency were to send a great reinforcement into Catalonia, they might be expelled from that province. In that case there would no longer be any safety for them behind the Ebro in Aragon, Navarre, and Biscay, especially if, as is your plan, you succeeded in organizing and launching the Galician army into Biscay and the kingdom of Leon, along with a British corps—for example, that of General Graham—which will be of no

[1] Masséna and Marmont.

[2] The first part of this retirement was to be carried out by the French after their severe defeat at Salamanca in July, 1812. The concentration thus effected, especially by the withdrawal from Andalusia and Valencia, enabled them to compel Wellington to retire to Ciudad Rodrigo for the winter of 1812–13. The prophecy of Dumouriez thus antedated events by about two years; for not till June, 1873, did the French retire to the Ebro.

use at Cadiz as soon as the siege is raised, and would be of decisive service on the north of your left wing, and compel the French to evacuate Andalusia and the Castilles.

"The French cannot for some length of time expect any considerable help from France, and in their present critical situation I could almost wish that Soult by a false sense of shame should deem it his duty to hold on to the siege of Cadiz and Andalusia, because that would paralyze 30,000 to 40,000 French troops far away from the real centre of events in the north of Spain, and you would have that number the less to fight, with the certainty that they would not escape you afterwards.[1] In this case you could concentrate the chief efforts of the Spaniards on your two flanks in the north, namely, on Catalonia and Biscay, while your victorious main army in the centre would hinder the reunion of the two French armies of the north and south, separated too completely to effect a junction or even to concert their movements.

"These are not pieces of advice that I venture, my lord, to give you, for you have shown your mettle. I am trying to foresee what is in your thoughts and what are your plans for the successful termination of this war conducted by you with so much talent, wisdom, staunchness, and glory."

He then begs Wellington to help on in his military career the son of his (Dumouriez') aide-de-camp, the Comte de St. Martin, an able youth well versed in languages, then a lieutenant in the foot regiment, the Royals, who wished to exchange into a Portuguese regiment with

[1] As often, Dumouriez was too sanguine; but undoubtedly the keeping a large force opposite the impregnable peninsula of Cadiz was one of the causes that ruined the French campaign in the summer of 1812. Soult led it off skilfully after Salamanca, and it turned the scale in the centre in the early autumn.



DUMOURIEZ
From a drawing by Craft

the grade of captain. A later letter refers to the death of this youth in the Peninsula.[1]

Wellington does not seem to have replied to Dumouriez' letter of June 6th, but he sent the following answer to his next missive, which unfortunately has not been preserved :—

"To General Dumouriez.

"Fuente Guinaldo, *August 28th*, 1811.

"General,

"I am much obliged for your letter of August 5th just received. You have seen how our attempts on Badajoz finished, and you will see how those that I had the intention of making on Ciudad Rodrigo will fare.

"I was quite contented with transferring my troops to the right bank of the Tagus during the heats of August and September, and I threatened Ciudad Rodrigo in order to effect a diversion for the Spaniards. I had it in my head to besiege that fortress, if I had had before me an army against which I could hold my own. Suddenly everybody comes down upon me. Marmont marches into Castille: the French army of the north, reinforced by troops newly arrived, stops its march against Santocildes, and I expect every moment to hear of its arrival on the Tormes [near Salamanca].

"You will see that Santocildes, or rather Abadia, who now commands in Galicia, can do nothing, owing to want

[1] The extremely hopeful nature of the old general further appears in a letter (probably of June (?), 1811) to Colonel Bunbury (?), describing his joy at the state of things in Estremadura: "The diversion of Blake on Seville, forcing Soult to send thither a part of his army and perhaps to march there in person, makes Marmont inferior to Lord Wellington and enables the latter to operate offensively as soon as he has received his reinforcements and prepared his magazines and gun-carriages. The guerillas and famine will exhaust the two French armies, and I anticipate that soon they will receive as reinforcements from France only little bands of conscripts insufficient to replace even the daily losses."

of stores and an utter lack of cavalry, though we have set him wholly free. You will also see that Blake, who has gone into Murcia, will do nothing.[1] Perchance he will be beaten by Soult, who has with him the 4th corps and the reserves, and some battalions of the 1st corps, after leaving the 5th in Estremadura and the remainder of the 1st before Cadiz. But if Blake is not beaten, be sure that for lack of resources, discipline and organization, he will never undertake what you have planned out. As for Sirveira, he commands only militia, which does well for the defence of Portugal, but cannot undertake operations in Spain.

"So you see your perspective of an offensive campaign is not encouraging. But I do not lose heart. So long as we are not beaten, the French can do nothing on this side; and the Spaniards will at last see the necessity of organising, disciplining, and equipping their armies. Then things will go better. I should be pleased to see you if you come to this country; but I do not advise it. You would see many things which would disgust you with these revolutionary wars, necessary though they are amidst the misfortunes of our time.

"WELLINGTON."[2]

This cold douche of facts directed against the day-dreams of Dumouriez seems to have disconcerted the old general, who apparently did not reply. Wellington, however, resumed the correspondence thirteen months later by sending him an encouraging letter. Now that the mighty blow of Salamanca (July 22, 1812) had shaken the French domination to its base and enabled Wellington to enter Madrid in triumph, Dumouriez' prophecies of June, 1811, seemed capable of fulfilment, and

[1] Blake, a general of Irish extraction, in the Spanish service.
[2] Wellington, *Dispatches*, VIII, p. 238.

the duke reopened the discussion in the following way:—

"To General Dumouriez.

"Torquemada, *September 13th*, 1812.

"General,

"It is long since I wrote to you, for I knew that I could not tell you anything which you would not find in my dispatches. Well; now the siege of Cadiz is raised and Andalusia evacuated by the French, owing to a movement into Castile and the results of the battle of Salamanca. Everybody seems to want to muster in Valencia; and while their plans develop, and while General Hill's corps advance from Estremadura and the Spaniards reunite, I will chase the parts of Marmont's army from the Douro and will drive them as far away as possible. I will also seek to establish a good communication between the Anglo-Portuguese divisions that must be left here, and the Galician army, so as to be sure of my left when I have pushed on towards Valencia.[1]

"The capture of Madrid has been a very advantageous stroke politically and in a military sense. It has done us very much good, and, I think, has brought about the evacuation of Andalusia.

"I must however beg all of you in England not to fly too fast. Of trained troops fit to oppose the French I have only the Anglo-Portuguese army. As to the rest, I am satisfied if they do not get themselves annihilated. That is all I ask of them. But you must perceive that one cannot speedily achieve great things with such a disparity of force."

"I have, &c.,

"Wellington."[2]

[1] For various reasons Wellington was unable to make this move.

[2] *Dispatches*, Vol. IX, p. 424.

The following is Dumouriez' reply:—

"*December 27th*, 1812.

"MY LORD,

"I received two days ago the detailed letter which you wrote me on the 3rd [13th?]. I expected it from your friendship and from the confidence which naturally subsists between two men of the same profession who understand one another. My flight was not too swift after your victory at Salamanca and your entry into Madrid. If at that time Ballesteros had not stopped at Granada and had marched on Alcazar, as you deemed necessary and as I myself had pointed out in my previous notes, he could have joined the corps of Elio, come into touch with General Hill, and eased the movements of the army of Alicante.[1] And though that would not have hindered the final union of King Joseph and Soult, yet these last could not have advanced into Castile without first destroying that threatening force in their rear and on their left flank; and this delay would have given you time to take Burgos. After that, no general junction of the enemy's forces could have taken place except beyond the River Ebro. For be sure that, even according to the orders of their Government, the plan of the French generals was to evacuate Spain as far as the Ebro, disputing the way step by step along the perpendicular from Vittoria to Toledo for the utmost length of time.[2] Also they would not have formed the bold plan of uniting against you, but for these three circumstances—(1) the prolonged siege of Burgos, (2) the disobedience of Ballesteros, (3) and the feeble attempt at reinforcement from Sicily, which was made in Catalonia and at Lake Albufera (this last having been well divined and forestalled by Suchet), re-

[1] These notes have been lost.

[2] The French never thought of evacuating central Spain. Soult even wished to hold on to Andalusia.

sulting from its landing at Alicanté and its forced inaction. Concerning its uselessness in that remote position you say not a word.[1]

"Let us leave past events. My conjectures might be unjust or at least rash, because only the general on the spot, if he possesses your talents, can form a sure judgment. Of these three conjectures, there is only one which concerns you directly. I see, as you do, that it was very important to make sure of Burgos. But could you in the first place merely blockade that castle from the city, continue the pursuit of the French by way of Brivesca right to the Ebro, so as to complete the destruction of that army, and during that rapid march bring up siege guns from Ciudad Rodrigo, Madrid or Badajoz, and afterwards return to carry on the siege in the full assurance that, even with the reinforcement of ten thousand *conscripts* from France, that army would not within a month have been in a fit state to come to raise the siege?

"My reply is that if you did not take this course it was because you could not, and you were the sole judge of that. Certain it is that the length of this irregular siege and the fine defence of the governor gave time for the two French armies in the north to receive reinforcements and resume the offensive, and for Soult and [King] Joseph to plan and effect the general rally which has forced you to draw back in order to take up a firm defensive, the whole conduct of which bespeaks the consummate general.

"Your campaign has been none the less brilliant, or the effects of it the less solid; and if the Spaniards merely make feints in Castile; if the army at Alicante, strongly reinforced, makes an offensive move into the kingdom of Valencia, the French generals will either separate once more in order to prevent the projected attack from the east, or they will

[1] Maitland, with 600 British troops, had landed at Alicante early in August, but effected nothing.

keep together, not, however, in front of you, for 100,000 men could not exist in a mass during the winter in the two Castiles, one of which would be threatened and disputed by the two armies of Alicante and Andalusia, while the other is exhausted by the guerillas as well as by your sojourn and retreat. Or, again, they will keep together to await orders from their master who has reached Paris.[1] But then this collected mass would take up its winter quarters *en front de bandière* behind the Ebro, according to the first plan, make use of that time to clear the guerrillas out of Biscay, Navarre, and Arragon, and to subdue Catalonia.

"My dear Lord, our Government has done grievously wrong to this last province in compelling the Spanish Government discourteously to recall the Duke of Orleans from Catalonia, when it had summoned him to command there. Tarragona and Tortosa would not have been taken so quickly.[2] And by an active diversion in the east the Prince would have supported your plans in the centre and west. I am sure that the fault is not yours, and that perhaps you never received the memorandum which I sent to your brother [the Marquis Wellesley] for you, and which I also forwarded by indirect means to Castaños, who, like a good Spaniard, will not have mentioned it to you.

"Since this first blunder Catalonia has always been neglected, despite the staunch heroism of its inhabitants, and it will perhaps be utterly subdued before the spring-time, when the army at Alicante will either be sent thither by sea or will try to reach it by the right bank of the

[1] Macdonald in his *Souvenirs* remarked that the more territory the French sought to hold in Spain the more their difficulties multiplied. Napoleon, leaving the wreck of his Grand Army at Smorgoni in Lithuania, hurried on incognito to Paris, where he arrived on December 18.

[2] Suchet captured Tortosa on January 2, 1811, and Tarragona on June 21, 1811.

Ebro, though Tortosa, Tarragona, Gerona, and Lerida will make this latter course exceedingly difficult.

"Meanwhile you are about to take your winter quarters. They cannot, I believe, be in any way disturbed. The French will be too engrossed by events north of the Pyrenees, or perhaps the greater part of their army will be recalled, as it is the only veteran force within reach of Buonaparte, and he may need it either to keep order in France or impose on the 130,000 conscripts; or, after strengthening it, he may impose new taxes and begin a great campaign either in the north against the Russians or in the south-west against you.

"The decision formed by the Corsican during the winter will determine the fate of your next campaign and of Spain. You have three months before you, and assuredly you will make good use of them by placing the Anglo-Portuguese army on a respectable footing. So in any case you will effectively defend Portugal, or at least Lisbon and Cadiz. But, if your title of *Generalissimo* is not merely honorary, if you do not succeed in organizing the Spaniards, you can do nothing outside Portugal."[1]

Dumouriez concludes by expressing a poor opinion of the Spanish generals, Ballesteros and Elio, even of Castaños and the army of Galicia. Over that army Wellington ought to have complete control, so that it may defend his left during his advance in the spring.

In his reply of February 3rd, 1813, Wellington assured Dumouriez that the Duke of Orleans was summoned to Spain in order to carry out a wild plan of the Spanish Regency for leading a force, mainly composed of Frenchmen, against the French frontier. The young duke dis-

[1] Wellington was proclaimed generalissimo of the Spanish armies in November, 1812.

embarked at Tarragona, began his task badly, was very coldly received, then re-embarked and went to Cadiz. The British had no hand in this affair; but the continuance of the Duke of Orleans in Spain would soon have ruined his reputation. The Marquis Wellesley had warned him what would come to pass, and neither supported nor opposed his views. The rebuff to that excellent young man was not the fault of the British Government.[1]

Such is all that can be known of this curious episode in the life of the future King of France. Evidently Dumouriez watched closely over his interests and felt the slight keenly. There are no letters of the years 1813 and 1814 between Wellington and Dumouriez, except one from the former, of August 16th, 1813, in which he describes the rout of Soult and his narrow escape from complete capture near the Bidassoa.[2] From the correspondence of Dumouriez with Nicholas Vansittart we know that this note was duly acknowledged, but the reply has been lost.

After the expulsion of Soult's army from Spain, the interest of events centres chiefly in the campaign of the allies in Saxony against Napoleon. There, as is well known, Austria joined her forces to those of Russia and Prussia, while Bernadotte, now Prince-Royal of Sweden, led a large force of Swedes and North Germans against Napoleon from the side of Berlin. No figure in the Allied Grand Army aroused more interest than that of the French general Moreau. Fortunately Dumouriez had correspondence with his aide-de-camp, Rapatel, as well as with the Austrian general Armfeldt and another officer named Bock. His correspondence with Nicholas Van-

[1] Wellington, *Dispatches*, X, p. 79.
[2] *Ibid.*, XI, p. 7.

sittart, Chancellor of the Exchequer, gives frequent glimpses into affairs at that interesting time, and sometimes supplements his letters to Wellington. Thus on September 2nd, 1813, he writes to Vansittart :—

". . . I pray you to read my reply to my excellent Wellington, to seal it and forward it to him as soon as possible. I find him more sanguine than I myself am as to the hope of the invasion of France. If the capture of St. Sebastian takes the whole of September, as is possible, owing to the strength of that place, I think he will be compelled to limit all attempts at invading France in this year to guerilla raids, and to defer to next year all attacks on a greater scale. But he can use the winter in *walling* [*murer*] the gates of the Pyrenees, and leaving open only those that he can defend until he makes use of them for the offensive."[1]

In his next letter to Vansittart, of September 28th, 1813, he inquires his opinion on his (Dumouriez') advice to Wellington respecting the use to be made of the British army then in Sicily. He then refers to the defeat of the allies by Napoleon at Dresden and the death of Moreau :—

"I have received some details about the Russian army, but by belated letters which only come up to the 14th of August, the time when the three sovereigns met in order to attempt the *coup de main* against Dresden. Verily they took the bull by the horns and were badly mauled. Unfortunately the worthy Moreau has been a victim of this rashness, which he certainly did not advise. His is an enormous loss, especially in its effect on public opinion, which had come to confide in him exclusively. He cer-

[1] In Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., No. 31,230, which contains all the letters, etc., following, up to the end of 1813.

tainly had very great talents and a very estimable character; but in the sequel he would have found many obstacles in the persons whom he was called to guide.

"Happily Buonaparte and still more his lieutenants have on their side committed enormous follies which have everywhere met with punishment. With their backs to the Elbe along its whole course, they cannot possibly defend it beyond the end of September;[1] and after Bernadotte crosses it between Wittenberg and Magdeburg, and the Austrians advance on the Saale, while Blücher threatens Dresden in front, Buonaparte will be forced to retire to the Thuringerwald and Erfurt. There it is that he will try to rally all his corps in order to try once more, perhaps, the fate of a battle, the only chance remaining to him, and the very one which ought not to be left to him. I await tidings more direct and important than those now before me. I shall not have them so soon from Rapatel, who is plunged in grief. I count on coming to you on Friday between 11 a.m. and noon, as I have many interesting things to speak of and am weary of not seeing you."

Ultimately Napoleon did retreat to the Erfurt line of defence, but only after sustaining such serious losses at the battle of Leipzig (October 16th–19th), as to make it impossible for him to hold the Thuringian Forest. Dumouriez in his next letters to Vansittart refers to one which he had just received from Moreau, but this unfortunately has not been recovered.

"*October 7th*, 1813.

"SIR AND DEAR FRIEND,

"Here is a letter that I received yesterday, which has made me shed tears. This mark of friendship of

[1] Davoust commanded the entrenched French camp at Hamburg. Other generals held the intermediate fortresses up to the camp of Pirna above Dresden.

Moreau in the midst of his difficulties has touched me. A fortnight later he was no more, and his death was accompanied by a great defeat of the Allies. I do not doubt that, if he had not been mortally wounded, he would not have remained after the failure of the assault of the 26th under the walls of Dresden to await the battle of the 27th, [but] that he would have drawn off the army after the night of the 26th into the camp of Pirna, whence Buonaparte could not have dislodged him. It was so great a good fortune to have near at hand this impregnable camp of Pirna, that its preservation would have finished the campaign on the Elbe in eight days. Consider also that at that same time Blücher and Bernadotte[1] had had brilliant successes. See what store Buonaparte now lays on this camp of Pirna, which he had had the stupidity to dismantle, and which he now makes the main pivot of his movements, both offensive and defensive. . . ."

"*October* 13*th*, 1813.

"SIR AND DEAR FRIEND,

"You are right in keeping for some time Moreau's letter to send to your colleagues. It is not merely a curiosity in itself: it deserves to be read attentively. It was written at Berlin under the eyes of Bernadotte, and may be looked on as expressing the views of the two principal military heads of the Coalition. Inform me on what day of next week you will receive me, as usual between 11 a.m. and noon. I will impart to you my opinions and conjectures respecting this letter, and the spirit which dictated it: then you will give it back to me. I send you, as you requested, a fine memorandum for Lord Castlereagh."

[1] Blücher routed Macdonald at the Katzbach in Upper Silesia on August 26; and Bernadotte, or rather his lieutenant Bülow, beat Reynier at Grossbeeren south of Berlin on August 23.

The memorandum was on the need of an expedition to Italy, of which the following *précis* may be given here:—

More than six years ago, in tracing the general plan of operations to be followed in the war against Buonaparte, I pointed out the importance of making a great diversion in Italy. It should be effected through the kingdoms of Sardinia and Sicily. If helped by small subsidies and British squadrons, those potentates could powerfully influence the course of events. The King of Sardinia especially 'must by force of circumstances become the true protector of the liberty of Italy and the warder of the Alps, an object which his predecessors have always coveted and never attained.' This perpetual ambition of the House of Savoy is invariably in accord with the healthy policy of England, whose interest it is that Italy shall be delivered from every ultramontane domination, and that the Kings of Sardinia and Sicily in the north and south shall be the two steadfast columns of its liberty.

If, instead of sending the small Anglo-Sicilian force to Spain last summer, it had been sent to the Roman or Tuscan coast, good would have resulted instead of failure or even shame. It is now a duty to our new ally, Austria, to make a diversion on the west coast between Naples and Spezzia, so as to weaken and distract the Viceroy, Eugène Beauharnais, in the defence of the kingdom; 20,000 or 25,000 men would suffice there while the Austrians are using double those numbers in the north. Lord William Bentinck's force in Sicily should be increased and disciplined for such a diversion, in which the Sicilians and Neapolitans will find profit and glory and forget their feuds.

"GENERAL DUMOURIEZ.

"*Endorsed October 13th*, 1813."

Dumouriez' next two letters to Vansittart comment on the progress of the allies in Germany and the south of France. He also refers to letters which he is sending to Baron Suchselen, Russian commissioner in Bernadotte's army, at Vansittart's request. The letters to Vansittart explain themselves. That dealing with German affairs gives suggestive hints as to the solution of that complex problem.

"*November 29th*, 1813.

"SIR AND DEAR FRIEND,

"Our affairs are going very well everywhere. I am no longer disturbed about Holland, knowing that Winzingerode reached Amersfoort [in Utrecht] on the 23rd, and your troops are also entering with the Prince of Orange. There will be at once 30,000 to 40,000 men for the defence of the Meuse, without counting the Dutch; and Bernadotte will have time to come up. Wellington on his side is in France very opportunely. His invasion, which I did not approve until I knew of the flight of Buonaparte and the rising in Holland, now seems to me very wise and most suitable; for there is no fear of an attack from Suchet in Catalonia. On the contrary, he will be recalled to France, instead of being reinforced from Toulon and Italy as I feared.

. . . . . .

"Nothing is at once so easy and so difficult as to make the best arrangement for Germany. The difficulty which ought, as a preliminary step, to be removed, lies in the principles on which the constitution of the future Germanic Empire is to be based.

"If the old constitution is revived (and it is only favourable to the chief), the sovereignty of the clergy will be perpetuated along with the three ecclesiastical Electorates, the ecclesiastical rulers, and the Order (*banc*) of the Im-

mediate Nobles.[1] Then there is no hope of anything good; and this vicious constitution will bring back the abuses, the weakness, and the internal wars of that crass and monstrous federation.

"If in order to perfect the union of Germany an agreement is formed to modify that Empire,

"(1) Three lay electors will replace the three ecclesiastical electors; and without attacking religion, all sovereignty of the clergy, bishops, abbés, chapters, etc., will be suppressed; and it is out of these sovereign powers that the portions will be forthcoming for the purpose, not of equalizing, but of at least rendering proportionate the fifteen or sixteen sovereign states which will form the Germanic Federation;

"(2) The Order of Immediate Nobles will likewise be suppressed, since that is already quite settled; and these lords of all kinds will be subjects in their respective states;

"(3) The three Hanse towns, Hamburg, Lübeck, and Bremen, will be free, as well as Frankfurt, the place of assembly of the Germanic Diet.

". . . We will speak of all this on Wednesday.

"DUMOURIEZ."

"*December 13th*, 1813.

"SIR AND DEAR FRIEND,

[He expresses a wish to go on a mission to the allied sovereigns, or one of them; but if it were judged inexpedient by Lord Castlereagh, he would go as a traveller without any ostensible mission.]

"The Prince of Orange has been declared a sovereign. It is a great step, and entirely in the interest of England. But it may prove to be a dangerous challenge to arms if there is not assured to him an extension of territory which may strengthen a title insignificant and even perilous if

[1] The Immediate Nobles were those who owned allegiance to no sovereign but the Emperor. They were all "mediatized" by 1806.

he remains limited to the seven provinces. With respect to what may be suitable, I see only the ten Belgic provinces.[1] Only by negotiation and with goodwill on both sides can they be withdrawn from the House of Austria, and compensated for by an equivalent which is naturally to be found in the two ecclesiastical electorates of Cologne and Trèves, and replacing these electorates by the two lay electorates of Hesse and Würtemberg. This arrangement would suit everybody, and as the suppression would only concern *des terres mainmortables*, it would not injure any hereditary possession.

"Such is my opinion, on which I will speak with you when we meet. Tell me on what day I may usefully visit you. I do not speak to you of anything else. I am sorry to see so many sovereigns meeting at Frankfurt. It is a case of too many workmen of different tongues. I fear the confusion of the Tower of Babel."

The width of Dumouriez' interests is evinced by his next memorandum to Vansittart, which deals with Africa and the suppression of slavery. He gives extracts from the letters of General Stevenson on this subject in 1804–6 and 1811, proving the importance which he and the ministers attached to the possession of parts of Africa. He comments on these letters, and adds :—

"I draw to a close these remarks on 'The Plan to ameliorate Africa,' and to utilize it by alliances and treaties with the different sovereigns of its interior and by commercial posts, which will introduce a moral and religious civilization and will stimulate industry in the working of the fertile soil of that country, only the coasts of which are known. These are the most barren parts, where our trade has for ages been of a kind tending to

[1] These were added in 1814, and lost by the Belgic Revolution of 1830.

perpetuate slavery and all its resulting evils. It is England which has had the glory of being the first to ensure the triumph of the cause of humanity, by abolishing the slave trade, and by propagating our beneficent religion. To complete this glorious work, and at the same time reap its fruits, we must open a way between the coast and this great and as yet unknown realm of the interior, neither by conquests, which never produce any good, nor by colonial settlements, always ruinous for the people which sends them out and burdensome to that which receives them, but rather by the opening of roads for the safety and ease of the transport and exchange of wares between the Africans and ourselves, so that mutual interest and reciprocal benefits may in a natural way form a social tie. Then the Africans will bless the nation which will have brought them all the advantages of civilization without imposing on them the evils of slavery or even the yoke of an unjust domination."[1]

Dumouriez' letters to Vansittart in the fateful year 1814, which was soon to see the downfall of Napoleon, begin with the suggestion that the Bourbon princes ought to be allowed to proceed to France so as to raise the royal standard against the usurper. The Duke of Orleans would be well employed in Italy in campaigning with his intimate friend Lord Bentinck—"It would be an act of injustice if the other Bourbon princes are allowed to appear in the other armies, nay, it would be impolitic to exclude from them the prince who is the most capable."[2] A week later, that is on January 22nd, he says that the Comte d'Artois should go to Switzerland and raise there the

[1] At the end of the Add. MSS. 31,230. Would that the exploitation of Africa had always proceeded on these lines.

[2] All Dumouriez' letters to Vansittart of the year 1814 are in Add. MSS. Nos. 31, 231.

twelve regiments always at the service of the Kings of France. He also refers to the sharp censure of Bernadotte by Blücher, and other disputes at the allied head-quarters during the late campaign, as described by a correspondent.

Amidst the exciting changes of the winter campaign in Champagne, Dumouriez again found time to refer (February 18th) to the scheme for ameliorating Africa, which evidently lay near to his heart. He says that the plan was discussed by the Addington Cabinet and was adopted by Pitt in his last ministry. It is now specially urgent; for Bonaparte, if brought to bay, might try to fling himself into Africa. He begs Vansittart to arrange for a conference with him, Stevenson, and Sullivan.

Nine days later he dwells on the madness of Blücher in rushing forward through Champagne in detachments which were deservedly crushed piecemeal. Still worse was the torpor of the Austrian Grand Army. Advices from a friend at their head-quarters at Arcis-sur-Aube showed the distrust of Prussia and Russia there prevalent: "Monsieur le Grandpère [i.e. Francis II] sings the song of Metternich, who is now our worst enemy. Pay him in the English way, and you will have him in your pocket. The Emperor Alexander behaves like an angel; he alone sustains the whole fabric. I should like to say more, but Mr. Robinson is leaving." The name of the informant is not given. Possibly it was Gentz.

On March 9th Dumouriez refers to news received direct from Rapatel, Moreau's aide-de-camp, who was soon to share the fate of his master; also to advices received from Lord Burghersh and Colonel Lowe (afterwards Sir Hudson Lowe) at the head-quarters of the Grand Army. Six days later he inquires indignantly whether the Allies

intend to patch up peace, also leaving the South of Italy to the turncoat, Murat. After receiving the news of Wellington's triumph at Orthez, he renews his advice never again to treat with "Buonaparte." Writing again to Vansittart on April 7th, when the French Emperor was dealing that daring blow at the communications of the Allies, which the Czar and Blücher foiled by marching on Paris, Dumouriez referred, firstly, to the danger of a Bourbon Restoration if accompanied by no safeguards for the cause of liberty, and secondly, to Napoleon's probable course of action. The letter reveals remarkable foresight.

"I hope that the Provisional Government at Paris will send Deputies to Louis XVIII to invite him to come amongst his people. His complete restoration is, in my judgment, assured; but I ardently hope that for his own safety, for the peace of Europe and the welfare of France, he will reign by virtue of a well constructed constitution. For if, while lifting up the cart, it is thrown over on the other side (that is, if from the despotism of Napoleon one falls into the arbitrary rule of the Bourbons), it is to be feared Revolutions will begin again as soon as the Allies depart. Unfortunately the Court at Hartwell is dangerous in this respect, not by its strength but by its pretensions.[1] All will depend on the manner in which Louis XVIII will behave when he presents himself on his native soil. On this subject I can only form wishes. My age, principles and character prescribe the duty of holding aloof. For ten years I have devoted all my physical and moral energies to my second fatherland, England.

"Let us turn to Buonoparte. For a month past all

[1] Louis XVIII resided at Hartwell.

his plans have been marked by folly. He had it in his power to make the most sure and lasting peace, keeping all his authority over France, and even afterwards carrying out all the plans of his insatiable ambition, if only he would defer them, seeing that his conscience is too elastic to bid him regard treaties of peace as sacred, whenever the Allies departed, or should have disarmed or be in conflict—a contingency easy to foresee by a Machiavellian more profound and less atrocious than he is."

Dumouriez then says that Buonaparte's best plan would be either (1) to throw himself into the strongholds of the East of France and menace the communications of the Allies; or (2) fall on the Austrians, drive them back through Burgundy, then re-pass the Seine, rally Joseph's forces near Paris, recall Soult, Suchet, and Augereau, and form an army of nearly 150,000 men in the middle of France. The Empress Marie Louise might cause trouble if she went and interceded with her father, the Emperor Francis II, on Napoleon's behalf.

On May 19th, five weeks after Napoleon had abdicated and departed for Elba, Dumouriez surveys the difficulties in the way of Louis XVIII. He declares that the new monarch must break up the Imperial Guard, or establish it on a new footing before the crowd of prisoners return.[1] Otherwise, on the departure of the Allies, there will be a war of gladiators, and many a Spartacus will come forward.

He hopes that England, if she restores Senegal to France, will retain Goree, an essential point for the command of that coast. He also sends to Vansittart an

[1] It was they who formed the bulk of Napoleon's army in 1815.

extract from a letter in French (unsigned), dated Paris, May 10th, 1814.

"It is of the utmost importance for England to redouble the vigilance of her watch on the Isle of Elba, because the *whole* of the powerful French army asks nothing better than to replace the Corsican on the throne, and already declares its intention without reserve. The legitimate interest of the King, and even more that of the nation, are in direct opposition to the desires and customs of the army. . . . Paris is a detestable sink of depravity and perversity. After twenty-five years of revolution and misfortune one would have expected the eyes of this fickle and senseless crowd to be opened. But no. It is enamoured of immorality, extravagance, and violence. We shall scarcely leave Paris without seeing forthwith a revolt of the army. . . ."

As Dumouriez doubtless expected, the British Government paid no heed to this clear and emphatic warning about Elba. One sloop, the *Partridge*, was left there. The result is well known: the imperial eagle easily escaped, and the outcome was the Waterloo campaign.

Dumouriez's letters in the rest of the year 1814 are tinged with a certain irony and bitterness. He notes that the royalist reaction in France meets with little or no opposition, owing to the frivolity and love of pleasure of the French people, who evidently "cannot appreciate reasoned liberty"; and he thinks that, after all, the King may be acting for the best in founding a paternal despotism. On August 31st he requests an interview with Vansittart for the discussion of continental affairs, including "the canonization of the good martyr, Louis XVI, who works miracles, attestations of which have just been

sent to Rome"; also "the re-establishment of the Jesuits in France." But sooner or later his love for France re-asserts itself. He observes the signs of unrest. On September 18th he refers to a "Warning on Liberty of the Press," just sent him by its compiler, his old friend Macdonald, who is "as frank a citizen as he is a good general: he does not mince matters." By the end of the year it is clear that mischief is brewing.

Turning to personal matters, we ask, Why did not Dumouriez' friends seek to procure his recall to France with honour? One alone seems to have made any noteworthy effort. Marshal Macdonald showed the staunchness of his friendship with Dumouriez by pleading in the Chamber of Peers in favour of "the victor of Jemappes." But his attempt failed, probably owing to the hostility of Louis XVIII. The causes of this hostility are obscure. Croker at a much later date was informed by Louis Philippe that it dated from their meeting at Mittau in 1800, when Louis XVIII, then an exile in Russia, promised to Dumouriez the rank of brigadier-general at the forthcoming Restoration, an act of condescension which the latter rather warmly repulsed.[1]

It seems scarcely possible that for so small a cause even Louis XVIII, petty and pedantic as he was, could have continued to frown on a man whose zeal for constitutional royalty had been his undoing. But some light is thrown on this affair by the following correspondence, which Dumouriez enclosed to Vansittart on March 24th, 1815, shortly after the return of Napoleon to the Tuileries in

[1] Croker's *Diary*, Vol. III, p. 208. His informant, the ex-King, Louis Philippe, added that in 1814 Louis XVIII forbade Dumouriez' name to be mentioned to him again.

triumph. After informing Vansittart that he had foreseen this catastrophe, he states that he had been reproached by his French friends for not accompanying Louis XVIII on his return to *la patrie* in 1814. They had addressed themselves to the Duke of Orleans—"my friend, and under obligation to me during twenty years"—and had "forced" him to appeal to the King on Dumouriez' behalf.

"The result is explained herewith in the correspondence of the Duke of Orleans with me. This rather awkward step had been taken almost without my knowledge, and without my bringing it about or having any part in it. My refusal was formal, and I had ceased to think of it for two months, when on the 11th of March I heard of the disembarkation of Buonaparte and his march on Lyons. I thought it my duty as a Frenchman, a general, and former minister, to send at once to the King the short letter that la Châtre sent off by his courier the same day. I knew all the danger and foresaw the fatal issue; but I devoted myself and satisfied my feelings. My plan was, whether success or disgrace followed, not to break up my establishment at Ealing, but to return at once to live and die amidst my kind and esteemed friends the English. I imparted this to the Duke of York (whom I dare to call my constant friend), to the Regent, and both approved my conduct. . . ."

He then encloses extracts from letters of the Duke of Orleans and his reply.

EXTRACTS from letters of the Duke of Orleans to Dumouriez

"*December 8th*, 1814.

"The King will be quite pleased that General Dumouriez should return to France. But as his age does not

permit him to take active service, the King does not see how he could usefully employ him. Therefore it would only remain to give him a pension; and as it would not approach what he receives in England, it would be one misfortune the more for him. That is what Monsieur [the Comte d'Artois] said to me. It remains to hear what M. de Blacas will say."

"*December* 14*th*, 1814.

"The King has authorized me to inform you that if you wish to return to France you are at liberty to do so; and that although His Majesty knows very well that you cannot take active service at your age, yet you shall enjoy the pay and rations of a Lieutenant-General in service."

REPLY of Dumouriez to the Duke of Orleans.

"*January* 3*rd*, 1815.

"You are well enough acquainted with my character, Monseigneur, to judge (as you indeed foresee in your two letters) that this arrangement proposed by M. de Blacas in the name of the King cannot be suitable for me. Firstly, because he declares me invalided and incapable of any useful service for my King and country. So I should be only a burden, receiving the obolus of Belizarius. I believe that you do not share this idea of my decrepitude; nor do I. The English Government, the princes, the nation think differently about me, and I respect their opinion. The fact is that I am as sound in body and mind as Kutusoff, Blücher, and even the Count de Viomenil. Therefore the bread that I earn honourably is preferable to what is offered me as an alms.

"Secondly, I think I have merited the *eternal* gratitude of my nation, and therefore the recompense of the King. They can, without causing any one in France to grumble, make me a marshal. The English have expected this, as

you have seen by the letter of the Duke of York. Even supposing that I were no longer fit to bear the fatigues of war, my varied education, my knowledge of languages, of nations, of political and military affairs, and my long experience, would open up for the King other careers in order to benefit by my vigorous old age. I might be placed in the Chamber of Peers.

"Thus there were two ways open to the King of bringing me back honourably to my country—either the bâton of a marshal or the Chamber of Peers. Then I should not hesitate to go and throw myself at the feet of the best and justest of kings and to consecrate to him the remainder of my life."

Undoubtedly Dumouriez resented this ingratitude, and he must also have felt that the Duke of Orleans had done very little on his behalf. He may have shown this feeling to his former *protégé*, and thus have weakened the ties that had bound them so long. Gratitude is not a virtue common among princes, least of all in the House of Orleans; and probably we have here the explanation of the very strange silence which the future King of the French always observed about the general who had sought to further his interests in every possible way.

Dumouriez' freedom from rancour is seen in the following letter to Louis XVIII:—

"*March* 11*th*, 1815.

"SIRE,

"I beg Your Majesty to do me the favour to accept my services, and to do me the honour to send me your orders promptly, and to be assured that I aspire to nothing more than to live and die for the best of kings and for my country."

To this generous offer Louis XVIII seems to have sent

no reply; and this silence of his sovereign severed another link which had connected him with France.

Nevertheless Dumouriez evinced the greatest eagerness for his restoration, as will appear from the contents of the following chapter.

CHAPTER XVI

BEFORE AND AFTER WATERLOO

The surest way to prevent Seditions (if the Times doe bear it) is to take away the *Matter* of them."—BACON.

THE fertility of Dumouriez' brain is nowhere more remarkable than in the weeks before and after Waterloo. He was then in his seventy-sixth year; but in the number and ingenuity of his plans he still evinced the freshness of youth. He had done his duty by warning the British Government of the need of watching Elba closely. The warning was disregarded; but with vision undimmed by disappointment, he sought to foresee the course of events and thus to hasten the restoration of royalty in France in a form which would better meet the needs of the age. The first of his Memoranda for the British Government bears date April 17th. He enclosed it in a letter to an unnamed friend (probably Vansittart), asking him to send it to Lord Castlereagh. He also assured him that his friend and hero, Wellington, would certainly make use of it. This Memorandum, setting forth the supreme importance of Switzerland, may be thus summarized.[1]

Switzerland is the most essential point of offence and defence for France. It is a citadel commanding Italy,

[1] Apsley House Archives.

central France, Bavaria, Swabia. If France gained it now (as Frederick gained Saxony in 1756) the war would change entirely in character, becoming offensive and therefore advantageous for France while defensive and disadvantageous for the Allies. Its seizure would suit the genius of the modern Agathocles, and the plan is feasible, as the Swiss frontier is very long; moreover, that confederation is ill cemented, and several cantons regret Buonaparte's supremacy; these would join a French army. The restless state of Italy would favour such a plan. Murat, despite his protestations, would probably join Buonaparte and bring eighty thousand men to help him, by invading Venetia and Lombardy, which would gladly receive him and would form a Kingdom of Italy, chasing away the King of Sardinia. Switzerland is the keystone of this gigantic edifice, proportioned to the genius and daring of Buonaparte and Murat. That land must therefore be looked to first of all by the Allies; and its defence must not be left to the Swiss militia alone. Buonaparte is assembling a strong corps at Altkirk, near Bâsle; and Suchet has a force at Lyons. Murat is assembling his army and fleet at Ancona, probably for efforts against Venice or Trieste.

Therefore the Allies should act as follows:—(1) Assemble the army of the S. E. at Bâsle. (2) A strong Austrian division ought to march by way of St. Gall and Schaffhausen to protect Geneva. (3) The Swiss Diet must be compelled to adhere to the European League, and doubtful troops must be disarmed, e.g. those of Aargau and Vaud. (4) The Piedmontese army (supported by an Austrian corps) must assemble near Mount St. Bernard, to occupy the Department of Mont Blanc. (5) An Austrian force should march into Piedmont to operate in Provence and Dauphiné. (6) The Austrians should quickly occupy Lombardy and Venice. (7) An English squadron should blockade Ancona and cover Venice.

By these means the seizure of Switzerland, by Buonaparte may be forestalled without deranging the general plans of the Allies.

A week later we find Dumouriez writing to Vansittart that Murat had gone over to Napoleon's side, as might have been expected, and that Suchet in the South East of France would probably come into touch with him. Together they would occupy Piedmont and Switzerland, thus absorbing all the attention of the Austrian forces. For once, Dumouriez was too apprehensive; he could not however, know what we know, that Napoleon utterly distrusted Murat after his recent defection. But for this it is quite possible that the campaign of 1815 might have turned largely on the possession of Piedmont and Switzerland. Another defect, however, in Dumouriez' reasoning is that Napoleon could not have ventured far away from Paris without leaving that city open to the fatal blow which brought ruin on him in 1814. Dumouriez' anxiety to be of service to the Allies also appears in the following letter to Vansittart (Brit. Mus., Add MSS. 31, 231), written doubtless at Ealing:—

May 1, 1815.

"I am cast down when I do not find you at home. I cannot journey to London and back at a less expense than thirty shillings; and I cannot afford to repeat this expense often. However, I believe it would be useful to see you twice or four times a month, at least until military operations begin. Whilst I lived at Gunnersbury, Lord Camden gave me a 'gratification' of £200 to cover this expense. Speak of this to Lord Castlereagh, who has always shown me marks of esteem and good will, especially last year at your recommendation; £300 now

would enable me to serve you, not with more zeal, but with more effect. I proffer this request to the benevolence of Lord Castlereagh and to your friendship. Answer me on this matter."

A little later, in a letter to Wellington, we catch a glimpse of an ambitious scheme of a mission to the allied sovereigns. In the covering letter to Vansittart, Dumouriez informs that statesman that he hopes to benefit by it personally, as he means to press Metternich to renew the Austrian pension accorded to him in 1800, for advice on the reorganization of that army. He adds that in 1807, on the change in Austria's policy, he had refused to receive it any more. He now regretted this *coup de tête*, and felt the need of a second pension, which would assure him comforts in his old age. The letter to the Duke of Wellington is more important. The modes of address are given in the original French. The rest of the correspondence, here as elsewhere, is translated as literally as possible :—

"*May* 13*th*, 1815.

"MONSIEUR LE DUC,

"I make use of the departure of my friend, M. de Rosenhayn, who will be at the head of the finance department of my [*sic*] army, to renew the correspondence with you which for some years has been my happiness and my glory. I did not intend to write to you until you had begun the campaign, because I knew that Lord Castlereagh was in the habit of forwarding to you all the notes which my experience and my zeal for the common cause dictated. I know that he has also consulted you on the proposal made by me to the Government to undertake a journey of two or three months in the Low Countries to see you before you enter France, and to see also the King of the Netherlands, the King of Prussia, the Emperors of

Austria and Russia, and particularly Prince Metternich, with whom I have business that concerns me and is very important to my comfort.

"I have no claim, nor have I the desire, to be employed in a military capacity and to return to France with the allied armies, as I have renounced France and adopted England as my country. Moreover, you will see by my notes that have been sent to you I do not advise the presence of the French princes or an armed corps of *émigrés* among the allied armies, because I, more than any one, have seen the evil wrought by their presence in Champagne [*i.e.* in 1792]. It is in the north-west, west, and south that they can and ought to be employed profitably; and I am sure that you will be persuaded of the desirability of sending them thither by sea at the time when you begin to move; for there would also be some drawback in letting them assemble in the Netherlands after your departure. Their presence, and, I venture to say, their indiscretion would chafe public opinion there.

"The diversions that might be undertaken far away from the scene of operations of the Allies, if the princes of the blood placed themselves at the head of numerous partisans, would contribute to diminish or weaken the following of Buonaparte, and thereby render this war less obstinate, and therefore less long and calamitous.[1]

"As for the venerable and unhappy Louis XVIII, his presence in the train of the Allies and in the midst of the calamities of such a war as this, would rouse against him the whole nation. He ought, like the queen bee, to appear without the sting. The only place befitting his dignity and interest during the campaign is at Frankfort, in the midst of the sovereigns armed for the overthrow of his unworthy rival.

[1] The French princes did not proceed to Brittany or la Vendée. Nevertheless the royalist rising there occupied several battalions of Napoleon's troops, enough to turn the scale at Waterloo.

"I wish, then, my heroic friend, to talk of all this with you, see once more the sovereigns who have honoured me with their esteem, and sojourn once more in a land which was formerly the arena of my exploits, and where I did nothing but good. In fine, I want to be as useful as I can at my age. You showed me so much interest and friendship on the occasion of which you availed yourself at Paris to benefit me, that I am fully convinced that you will give a favourable reply to the question put to you by the Ministry respecting my continental journey, which I will not undertake without the permission and help of the Government, just as in 1805 I was sent into Bohemia by Lord Castlereagh. Answer me, my Lord Duke, as soon as possible, and count on the lifelong, tender, and respectful attachment of your faithful servant,

"DUMOURIEZ."

The foregoing letter, along with the next, is not at Apsley House, but among the Vansittart MSS. at the British Museum [Add. MSS., No. 31, 231]:—

"*June 9th*, 1815.

"MON CHER DUC,

"I thank you for the promptitude with which you have replied to me and for your desire (so very honourable for me) of continuing our correspondence. You leave me uncertain as to the assurance that had been given me, that my Memorandum given in parts in the first days of April, as also my notes of April 17th and 24th, and May 4th, 6th, and 11th, had been sent to you direct, one after the other.[1]

"As to my wish to go to the Netherlands for two or three months, on which Lord Castlereagh was to have consulted you, I assure you it was founded on no claim of pushing myself forward and giving my opinions to any one but

[1] All these are missing.

yourself, whom I love and respect. I had to treat with Prince Metternich on an affair of great interest for me.

[The affair of the Austrian pension is then alluded to.]

"You are going soon to begin military operations, either offensive or defensive. Buonaparte has got rid of political obstacles by the farce of the Champ de Mai, which has not for a moment interrupted his formidable military preparations.[1] On the contrary, even this pageant has increased his strength, by nationalizing his measures. It is believed that the two Chambers will snarl at him and once more block his way. Unfortunately I cannot believe it. Though perhaps he may be annoyed at the composition of the Chamber of Peers, they are too guilty to work against him and too cowardly to oppose him in any dangerous way. As for the Chamber of Deputies, though in appearance chosen freely, they are cringing, vile dogs to whom he will fling a few bones to keep them quiet. Thus this clever rascal, by his astute Machiavellian ways, has mastered all the nation, bends it to his will, and will use it wholly for himself, without any faction being able to rear its head, at least until the allied armies cross the frontier.

"Thus, you cannot count on anything but your own forces and your promptitude in uniting them on a common centre, by marches combined precisely and with great efforts. It is against his regular army that you will propel them in the first instance, for this alone makes his real strength. The National Guards are a mass more imposing to appearance than reality; but it is a nursery of young soldiers who will enthusiastically recruit the regular army, if you do not win a decided success at the outset of the campaign.

"The first shock, then, is almost decisive; it is prepared for beforehand on both sides, and there is too little distance between the two headquarters for the assailant not

[1] At the Champ de Mai Napoleon promulgated the new constitution.

to compel his enemy almost at the first march to receive battle, for which both armies are prepared, drawing from nature and art all possible advantages in a country bristling with strong places which there is time to arrange, with intrenched camps, with rivers flowing parallel to a well-marked frontier bounded on the north-east by the sea, by channels, waterways, and swamps, and on the south-east by a forest which the French have had the time to make almost impassable.[1] I speak specially of the attacking position with which you are personally charged. It is that which occupies me specially. You will be obliged to employ more force than art to pierce this line, where you are waited for at all points; where you can neither surprise, nor deploy, nor turn the enemy before piercing this obstacle; where all your manœuvres are foreseen, and the defence is prepared beforehand.

"In truth, the manœuvre of the allied army of the centre, which will move simultaneously and almost within touch on your left, will occupy and distract a considerable part of the hostile forces, and will derive the same advantage from the movement of the third army which will make for Switzerland. Each of these three armies, being stronger than that which Buonaparte can oppose to it, must, of course, push on boldly with a great hope of success.

"This general and simultaneous movement would cause me great anxiety if you had not arranged the plan and were not directing the principal arm. But I have a complete confidence in my hero, who in all his campaigns has united boldness with prudence; and I await with more impatience than uneasiness the first downright blow which will perchance within three weeks decide the fate of France.[2]

"Whatever preparations Buonaparte has made to

[1] The Ardennes.

[2] It was decided within nine days of this letter.

defend his interior lines, and especially his capital, it is on his frontier that his resistance will be concentrated. . . ."

In another letter to the duke six days later he refers at the outset to a paper drawn up for the British ministry and for him (Wellington), whom he begs to place it direct in the hands of Louis XVIII. It was the fruit of his long experience, and was of the first importance for France; for "one cannot play this tragedy every year." Probably it referred to the entire reorganization of the French army after the overthrow of Napoleon. Dumouriez then gives some hints as to the way in which Napoleon is likely to attack the Allies in Belgium. The letter is in the Apsley House Archives, but without the note referred to above.

"*June 15th*, 1815.

"MONSIEUR LE DUC,

". . . If the French defend lines, you will pierce them. If they attack, or are attacked, in open country, their cavalry will not resist your superiority [in that arm].[1] But remember that his [Napoleon's] infantry is excellent; that his usual method is to form immediately strong columns at his centre to attack the enemy's centre, to pierce it, drive it apart, and then fall on one of the wings. He has successfully employed this manœuvre, which is not without its dangers, at Austerlitz, Marengo, Eylau, Fridberg [Friedland], Rivoli, Ercole [Arcola], and has always triumphed, because only lines have been opposed to his columns.[2]

"If I had to fight him, I would oppose this central attack by moderate-sized columns placed chequer-fashion,

[1] The French cavalry, though very recently reorganized, showed up far better at Waterloo than the writer expected. It must be remembered that Wellington had never met Napoleon in battle.

[2] Waterloo and several battles in the Peninsula falsified this contention.

so as to take each other's place, in case he forged ahead, without hindering the retirement of the beaten columns. Fifty or one hundred paces behind the intervals of my columns I would place separate squadrons of cavalry, especially lancers, so that they should be masked up to the time of the bayonet charge, and pour on the enemy through the intervals of the footmen; and I would distribute all my second line among the reserves, one part of it at right angles to the two lines so as to face the two flanks in case the enemy had broken through there. Pardon my boldness in setting these views before my hero.

"Your faithful "DUMOURIEZ."

This letter did not reach the Duke before Waterloo. It is curious that Dumouriez devised the plan of drawing up the defenders' battalions chequer-wise, though on June 18th they were early in the fight formed into squares instead of columns. His notion of placing parts of the reserves at right angles to the lines so as to check a successful onset on either flank is more ingenious than convincing. It would probably cause confusion, especially in case of a fierce attack on the centre.

On June 20th the Duke paid Dumouriez the compliment of briefly acknowledging his letters of the 9th and 15th (the latter of which he had just received), and stating that he would press his claim on Metternich.[1] The following is Dumouriez' letter written on receipt of the news of Waterloo:—

"*June 23rd*, 1815.

"MON CHER HÉROS,

"We are all intoxicated with joy here; and I more than any one, because I feel that your glory attaches me

[1] Wellington, *Dispatches*, XII, 490.

once more to life and ennobles the tender friendship with which you have inspired me. Your character as well as your merit have turned upon you all the ambition that I formerly cherished for myself; and they serve to link me with you.

"I know the scene of your victory, and I have followed on the map your modest, unaffected, and very concise account of it. Your heroic resistance on the 16th so astonished the impetuous Buonaparte that it paralysed his natural activity during the whole of the 17th, thus giving brave Blücher time during the night of the 16th to withdraw from his very risky position at Sombreff and to reach Wavre, where he was in touch with you.[1]

"Your retreat in full daylight on the 17th, and your position in front of Waterloo between Braine and Ohain, are masterpieces of the art of war. The junction of Blücher at Ohain during the battle and the threatening manœuvre of Bülow prove, as was abundantly illustrated in Spain, that your conciliatory spirit and the confidence inspired by your genius endow you with an invincible ascendancy over your colleagues and the various allied nations.[2]

"As you announce your advance for the 19th, I anticipate decisive results from your victory, and expect that Buonaparte will not rally many troops at Avesnes, whence he set out so boastfully on the 14th. The false bulletin of his pretended victory on the 16th will ruin him in the

[1] Dumouriez did not know all the facts. Napoleon's delay on the 17th, up to about eleven o'clock, was due to the arrival of irritating parliamentary news from Paris, and to his belief that he had utterly crushed the Prussians.

[2] The writer could not of course know that the slowness of the Prussian advance was largely due to the *suspicions* which Gneisenau, Prussian Chief of Staff, harboured against Wellington. See the Essay on "The Co-operation of the Prussians at Waterloo" in *Napoleonic Studies*, by Dr. J. Holland Rose.

Bülow led the leading Prussian corps and attacked Planchenoit near the rear of the French right wing.

opinion of the Parisians, and public opinion now becomes your potent ally in completing his overthrow.[1] Long ago I foretold that you were destined to free Europe from this scourge. Among all the congratulations and good wishes that you receive, pray distinguish those of your old and faithful servant, "DUMOURIEZ.

"P.S.—Now is the time when I desire that Louis XVIII should have my memorandum on co-operation with the Allies; for he [Louis XVIII] has no time to lose in organizing an army to replace that which you are about to destroy completely."

The next letters of Dumouriez to the Duke of Wellington show his anxiety about the re-establishment of the Bourbons at Paris. Along with statesmanlike advice on public affairs there are passages which reveal his longing for admission to the councils of Louis XVIII. The letters are too detailed to give *in extenso*, but all important parts are here reproduced, and nearly the whole of the later letters.

(*Précis*)

"*June 27th*, 1815.

"MON RESPECTABLE DUC,

"He has received the Duke's letter of the 20th. The Allies must complete at Paris the Duke's work at Waterloo, i.e. if the French, who always pass from one extreme to the other, do not themselves dethrone *ce fou enragé*. The Duke's career has transcended everything in ancient and modern times. The Allies will now need his good sense to conciliate the French and make them reasonable—a more difficult task than to gain battles.

[Continued on June 28th, 1815.]

[1] Dumouriez' hatred of Napoleon betrays him frequently into gross unfairness. Ligny was a great victory.

Nothing will have been done if Louis XVIII allows the French army to remain as it is. It must be changed entirely, in order to root out bad discipline. Louis XVIII ought to profit by this occasion to discharge it entirely, and fashion it anew. He begs the Duke to submit his [Dumouriez'] Memorandum on this subject to Louis XVIII even if he does not agree with it. The Chambers would probably not oppose such an act, because it is not legislative, and the nation longs to be free from the yoke of the army, which has proved itself insolent and perfidious.

It is clear that terror and confusion have seized hold of the Provisional Government at Paris. The two Chambers are a bastard creation, which does not represent the nation. The Allies can recognize only the Government of the King, which alone can treat with the Powers. The regency of Napoleon II is quite a nullity. The recent acts will show the King whom he may trust and distrust.

(*Précis*)

July 26th, 1815.

The Duke must be wearied by his [Dumouriez'] letters; for he has not answered them of late. He begs the Duke to give an enclosed letter to his faithful Morgan, who writes very disconsolately about affairs at Paris, and the Jacobinical spirit there prevalent. Morgan begs that the Duke would use his influence to procure for him a Prefecture, for which his talents, probity, and knowledge of the country well fit him. All the tidings from Paris received by Dumouriez are depressing. His advice about the army had doubtless been rejected; the King's Ministers were treating with Davoust, Vandamme, Masséna, Rapp, Grouchy, Suchet, Clausel, etc., and all the vile gladiators who ought to have been prosecuted *à outrance* after the fall of their Spartacus. The evil is done and the remedies will be tardy. All the *grands coupables* should have been

arrested. The confiscation of their property would have sufficed to indemnify all the *émigrés*. No one about the King seems to have the courage to advise him wisely. Dumouriez cannot explain this fully without personal details, which he desires to avoid.

(*Précis*)

August 7th, 1815.

He has received no letter from the Duke since his arrival in Paris, though he has sent to him two letters important for his personal interests and hoped for a reply respecting the steps which Wellington had promised to take with Metternich on behalf of his [Dumouriez'] pension.

It is said, by some in England, that Buonaparte ought to retain the title of Emperor because it was recognised in the treaty of 1814. But (1) the British plenipotentiary did not sign any act acknowledging that title; and (2) Buonaparte broke all claim to consideration by leaving Elba. The Buonapartists say that he is a prisoner of war and should be freed at the peace. That is not so. He came to give himself up to the magnanimity of the British people, when he saw escape to America was impossible; and as he admitted that he had ended his political life, he was not Emperor. He is a private individual fleeing from justice on the Continent; and his proposed treatment is generous. It would be well to have him tried in France for contumacy along with his accomplices. This would legalise his detention for life at St. Helena. Reflect on this and communicate it to Lord Castlereagh.

The last royal ordinance signed by Fouché on the punishment of the *grands coupables* seems to him halting and timid.

In his reply of August 17th the Duke of Wellington briefly acknowledged Dumouriez' letter and stated that Metternich would write to him about the pension. As for

Louis XVIII, he was more firmly established than in 1814; but affairs certainly did not look well.[1] Again the French general returned to the charge in the following letters:—

August 23rd, 1815.

"MON CHER ET RESPECTABLE DUC,

"I reply at once to your letter of the 17th. I have not received the letter which you announce to me from Prince Metternich, and, to hasten his decision, I address to you the enclosed for him, which I pray you to send to him after reading it. I do not ask you to support it, having already had many proofs of your goodwill towards me.

"I find French affairs still very disturbed; and I cannot refrain from regretting, not only the tardiness but also the weakness and incoherence of the measures adopted by that government. For example, I approve the departmental organisation of the regular army by legions; but it requires a total change in the formation of divisions adapted for war, in tactics, or the employment and manœuvres of corps, and in the amalgamation of the different arms. This is an undertaking that I could have wished avoided at present; it is a new military system, which cannot but oppose the present system of divisions of the army, as adopted in the whole of Europe. No more can I conceive how they can reconcile the constitution of departmental legions with the royalist battalions and companies which the Government allows private individuals to raise, who raise their banners, as at the time of the Crusades, and form a mass of Free Corps, which has no connection with the Departmental Army, and even clashes with it.

"I see, then, in France three distinct armies. (1) The Legionary Departmental Army. (2) The Royal Feudal Army raised by Lords' bannerets. (3) The old refractory

[1] Wellington, *Dispatches*, XII, pp. 607–8.

army, to which the King and the allied sovereigns send, as if to recruit it, the garrisons of the frontier fortresses as they surrender. There results from this three very distinct and separatist *esprit de corps*."

[He then refers at length to civil affairs, and hopes that the Chamber of Deputies soon to meet will not be "too pure in their royalism or too bold in *idées libérales*. As for that of the Peers, according to the nominations that I know, it will be almost a nullity."]

He concludes thus :—

"The Duke of Orleans has fulfilled your commission. I thank you, and I beg you to continue your good services for the re-establishment of this pension from Vienna, the only resource which remains to me to increase the comforts of my old age, for I do not expect, or claim any honorary or pecuniary favour from the present French Government, despite my services and zeal, with part of which you are acquainted.

"DUMOURIEZ."

"LITTLE EALING, *September 9th*, 1815.

"MON CHER ET RESPECTABLE DUC,—"

[After thanking him for his attempt to persuade Metternich to renew the Austrian pension, he says he has little hope of it. All his happiness comes from England. He had served France for sixty years, and his only recompense was the Cross of St. Louis, which he gained at twenty-two years of age for that number of wounds.]

"They even erased my name from the Military List as Lieutenant-General, in the month of January, when they offered to let me return, but not on active service, with the pay of that rank. None the less, I render homage to the virtues of our unfortunate King. Neither has it lessened my attachment to him, nor my love to my

country. But I renounce her, happy at my age and in my retreat to enjoy my recollections and, above all, the friendship of my hero.

"Your faithful

"DUMOURIEZ."

"*September* 18*th*, 1815.

"MON CHER ET RESPECTABLE DUC.—"

[After thanking him again for his services with Metternich, which were unavailing, he continues thus]:—

"Let us come back to public affairs. What you tell me about them is very short, but very significant. I pity the King. His good nature is a disadvantage, and is becoming a dangerous fault. Believe that there are still some good heads, some good citizens in France, but they have been shelved, or else have withdrawn of their own accord so as not to be mixed up with intriguers or fanatics, who bombard this unfortunate King from opposite sides. An example of this is seen in the flight of the Duc de Richelieu. I know other good servants who are groaning under it.

"You yourselves, *messieurs lés étrangers*, have helped to deceive him in the choice of his Ministers; for you have been led away by certain talented men who have twisted your legs till they are like those of Laocoon. When a Government is well established and strong, you may, though always with danger, give precedence to talent over morals. But when it is a question of regenerating an utterly demoralized nation, virtuous Ministers are needed and not clever rogues. Sully was of a straightforward firm nature, devoid of finesse; in fact, such an one as would be thought ridiculous in these times. He it was who, after the greatest calamities, made of Henri IV a great King, and brought back happiness and glory to France.

"In a short time you will know the wishes of the nation,

and in your own interests you will seek intelligently and wholeheartedly to support it. In general, the nation does justice to the good intentions of Louis XVIII, to his virtues, intellect, and knowledge; but it sees all these qualities paralyzed by underhand and self-seeking manœuvres, by roguery, by the intrigues of those who, while serving, debase. The nation is juster than is thought. It has no trust in a Council as motley as a harlequin's coat—some councillors being old courtiers who have learnt nothing, and with no other merit than to have vegetated in exile for twenty-five years; and others, blackguards who for that length of time have served out all the poisonous drugs of the Revolution. The nation cannot in the least trust so heterogeneous a Council; and the first condition it ought to wish for—exact, I would almost say—is a total recasting of the higher grades of an administration which cannot walk.[1]

"My dear Lord, if, as people try to insinuate, you have had influence in this deplorable choice, experience must now have shown you that your good faith has been snared. I love your glory too much not to warn you of it. It concerns the future of the whole of Europe; I love you too much; I place you too high above the level of mankind in your century, to flatter you and to hide from you the truth. All the ill which threatens France may become for you a personal calamity, or, at least, a source of disagreements which would mar the career not only of glory but prosperity which has as yet been yours.

"The two Chambers are about to assemble; each of them will furnish several men who with talent unite——.[2] They will find them out and will point them out, either among or outside of their own number. From these men, marked out by the voice of the nation, the King ought to

[1] The mixture of metaphors is in the original.

[2] Dumouriez left this sentence incomplete.

be pressed to form a strong Ministry, possessing the confidence of the people because they will have pointed it out.

"I finish my sermon, which, judging by the brevity of your letters, you will have no time to read. In it my heart speaks to your heart; and I hope that, perchance under an exterior none too pleasing, you will recognize your old and faithful servant,

"DUMOURIEZ."

"*October 4th*, 1815.

"MON CHER ET RESPECTABLE DUC,

"My opinion of you rendered it wholly unnecessary for you to send the frank and noble justification, into which you had the graciousness to enter in your letter of September 26th, with respect to the nomination and dismissal of Fouche.[1] That first measure was commanded by events, and saved much bloodshed. The second, though indispensable, has the drawback of being untimely. It is annoying that a monarch of sixty years of age should let himself be led by young swashbucklers who are absolutely bent on referring the issue of the whole affair to God and their swords.

"The results are easy to foresee. The deputies, whom it would have been so wise and skilful to consult for the purpose of gaining their confidence and half connecting them with the event, will be shocked at the haste of this thoughtless dismissal, which reveals the violent plans that were already suspected owing to the heedless prattle of the "pure" royalists, and the outrageous conduct of that faction's agents in the southern departments and everywhere where they have a free hand.[2] The Court

[1] For Wellington's letter see Wellington, *Dispatches*, XII, 649, 650. He shows the need of having a man who knew all parties, and states that "le roi était content de Fouché." Moreover, the Powers favourable to Louis XVIII had long been urging him to get the help of Fouché, who was a necessary go-between with the Liberals.

[2] "Les purs" was a term denoting the thorough royalists who scorned a constitution. The "White Terror" was then beginning in the south.

has just recharged the mine driven under its course, and holds the match lighted to explode it against itself.

"Under these terrible auspices will the Chambers assemble. At first, perhaps, there may be an illusory agreement, the effect of the Court's active electioneering intrigues; but the first debates will soon mark out the different parties. The metals will separate, and the strife will begin furiously. The allied Sovereigns will no longer be there to restrain or conciliate, and the intervention of ministers and generals, whose authority is only secondary, and whose opinions widely differ, will only increase the confusion and necessitate the use of the sword to cut the Gordian knot which the good Louis XVIII had not the skill to untie.

"Then, my dear hero, I foresee unfortunately that you will be compelled to return to your military duties, as well as your old comrade in arms [Blücher], whom I am sorry to see acting as your vanguard leader at Paris, for I fear his and his army's disposition."

[He then warns him to prepare for the coming Revolution in Paris, and to place garrisons at Calais and Dunkirk so as to keep open his communications with England.]

"*November 15th*, 1815.

"MON CHER ET RESPECTABLE DUC,

[He regrets the Duke's silence about General Morgan, against whom there must have been some intrigues. His veracity and loyalty were known to Lord Castlereagh and "Sir Stuard." On French affairs, he adds:—]

"Bitterness is increasing. Excesses by both parties are paving the way for a reaction, which all the factions seem alike to desire and provoke. Your discernment, prudence, and impartiality are needed to prevent the ills flowing from this state of things. I hope you will overcome them all. This kind of glory is alone wanting to

your career. It is the wish of your faithful friend and servant,

DUMOURIEZ."

The last letter of Dumouriez in the archives of Apsley House bears signs of pain at the duke's silence.

"LITTLE EALING, *December 4th*, 1815.

"MONSIEUR LE DUC,

[He regrets that General Morgan has lost the Duke's confidence, and that he himself also has to some extent. In June he sent a memorandum on the French army, begging him, whatever his opinions on its contents, to have it forwarded to the King. The duke had taken no notice of it; and, as this coincided with the disfavour shown him by Louis XVIII, it caused him great pain. He thanks the duke for presenting his appeal to Prince Metternich relative to the pension (as he must have done); but the prince had left Paris without deigning to reply.]

He concludes thus :—

"Although we may not, perhaps, see political affairs from the same point of view (and there I yield to you, for you are on the spot), this small difference of opinion cannot influence our reciprocal feelings, rooted as they are in well-deserved esteem. Therefore I am sure always of re-discovering my hero, my dear Wellington, just as I want him to be. Filled with this confidence, I have now no more to do than to assure you of the constant and tender attachment and profound respect with which I have the honour to be, Monsieur le Duc, your very humble and obedient servant,

"DUMOURIEZ."

CHAPTER XVII

DUMOURIEZ IN ENGLAND — LIFE AT GUNNERSBURY LODGE, ACTON; ROCHESTER HOUSE, LITTLE EALING; AND TURVILLE PARK, HENLEY-ON-THAMES (1803–23)

At rest in a peaceful retreat, due to the generous hospitality of a fine people, sure of the friendship of men of distinguished rank, character and intellect, I shall find nothing lacking from the happiness I shall be able to call mine if I know that the French people themselves are happy.

DUMOURIEZ' last Letter.

DUMOURIEZ' lines in England were, for the most part at any rate, cast in pleasant places; nor did he lack the society of many distinguished friends, Lord Nelson heading the list. The great defence-expert was still in London (probably in Leicester Place) when Nelson (August 26th, 1803), in a letter to Lady Hamilton, says:—

". . . I have wrote to Dumourier: therefore I will only trouble you to say how much I respect him. I fancy he must have suffered great distress at Altona. However, I hope he will now be comfortable for life. He is a very clever man: and beats our generals out and out. Don't they feel his coming? Advise him not to make *enemies* by shewing he knows more than some of us. Envy knows no bounds to its persecution. He has seen the world, and will be on his guard."[1]

[1] *Nelson Despatches*, edited by Sir H. Nicholas, Vol. V, p. 184.

Six months later (February 10th, 1804), in the postscript of a letter to Sir John Acton, Nelson writes:—

"I send two letters from Dumourier. Your Excellency will judge from his character whether he could at any period be useful to Naples. I have a very high opinion of his *abilities*."[1]

By this time Dumouriez had pitched his tent at Gunnersbury Lodge, a charming old house surrounded by poplars, elms, and acacias, and almost opposite the stately mansion occupied a quarter of a century before by the Princess Amelia, the venerable aunt of George III, who divided her time between Gunnersbury House and her town residence on the north side of Cavendish Square.[2]

Dumouriez was living at Gunnersbury Lodge in 1805 when he penned his last letter to his "most dear Nelson" just forty days before Trafalgar:—

"MY MUST DEAR NELSON,

"If i cannot be so happy als to encounter you today, j pray you to be sure that my heart is full of your friendship, that my thoughts are all directed to your glory, that my constant desires are to co-operate with you in Italy, that all my Hopes at the very point of the continental war are in your counsels to your ministry to pro-

[1] *Nelson Despatches*, edited by Sir H. Nicholas, Vol. V, p. 412.

[2] The Gunnersbury House of 1770 has entirely disappeared, being replaced by the existing abode of Mr. Leopold de Rothschild, who also owns Gunnersbury Lodge, now tenanted by Miss Spark, the head of one of the best known ladies' schools in the neighbourhood of London. A former owner, Mr. J. Boddington, made considerable additions to the eighteenth-century house which have almost totally changed its character, but the humbler dwelling of Dumouriez can still be traced in the interior and basement. Thanks to Mr. de Rothschild, the delightful rusticity of this part of Acton remains unimpaired. An engraving of 1770 shows a pleasant view over meadows and cornfields, as seen across the garden-wall of Gunnersbury Lodge.

vide me with a foreign army, or Italians or Austrians, to attack the upstart Corsican through the center of his Italian Kingdom. I planed and send to the Court of Vienna a project for landing a division of 20,000 Austrians, of Dalmatia, in the Pope's territory near Ancona, to cut of the french Division now standing in the Kingdom of Neapel [Naples], and to march afterwards through Toscany and Parma direct to the Genoese, to take the rear of the french deffending the Mantuan and Milanese. I expect daily an answer. if my plan is agreed, and if i receive the command of that Diversion, we will realize together the projects we formed at our first meeting in Hambourg against the barbarian usurpator whom we equally abhore.

"Your task, dear friend, is to inculcate to your ministry that they must not let my experience unemployed, that my name is preponderant in the opinion of the french, and very proper to be opposed to the Corsican, even better than the name of other Generals more skilfull than myself; that the Court of Vienna is well disposed for me, and that an insinuation of your Ministry would determine it to call me; that it would be politically useful to your Ministry to have a general devoted to itself for the co-operation of a plan decisive for the end of the war.

"I confide you as a brother. if your hasty depart don't permit you to discuss the matter with your ministry, make use of my letter as you judge convenable.

"Excuse my rough English language; be convinced of my constant admiration and friendship. Sail in the *Victory* to victory, lend me the hand to be one of your glory's compagnions, and be always the good friend of your devoted servant "GAL. DUMOURIEZ.

"*Wednesday* 11 *7bre* 1805.

"To his Excellency LORD NELSON and BRONTÉ."[1]

[1] British Museum Add. MSS. 34,931, folio 160.

A short time before this letter was written Dumouriez had been cordially received by the Prince of Wales at his marine residence. Mr. Wilkins tells us[1] that "there were many distinguished visitors to Brighton during this period. The famous General Dumouriez was there in the summer of 1805, and was sumptuously entertained at the Pavilion. When he paraded the Steine he was 'the very centre of attraction.'" It is therefore evident that Dumouriez enjoyed at this time the friendship of the heir to the throne, as well as that of the other Royal Dukes he subsequently mentions in his will.[2]

We have letters from Gunnersbury Lodge, Acton, in 1804, 1806, and 1807, but in the latter year Dumouriez was also at Leicester Place, Broadstairs, and Ryde. In 1812 he took up his abode at Rochester House, Little Ealing, about a mile to the north-west of his former abode, where he resided until 1822.[3] It is manifest that no poor man could have "kept house" at Gunnersbury Lodge, or still less at Rochester House. From the day Dumouriez commenced to work on the defence scheme a substantial income was assured him by the Government he served with commendable fidelity, and when the Bourbons "came to their own again" this was augmented by a handsome pension from the Duke of Orleans, who had fought under him at Jemappes and shared with him the ignominy of the events which had followed Neerwinden, including the oft-

[1] *Mrs. Fitzherbert and George IV*, Vol. II, p. 47.

[2] See *post*, p. 470.

[3] Mr. J. W. Tidy writes from the Vestry Hall, Ealing, June 27th, 1907. "I find from the Rate Books that General Dumouriez resided at Gunnersbury Lodge from 1803 until 1807. The first entry of his residence at Rochester House was in 1812. This house was previously occupied by Sir Thomas Plumer."



ROCHESTER HOUSE, FOR MANY YEARS DUMOURIEZ' RESIDENCE AT LITTLE EALING
From an old print. Reproduced by permission from Mrs. Jackson's "Annals of Ealing"

repeated stigma of "treason." At least seven tranquil years were passed by Dumouriez in the roomy red-brick mansion known as Rochester House, Little Ealing, encircled by spacious grounds studded with forest trees and facing a lake now entirely filled up. Ealing, like Acton, was at the beginning of the nineteenth century as it is at the commencement of the 20th—one of the pleasantest and most picturesque of London's rural suburbs. As far back as 30th April, 1734, Mrs. Delaney (Mary Grenville) wrote to her sister Ann :—"I have not spent a summer in the country with you since we were at Ealing, and don't you remember how sweet that was? I am sure you do. The churchyard and the fields, even the dusty lanes all were charming."[1] Rochester House existed even in those days, and Ealing's painstaking historian, Mrs. Jackson, thus describes it :—

"Nearly opposite the principal entrance to Ealing Park stands Rochester House, a delightfully spacious, early eighteenth century mansion, built most probably in the time of Queen Anne, for its owner, Thomas Pearce, lived in Ealing for forty years and died there in 1752. It seems likely that the present building is the successor of one older still, of which the moat and drawbridge, in existence at the close of the eighteenth century, were survivals. . . ."

The house takes its name from the founder's son, the learned Zachary Pearce, Bishop of Rochester (and Dean of Westminster), who died there in 1774."

Close to Rochester House were the country residences of the Duke of Marlborough and the Bishop of Durham, while on the opposite side of the lane stood the mansion

[1] A very charming account of Ealing, its "handsome mansions" and numerous worthies, will be found in Mrs. Jackson's "*The Annals of Ealing*," in which mention is made of Dumouriez' long residence there.

of Viscount Weymouth. Nearer still was Ealing Park (now a convent), where Pope visited the Earl of Warwick, and where, in the early days of the nineteenth century, the garden-parties of Mrs. Lawrence rivalled in their lavishness the hospitalities of Kew. The association of Pope with Ealing is still commemorated by the existence of Pope's Lane. Well within sight of Dumouriez' door was the celebrated Ealing Academy, presided over in turn by Drs. George and Francis Nicholas. During the years Dumouriez resided there, Charles Knight, Frederick Marryat, John and Henry Lawrence, Bishop Selwyn, John Henry and Francis William Newman and Henry Rawlinson, all figured on the roll of Ealing *alumni*. Amongst the pupils who probably gazed with mingled feelings of awe and curiosity at the venerable French exile was that "pretty, timid, gentle boy," William Makepeace Thackeray, who years later immortalized his teacher under the easily recognizable pseudonym of "Doctor Tickle-Us." Dr. Nicholas was one of the organizers of the corps of Ealing and Brentford Volunteers, the musters of which doubtless proved very interesting to Dumouriez. In all probability he was often a guest at the Doctor's card-parties, for the Duke of Orleans (afterwards King Louis Philippe) had settled close by at Twickenham in 1800, and one of his most successful classes for French, geography, and mathematics was that at the Ealing Academy. At Little Ealing, as at Acton, the exile could hobnob to his heart's content with his former general-in-chief. Dumouriez only quitted Rochester House in March, 1822, just one year before his death.[1]

[1] Mrs. Jackson's view as to Rochester House being Dumouriez' place of residence at Ealing is confirmed by the statements of Thomas Faulkner in his *History and Antiquities of Brentford, Ealing and Chiswick* (London,

The Duke of Kent lived for some years close by at Castle Hill Lodge, and undoubtedly showed sympathy for his French neighbour. He was also fond of a rubber with Dr. Nicholas. About a month before Dumouriez left Little Ealing for ever, Archibald Constable wrote thus to Sir Walter Scott:—

"CASTLEBEARE PARK,

"*14th February*, 1822.

"Allow me, as an old correspondent, to offer you my best acknowledgments for *The Pirate*. . . . My copy, secluded as my situation is, has been in considerable requisition, and in its travels is now in the hands of the venerable General Dumouriez, who resides a very little way off this mansion. He was the only person to whom in my present state of health I had any inclination to be known. I had the pleasure of being introduced to him, and we have since exchanged civilities. The General is at a very advanced period of life. He was born in the year 1739, and is a truly interesting old gentleman, rather of short stature, with much of an Englishman's expression of countenance, extremely intelligent: indeed, he is altogether what I would suppose one of our own *noblesse* to have been who followed the fortunes of Prince Charles."[1]

1845). Rochester House eventually became the fashionable ladies' boarding-school of Mrs. Robinson and the popular military college of Dr. Northcott. It has quite recently been acquired by the St. Marylebone Charity School for Girls, established in the Marylebone Road as far back as 1750. A new building has been erected in the grounds, but Dumouriez' English home is almost as he left it. The present head-mistress, Miss Lyndon, is keenly alive to the historic interest of the old-world mansion in which she lives, and the Marylebone School, by a felicitous coincidence, derives a portion of its revenues from a "Volunteer Fund," originating in a donation from the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates of the late Royal York St. Marylebone Volunteers, made at the dissolution of the corps in 1814.

[1] *Archibald Constable and his Correspondents.* A memorial by his son, Thomas Constable. Three vols. Edinburgh, 1873.

Both the historians of Ealing relate an anecdote of Dumouriez' relations with the Duke of Kent, which is interesting in view of the story told in the letter from Cherbourg already referred to.[1]

"The Duke," writes Mrs. Jackson, "had a great regard for Dumouriez, and one day introduced him to a farmer in the place, with a view to induce him to give up his family seat in the parish church to the general. The farmer, however, refused, saying that he had not forgotten the general's former enmity to this country. In reply, His Royal Highness said that he had freely forgiven him. 'You may forgive him,' replied the farmer, 'but for my part I never will, nor shall he have my family pew.' The planned descent on the Isle of Wight in 1778, and altogether the projected invasion of England, had been too much, in the farmer's opinion, to be cancelled."

The Duke of Wellington's friendship for Dumouriez has already been dealt with.[2] It is clear from his will that the Duke of York, George Canning and Nicholas Vansittart (afterwards Lord Bexley) could all be numbered amongst his friends. For some considerable time the Comte and Comtesse de Saint Martin[3] lived with Dumouriez at Rochester House, and did much to alleviate the cares and trials of his old age.

Dumouriez was throughout the whole of his life a great letter writer, and some of his unpublished correspondence is very interesting. After the final return of the Bourbons he wrote frequently to old friends in Paris. The following letter is addressed to the Marquise de Forbin-Janson:—

[1] See *ante*, chap. II.
[2] See *ante*, chap. XII and XV.
[3] See *post*, p. 470.

"LITTLE EALING, NR. BRENTFORD,
"*August 7th*, 1816.

"MA BELLE DAME,

"M. Fauché has sent on your letter to me, which gave me great pleasure. You put me in mind of a time when you were playing a very interesting rôle and I a very critical one. You were braving perils for the service of a cause which I perforce had to ensconce in my bosom, like Monk, but with less chances of success. This position fostered a sympathy between you and me which then made you the object of my attentions and solicitude. I admired your courage and the resources of your mind and I cherished many desires for your safety and that of your gentle companion [de voyage?]. You came out of everything successfully and rendered essential service to the august family now reigning over us. Have you been recompensed therefore? I do not ask it, for I fear your reply. The poor Baron de Breteuil[1] has long been dead; had he been alive in these days he would have been forgotten and set aside. You wish me to speak of myself. In retirement for several years in the country near Hamburg, I came forth in 1800, summoned to Petersburg by Paul I for a great project in favour of Louis XVIII, who greeted me well at Mittau.[2] This project, which made me stay four months with this Emperor, failed owing to the change of policy of this unfortunate Prince, who let himself be won over to Napoleon by a French *chanteuse*.[3]

[1] Breteuil held the "Maison du Roi" Ministry in the Calonne-Vergennes Cabinet of 1785–8.

[2] For this mission see *ante*, chap. XV. Louis Philippe told Croker in 1850 that Louis XVIII received Dumouriez rather coolly at Mittau, and finally appointed him to be maréchal de camp (brigadier-general), which Dumouriez rejected as unworthy for one who had commanded armies and gained victories. This, he said, accounted for the lasting antipathy between them (Croker's *Diaries*, III, p. 208).

[3] This word is underlined by the *writer*, and then partly blotted out, at the fold of the sheet, by the recipient—or the writer (?).

This mad and pernicious man dismissed me, though without ill treatment. Having returned to Denmark, on the renewal of war in 1802[1] between France and England, I was summoned by the English Government, when Napoleon threatened an invasion. I have never been treated as an *émigré;* an honest allowance has been made me, which I have enjoyed for the past thirteen years and which ensures an independence of life in a pretty country-house two leagues out of London. I have been of use to this nation, which has solid virtues preferable by far to our frivolous amenities. I reside here with one of my aides-de-camp, the Count de St. Martin, a Piedmontese, and his wife and daughter, who make excellent company for me as for their own father. What more do you want at seventy-seven? I enjoy the same health and the same tranquillity of mind you saw me with at Antwerp. I read without spectacles; I write a great deal; and I cultivate my garden. I had the good sense to refuse, *by way of retiring pension*, the full pay of Lieut.-General on the active list that the King offered me to return to France, where I possess in addition not one single inch of ground nor one single crown. I came to the conclusion that I suited neither my country such as it now is, nor the present epoch. I should have lived there in isolation, without contemporaries, dissatisfied with what I saw and what I did not see. I stand perfectly well being forgotten and forgetting all that relates to the [your] Government, composed of very heterogeneous not too heteroclite (*sic*) parts. A few friendly correspondences are a source of satisfaction to my heart: among these will yours figure if you will. I thank M. de Janson for his remembrance of me: it is a long time ago since we played at chess together: and no one in our midst could foresee the frightful Revolution which followed, to which our unfortunate comrade Donivan

[1] Dumouriez' memory here failed him. War broke out in May, 1803.

fell a victim. Escaped from that shipwreck, let us keep in Port—you in France, I in England. I'm distressed by your son's position, but I learnt with pleasure that he is at Rome under the protection of the Holy Father, who certainly will work on behalf of his return. The sojourn of M. de Blacas[1] at Rome seems to me a favourable circumstance, given his great credit with the King. So that I hope you will not have to wait long before embracing your son and reuniting your family around you. I pray you, when you . . . [? shall have received a letter from him give me] at once the news. I do not know . . . [? the familiar or the confidants] of the King, nor the *entourage* of the Princes, without . . . [? which or else] I should lose no time in helping you to obtain justice or grace . . . [? it is necessary to] dispute about the words. Good-bye, my most lovable Marquise, will not . . . [? weary you] with a longer letter, though there remain many things for me to tell you. Ever count upon the most respectful and tender friendship of your faithful servant,

"D'Z."

On receipt of this letter the Marquise de Forbin-Janson underscored in ink the first part of it and wrote on the outside the following memorandum: "The first part of this letter of Gen. Dumouriez treats of the negotiations I entered upon with him to induce him to save Louis XVII, restore the constitutional Monarchy, *save the Queen*, end the Revolution and wind it up. The negotiations [took place] at the end of Jany. 1793 or beginning of Feby. 1793. The King had just expired and I was at Liége when his death was announced."

In the spring of 1818 Dumouriez wrote thus to the

[1] M. de Blacas had been one of the most constant of Louis XVIII's companions in exile, and undertook important diplomatic work for him.

Duke of Orleans, no longer a teacher at the Ealing Academy:—

"*March 30th*, 1818.

"MONSEIGNEUR,

"I had long awaited news of you with much impatience, not that I in any way doubted the continuance of your friendship, but because I attributed your silence to the desire you might entertain to announce to me the termination of your law-suit. I see with pain that you will have the trouble of it for long, seeing that after the judgment of the Court of first instance expected at the end of next month you will have to experience much pettifogging before the final judgment. Patience! The news you give me of the interesting condition of Her Royal Highness rejoiced me. I am not anxious about her accouchement. She is the best of consorts, and at the same time the happiest of mothers.[1] She surrounds you with an angelic family which will crown your old age with happiness, because you are still young enough to see them grow in virtues, reason and all the qualities which can retain your House and your Rank under the eyes and by the care of your incomparable spouse and your angelic sister. In a very few years Ferdinand will be already an interesting man, on his own merits, and thanks to the enlightened care you will yourself bestow upon his education. No doubt you will have had details of the horrible effect of the catastrophes of the end of February in Sicily and Calabria. These unfortunate countries pay very dearly for the beauty and wealth of their soil and climate. Messina, Catania, and the neighbouring and opposite shores are often visited by these scourges. I hope that the affair of the Budget may end as happily as the Decree on the reconstruction of the Army, and procure funds to form and pay it. I trust, too, that they will not busy them-

[1] She was the daughter of Maria Carolina, Queen of Naples, and was therefore niece of Marie Antoinette.

selves with the *Concordat* until they shall have arranged the Finance, and ensured the Loans; it would be well to keep the latter in the hands of French Capitalists so that the money should not leave the country, that France should be in this respect at least independent, and that the vicious expedient of Loans, since it is necessary, should turn to the profit of public confidence and national credit. They must arrange to apportion the expenses of Government and the payment of the foreign debt [? war indemnity] into fixed periods, working as cleverly as possible to retard those periods, and especially to define *exactly* the claims, set aside all new demands, and reduce the old pretensions. It would, no doubt, be a great advantage to France to get rid of the Army of Occupation, but if, as they say, 60,000 men of that Army are to remain collected just beyond our frontiers and we are to be saddled with the upkeep of these worthy fellows, then we shall gain nothing, for we shall have to defray this expense in specie, which at least used to be (is still) spent in France and was not lost to her.[1] I do not like the idea of the Assembly of Sovereigns at Düsseldorf, and I wish, more than I hope, that our Budget and our Army may be in good condition before that epoch, in order that our King may, in the person of his representative, play the part suited to the Majesty (Sovereign) of so powerful a Monarchy, even in the midst of its ruins. I say this, not that it may provoke war, but on the contrary as the sole means of avoiding it. *Si vis pacem para bellum.* I congratulate you upon going into the country. Your Ladies, to whom kindly present my tenderest respect,

[1] The Congress of the Allied Sovereigns which met at Aix-la Chapelle (*not* at Düsseldorf) decided by the compact of November 15th, 1818, that their troops should evacuate France, and they did not canton them just beyond her frontiers. (See Hertslet, *Map of Europe by Treaty*, I, 571.) The patriotism of Dumouriez is clearly evinced by his anxiety for the fate of France.

your children and you yourself will all be the better for it. Take plenty of exercise, especially on foot; go in even for a little manual or tiring work, in order to avoid corpulence to which you are prone. Love your old friend, and write to him as often as your affairs will allow you to."

Later in the same year he again writes to his friend the Marchioness de Forbin-Janson :—

August 19th, 1818.

"MY VERY LOVABLE FRIEND,

"Your little letter of the day before yesterday is like yourself, and gave me great pleasure. Cure as quickly as you can my old companion in arms, and take him off to Paris, since the air of the country does not suit him. If I were to go by the *Gazette de France* of the 10th inst. which a friend of mine has just sent me from Paris, I ought to have succumbed during the last few days to this terrible climate. Happily I have inured myself to it, thanks to the good allowance made me by these noble English, all of whose virtues are not known in France and who are judged with rigour by certain ridiculous traits—as if we had none of our own. All you say to me concerning liberty is quite true; it exists but in this happy isle. Frenchmen talk a deal about it, it is the fashionable jargon, but they are unworthy of it. I confess to you that it was my grief at seeing them [so] incorrigible that induced me to undergo the voluntary *ostracism* I resorted to twenty-five years ago, whose term I have renewed at the Restoration. I regret my native soil and sky; I regret the handful of friends that dwell there through fortune good or ill: and in order that oblivion steal not between them and me, I write to them and read their epistles with delight. So you can fancy, my dear Marquise, what value I attach to your correspondence, so full of life, spirits and sentiment. The St. Martins tender their homage and their good wishes for your happiness. Do not leave without letting me know

the day. Your good Palamedes interests me on two grounds: (1) as the son of my old friends, (2) as showing essential qualities which attach him to others. So I will cultivate him like a precious plant, so soon as he consents to come and beautify my solitude. I live now but for friendship: I enjoy but through it. Hence I cannot resist the temptation of sending you for your *Album* some verses which I addressed some time back to a friend.

Holy Friendship, Celestial Flame,
Source of purest sentiments,
When thy ardour fills our Soul,
Thou bravest time and space.

It is thou that givest the ardour of my heart,
And makest me endure my four-score years,
It is thou that beautifiest my life to the end,
It is thou who dictatest these verses for my friends.

Mr. G. L. de St. M. Watson has supplied the authors with the following metrical translation of Dumouriez' verses :—

Holy Friendship, Flame of Heaven,
Sentient spark of purest ray,
When thine ardour stirs our bosom,
Time and space are swept away.

Thou alone my heart indwellest,
Lessening Life's protracted score,
Showering beauty—and thou wingest
With these words to yonder shore!

Two months later he again wrote to a friend :—

"*October 23rd*, 1818.

"I am replying at once to your letter, my dear Pieneville, and I congratulate you upon your rejoining your family at Paris, either to attend to your business with your charming wife—which presupposes hopes of success—or to bring her back in case she has given up the projects which took her to that country. In any case I tender my

wishes for your satisfaction. I thank you for your offer to call here to take my commissions. It would be too costly a détour, and I have no other than that of bidding you caress for me your wife and your daughter. I have received a reply from *Mademoiselle.* It is so kind to your ladies that I am entrusting you with it to show them, on condition you return it me, or give it me back when in England once more, for I do not think you will meet in France with sufficient success for you to be able to give up your allowance in this country, which you would presumably forego if you left it. M. and Mdm. de Saint Martin send you and your ladies their kindest regards. We are not aware of Genl. Turner's address, but think you may address your letter at H.R.H. the Prince Regent's, Carlton House. Farewell, my dear Pieneville, I wish you a happy journey and embrace you in sincere friendship.

"D."

In the early part of 1822 Dumouriez decided to remove from Little Ealing to Turville Park,[1] one of the many commodious residences near Henley in the Thames valley. On March 14th, 1822, at 2.30 p.m., he arrived at his new home. A year later (March 14th, 1823), to the very hour, he died, and was buried a week later in a vault beneath the pavement of Henley Church. The entry in the register is as follows: "Charles François Dumouriez, ex-General-in-Chief of the French Army, of Turville Park. Buried March 21st, 1823 (died the 14th), age 84, by George Scobell, Rector."

[1] Mrs. Climenson, the author of an excellent guide-book to Henley, and the biographer of her celebrated great-aunt Elizabeth Montagu, points out the great antiquity of Turville, the name of which is derived from Tyrf-feld. From the Badesmeres Turville Park passed successively to the Chamberlaynes, Gages, and Gorings, and eventually to the Perrys, who were succeeded by the Shelleys. Lord Lyndhurst resided there from 1840 to 1854.

DUMOURIEZ' LAST HOME, TURVILLE PARK, HENLEY-ON-THAMES, WHERE HE DIED MARCH, 1823

Over the door of the south aisle is a handsome memorial tablet bearing the following inscription, composed by Dumouriez' literary executor, the late Sir John Bowring :—

HIC JACET
TARDAM EXPECTANS PATRIÆ JUSTITIAM
CAROLUS FRANCISCUS DUMOURIEZ
QUI CAMERACI NATUS JANUARII XXV A.D. MDCCXXXIX.
INGENIO, DOCTRINA AC VIRTUTE PRÆCLARUS,
AD SUMMUM MILITARE IMPERIUM
FORTITUDINE AC PRUDENTIA PERVENIT.
LUDOVICI XVI. CONSILIIS PRÆFUIT.
REGEM ET LEGES IN ROSTRIS ELOQUENTIA,
IN CASTRIS GLADIO, PATRIAM ET LIBERATEM DEFENDIT.
NEFANDIS IN TEMPORIBUS
BIS GALLIAM A DEPOPULATIONE ET SERVITUTE SERVAVIT:
SED AB IPSA EAM SERVARE CONANS
PROSCRIPTUS EST.
ASYLUM EXULI GERMANIA PRIMUM
NOBILEM POSTEA HOSPITALITEM OBTULIT BRITANNIA.
GRATUS OBIIT TURVILLE
DIE MARTII XIV. A.D. MDCCCXXIII.

HIC MONUMENTUM
ILLUSTRISSIMO CIVI, PERITISSIMO MINISTRO
FORTISSIMO DUCI AC AMICORUM OPTIMO
DESIDERANTES ET FLENTES
DEDICAVERUNT AMICI.[1]

[1] Translation :—"Here lieth, awaiting the belated justice of his country, Charles-François Dumouriez, born at Cambrai January 25th, 1739. Foremost in genius, erudition, and valour, he rose to the highest military command through prudence and resolution. He presided over the councils of Louis XVI. He defended the sovereign and the laws in the tribune with his eloquence, and freedom and fatherland in the field with his sword. In dire days he saved France twice from spoliation and slavery; but, trying to preserve her from herself, was banished. Germany first afforded a refuge, and later England proffered a worthy hospitality to the exile. He died

In the autumn preceding his death Dumouriez wrote the following touching letter to one of his old friends:—

"I have yielded to repeated requests. I have consented to the republication of my Life and my Memoirs. At the age of over four score and three I have had to undertake the revision. I have gone over anew the whole of my toilsome career, and, within sight of its termination, have put the last stroke to its account. The hope of being of use to my Motherland, even when no more, has upborne me in this painful labour. May she find in this retrospect of the past lessons for the future! That is my desire and my hope. France will not have again to traverse the same circle. All she need do is to maintain the institutions acquired at the price of so much blood and treasure, and sanctioned by her King, whose fidelity is guaranteed by his honour and his wisdom, and by the need for security. At rest in a peaceful retreat, due to the generous hospitality of a fine people, sure of the friendship of men of distinguished rank, character, and intellect, I shall find nothing lacking from the happiness I shall be able to call mine if I know that the French themselves are happy.

"DUMOURIEZ.

"Turville Park, September 4th, 1822."

Sir John Bowring many years later writes thus of Dumouriez, the friend of his youth:—

"Dumouriez died on 2nd March, 1823,[1] at Turville Park, aged eighty-four, his last days having been made comfortable by an allowance from the Duke of Orleans, which enabled him to keep a carriage. The general had,

thankful at Turville Park, on March 14th, 1823. This memorial to a most famous citizen, a most skilful minister, a most doughty commander, and a most excellent comrade, is dedicated by friends in longing and lamentation." Below the mural tablet on either side of a group of martial emblems are inscribed in raised letters the words "Champagne" and "Jemappes."

[1] An error. He died March 14th.

I believe, a pension of £1000 a year from the British Government, with whom he was in intimate communication, and for whom he drew up a plan of defence against the menaced French invasion. At his death his papers were purchased by the Government from his executors. The accusation that he had sold himself to the enemy was certainly groundless, for he was almost penniless when he quitted the army, and subsisted for some time in Germany by the use of his pen before he emigrated to England. I left London [March, 1823] in the vain hope of finding him alive, but found a corpse. He had enjoyed life to the very last, and a few hours before his death had walked to the window and looked over the green common with complacent and delighted satisfaction. I had hoped for one glance from those bright eyes, but they were closed, and for ever. He was dead, stiff, calm, and silent. He who shook empires, frozen as a wintry clod. The spirit of Jemappes stilled and voiceless. A short time before his death his hands were often observed to be closed. 'Que faites vous, mon Général?' 'Je me recueille,' (I am harvesting myself.) What a harvest! The Catholic priest behaved manfully. Le Dieu said, "The general believed in God, and in a future state. He did harm to none, but good wherever he could. We will not have his last moments tormented with cruel questionings.' The priest crossed his eyelids with the holy oil (extreme unction), in silence,—and the general died."

. . . . . .

More than eight years before his death (25th January, 1814), Dumouriez had made a short holograph will in French at Rochester House, of which the following is an abstract:—

"I, *Charles François Duperier Du Mouriez*, being arrived at the advanced age of 75, through a life more agitated

than unhappy . . . having attached to me by ties of filial affection . . . *Count* and *Countess de Saint Martin* . . . am distressed that my honorable poverty disables me from making greater provision for their needs. . . . I appoint *Count* and *Countess de Saint Martin* my sole legatees and joint executors, and bequeath to them all my property, moneys due to me, books, furniture, etc. . . . and I charge *H.R.H. the Duke of York*, *H.R.H. the Duke of Kent*, the *Honble. Geo. Canning* and *Nicholas Vansittart*, whose friendship I have long been honoured with, to look to the execution of the above provisions of my will; and to use their influence with the *Prince Regent* to have part of my pension still continued after my death to the said *Ct.* and *Ctess. de St. Martin.* . . .

"The above will I have written with my hand and sealed with my seal bearing my coat of arms.

"CHARLES FRANÇOIS DUPERIER DU MOURIEZ,

"Late Lieut.-Gen. of the French Armies and Navies.

"Knight of the Royal and Military Order of St. Louis.

"*Little Ealing.*"

Sir John Bowring was one of those who signed the affidavit for probate, which was granted on 27th March, 1823. More than three-quarters of a century have passed away since the trusted councillor of Louis XVI, the victor of Jemappes, and the author of the most complete project devised for the defence of England during the Great Terror, was laid to rest in the beautiful church on the banks of the Thames. It is assuredly time that an effort should be made impartially to assign to Dumouriez his proper place amongst the statesmen and warriors of the troublous times in which he lived and laboured.

CHAPTER XVIII

DUMOURIEZ AND HIS CRITICS. AN APPRECIATION

Judges must beware of hard constructions and strained inferences; for there is no worse torture than the torture of Lawes.—BACON.

TO apply the same standard of criticism to men of all nations and all ages is manifestly unfair. Yet this Procrustean method of judgment is the rule rather than the exception. The reason is obvious. It is far easier for a critic to read his own thoughts and notions into the actions of another man than to seek patiently and sympathetically to understand them. The former methods lead straightway to those slap-dash judgments which are so attractive and fallacious; the latter imply the subordination of the student's personality to the results of research—a matter far from easy even to the conscientious, repellent to the idle, and beyond reach of attainment by the case-hardened egoist.

It is well, then, to remember that Dumouriez, like Mirabeau and Napoleon, was a true child of the South and a typical product of the eighteenth century. Very much lies enfolded in these brief statements. The Southern nature is nothing if not impulsive, vehement, and versatile. To the Provençal, life has a charm and flow that the chill Northerner can scarcely understand. Carlyle, gazing in imagination at the Feast of Pikes

(July 14th, 1790), always saw it from the standpoint of Edinburgh; and, despite his rich vein of humour, he never got away from the feelings of a Covenanter. His description of that event—a masterpiece of irony—enables one to gauge the difference between the canny Scot, intent on keeping his powder dry, and the sociable and vivacious Southerner, who longs to give dramatic expression to his feelings and aspirations.

One not unimportant source of error respecting the character and career of Dumouriez is to regard him as a Northerner. As has been shown in chapter I of this work, it was an accident that he was born at Cambrai. He has absolutely nothing in common with Robespierre, Lebon and the other revolutionaries who hailed from the north. There is no Flemish or Picard strain in his nature. The cold and calculating fanaticism of the two men just named was wholly alien to him. He had his faults, but they resulted from an excess of vivacity and confidence. His vanity sometimes made him ridiculous; but it was the vanity of a gay youth who somehow never could grow old.

Again, his self-confidence often led him to extreme measures, from the consequences of which only the most exalted genius or unlimited resources could have rescued him. A typical example of this was his attempt to invade Holland in February, 1793, and his clinging to that enterprise when his communications with France were nearly cut—a blunder which cost him the defeat at Neerwinden and the downfall of his ambitious schemes for the overthrow of the Jacobins. In his saner moments he must have realized that he was then attempting the impossible; witness his words on February 11th to Miranda: "Let us

perform incredible, nay impossible, feats. . . . We must astonish the enemy and deal blows with the courage of despair." To criticize such a man as if he were a mere intriguer like Pache or Barère is to betray phenomenal powers of misreading character.

The subjective way of regarding men and affairs is, however, so easy and attractive that it will probably always hold the field, especially in the case of Dumouriez. The champions of this school of historical method begin by fixing their eyes on some outstanding event in the life of the prisoner at the bar and thence deducing their notion of his character. Everything else has to fit in with it. In the case now under discussion, judges of that ilk begin by the reflection: "Dumouriez was a traitor. He tried to betray his country to the Austrians. He failed, and had to go over to them. He ended his life in exile, which he richly deserved."

In pursuance of this line of research, it is then discovered that he was a *parvenu*, born in French Flanders, probably of mixed race; that he slowly worked his way up in the diplomatic service and army by means of intrigue, and that the Revolution found him a needy and unprincipled adventurer. No notice is taken of his statesmanlike proposals for the regeneration of Poland; and as little heed as possible is paid to his plans for popularizing the French monarchy and girdling France with a ring of allied and federated Republics. The cry afterwards taken up by foreign potentates (e.g. by the Archbishop of Mayence, as was shown in chapter VII) that he was the sole author of the war of 1792, is then echoed with much gusto, as a *motif* introductory to the "treason" *fantasia*.

As regards the campaign of Valmy, critics of the subjective school grudgingly admit that Dumouriez showed some skill and daring; but they dispute his claims to originality, and refer the whole plan of campaign to Servan. They also assert that while Kellerman bore the whole brunt of the fighting at Valmy, Dumouriez behaved in a very characteristic manner by looking on from a neighbouring height. Jemappes is allowed to have been a decided victory, but mainly owing to the magical influence of the *Marseillaise* on the raw levies of France.

The judges then make light of Dumouriez' efforts to screen the Belgians from the depredations of the commissioners and agents of the Convention[1]; and they belittle his attempt to procure the reversal of the decree of December 15th, respecting the property of liberated peoples, which had such unexpectedly lamentable results. They then ascribe his presence at Paris, at the time of Louis XVI's trial, to a desire to further the interests of the Duke of Orleans (Égalité); and the presence of young Égalité at his headquarters in the ensuing campaign is taken as proof of the reality of the "Orleanist plot."

It will be well here to enter more into detail. A specimen of the partisan writing summarized above is to be seen in an anonymous work in three volumes entitled *Histoire de la Conjuration de Louis-Philippe Joseph d'Orléans* (Paris, 1796). There it is asserted that Dumouriez came to Paris in December, 1792, in order to pull the wires for Égalité; that he could achieve nothing, and that consequently the

[1] Even Sorel, *op. cit.*, III, p. 173, tries to insinuate that his (Dumouriez') protection of the Belgians was founded solely on selfish considerations. Sorel is, of course, far above the horde of vulgar libellers alluded to above; but his description of Dumouriez is throughout marred by an invincible prejudice. See III, 339, for an instance.

Orleanist star thenceforth paled. When the general returned to his army he succeeded in ruining the fortunes of that Prince by acting *en vrai héros de roman.* His aim was to march on Paris "in order to place Orleans on the throne." As is well known after Dumouriez' desertion to the Austrians, this cry was raised, probably with the view of ruining the Duke of Orleans and securing his property. On his side, the Duke sought to avert the blow by blackening Dumouriez' character in every possible way[1]; and the Girondins, when accused of Orleanism, joined in the hue and cry.

This libel is found in its extreme form in the work of Michaud — *Vie publique et privée de Louis-Philippe d'Orléans* (Paris, 1849). Writing of the career of the lately dethroned King, he avers that Dumouriez and young Égalité, even during the Valmy campaign, were plotting to bring about the trial and death of Louis XVI; that they went together to Paris in December, 1792, were in close touch with the prosecutors, especially Égalité (*père*), and, in fine, pushed that monarch to the scaffold. Pétion, we are also assured, had enrolled the "Peruvian" Miranda, in the "Orleanist faction"; but their schemes came to naught owing to Miranda's cowardice at Neerwinden. In the subsequent traitorous dealings with the Austrians, young Égalité was the pivot and instrument of Dumouriez, though the latter was the head of the Orleanist party.[2]

[1] See *inter alia, Life and Times of Louis Philippe,* by the Rev. G. N. Wright [N.D.]. In the British Museum collection of Revolutionary pamphlets and placards is a *Déclaration* of Louise Adélaide d'Orléans asserting that Dumouriez had corrupted the politics of Égalité (*fils*), and had sought to entangle him in his schemes.

[2] Michaud, *op. cit.*, pp. 54–64.

We must do Michaud the justice to state that he printed in full the letter which Dumouriez on April 20th, 1793, sent to several German and English newspapers, denying that there was an Orleans faction, and declaring his supreme contempt for the duke ever since he voted for the death of Louis XVI. The general, however, affirmed his entire confidence in the high principles of young Égalité, and his belief that he would flee to the ends of the earth rather than accept the crown of France; but that, if he ever aspired to that crown, he (Dumouriez) would vow an eternal hatred to him.

Over against this letter Michaud set another of Dumouriez, of October 18th, 1795 (manifestly a forgery), in which the general proposed to the Vendéan leader, Charette, to set young Égalité on the throne.[1]

These lucubrations are not unimportant. They are by the editor and part author of *La Biographie universelle;* and his hatred of Dumouriez found expression in that compilation which of course has had potent influence on public opinion. There, for instance, we read that Dumouriez received £1200 a year from the British Government, but nevertheless in the year 1804 applied to Napoleon for a marshal's bâton, and the title Duc de Ste. Menehould.

Reverting to our main theme, we must notice that every party in the year 1793 had strong reasons for defaming the general, and that the sources of evidence were thus poisoned at their source. An example of the acrid nonsense served out to the public at that time is seen in the Report of the Committee of General Defence on the

[1] Michaud, *op. cit.*, pp. 67, 68, 72-77.

Treason of Dumouriez. Among the inculpating evidence it includes the depositions on oath of an officer, Dubuisson, that Dumouriez many times during the campaigns of 1792 and 1793 had declared that France must have a King, and that, as soon as the army was in a stronghold, he would raise the royal standard. Dubuisson further assured the Committee that the general had *wept* at every victory which he had gained for the Republic.[1]

When rubbish like this was published in official documents, it is not surprising that pamphleteers strained the resources of the French language in denouncing the infamy of Dumouriez. A feeble echo of this shrill abuse is found in an English pamphlet by C. Pigott, entitled "Treachery no Crime; Exemplified in the Character and Desertion of General Dumouriez" (London, 1793). The writer sounds the moral sternly in the first sentences. Fatal to freedom and virtue, he avers, are the perfidy and corruption of Courts. Those who breathe that tainted air of necessity grow up perfidious. This appears in the career of Dumouriez—"that paragon of traitors who voluntarily led such numbers of his valiant countrymen to slaughter under pretence of fighting for the liberty of mankind, which at that very instant it is evident he had resolved to betray."

We are next assured that, "though of plebeian extraction, our hero aspired to patrician distinctions." He was a very harlequin in politics, and knew how to assume the most diverse shapes. In Poland he figured as an officer, a pilgrim, an abbé, and a monk, always with success. He came over to London in 1780 (so Pigott

[1] Rapport du Comité, etc., p. 13.

asserts) in the disguise of an abbé, and again succeeded. In 1785–6 he was in Holland in disguise, urging on the patriots to their doom. The reason for his unfailing success, it appears, was his clairvoyance. The writer finally rejoices that vengeance has overtaken "the hoary old sycophant."[1] Was it this illuminating piece of biography which inspired Burns with his well-known outburst against the general, beginning

You're welcome to despots, Dumouriez?

Diatribes of this kind long continued to bias public opinion against Dumouriez. Quite typical is Lavalette's reckless statement in his *Memoirs*—"Dumouriez, after having deceived both the Court and the Jacobins, wanted to draw the King out of the abyss and crush his enemies." Even respectable historians like Mignet accepted as historical evidence the depositions of the emissaries of the Jacobins' Club, Proly, Pereira, and Dubuisson, who were sent to entrap the general. Thiers' account is free from the rancour that envenoms most French narratives of the treason; but he falls into the common error of looking on Dumouriez as the agent of "the Orleans faction."[2]

It is unnecessary to glance at the minor historians of that period; but we must once more call attention to the very obvious partisanship that darkens M. Sorel's otherwise fine description of these affairs. It appeared, firstly, in his two articles in the *Revue des deux Mondes* for August 15th, 1884, where he thus pronounced the verdict —"Dumouriez finished as he began, a nomadic adven-

[1] C. Pigott, *op. cit.*, pp. 8 *et seq.*

[2] Mignet, *French Revolution*, chap. VII; Thiers, *French Revolution*, chap. XX.

turer." The distinguished writer returned to the charge in his great work *L'Europe et la Révolution française.* Transgressing all the rules of historical presentment, he ushered in the figure of Dumouriez with a preliminary condemnation. There the reader learnt that the general was a second-rate intriguer and soldier of fortune—"After thirty restless years, in which he had negotiated more than fought, and intrigued more than negotiated, he had with great difficulty obtained this subordinate post [commandant at Cherbourg]." It then appears that his official career in 1792–3 was a "romance of intrigue," which only for an instant, namely, in the treason, "turned to great history." He had no belief in the Revolution. He threw himself into it with "a perfect scepticism and a complete indifference as to the means employed." In March, 1792, when he gained the confidence of the Girondins, he avowed himself ready to serve the King. The explanation of it all is that "at bottom he was an adventurer."[1]

This is an excellent preparation for the narrative of the treason. There M. Sorel makes light of the skirmish with the three battalions of volunteers, the flurried flight of Dumouriez, and the consequent change in his plans. His narrative leaves the impression that the surrender of certain French fortresses to the Austrians may always have formed part of the general's schemes.[2] In truth, there is only one account of Dumouriez' treason which is accurate and not markedly prejudiced, namely, that of M. Chuquet.[3] Even in his case the title of the volume

[1] Sorel, *op. cit.*, Part II, pp. 403–8.

[2] *Ibid.*, Part III, pp. 362–3.

[3] Chuquet, *Guerres de la Révolution*, Part V: "La Trahison de Dumouriez."

La Trahison de Dumouriez, gives the impression that all the previous events of the campaign of 1793 naturally led to this finale. It is charitable to assume that the choice of this misleading label was prompted, not by historical, but by advertizing considerations.

There is no excuse for any writer subsequent to the year 1865 leaving the details of that event in the least degree vague. That year saw the publication of Colonel Mack's account of his interviews with Dumouriez at the time of the treason. This careful and exact narrative proves that, not until April 4th (that is just after the general's flight from the three battalions of volunteers) did he offer to deliver French fortresses into the hands of the Imperialists. Up to that time Dumouriez had successfully insisted that the Austrians should observe an informal armistice and refrain from invading France—a step which otherwise they could have taken.

It seems to the present writers that the crux of the whole question of the treason is the following: *Why did* Dumouriez finally enter into the undertaking to hand over French fortresses to the enemy? Was it always a part of his design? Or did it result from the unfortunate encounter with the battalions of volunteers, as described in chapter VI of this work? The details, as there given, seem to show clearly that he had recourse to it as a last desperate resolve, formed amidst the excitement of his flight from the volunteers. Nothing beforehand had betokened such an expedient. Indeed, when Mack suggested it at the first interview, Dumouriez emphatically rejected the proposal. All that he then desired was the continuance of the armistice—a measure serviceable to France, as it delayed the advance of a victorious enemy.

On the whole, then, it is reasonable to conclude that Dumouriez, who had hitherto shown much shrewdness in the *pourparlers* with Mack, lost his mental balance during that ignominious flight on April 4th. Only so can we explain the tender of proposals which differed essentially from those first made. The final offer, of course, stamped upon him the name of traitor and blighted his reputation.

The fact of his treason must not be palliated. At the same time, all students of history will recognize that there are extenuating circumstances even for that heinous crime. They are to be found in the motives of the man and the events of the time. We have now briefly considered the aims of Dumouriez so far as they concern the worst part of his conduct, the proposal to hand over French fortresses to the enemy; and we have suggested that this offer formed no part of his original scheme, but resulted from wholly unforeseen circumstances. In legal parlance, Dumouriez was not a traitor *prépense*. He cannot be classed with Wallenstein who, however reputable his schemes, always relied on the help of the Swedes against the Emperor whom he served. Still less can he be relegated to the level of Sertorius and the many military adventurers of Roman and Italian history who persistently used foreigners for the purpose of waging relentless war upon their own kith and kin.

We now approach the question, whether a general is ever justified in leading his army against the Government of his country. Of course it is the most odious of crimes to use the army for the overthrow of a well-established Government, unless it be guilty of tyranny. But to compass the downfall of a faction, which has

recently leaped to power by violent means, is a very different thing.

Now, whatever may be the political leanings of the reader, he will admit that the men who overthrew the monarchy on August 10th, 1792, did so by the exercise of force, and consolidated their authority by the organized massacres of September 2nd–6th. It is true that the Jacobin rule acquired a semblance of legality by the general election of that month. But the careful researches of M. Taine and others have shown that, either from terrorism or apathy, the number of votes polled was 700,000 out of a possible total of about 7,000,000 voters.[1] Every one knew perfectly well that the Government represented a small though very determined minority of Frenchmen.

To lead an army against such a Government can scarcely be styled a treasonable act. It is rather an incident resulting naturally from the civil strifes of the time. What armed force has made, armed force can unmake. If Dumouriez was in this respect a traitor, then Cromwell was more than once a traitor. Bonaparte was also a traitor when he and his brother Lucien, at Brumaire 1799, made use of the armed guards of the Chambers of Deputies to drive out the deputies and abolish parliamentary institutions in France. The essential thing in all such cases is to succeed. We are here reminded of the *mot* of Morny, when, shortly before the *coup d'état* of 1851, he was asked whether there was to be a sweeping-out of the Chambers. "Of that, Madame, I know nothing," he replied; "but if there is, I shall take

[1] Taine, *La Révolution française*, Vol. II, p. 374.

care to be on the side of the broom-*handle*." The remark is quite typical. Indeed, it is scarcely unfair to say of the attitude of the vast majority of French writers towards Bonaparte and Dumouriez, that their laudation of the former and their execrations of the latter imply a deep-seated conviction that the one unpardonable sin in politics is—failure.

We must, however, hasten to admit that there are weak places in Dumouriez' behaviour towards the French Convention. His character would come better out of the scrutiny which we are seeking impartially to carry out, if he had consistently refused to bow down before a Government which was little more than the crystallization of mob rule. The weakest point of his career is his failure to protest against the execution of Louis XVI, and his undertaking the conquest of Holland ostensibly for the regicide Government. As has been pointed out in chapter VI, there are difficulties in the way of accepting his story that he all along meant to make use of the resources of that land for the overthrow of the Jacobins. In reality he does not seem to have formulated that idea until after the definite resolve of the Convention, on January 31st, 1793, to treat Belgium as a conquered province. This touched him at one of his tenderest points; and the present writers regard it as creditable to him that he thenceforth sought the overthrow of a Government which annulled its earlier repudiation of conquest and legalized the methods of spoliation already used by its underlings in Belgium.

At that time Dumouriez must have deemed the subject far more important than the fate of Louis XVI. In truth it was. The whole cycle of war was to turn ultimately

on the question of the relation of France to neighbouring peoples, and to Dumouriez belongs the credit of raising this question in an incisive manner. It was of little account to Frenchmen in the early part of 1793; and therefore Dumouriez outwardly subordinated it to the restoration of constitutional monarchy.

Here, of course, the chief difficulty lay in the Regency. In view of the unpopularity of the Comte de Provence (the future Louis XVIII), Dumouriez left that question vague. Those of his enemies who have not circulated the Orleans myth, have asserted that he meant to be at the head of affairs. Unquestionably self-interest entered into his calculations; but he must have known that the uncle of the little Louis XVII was the only possible regent. He sought, however, to prevent the return of outworn abuses by insisting on the restoration of the constitution of 1791, which reduced the monarch almost to the position of a figure-head. His views on this subject are quite consistent, if we except those of the winter of 1792–3, when for a time he recognized the Republic. At all other periods he was a constitutional royalist. He sought earnestly to persuade Louis XVI honestly to work the institutions of 1791; and in 1814–15 he still believed in their efficacy to heal all the wounds of France.

For this man loved his country with all the intensity of his southern nature. In his "treason" of 1793 he believed that he was furthering her highest welfare. Probably his success would have redounded to the best interests of France. Who will dare to assert that the restoration of constitutional monarchy in the spring of 1793, with its sequel of peace with the Allies and the readjustment of

the claims of royalty and democracy—the past and the present—was not an alternative far preferable to that desperate struggle of the Jacobins against coalesced Europe which was destined to shatter the old order of things and to found in France a militant form of government ending naturally in the Napoleonic Empire?

The time of heroics about the French Revolution is past. The rhapsodist, Michelet, has given place to the analyst, Taine; and the microscopic inquisition of the philosopher has revealed the infinitude of follies and cruelties that marred the great movement after the first salutary and irreversible reforms had taken effect. Such must have been the impression produced on bystanders as they gazed at the bewildering phantasmagoria of events. Are we to blame Dumouriez, an old servant of the monarchy, for seeking to expel by force a form of democratic tyranny founded on force?

However much we may censure his methods, we must admit the reasonableness of his aims. In their essential features they were those of Mirabeau. The two men have much in common. Of Provençal stock, belonging to the patrician order, and yet rebels against its abuses and absurdities, they entered on life with instincts and convictions that were closely akin. Such also were their careers. They served their country both in the army and in the diplomatic service. Curiously enough both were bearing arms in Corsica in the year when Napoleon was born (1769). Thereafter each of them transferred his versatile gifts to the secret diplomatic service, and saw much of the seamy side of life at the European capitals. For a short space in the early days of the French Revolution they collaborated as pamphleteers; but, despite the simi-

larity of their arms, the warmth of their tempers, and perhaps the overbearing ways of Mirabeau, prevented any close union. Students of the career of Mirabeau may, however, surmise that, had he lived on to see the supremacy of the Jacobins, his attitude to them would have resembled that of Dumouriez. As is now well known, the "tribune of the people" worked might and main to bring about a reaction in favour of constitutional royalty and prepared for a civil war. In that case, Dumouriez might have been his right hand in the campaign. Readers of the correspondence of Mirabeau with Count de la Marck will see that he was potentially guilty of the crime of treason, for which the memory of Dumouriez is pursued with so rancorous a hatred.[1]

In character, as in their aims, Mirabeau and Dumouriez had much in common. Theirs were the excellences and defects of the patrician order—its gaiety, wit, *bonhomie*, and bravery, along with its vanity, vice, and extravagance. That Dumouriez, despite these defects, inspired genuine affection is abundantly evident; witness the tearful grief of young Macdonald in parting from him at the time of the treason, and his subsequent declaration that the ruin of his chief was due to the cowards and the harpies who had ruined the campaign in the Netherlands.[2] Had all the friends of the general showed equal courage in his defence, his name would not have become a butt for every dabbler in history.

Whatever may be said against his conduct in 1793 (and

[1] In the plans drawn up for the King and La Marck by Mirabeau, civil war is often stated to be the only thorough solution.—"Why should we fear civil war? Civil war will be the means of saving the King, who will be lost without hope if he continues in Paris."—*Corresp. avec La Marck*, i, p. 141.

[2] *Recollections of Marshal Macdonald*, pp. 19–21.

it is by that alone that he is generally judged), few will deny to him the qualities of statesmanlike foresight, of generous sympathy with the oppressed (especially the Spaniards of South America and the negroes of Africa) which have been set forth in these pages. Despite the scorn ever expressed for him by his countrymen, and the frequent neglect of his advice by the officials at Whitehall, he continued to pour forth suggestions for the defence of the Island Power that had adopted him, and for the settlement of French affairs when the long-wished-for Restoration came about in 1814. While identifying himself with the fortunes of England, as the champion of the cause of ordered freedom and national independence, he could never sunder the ties that bound him to France; and he risked the displeasure of Wellington by urging him with uncourtier-like frankness to repair the wrong he had done to Frenchmen by helping to office that disreputable trimmer, Fouché. The correspondence between Wellington and Dumouriez ceased soon afterwards; and few letters are more pathetic and dignified than that in which the old soldier bowed himself out of the presence of the Iron Duke. Old age had brought to the exile one of its choicest gifts, cheery resignation.

It is, however, on Dumouriez' Plan of Defence of England that most attention has been bestowed in this volume. It may be objected that it was unpatriotic of him to devote his energies to such a subject. The criticism is not without force; but it may be replied that he foresaw ruin for France and ceaseless turmoil for Europe from the restless ambition of Napoleon, and salvation for both only in the restoration of constitutional monarchy in the person of Louis XVIII. There is a ring of sincerity in his letter

(quoted in the Preface)—"I am convinced that Great Britain is the only country that can save mine."

As to the ability evinced in the Plan of Defence there can be no doubt. Had limits of space admitted the publication in full of the plans drawn up by Sir David Dundas and the Duke of York, the reader would have seen the marked superiority of that of the French general. In a sense it was too thorough. The vivacious energy of the man led him to devise defences for Ireland and all parts of the English coast, which would have defied the invaders, but reduced the defenders to bankruptcy. All who know John Bull's habit of doing nothing until the emergency is upon him, will smile at Dumouriez' idea of making transverse cuts all along the cliffs from Newhaven to Brighton so as to sweep that coast with fire at all points. It is also a proof of his singular hopefulness that he believed the regulars in Essex, when backed up by the levies of neighbouring shires, to be capable of cooping up and annihilating the invading forces somewhere between Colchester, Chelmsford, and the coast.

Invincible hopefulness is, however, the mark of every great nature; for, as Goethe remarked—"If a man is to accomplish all that is demanded of him, he must deem himself greater than he is." If Dumouriez sometimes carried his schemes to excess, he erred in company with those other vivacious sons of the South, Mirabeau and Napoleon. He failed to achieve the portentous feats carried out by the latter—firstly, because he leaped to the front just three years too soon; for, in 1793, democratic enthusiasm had not fully worn itself out, as was the case at the time of the début of Bonaparte; and, secondly, because he lacked the power of concentrated effort which made the Corsican so

terrible on the battlefield and in the Cabinet. Dumouriez' plans bear the imprint of his forceful intelligence and large-hearted humanity; but they were not always rooted in fact. He played the part of Hercules, sometimes with success. Napoleon, up to the year 1807, was always Antæus.

After that time the schemes of the Emperor became so wild as to earn the contempt of the old exile. From his home in Ealing he looked on with a sure prognostication of the doom that awaited such madness as the Russian campaign, and the rejection of the offers of the Allies in 1813 and 1814. Not seldom Dumouriez' remarks on Napoleon are marred by personal rancour. Jealousy prevented him from discerning his greatness. But his hatred sprang not from jealousy alone. He early saw that the over-weening egotism of the First Consul would be fatal to the parliamentary institutions under which Frenchmen could gain balanced prosperity and self-control. Still more did he discern in the ambition of the Emperor a baleful force certain to rouse against France the united energies of peoples who ought to be her friends. Dumouriez never forgot his scheme of girdling France with federated and allied Republics. His letters of the year 1814 show that he strove to point out to the statesmen of Europe methods whereby the German people could win their way towards a national existence. We may smile at the vanity of the old man in seeking to go on a mission to the Allied Sovereigns; but the acceptance of his views in France and Central Europe would have told greatly in favour of peace and the welfare of all the nations concerned.

It is time, therefore, that the popular conception of Dumouriez, as the Judas of the French Revolution, should

be replaced by one which recognizes his claim to the rank of an enlightened patriot and a suggestive thinker. Assuredly he was a man strenuous in action, inspiring in the Council Chamber, endowed with a forceful and sympathetic personality that could turn the tide of battle and mould the fortunes of nations. If he erred and failed, it was from impetuosity and presumption. To depict him as some sleek, designing Jacob, ever intent on his own advancement, even at the cost of the betrayal of his kin, is ludicrously to distort his character. Rather does his restless, brusque, diffuse and impulsive nature stamp him as an Esau. This it was which turned all parties against him in the months March–June, 1792, and left him an impecunious outcast in April, 1793. The born intriguer and traitor seeks to ingratiate himself with all the factions, and ever to keep open a golden bridge of retreat.

Such were not the ways of Dumouriez. By the month of March, 1793, he had come to believe in the restoration of constitutional royalty as the only cure for the ills of France. At fifty-four years of age he failed to discern the potency of the then nascent idea of nationality apart from monarchy. With his usual excess of hopefulness, he set about the task hastily and awkwardly. He rushed into the fatal device of calling in the Austrians, and thenceforth he deserved to fail. Nevertheless, he does not merit the wholesale vituperation afterwards showered upon him by all parties and all writers. The authors of this volume have therefore endeavoured to set forth dispassionately the story of his remarkable life. They have not withheld censure where censure seemed due. But they have deemed it an act of tardy justice to portray his services to his country and to England in all their

magnitude and versatility; they have also sought carefully to analyse the motives which actuated him at the crisis of his career; and, finally, they have called attention to the generosity and wisdom of his aims alike for France and for Humanity at large.

APPENDIX I

LETTER OF DUMOURIEZ TO PITT[1]

GUNNERSBURY LODGE, NEAR ACTON, MIDDLESEX,
le 1 *Juin*, 1804.

MONSIEUR,

Je crois vous devoir compte de ce que j'ay fait depuis mon appel icy. Je m'étais d'abord renfermé dans la partie militaire; mais à la suite de deux conférences avec Mr. Adington [*sic*], j'ay donné une note politique à son invitation; je crois devoir la soumettre à vos lumières supérieures, trop heureux s'il s'y trouve quelque chose qui rentre dans vos vues, comme je l'espère d'après vos discours en Parlement.

Les circonstances n'ont point changé en bien depuis le 14 Oct^bre^ 1803; au contraire, le mal est augmenté, le danger s'est aggravé d'après la catastrophe du Duc d'Enghien, de Pichegru, de Moreau, &c., & par l'exaltation de Buonaparte au titre Impérial, qui en a été le résultat. Cet evénement monstrueux est la pierre de touche du salut ou de la perte de l'Europe. J'espère que la juste confiance des Puissances du Continent dans votre caractère & dans votre administration réveillera le courage des Souverains, & que vous deviendrez dès cette

[1] In Chatham MSS. No. 131. The note referred to in this letter has not been found.

année le moteur de la juste & nécessaire insurrection de l'Europe contre son oppresseur.

Je vous prie de vous faire représenter le *Mémoire sur les affaires du Nord* que j'ay envoyé le 8 Décembre à Mr. Adington, toujours d'après son invitation. Il doit se trouver dans l'office de Lord Harrowby. Il dévelope les moyens indiqués dans la note que vous avez sous les yeux.

Je ne cherche point à m'immiscer dans les affaires, lorsqu'elles sont entre les mains d'un ministre aussi célèbre; mais je serais au comble de mes vœux s'il trouvait à m'employer pour un Empire que je regarde à présent comme ma patrie, & pour sa propre gloire.

Je suis avec respect,
Monsieur,
De votre Excellence
Le très humble & très
Obéissant Serviteur,
le Gnal. DUMOURIEZ.

[*Translation*]

GUNNERSBURY LODGE, NEAR ACTON, MIDDLESEX.
June 1, 1804.

SIR,

I feel myself bound to render account of what I have done since I was called here. I confined myself at first to military matters, but after two discussions with Mr. Adington [*sic*], I introduced a political note on his suggestion; I think it necessary to submit it to your superior wisdom, too happy if there is anything there which coincides with your views, as I hope it may, from your speeches in Parliament.

Circumstances have not improved since October 14, 1803; on the contrary the evil has increased, the danger is aggravated since the catastrophe of the Duc d'Enghien, Pichegru, Moreau, etc., and by the elevation of Buonaparte to the Imperial dignity which was the outcome. This monstrous event is the touchstone of the safety or the ruin of Europe. I hope that the just confidence which the Continental Powers place in your character and administration will reawaken the courage of the Sovereigns, and that you will become from this time forth the motive power of the just and necessary insurrection of Europe against her oppressor.

I beg that you will have brought before you the memorandum on the affairs of the north, which I sent on December 8 last to Mr. Adington, again at his invitation. It should be found in the office of Lord Harrowby. It develops further the means indicated in the note which you have now before you.

I do not desire in the least to thrust myself into matters which are in the hands of so celebrated a minister; but I should be at the height of my ambition if he could employ me in the service of an Empire which I now regard as my country, and for its own glory.

I am with respect, Sir,
Your Excellency's very humble
And very obedient Servant,
GENERAL DUMOURIEZ.

APPENDIX II

BIBLIOGRAPHY

[N.B.—It is not claimed that this bibliography is exhaustive. The lack of an adequate catalogue at the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris has prevented the authors making it as complete as they desired.]

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These consist mainly of memoranda and similar writings contained in the Archives de Guerre and the Archives des Affaires Étrangères at Paris, or in the Archives of the War Office and Foreign Office at the Public Record Office, London. As was stated in chapters XV and XVI of this work, many of Dumouriez' letters, including important memoranda on state affairs, are in the Archives of Apsley House and in the Vansittart MSS. in the MS. Department of the British Museum, Vols. 31,230, 31,231; also a few in the Auckland MSS., Vol. 34,447.

The great Plan of Defence of England, completed in May, 1804, along with the subsequent memoranda on Ireland and Portugal, is in Mr. Broadley's collection of MSS.; and all the important parts of it are now published for the first time. Mr. Broadley has also twelve hitherto unpublished letters of Dumouriez. Some of Dumouriez' letters are preserved at his native town of Cambrai. A collection of books, pamphlets, and a few unpublished

letters has been formed by M. Paul de Lannoy, of Cambrai, who has kindly supplied the authors with a list of them.

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[N.B.—The decrees, proclamations, and unimportant anonymous letters and pamphlets relating to Dumouriez are too numerous to be inserted here.]

APPENDIX III

ICONOGRAPHY OF DUMOURIEZ

1. *C. F. Dumouriez.* 8vo. Full bust, in oval, directed to left. Mezzotint. "*Paris chez Basset, Rue St. Jacques.*"
2. *Mr. Dumouriez, Général-Commandant en chef de l'armée du Nord.* Circular mezzotint. 12mo. Under, "*Vivre libre ou mourir, son cachet est celui d'un bon citoyen.*" Bust to left.
3. *C. F. Dumouriez, General-Commandant.* 12mo. Circular mezzotint. Bust to right. "*Paris chez Villeneuve.*"
4. *C. F. Dumouriez, Commandant-General.* 12mo. Circular mezzotint. Bust to right. Similar to preceding.
5. *M. Dumouriez.* 4to. Full bust, in oval, to left. *Jones fecit. Engraved for C. Lowndes and T. Parsons, No.* 21 *Paternoster Row. 28th June,* 1794.
6. *M. Dumouriez, General.* 4to. Full bust to left. Aquatint. *A Paris chez Le Vachez sous les Colonnades du Palais Royal, No.* 258.
7. *Il General Dumourier.* Half-length, to left, fortress in background. *A. Zaballi fc. in Napoli presso Talani e Jevasi el Gigante, No.* 3, 7. 8vo.
8. *Dumouriez.* 8vo. Full bust, in oval, to left. Stipple engraving. No engraver's name.

9. *General Dumouriez.* 12mo. Full bust, in oval, to left. *Bollinger fc. Berlin,* 1796.

10. *Ch. Fr. Dumourier.* 8vo. Full bust, to left, in oval. *Paris chez Basset, Rue St. Jacques, au coin de celle des Mathurins. Victor Bougy sc.*

11. *General Dumouriez.* 8vo. Full bust, in oval, to left. *N. Ligbert sc.*

12. *Du Mourier.* 8vo. Full bust to left. German stipple engraving No engraver's name.

13. *Dumourier.* 12mo. Similar engraving to preceding. German stipple engraving. No engraver's name.

14. *Dumouriez Fr. General.* 12mo. Half-length, in circular medallion. German portrait. No engraver's name.

15. *Dumouriez, Gén. en chef des Armées Françaises.* 8vo. Full bust to left. French outline engraving.

16. *Dumourier.* Very small colour engraving. Half-length to left. Dumouriez wears a Phrygian cap.

17. *Dumouriez.* 8vo. Full bust to right. T. B. Louvion sculp.

18. *C. F. Dumouriez Né à Cambray le 26 Janvier,* 1739. 8vo. Full bust, in oval, to right. No engraver's name. French portrait.

19. *C. F. Dumouriez.* 8vo. Full bust to right. D'après nature par F. Bonneville, Paris, Rue St. Jacques, No. 195.

20. *Charles François Dumouriez.* 8vo. Full bust, to right, in oval. Gravé par E. Bovinet.

21. *Ch. F. Dumourier.* 8vo. Full bust, in oval, to right. T. P. Schweyer sc.

22. *C. F. Dumouriez.* 12mo. Bust to right. Mark sc.

24. *Dumouriez, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.* Folio. Circular medallion. Below Arrest of the French Deputies. Engraved by Levachez (the head), and Duplessis Bertaux (the scene).

25. *C. F. Dumourier.* 8vo. Full bust to right. Medallion frame. Moreau del. Voyez sc. A Paris Rue de Rohan No. 17.

26. *Der franzosische Heerführer Dumourier.* 8vo. Bust to right. Eng. by Kolman.

27. *Du Mourier.* 8vo. Bust to right. Oval frame. De Pestre Pinx. T. de Roode, sculp. a Rottm. A Loosges and P. Excud. 1792.

28. *Dumouriez.* 8vo. Bust to right. Outline. Me. Soyer sc.

29. *Dumouriez.* 8vo. Three-quarter length in octagon. Raffet del. Robinson sc. Paris, published by Furne.

30. *Dumouriez.* 8vo. Bust to right. Lithographie b. d. Exp. Un. Z.

31. *Dumourier.* Bürger von Frankreich u. General. 8vo. Half-length, facing. Under a Battle. Aquatint. A. Watteau pinx et fec. 1793

32. *Dumouriez.* 12mo. Bust, in oval, to right. Gest von. P. W. Schwarz, Ng. 1793.

33. *Le Gal Dumouriez.* 8vo. Bust on pedestal. M. Dien sculp.

34. *Dumouriez.* 8vo. Bust to left. J. Forestier sculp.

35. *Dumouriez.* 8vo. Bust to left. Boulenaz sculp.

36. *Dumouriez.* 8vo. Bust to left. Lithographie de Delpech.

37. *Charles François Dumouriez.* 4to. Half-length, oval, slightly directed to right. A Paris chez Alix, Graveur, Rue Christine, No. 2. F. S. G. Printed in colours.

38. *Dumouriez.* 8vo. Bust facing slightly to right. Outline. Revel sc.

39. *Dumourier.* Folio. Bust slightly to right. Hesse, 1823. J. lith. de Delpech.

40. *Dumouriez and Baptiste, his Valet de Chambre.* Circular medallion. Drawn from nature by Quenedey. Aquatint. 8vo.

41. *Dumouriez-Custine.* 12mo. Small medallion. Portraits on a column.

42. *Dumouriez.* 4to. Whole length, to left. Wood-cut by Allouis.

43. *Dumouriez.* 4to. Bust to left. Wood-cut by Yan D'Argent.

44. *Dumourier.* 8vo. Bust in oval, facing. Vérité del. G Zatta sc.

45. *Dumouriez.* Guerraro, Democratico, e sublime. 4to. Oval frame. Vérité del. G Zatta sc.

46. *Dumouriez.* 4to. Bust to right. Drawn from nature by Craff.

47. *Dumouriez with Robespierre* and other Revolutionary characters. Half-length to left. French lithograph.

48. *Dumouriez,* Charles François. 4to. Whole length. Painted by Rovillard. Diagraphe Gavard.

49. *Dumouriez.* 8vo. Whole length. Lacauchie del. E. Leguay sc.

50. *Mr. Dumourier.* 8vo. Bust to right. Venezia presso Antonio G. Zatta.

51. *Dumouriez.* 12mo. Circular aquatint by Quenedey. P 2.

52. *Dumouriez.* 4to. Whole length. Sasso inc.

53. *Dumouriez.* 12mo. Circular portrait. Sardi sc. Venezia.

54. *Dumouriez.* 8vo. Engraved by Bendorp, 1792.

55. *Dumouriez.* 4to. Whole length. Savoine sc.

56. *M. Dumourier.* Folio. Bust, in oval, to right. A Paris chez Sr Gamble aux Boulvarts. Mezzotint (by Hodges?).

57. *General Dumourier gezeichnet in Frankfurt von G. Kampf, bey seiner Durchreise.* Folio. Coloured engraving.

58. Dumouriez arresting Beurnonville with the four deputies, Camus, Bancal, Quinette, and Lamarque. Engraved by James Prand, after Barbier. Folio.

59. Arrest of the French Deputies by Dumouriez in the year 1793. Engraved by Vinkeles. Oblong Folio.

60. "A Souvenir of Belgium." Mezzotint caricature in which Dumouriez is represented as marching over corpses, sword in hand. Folio. Paris chez Villeneuve.

61. "Specimen of the affair of Mons." Mezzotint caricature in which Dumouriez is represented, pursued by a Uhlan. 4to. Oblong.

62. *Frankreichs Philosophische Regierung von Mirabeau bis Robespierre.* German Caricature, in colours, representing Dumouriez, Mirabeau, Custine, and Robespierre, mounted on a lion, which drags along a guillotine.

63. English Caricature. "The Victor of Jemappes on his way to seal up the Prince of Orange's papers." Published March 13th, 1793, by Fores, 3 Piccadilly.

64. English Caricature. "Dumouriez dining in state at St. James's." Published by Humphreys, 27 St. James's Street, March 30th, 1793.

65. English Caricature. "A dose for Dumouriez. The evacuation of Holland and Brabant." Published both plain and in colours, 1793.

NOTE.—Dumouriez also appears in various engraved views of the battle of Jemappes and other incidents of the campaign of 1792–3.

DUMOURIEZ MEDAL

A medal or badge was struck in honour of Dumouriez at the end of 1792 (December 31st).

It is thus described in the *Histoire Numismatique de la Révolution Française.*

C. F. DUMOURIER. Bust of the general, wearing cocked hat, three-quarter face to left. Without reverse. Laurel leaf at top forming loop.



APPENDIX IV

CHRONOLOGY

Born	January 26, 1739
At College	1749–52
Studying for diplomacy	1753–7
Joins Army of Prince de Soubise	February 8, 1757
Enlists in D'Escar's Dragoons	1758
Battle of Kloster Kampen	October 15, 1760
Made Captain	January, 1761
Returns to France	1763
Visits to Italy and Corsica	1763
„ Spain and Portugal	1764–7
Campaign in Corsica	1768–9
In Paris	1769–70
Visits Poland	1770–2
Supernumerary in Paris	1772
In Hamburg	June, 1773
Arrested and in Bastille	October, 1773–May, 1774
Marriage	September 13, 1774
(Separated from wife, 1788)	
In Normandy	1776–7
Commandant of Cherbourg	1778–89
In Paris	1790–1
In Command, Army of the Loire	June, 1791–February, 1792

Minister of Foreign Affairs	March 15, 1792–June 12, 1792
Minister of War	June 13–17, 1792
Joins Army of the North	July, 1792
Battle of Valmy	September 20, 1792
Battle of Jemappes	November 6, 1792
Battle of Neerwinden	March 18, 1793
Negotiates with Austrians	March 25, 1793
Alliance with Coburg	March 30, 1793
In London	June 12, 1793
Expelled from England	June 22, 1793
At Oltensen	1795–1803
Recalled to London	October, 1803
Draws up Scheme of Defence	1803–4
At Gunnersbury Lodge	1804–12
At Rochester House	1812–22
At Turville Park	March, 1822–March, 1823
Death	March 14, 1823

INDEX

INDEX

Abatis, 295
Abbess de Fevracques, 5, 32
Abbotsbury, 339, 340
Abercrombie, Sir R., 228
Aberdeenshire, 363
Aberdovey, 352
Abergelly, 352
Addington, Mr., 211, 226
Adour (r.), 305
Africa, Dumouriez on, 419
d'Aiguillon Duc, 27, 29, 32
Aix-la-Chapelle, 153, 159, 161
Albrighton, 267
Aldborough, 300 n., 301
Alde (r.), 298
"All the Talents" Ministry, 383
Alton, 217
Altona, 199
Altrincham, 355
Amsterdam, Bank of, 151
Andover, Lady, 302 n.
Anglesea, 351–3
d'Angoulême, Duchesse, 180
Appledore, 218, 288 *et seq.*
Apsley House, 401
Arbuthnot, Adm., 319
Argonne, Passes of, 119
Argyle, 365
Army, British, Dumouriez on, 255
d'Artois, Comte, 97, 381, 423
Arun (r.), 305
Arundel, 305 *et seq.*
Ashford, 217, 221, 233, 280 *et seq.*, 375
Assignats, 251, 252
Athlone, 230–1
Auckland, Lord, 159, 160, 198
Auerstadt, battle of, 386
Austerlitz, battle of, 383, 385
Austria, 33, 77, 80–144, 153, 382
Ayrshire, 361

Ballebat, Canon, 4 and n.
Banffshire, 363
Bangor, 352
Bantry Bay, 229–31
Barbaroux, 110
Barère, 153
Bassano, Duc de. *See* Maret.
Bastille, Dumouriez in, 34
Batteries, shore, 249
Beachy Head, 216, 234, 272, 374
Beaminster, 339
Beaumaris, 353
Bedford, 269
Belgium, 134, 140, 142–3, 148, 150 *et seq.*, 155, 175
Belloc, Hilaire, on Dumouriez, 131
Belloy, Marquise de, 9
Berehaven, 231
Bere Regis, 339
Beresford, Gen., 402
Berkshire, 270
Bernadotte, 412, 415, 416
Bernonville, 127, 136–8, 156, 180
Berri, Duc de, 213
Berwick, 254, 358
Bessières, Gen., 398
Bexhill, 218, 310 *et seq.*
Bilwerde, 203
Biron, 99, 100
Blacas, M. de, 427, 461 and n.
Blackheath, 290
Blackwater (r.), 275 *et seq.*
Blake, Gen., 406 and n.
Blandford, 339
Bloomsbury, 227
Blücher, Gen., 415 n., 421, 422, 440
Blythe (r.), 298
Bodmin, 344
Bohemia, 32
Boothby, Sir B., 211
Boulogne, 37, 243, 245, 327–9
Bourbon, Duc de, 213
Bovey Tracey, 341
Bowring, Sir J., 467
Braintree, 235
Brampton, 357

Brent, 341
Brenton, Capt. Jahleel, 330 n.
Brentwood, 235, 302 n.
Brest, 331
Brest Fleet, 211, 245, 368
Breteuil, Baron de, 459
Bridport, 339
Brighton, 247, 305 *et seq.*, 375
Brissot, 67, 83, 110, 147, 187
Bristol, 227, 269, 349
Broadley Collection, 45, 46, 75, 189, 273, 330
Broadstairs, 219, 398
Broadway, 339
Broglie, Duc de, 7, 25, 290
Broissy, Mlle. de, 9, 17, 26, 35, 36, 41
Brunswick, Duke of, 8, 111, 113, 116, 120, 123, 129
Brussels, 143, 175
Buckinghamshire, 270
Bungay, 298
Buonaparte, Joseph, 398, 408
Buonaparte, Lucien, 482
Buonaparte, Napoleon, 24, 30, 59, 98, 134, 148, 155, 174, 211, 229, 215, 245, 257 n., 260, 366, 377, 380, 382, 386, 388, 394–5, 403, 412, 414, 417, 421–3, 425, 436, 438, 440, 443, 459, 482, 488–9
Burke, 188
Burns, R., 478

Caen, 35
Caen, Bay of, 329
Caister, 300
Caithness, 365
Calais, 327
Calder, Sir R., 366, 377
Calvert, Sir H., 216
Cambrai, 1, 4
Cambridge, 268
Camden, Lord, 94, 382
Camelford, 348
Camps, 252
Camus, 152, 169, 180
Canning, G., 458, 470
Canterbury, 217, 221, 226, 280 *et seq.*, 374
Canvey Is., 279 *et seq.*
Cardigan Bay, 351
Carlisle, 357
Carmarthen, 351
Carnarvon, 352
Carnot, 98
Castlebar, 231
Castlereagh, Lord, 228, 384, 393–4, 398, 432
Catherine Hill, 339
Catherstone, 339
Cawsand Bay, 343
Cellini, Benvenuto, 38
Chaldon Hill, 339
Channel crossing, 244
Channel Fleet, 331, 333
Channel Islands, 319
Charmouth, 340
Chartres, Duc de, 137, 172, 176, 193
Chasse-marées, 51
Châteauneuf, M., 30
Chatham, 235
Chaunet, 150
Chauvelin, Marquis de, 20, 21, 89, 94, 157
Chazot, 123
Chelmer (r.), 277
Chelmsford, 221, 234–5, 302 n., 372
Cherbourg, 38, 39–69, 320–4, 330
Cheshire, 353–5
Chester, 354
Chester Canal, 267, 354
Chichester, 305 *et seq.*
Chislehurst, 217
Choiseul, Duc de, 13, 15, 20, 25, 28, 29
Christchurch, 359
Chulmleigh, 344
Clackmannan, 363
Clacton, 302 n.
Clausel, 442
Clavière, 79, 85, 104
Cley, 303
Clovelly, 344
Clyde, 246, 361
Coast defence, 216, 234, 238, 249–52
Coburg, Prince of, 165, 171–6, 182–3, 192, 199
Coke of Holkham, 302 n.
Colchester, 235, 273 *et seq.*, 302 n.
Collingwood, Admiral Lord, 228
Colne (r.), 275 *et seq.*
Condé, 181
Condé, Prince de, 213
Condorcet, 187
Constable, A., 457
Cooke, Mr., 381
Copenhagen, battle of, 207
Cordelier Club, 107
Corfe Castle, 339

Cork, 231, 255
Cork Harbour, 229
Cornwall, 269, 337, 344–9
Cornwallis, Lord, 228, 234
Corsica, 12–16, 20–5
Coxheath, 217, 289 *et seq.*
Craig, Sir J., 235
Criccieth, 352
Cromer, 302
Crouch (r.), 225 *et seq.*
Cuckfield, 313, 315
Cumberland, 357
— Duke of, 222, 266
Custine, 140, 142, 146, 150

Dampier, Gen., 181
Danish Navy, 387
Danton, 67, 107, 110, 131, 150–2, 155, 159 n., 164, 168–9, 175
Dartford, 217
Dartmoor, 341
Davout, 182, 442
Deal, 219, 234, 285
Debenham, 298
Dee (r.), 246, 248
Defence Act (1798), 225
Defence, Naval, 241
Defence, schemes of, 61, 215 *et seq.*, 227–9, 232
Defence schemes of Dumouriez, 240–377
Defence, men needed for, 233
Degrave, 85, 100
Delacroix, 151, 159 n., 169, 175
Delessart, 77, 79
Derbyshire, 267
Derwent, 271
Devil's Dyke, 316
Devonshire, 269, 337, 341–3
Dieppe, 329
Dillon, A., 114–18, 122
Dillon, T., 99, 100
Diplomacy Memoir, 71
Diplomatic Committee, 91
Don, Maj.-Gen., 61
Dorchester, 339
Dorking, 219, 314–17
Dorset, 269, 337–41
Dover, 217, 219, 235, 254, 285, 374
Downs, Roadstead, 234
Downs, the (hills), 316–17
Dresden, 32, 413
"Driving" country, 224
Dublin, 230–1
Dulwich, 217
Dumbarton, 363
Dumfries-shire, 362
Dumouriez, Commissary, 6, 8, 12, 24
Dumouriez, A. F., 2
Dumouriez, Mme. *See* Broissy, Mlle. de
Dumouriez, Mlle. *See* Abbess de Fevracques
Dumouriez, C., F. Gen., birthplace, 3; infancy, 5; at Maubeuge, 7; at Bremen, 7; visits Italy, 12; Corsica, 13; in Rheims, 16; in Spain and Portugal, 16–19; in Corsica, 20; at Meudon, 26; in Poland, 28–31; arrested in Hamburg, 34; released and goes to Caen, 35; marriage, 36; Commandant of Cherbourg, 39–69; in Austria, 70; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 75; Ministry of War, 104; last interview with Louis XVI, 106; joins Lückner, 109; commands Army of the North, 113; campaign in Champagne, 115; battle of Valmy, 128–30; battle of Jemappes, 135–8; in Brussels, 143; in Paris, 153; denounces Pache, 156; plans for invading Holland, 161; campaign in Holland, 163–7; battle of Neerwinden, 170–5; interview with Col. Mack, 176–8; interview with Jacobins, 179; joins Coburg, 182; at Mons, 189; interview with Fersen, 192; expelled from Mergentheim, 195; in London, 197; leaves again, 199; at Bilwerde, 203; journey to Russia, 204; meets Nelson, 206; returns to London, 213; his schemes of defence, 240–377; relations with British Government, 381; on the Continent, 383; correspondence with Wellington, 402–13; with Vansittart, 413–29; quarrel with Louis XVIII, 425–9; correspondence with Wellington, 433–50; life in England, 451–66; death, 466–70; Dumouriez and his critics, 471–91
Dunbar, 236
Dundas, Sir D., 216, 227–8, 488
Dungeness, 220, 247, 374
Dunkirk, 326
Duranton, 103–4
Durham Co., 266, 271

Dutch Navy, 149, 369
Dutch Republic. *See* Holland

Eastbourne, 218, 307 *et seq.*
East Coast, defence of, 270–85, 371–3
East Grinstead, 219
Edenbridge, 218
Edinburgh, 232, 284, 360
Elba, 423–4
Ely, 298
Embarkation, plans for, 52
Enniskillen, 230–1
d'Enghien, Duc, 380
Eperies (Hungary), 27, 31
Erthal, Baron von, 197
Essex, Deputy Lieut. of, 226
Essex, Defence of, 219, 262, 270, 273–9, 302 n., 372
Evershot, 339
Exeter, 269, 342
Exmouth, 342
Expulsion of priests, 102

Falmouth, 346
Faversham, 224, 280 *et seq.*
Favier, J. L., 10, 15
Felixstowe, 299
Fersen, Count, 84, 94 n., 96, 189, 192
Feuillants, the, 107–8
Fife, 363
Firth of Clyde, 248
Fishguard, 227, 351
Flooding for protection, 218, 234, 237, 278, 303
Flotillas, 241–6, 324–37, 369
Flushing, 245, 326
Folkestone, 219, 234, 375
Fontaine, Abbé, 5
Forbin-Janson, Marquise de, 458–61, 464
Ford, Capt., 234
Fordingbridge, 339
Fort George, 255
Forth, defence of, 360
Fortifications, use of, 229, 233
Fouché, 443, 448 n., 487
Fowey, 346
Fox, C. J., 157, 195, 301
Francis II of Austria, 81
Frankfort, 32, 146
Frederick William II, 113, 120

Galway, 231
Ganteaume, Adm., 377
Gensommé, 107
Gentleman's Magazine, 212
George III, 93–4, 214, 220–1
George IV, 205, 426
Girondins, the, 67, 101–2, 105, 107, 132, 479
Glasgow, 361
Gloucestershire, 269, 350
Gneisenau, Gen., 440
Godstone, 219, 315 *et seq.*
Goethe, 123
Gorleston, 300, 371
Gower, Earl, 81, 85, 101
Grain, Isle of, 275 *et seq.*
Granville, 331
Granville-Penn, Mr., 381
Gravesend, 280 *et seq.*
Grenville, Lord, 94, 160, 197, 385, 390
Grey, Sir C., 226
Grimsby, 268, 371
Grouchy, 442
Guernsey, 319
Guildford, 217, 219, 306 *et seq.*
Gunnersbury Lodge, 381, 385, 452
Gunnersbury, House, 452 and n., 454
Gustavus Adolphus, 205

Haddington, 359
Hamburg, 34, 200, 203
Hampshire, 224, 270, 306 *et seq.*
d'Harcourt, Marshal, 45
Harfleur, 329
Hartland Point, 344
Hart, Isle of, 281
Harville, Gen., 135–6, 138, 161, 174
Harwich, 254, 274 and n.
Hasteimbech, battle of, 7
Hastings, 218, 234, 310, 375
Haulbowline, 230
Haverford West, 351
Havre, 324, 329
Hébert, 150
Henley Church, 466
Herefordshire, 267, 350
Hertfordshire, 270
Hindhead, 217
Hobart, Lord, 226, 232
Holland, 146, 175, 214
Holland, Dumouriez on, 200 *et seq.*
Hope, Col., 228, 234
Horse Guards, 228
Horsham, 219, 221, 233, 306 *et seq.*
Howick, Lord, 390, 393
Hull, 254, 268

Humber, 232, 235, 248, 266–7, 371–3
Hunstanton, 303
Huntingdon, 268
Hurstmonceux, 308 *et seq.*
Hutchinson, Lord, 393
Hythe, 218–19, 234, 288 *et seq.*, 375
Hythe Canal, 292

Invasion, Dumouriez on, 48–60; 366–378
Invasion, duration of, 258
Inverness, 363, 365
Ipswich, 269, 298
Ireby, 357
Ireland, importance of, 232, 245, 247 n.
Ireland, Plans for Defence, 230, 291
Ireland, army for, 232, 333–7, 370
Ireland, Hoche's Invasion, 229
Italy, Dumouriez on, 416

Jacobins, the, 105, 132, 145 *et seq.*, 478, 482
Jemappes, 135 *et seq.*, 171, 474
Jena, 386
Jersey, 319, 321–4
Jomini on Dumouriez, 131, 135, 139, 175
Junot, Gen., 395

Kaunitz, Prince, 78–81
Keith, Adm. Lord, 371
Keith, Sir R., 77
Kellerman, Gen., 122, 127, 129
Kendal, 356
Kenmare, 231
Kent, Duke of, 222, 457–8, 470
Kent, 217, 226, 233, 270, 279–85, 374
Keppel, Adm., 50
Keswick, 357
Kilkenny, 230
Killala, 231
Kilmaine, 137
Kincardineshire, 363
King's Lynn, 267
Kinross, 363
Kinsale, 231
Kirkcudbright, 362
Kloster Kampen, battle of, 8
Knight, Miss, 206
Knockholt Hill, 217

Labourdonnaie, 143, 151
Lacoste, 103–4
Lafayette, 67, 99, 100, 105, 111–12, 179
La Hogue roads, 329
Lampeter, 351
Lanark, 262
Lancashire, 266, 355–6
Landguard Fort, 274, 299, 300
Land's End, 346
Laporte, 103
Lauderdale, Lord, 390
Lauzan, Duc de. *See* Biron
Lebrun, 147, 149
Leicestershire, 267
Leicester, Earl of. *See* Coke
Leipsic, 32, 414
Leith, 236, 254
Leith Hill, 217
Leopold II of Austria, 77, 81
Lewes, 219, 316
Liége, 144–5, 148–9, 153, 161, 164, 166, 171
Lifton, 341
Lille, 181
Limerick, 230–1, 255
Lincolnshire, 267
Linlithgow, 361
Lisbon, 395
Liskeard, 345
Littlehampton, 218
Liverpool, 266, 349, 353–6
Lizard, 347
Llandeilo Fawr, 351
Llandudno, 352
Llangollen, 352
Lombard, Herr, 130
London, Defence of, 227, 236, 255, 270, 279, 290
Londonderry, 231
Lords-Lieutenant, powers of, 225
Lorraine Legion, 35
Looe, 346
Lough Neagh, 230
Lough Swilly, 230
Louis XV, 25, 33–4
Louis XVI, 39, 43, 70, 79, 84, 93, 102–6, 111, 153, 424, 474, 483
Louis XVII, 176, 179, 461, 484
Louis XVIII, 204, 422, 425 and n. 426–8, 434, 438, 441, 444, 447, 449, 459, 484
Louis Philippe, 392
Lowe, Sir H., 421
Lowestoft, 300 *et seq.*, 371
Lückner, Marshal, 100, 109, 118, 120, 122

Lulworth, 340
Luxembourg, Prince of, 323
Lyme, 338
Lynn, 254, 300

Macdonald, Marshal, 181, 410, 425
Mack, Colonel, 175–8, 182, 183 and n. 367, 480
Madrid, 395, 407
Maestricht, 149, 157, 164
Maidstone, 217, 296
Maldon, 273 *et seq.*, 372
Malling, 233, 289 *et seq.*
Man, Isle of, 354
Manchester, 353–6
Manningtree, 273 *et seq.*, 372
Marat, 67, 110, 132
Marbœuf, Count de, 14, 21
Maret, 95, 156, 157 n.
Margate, 219, 284
Market Drayton, 267
Marie Antoinette, Queen, 26, 66, 78, 81, 94, 96, 189
Marine regulations, 43
Marquet, Mlle., 18–19
Martello towers, 234 and n., 312 n.
Masséna, 442
Masson Company, the, 145
Maulde, M. de, 159, 198
Maupeou, Chancellor, 27, 29
Medway (r.), 217, 235, 280 *et seq.*
Menai Strait, 351
Merk, Gen., 381
Mersea Island, 275 *et seq.*, 373
Mersey (r.), 353–5
Metternich, Prince, 434, 436, 439, 443–4, 450
Meuse (r.), 59, 116, 270, 324
Mexico, 391
Miaczynski, 181
Middlesex, 270
Middlewich, 355
Midhurst, 219
Milford Haven, 351
Military districts, 266–70
Minerva, frigate, 330
Mirabeau, 67, 105, 471, 485–6
Miranda, Gen., 93 n., 121, 143, 147, 149, 156, 158–9, 161–4, 171–3, 389
Mniezeck, Countess, 28
Monmouth, 350
Mons, 189
Montgaillard, Comte de, 203
Montgomeryshire, 352
Montjoye, Col., 175–6
Moore, Sir J., 224, 228
Moorwinstow, 348
Morayshire, 363
Moreau, Gen., 412, 414
Morgan, Gen., 442, 449, 450
Mount's Bay, 246, 347
Mundesley, 302
Murat, 422, 432
Mutiny at Cherbourg, 69
Muy, M. de, 37

Naked Cross, 339
Nairn, 363
Narbonne, Count, 65, 75
Nassau, Prince of, 323
National Assembly, 79, 82–3, 86, 97–8, 102, 104, 110–11
National Convention, 111, 146, 153, 156, 161, 175–6, 181, 483
National Guard, 105, 436
"Natural boundaries," 99
Navy, British, 219, 241–6, 324–37, 368, 375
Navy, Dutch, 149
Necker, 105
Neerwinden, battle of, 170–5
Nellidov, Mlle., 205
Nelson, Adm. Lord, 206–12, 228, 245, 327, 451–3
Neuilly, Gen., 172, 181
Newhaven, 305 *et seq.*
Newport, 267
Noailles, M de, 85
Norfolk, 227, 235, 268, 298–304, 371
Northampton, 268
Northumberland, 262, 266, 271
Northwich, 355
Norwich, 269, 298 *et seq.*
Norwood, 217–18
Nottingham, 267

d'Oisy, Chev., 37
Okehampton, 341, 344
Olpha, 357
Oltensen, 207–8, 210, 212
Orford, 268–9, 371
Orleans, Duke of, 179, 187, 193, 391, 410–12, 420, 426, 445, 456, 462–4, 468, 474
Orwell (r.), 298
Ostend, 199
Ouse (Sussex r.), 305
Ouse (Yorks. r.), 271, 273

Ovingdean, 309
Oxfordshire, 270
Oxney Isle, 247, 288 *et seq.*, 306, 375
Pache, 133, 140, 142, 145, 147, 149, 156
Pagham, 305 *et seq.*
Paine, Thomas, 153
Paisley, 361
Paoli, Pasquale, 12, 22, 24 n.
Partridge sloop, 424
Paul, Emperor, 204
Paulett, Lord, 221
Peebles, 363
Pendleton, 356
Penzance, 347
Perthshire, 363
Pétion, Major, 110
Pevensey, 218, 234, 305, *et seq.*, 375
Piedmontese prisoners, 381
Pitt, Wm., 94, 146, 157, 198, 215, 221, 228, 383
Places of arms, 248 and n., 254
Plague, Dumouriez on, 381
Plymouth, 233, 235, 246, 254, 269, 270, 297, 338, 343
Poland, Army of, 28
Polish Confederation, 27, 31
Poole, 338, 341
Portland, 220, 333, 338, 340
Ports, defence of, 248
Portsmouth, 220, 233, 235, 246, 254, 305, 314, 338
Portugal, 16–18, 33, 335–6, 395–9
Prince Regent. *See* George IV
Prussia, 28, 33, 94, 146, 383, 393
Pwllheli, 352

Ramsgate, 219, 234, 284
Rapatel, 412, 421
Rapp, Gen., 442
Rathline, 231
Reigate, 217, 314 *et seq.*
Renfrew, 361
Revue des Deux Mondes, 86, 478
Richelieu, Duc de, 446
Ringwood, 339
Rivers, Lord, 221
Rivers as landing-places, 248
Roads, breaking up, 224, 226
Roadstead of St. Jean, 241, 327
Robespierre, 67, 107, 110
Rochambeau, 99, 100
Rochester, 280 *et seq.*
Rochester House, 454 and n., 455–6 and n.
Rochford, 273 *et seq.*, 372
Roland, M., 79, 84, 104
Roland, Mme., 76, 83, 101, 103, 132
Romney Marsh, 234, 247, 285 *et seq.*, 306, 375
Ronsin, 145
Rosenhayn, M. de, 433
Ross, 365
Rozière, M. de la, 37–8, 327, 397
Rottingdean, 309
Roxburgh, 363
Royal Exchange, 227
Rullecourt, M., 323
Russia, 33, 38, 67, 95, 204, 393–4
Ruthin, 352
Rye, 218–19, 234, 247, 285 *et seq.*, 375

St. Cyr, Gouvion, 110
St. Helena, 443
St. Heliers, 321–4
St. Ives, 347
St. Malo, 331
St. Marcouf Is., 330
St. Martin, Count de, 386, 404, 458, 460, 470
St. Michael's Mount, 346 *et seq.*
St. Ouen's Bay, 323
St. Paul's Cathedral, 227
St. Valery-en-Somme,
Salamanca, 403, 406
Saltash, 269–70
Sandown, 234
Sandwich, 217
Sansculotte Ministry, 79
Sardinia, King of, 97
Scheldt (r.), 59, 146, 270, 324
Scotland, 270 and n., 357–65
Sea Fencibles, 61, 252
Seaford, 218, 308
Seaweed, burning of, 43
Ségur, Count de, 32
Seine (r.), 329
Selkirk, 363
Selsea Bill, 234, 247, 314
Servan, M., 100–4, 118, 128, 133
Sevenoaks, 217, 233, 314 *et seq.*
Severn (r.), 248, 266
Shannon (r.), 230, 246, 248
Shee, Sir G., 385
Sheerness, 282 *et seq.*
Sheppey, Isle of, 254, 279 *et seq.*, 375
Sherbrook, Gen., 226
Shermanbury, 312 *et seq.*, 375

Shooter's Hill, 217
Shoreham, 219, 305 *et seq.*
Shorncliff, 219
Shropshire, 267
Sicily, 382
Sittingbourne, 382
Sligo, 231
Soissons, 104
Solebay, 268–9, 301
Solway, 246, 248
Somersetshire, 269
Soubise, Duc de, 35
Soult, Marshal, 406, 408, 412
South America, 389, 391–3, 399
South Coast Defence, 305–19, 374–6
South-East Coast Defence, 291–98
South-West Coast Defence, 337–49
Southwark, 228
Southwold. *See* Solebay
Spain, 16–18, 33, 395, 402 *et seq.*
Spalding, 231
Spencer, Lord, 393
Spike Island, 230
Spurn Head, 268
Staffordshire, 267
Start Point, 333
Stirling, 363
Stour (Essex r.), 248, 272, 274 *et seq.*
Stour (Kent r.), 217, 284
Studland Bay, 339
Suchet, 442
Sudbury, 235
Suffolk, 219, 268, 298–304
Surrey, 270, 314–17
Sussex, 219, 225, 233, 247, 270, 285 *et seq.*, 305–19, 374
Sutherland, 365
Swaffham, 298
Swale, 271
Swanage, 339
Sweden, 33, 388 n., 393
Switzerland, Dumouriez on, 430–2

Talleyrand, 88
Tamar, 341
Tarporley, 354
Taules, Chev. de, 26
Taunton, 341
Tavistock, 341
Tees (r.), 271
Teignmouth, 342
Temple, the, 111
Texel, 245, 270
Thames (r.), 236, 248, 272, 279–85, 371–3
Thanet, Isle of, 217, 283 *et seq.*
Thouvenot, 115, 137, 166, 176
Thumery, 380
Thurlow, Lord, 94
Tilbury, 279
Tilsit, Treaty of, 388 n., 394
Tiverton, 341, 344
Tobago, 92
Tonbridge, 289
Torbay, 246, 338
Torquay, 343
Tower of London, 227
Trafalgar, 383
Tralee, 231
Transport, 252
Troops in London, 227
Tregellas, W. H., 238
Trent (r.), 266, 272
Tunbridge, 218, 233, 280 *et seq.*, 380 *et seq.*
Turkey, 95
Turville Park, 466
Tweed, 271
Twiss, Colonel, 229, 234
Tyne (r.), 232, 271

Ulm, 367, 383
United States, 149

Valence, Gen., 143, 159, 161, 166, 171, 176
Valenciennes, 188
Valentia Is., 231, 255
Valmy, battle of, 128–30, 474
Vandamme, 442
Van der Noot, 150
Van der Spiegel, 158–60
Vansittart, Nicholas, 386 n., 390, 412–29, 432, 458, 470
Vaux, Count de, 23, 55–7
Venloo, 157, 164
Vergniaud, 83, 132
Villaret, Adm., 211
Villeneuve, Adm., 366, 377
Viomesnil, Baron de, 31 and n., 427
Volunteers, 213, 225, 227, 302 n.
Volunteers in France, 110, 174, 182, 183

Walcheren, 325, 333, 336
Wales, 267, 350–3
Wallace, Lady, 144
Walmer, 219, 234, 285
Walpole, Horace, 188
Wareham, 339

War Office, 216, 224, 226, 234–5 and n., 381, 382 n., 383 n., 392, 400
Warrington, 355
Warwickshire, 267
Wash, the, 248, 267, 273 *et seq.*
Waterloo, battle of, 430–50
Wear (r.), 271
Welland (r.), 273
Wellesley, Marquis, 410, 412
Wellington, Duke of, 397, 402–13, 417, 433–50
West Coast Defence, 350–57
Westermann, 159
Westmorland, 266, 356
Weymouth, 220–1, 338
Whitehaven, 357
Whitelocke, Gen., 389 n.
Wight, Isle of, Invasion, 47–60
Wight, Isle of, Defence, 61–5, 220, 317, 400–1
Wiltshire, 269
Wimborne Minster, 339
Winchelsea, 292, 310
Winchester, 216
Windham, Wm., 302 n., 383, 390
Windsor, 315
Winter, Adm. de, 372
Worcestershire, 267
Worthing, 308

Yare (r.), 298–9
Yarmouth, 254, 268–9, 301 *et seq.*, 371
York, Duke of, 220, 222, 226, 426–7, 458, 470
York, Duke of, Defence Scheme, 232, 236, 240 and n., 255 n., 488
Yorkshire, 235, 266, 271

Zaremba, Gen., 28

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